NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA

SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

COURSE CODE: PCR 811

COURSE TITLE: THEORIES IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

**COURSE
GUIDE**

**PCR 811
THEORIES IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT**

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NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA

Content

Introduction

Welcome to **PCR 811: Theories in Conflict Management. PCR 811 is a three unit course. It** introduces you to the basic concepts, perspectives and theories of conflict management. It is designed to provide a comprehensive understanding of the major perspectives and theories relating to the management of conflicts at various stages.

What you will learn in this course

You will explore the processes, and dimensions of conflict management. Important concepts in these processes discussed include: Third party intervention, mediation, negotiation, arbitration and African traditional conflict management forms. It also explores several issues, such as ethnicity, culture, communication, and public policy making and their implications for conflict management. Other issues include disarmament and arms control, preventive and multi-track diplomacy.

As a theoretical course it deals with the various attempts to create taxonomy of conflicts worldwide with special attention on causes and sources of conflicts in Africa. The global framework of conflict management is also dealt with in great detail. These include international and national peace promotion agencies, including non-state actors. Particular attention is paid to the United Nations role in conflict management.

It enables you to understudy conflict management as a part of the larger process of ensuring that man lives in peace, and in order also that conflict is channelled towards positive effects in every human community. It will also provide an overview of the types of conflict management principles that are so essential for dealing with a variety of conflicts that are commonplace in our world today.

This course will be valuable for leaders or anyone planning a career in public or private organizations, non-governmental agencies and community development organizations.

Course Aims

The aims of this course are to:
  i)   Acquaint you with the various concepts used in conflict manage;
  ii)   Introduce you to the theory and practices of conflict management;
  iii) Provide you with an appraisal of the content and context of these theories; and

iv)   Enable you to distinguish between alternative dispute resolution and traditional conflict management processes in Africa.

Course Objectives

The course seeks to enable you to:

1.   Identify the basic concepts and theories of conflict management.
2.   Demonstrate competency in the basic approaches and perspectives in conflict management through written and oral communication.
3.   Distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate uses of conflict management approaches in a variety of contexts.

Working through the course

This course guide is written in Modules (Sections) and Units. There are end of unit reviews and examination questions at the end of each unit or Module.   You are expected to answer these self review questions unaided. Additional requirements for the course will include an appraisal paper and a final examination. The course guide tells you briefly what the course is all about, what you are expected to know in each unit, what course materials you need to use and how you can work your way through these materials.

The Course Materials

The main components of the course are:

1.   The Course Guide
2.   Study Units
3.   References
4.   Assignments
5.   Presentation Schedule.

Study Units

There are twenty six study units in this course spread through six modules. These are as follows:
Unit 1:   The Notion of Conflict Management
Unit 2:   Approaches to conflict management
Unit 3:   Conflict management styles
Unit 4:   Communication and Conflict management
Unit 5:   Third Party Intervention
Unit 6:   Mediation
Unit 7:   Negotiation

Unit 8:   Arbitration
Unit 9:   African Traditional Conflict Management
Unit 10:   Conflict Transformation
Unit 11:   Peace-Building and Early Warning Systems
Unit 12:   Peace-making and Peace Keeping
Unit 13:   Disarmament and Arms Control
Unit 14:   Preventive and Multi-Track Diplomacy
Unit 15:   Post-Conflict Reconstruction
Unit 16:   Ethnicity and Conflict Management
Unit 17:   Culture, Identity and Conflict Management
Unit 18:   Public Policy Making and Conflict Management
Unit 19:   Sources and Causes of Conflicts
Unit 20:   Taxonomy of Causes of conflicts in Africa
Unit 21:   Taxonomy of Conflicts Worldwide
Unit 22:   National, Regional and International Peace Institutions
Unit 23:   United Nations and Peace Initiatives in Conflict Situations
Unit 24:   United Nations Peace Initiatives in Africa
Unit 25:   United Nations intervention Strategies
Unit 26:   Global Civil Society and Post Conflict Reconstruction

As noted earlier, each unit contains a number of self- assessment exercises (SAE). These self-assessment exercises are designed to test you on the materials you have just covered. They will help you to evaluate your progress as well as reinforce your understanding of the material. Together with tutor-marked assignments, these exercises will assist you in achieving the stated learning objectives of the individual units and of the Course.

References/Further Readings

The following books are suggested for further reading:

Albert (eds) *Community Conflicts in Nigeria: Management, Resolution and Transformation.* Ibadan: Spectrum books.

Coser, L. (1956). *The Functions of Social Conflict.* London: Collier-Macmillan.

Gurr, Ted (1993). *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethno-political Conflicts. Washington D.C.: United State Institute of Peace.*

Imobighe, T. A. (2003). *The OAU (AU) and OAS in Regional Conflict Management: A Comparative Assessment.* Ibadan: Spectrum Books.

Nnoli, O. (1998). (ed) *Ethnic Conflict in Africa.* Dakar: CODESRIA Books.

Otite, Onigu and O. Albert (eds) *Community conflicts in Nigeria: Management, Resolution and Transformation*. Ibadan: Spectrum books.

Rapaport, A., (1989).*The Origins of Violence: Approaches to the Study of Conflict*, New York: Paragon House.

Ross, M.H. (1993). *The Management of Conflict: Interpretations and Interests in Comparative Perspective*, Yale University Press, New Haven,

Smith, R.S. (1998). *War and Diplomacy in Pre-colonial West Africa*. London: Harper and Row.

Vayrynen, R., (1991). *New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation,* London: Sage Publications.

Young, C. (1979).   *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism*. London: University of Wisconsin Press.

Zartman, William. (1989). *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Presentation Schedule

Your course materials give you important dates for the early and timely completion and submission of your TMAs and attending tutorials. You should remember that you are required to submit all your assignments by the stipulated time and date. You should guard against lagging behind in your work.

Assignment File

In your assignment file, you will find all the details of the works you must submit to your tutor for marking. The marks you obtain for these assignments will count towards the final mark you obtain for this course. Further information on assignments will be found in the Assignment File itself, and later in this Course Guide in the section on assessment.
There are many assignments for this course, with each unit having at least one assignment. These assignments are basically meant to assist you to understand the course.

Assessment

There are two aspects to the assessment of this course. First, are the Tutor-Marked Assignments; second, is a written examination.
In tackling these assignments, you are expected to apply the information, knowledge and experience acquired during the course. The assignments must be submitted to your tutor for formal assessment in accordance with the deadlines stated in the Assignment File. The work you submit to your tutor for assessment will account for 30 per cent of your total course mark.
At the end of the course, you will need to sit for a final examination of three hours duration. This examination will account for the other 70 per cent of your total course mark.

Tutor-Marked Assignments (TMAs)

There are 21 tutor-marked assignments in this course. The best four (that is, the highest four of the 20 marks) will be counted. Each assignment counts for 20 marks but on the average when the four assignments are put together, then each assignment will count 10% towards your total course mark. This implies that the total marks for the best four (4) assignments, will constitute 30% of your total course mark.

The Assignments for the units in this course are contained in the Assignment File. You will be able to complete your assignments from the information and materials contained in your references, reading and study units. However, it is always desirable at this level of your education to research more widely, and demonstrate that you have a very broad and in-dept knowledge of the subject matter.
When each assignment is completed, send it together with a TMA (tutor-marked assignment) form to your tutor. Ensure that each assignment reaches your tutor on or before the deadline given in the Assignment File. If, for any reason you cannot complete your work on time, contact your tutor before the assignment is due to discuss the possibility of an extension. Extensions will not be granted after the due date unless there are exceptional circumstances warranting such.

Final Examination and Grading

The final examination for to **PCR 811: Theories of Conflict Management** will be of three hours' duration and have a value of 70% of the total course grade. The examination will consist of questions, which reflect the practice exercises and tutor-marked assignments, you have previously encountered. All areas of the course will be assessed.
Use the time between the completion of the last unit and sitting for the examination, to revise the entire course. You may find it useful to review your tutor-marked assignments and comment on them before the

examination. The final examination covers information from all aspects of the course.

Course Marking Scheme
Table 1: Course marking Scheme

ASSESSMENT	MARKS
Assignments	Best four marks of the Assignments @10% each (on the average) = 30% of course marks
Final examination	70% of overall course marks
Total	100% of course marks

How to get the most from this Course

1)   In distance learning, the study units replace the university lecture. This is one of the great advantages of distance learning; you can read and work through specially designed study materials at your own pace, and at a time and place that suits you best. Think of it as reading the lecture instead of listening to the lecturer. In the same way a lecturer might give you some reading to do, the study units tell you when to read, and which are your text materials or recommended books. You are provided exercises, to do at appropriate points, just as a lecturer might give you an in-class exercise.

2)   Each of the study units follows a common format. The first item is an introduction to the subject matter of the unit, and how a particular unit is integrated with the other units and the course as a whole. Next to this is a set of learning objectives. These objectives let you know what you should be able to do, by the time you have completed the unit. These learning objectives are meant to guide your study. The moment a unit is finished, you must go back and check whether you have achieved the objectives. If this is made a habit, then you will significantly improve your chances of passing the course.

3)   The main body of the unit guides you through the required reading from other sources. This will usually be either from your references or from a Reading section.

4)   The following is a practical strategy for working through the course. If you run into any trouble, telephone your tutor or visit the study centre nearest to you. Remember that your tutor's job is to help you. When you need assistance, do not hesitate to call and ask your tutor to provide it.

5)   Read this Course Guide thoroughly, it is your first assignment.

6)   Organise a Study Schedule- Design a 'Course Overview' to guide you through the Course. Note the time you are expected to spend on each unit and how the assignments relate to the units. Important information, e.g. details of your tutorials, and the date of the first day of the Semester is available at the study centre. You need to gather all the information into one place, such as your diary or a wall calendar. Whatever method you choose to use, you should decide on and write in your own dates and schedule of work for each unit.

7)   Once you have created your own study schedule, do everything to stay faithful to it. The major reason that students fail is that they get behind with their course work. If you get into difficulties with your schedule, please, let your tutor know before it is too late for help.

8)   Turn to Unit 1, and read the introduction and the objectives for the unit.

9)   Assemble the study materials. You will need your references and the unit you are studying at any point in time.

10)   As you work through the unit, you will know what sources to consult for further information.

11)   Visit your study centre whenever you need up to date information.

12)   Well before the relevant due dates (about 4 weeks before due dates), visit your study centre for your next required assignment. Keep in mind that you will learn a lot by doing the assignment carefully. They have been designed to help you meet the objectives of the course and, therefore, will help you pass the examination. Submit all assignments not later than the due date.

13)   Review the objectives for each study unit to confirm that you have achieved them. If you feel unsure about any of the objectives, review the study materials or consult your tutor. When you are confident that you have achieved a unit's objectives, you can start on the next unit. Proceed unit by unit through the course and try to space your study so that you can keep yourself on schedule.

14)   When you have submitted an assignment to your tutor for marking, do not wait for its return before starting on the next unit. Keep to your schedule. When the Assignment is returned, pay particular attention to your tutor's comments, both on the tutor-

marked assignment form and also the written comments on the ordinary assignments.

15)   After completing the last unit, review the course and prepare yourself for the final examination. Check that you have achieved the unit objectives (listed at the beginning of each unit) and the course objectives (listed in the Course Guide).

Tutors and Tutorials

There are 15 hours of tutorials provided in support of this course. However, tutorials are not compulsory, demand driven, and are meant to be problem- solving sessions. You will need to contact your tutor for more information of these tutorials, together with the name and phone number of your tutor.
Your tutor will mark and comment on your assignments, keep a close watch on your progress and on any difficulties you might encounter and provide assistance to you during the course. You must mail your tutor-marked assignments to your tutor well before the due date (at least two working days are required). They will be marked by your tutor and returned to you as soon as possible.

Do not hesitate to contact your tutor by telephone, e-mail, or discussion board. The following might be circumstances in which you will find help necessary. Contact your tutor if: –

> You do not understand any part of the study units or the assigned readings.
> You have difficulties within the exercises.
> You have a question or problem with an assignment, with your tutor's comments on an assignment or with the grading of an assignment.

You should try your best to attend the tutorials if you have problems. This is the only chance to have face-to-face contact with your tutor and ask questions which are answered instantly. You can raise any problem encountered in the course of your study. To gain the maximum benefits from course tutorials, prepare a question list before attending them. You will learn quite a lot from participating in the discussions.

Summary

PCR 811 aims at equipping you with the skills required in understanding conflict management processes. Upon completion of this course, you

should be acquainted with the various concepts, and practices of conflict management. You will also be able to appraise various contexts of conflict and the application of theoretical concepts learned.

We wish you success with the course.

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│ **MAIN**   │
│ **COURSE**   │
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Course Code   PCR 811

Course Title   Theories in Conflict Management

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MODULE 1

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: MEANING AND DEFINITION

Unit 1   The Notion of Conflict Management
Unit 2   Approaches to Conflict Management
Unit 3   Conflict Management Styles
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UNIT 1   THE NOTION OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

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6.0   Tutor-Marked Assignment
7.0   References/Further Readings

1.0   INTRODUCTION

This unit explores the meaning/concepts and objectives of conflict Management

2.0   OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit you should be able to:

1.   Highlight the basic concepts associated with conflict management;
2.   Distinguish between conflict prevention, conflict settlement, conflict resolution, and conflict management;
3.   Identify the various approaches to conflict management; and
4.   Identify the various conflict management styles.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Definition

Conflict management must be viewed as a part of a larger process of ensuring that man lives in peace and in an orderly way, conflict should also be channelled towards positive effect in every human community. In the view of Fisher et al. (2001:7) bringing about peace in a conflict situation is a process, which involves different stages, the best and most crucial of which is conflict transformation. The stages are:

3.2   Conflict Prevention

This aims to prevent the outbreak of violent conflict.

3.3   Conflict Settlement

This aims to end violent behaviour by reaching a peace agreement.

3.4   Conflict Management

This aims to limit and avoid future violence by promoting positive behavioural changes in the parties involved.

3.5   Conflict Resolution

This addresses the causes of conflict and seeks to build a new and lasting relationship between hostile groups.

3.6   Conflict Management in a Globalised World

Conflict management is another way of controlling conflict before or during and after it has occurred. According to Onigu Otite and Albert (1999:11), 'it is more elaborate and wider in conception and application, when necessitated; it involves conflict resolution and transformation. It is more of a long-term arrangement involving institutionalised provisions and regulative procedures for dealing with conflicts wherever they occur.'

This view of the comprehensiveness and institutionalisation involved in conflict management is further stressed by Zartman (1989:8), when he wrote that 'conflict management refers to the elimination, neutralisation of conflict from erupting into crises or to cool a crisis in eruption'.

Over the years the literature on conflict has reflected tensions between conflict management and conflict resolution. Now, however, the two issues seem to have been joined by the general acknowledgement that

the process of conflict management can be an effective route towards conflict resolution. In a related context, it has been suggested that different phases of conflict, e.g., pre-crisis, conflict and post-conflict stages, may require different governance structures and systems. Following the limited amount of literature available on conflict resolution and prevention in the context of governance, this survey has concluded that the structures and systems of governance need not be different during different phases, but rather that the issues that such systems and structures must address will certainly be different.

Four broad sources of conflict have been identified as the test of effective conflict prevention or resolution for governance structures and systems. These four are "deep-rooted conflict", power inequalities and asymmetries, ethnic conflict and multicentrism in a fragmented world. There is a rather substantial literature that suggests practical steps towards developing governance structures and systems that can resolve or prevent conflict. However, the steps between developing structures and systems and actually bringing contending forces or groups "to the table" have many gaps. This is particularly the case when dealing with power inequalities and ethnicity.

There has been relatively little work done to date that relates types of future conflicts that may arise in what has been called a fragmented world order and governance. It is increasingly apparent that states' capacities to govern are being increasingly influenced by externalities. Perhaps even more important, governance for individual states may be judged on the ways that they handle regime issues, regional issues and issues of global governance. To that extent, the ways that governments and governance structures deal with new types of conflict may depend upon their abilities to deal with the externalities as much as "domestic factors."

This survey has identified four broad gaps in the literature. There are few if any works that really bring together governance and conflict-related issues with issues of development. Secondly, while there is a growing literature on governance systems and ways to address conflict, there is a very real need for a major text that synthesises the disparate lessons of individual cases into some broad sets of conclusions. Thirdly, and related to the first two gaps, there is a dearth of works that go deeply beyond the rhetorical and give practical guidance on ways that governance systems and structures can address power inequality, or asymmetries.

Finally, few if any works, have attempted to bring the major transitions so rapidly transforming the global community into the context of future governance. Nor for that matter, do those few works that give some sense of what the future might hold give any idea of how future

governance might relate to future sources of conflict. And, there seems no effort to see what sort of development – as an aspect of governance and perhaps as a means to mitigate conflict – might be required amidst the turbulence of change.

The survey, in the final analysis, underscores the growing importance of ensuring that the concepts, theories and analyses of researchers benefit from the insights, experience and wisdom of practitioners. Practitioners have to feed into the world of the researcher and *vice versa.*

4.0   CONCLUSION

The international system abounds with uncertainties. Some of the most basic assumptions about the nature of governance and conflict are coming under increased scrutiny. One such assumption is that there is a direct correlation between poverty, intra and inter-state violence and systems' collapse. What has been a mainstay of some firmly held beliefs about the very inter-relationship between development, poverty, conflict and governance is being challenged by a number of scholars.

This point is not to open a debate at this stage about which contending views are right or wrong. Rather it is merely to emphasise that there is an ever increasing need to be aware that much so-called conventional wisdom is increasingly uncertain presumptions. To that extent, this survey has attempted to reflect at least some of the alternative concepts and paradigms that frame the present debates.

Perhaps even more important than the contending schools of thought that frame the *present* debate are those that are providing some insights into a future that is rapidly upon us. Rapid change and transitions will be an inherent feature of the international system in the foreseeable future. Here, the survey may give some sense to all who need to understand at least some of the dynamics that underpin these changes and transitions over the coming decades, for inevitably such changes will determine types of potential conflict and violence as well as governance structures in the future.

Yet beyond just informing the debate, the survey should also clearly underscore two inter-related points. In the first place, there is an increasingly urgent need to ensure that the concepts, theories and analyses of researchers benefit from the insights, experience and wisdom of practitioners. There needs to be closer interaction between the two. Hence, the second point is that the practitioner has to feed into the world of the researcher and *vice versa.* This survey suggests areas where conceptually this interaction might best take place.

5.0   SUMMARY

In this unit, we have examined definitions of conflict management; its distinguishing characteristics vis a viz conflict resolution, settlement, and prevention. Conflict management was also discussed from the perspective of its causes.

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENTS (TMAS)

i)   What is conflict management?
ii)   Distinguish between conflict management and conflict resolution.
iii)   Write short notes on the following: Conflict Prevention, Conflict Settlement, Conflict Management, Conflict Resolution.
iv)   What is the emerging focus of the global discourse on conflict management from the perspectives of causes?

7.0   REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

Otite, Onigu and O. Albert (eds) (1999) *Community conflicts in Nigeria: Management, Resolution and Transformation*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books.

Ross, M.H., (1993) *The Management of Conflict: Interpretations and Interests in Comparative Perspective*, Yale University Press, and New Haven.

Sandole, D. and Sandole-Staroste, (1987) [eds], *Conflict Management and Problem-Solving: Interpersonal to International Applications*, New York University Press, NY,

UNIT 2   APPROACHES TO CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

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1.0   INTRODUCTION

You are expected to become familiar with the various approaches to conflict management as well as appreciate their strengths and weaknesses and possibilities in various conflict situations.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit you should be able to:

1.   List the approaches to conflict Management; and
2.   Explain how they apply to various conflict situations

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   The Judicial Approach

This   has to do with conflict management within a legal framework in which a third party is given a sort of "Power of attorney", based on the conflict parties' confidence in the third party, to assume the responsibility of evolving an effective agreement concerning the resolution is hardly arrived at through this approach. This is purely legalistic and is based on legal procedural steps as available within the confine of the laws of the land. Examples are various courts using municipal laws or the International Court of Justice (ICJ) using international arbitration norms. This approach gives a zero-sum and win-lose outcome. Conflict parties are always wary to take the judicial approach because of its unpredictable outcome. The judicial approach is essentially a settlement of dispute by litigation.   In the case, the adversaries have no influence in choosing the third party. Only one party

s needed for an intervention to occur, and the decision-making authority is a judge.

3.2   The Power –Politics Approach

This is a situation in which the third party takes the initiative to manage a conflict out of concern (personal) bordering on realizing its own broader strategic interests rather than the interest of the parties to the conflict. The third party throws into the conflict its leverage, weight but not confidence, process and impose outcome on the parties. The Cold War era witnessed the superpowers largely managing conflicts among states based on power-politics.

A number tactics used in this regard include "light" tactics as ingratiation, gamesmanship, persuasion, and promises, and "heavy" tactics such as threats and irrevocable commitments. Although increasingly severe contentious tactics are a feature of conflict escalation, contentious tactics are not necessarily destructive. Through ingratiation, one party seeks to make the other party favourable disposed toward them, and so lessen their resistance to yielding. Specific tactics include flattery, agreeing with the other party's opinions, and doing them small favours. Gamesmanship tactics involve "inducing a state of upset or unrest that has the effect of lowering the other resistance to yielding." Ingratiation and gamesmanship both work best when the target is not aware that these tactics are being employed.

Persuasive arguments are overt attempts to induce the other party to lower their aspirations. A party usually argues either that they have a legitimate right to their desired outcome, or that it is in the other party's best interests to lower their aspirations. Promises and threats, seek to induce the other party to act in some particular way, by attaching further consequences (beneficial or harmful) to their actions. The advantages of promises are that they are generally effective, relatively "nice," and may create a sense of indebtedness in the recipient. The drawbacks are that promises cost the promising party whatever reward was offered, recipients may demand more extravagant rewards in the future, or they may be mistaken for bribes. Threats are even more effective than promises, and have lower costs. However, threats tend to evoke counter-threats, increasing hostility and escalating the conflict.

Another tactic involves making an irrevocable commitment to pursuing some potentially mutually harmful course of action. In making an irrevocable commitment, "the locus of control over the outcome of the exchange has been shifted from the shoulders of one Party to those of another, who is now the only one capable of preventing mutual disaster," presumably by choosing to yield. The advantages of this tactic

are that, it can be effective, and that it does not require much relative power (unlike promising or threatening). The drawbacks, are that it can entail substantial risks, must be used pre-emptively, must be clear and credible, and can foster escalation.

3.3   The Conciliatory Approach

It involves a process in which the third party tries to bring the parties in conflict to agreement through improving communication between them, helping them interpret the issues that divide them, and exploring avenues toward a peaceful settlement. Deep-seated conflicts, especially those involving deep emotions, necessarily require the systematic replacement of negative feelings and perceptions with positive ones and thereby helping the parties in conflict discover some mutuality of interests, which could be capitalized on for the resolution of the conflict.

4.0   CONCLUSION

Within the context of Africa's conflicts, we can see that the categorizations of Albert (1999) and Imobighe (2003) with reference to conflict management approaches have largely been used in responding to conflict in Africa with the exception of problem-solving approach which is the best but least used.

5.0   SUMMARY

In this unit, we have examined the various approaches to conflict management. They include the judicial, power-politics and conciliatory approaches.

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENTS (TMAS)

i)   What are the basic approaches to conflict management?
ii)   The reconciliatory approach is the most reliable approach to conflict management. Discuss.
iii)   The judicial approach is the longest approach to conflict management in Nigeria. Why is this so?
iv)   How desirable is the use of the power-politics approach to conflict resolution in a world of nuclear arms.

7.0   REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

Albert, I.O (1999). 'New Directions in the Management of Community Conflicts in Nigeria: Insights from the Activities of AAPW' in pp. 34-63, Onigu Otite and O. Albert (eds) *Community conflicts in Nigeria: Management, Resolution and Transformation*. Ibadan: Spectrum books.

Imobighe, T. A. (2003). *The OAU (AU) and OAS in Regional Conflict Management: A Comparative Assessment.* Ibadan: Spectrum Books.

Otite, Onigu and O. Albert (eds) (1999) *Community conflicts in Nigeria: Management, Resolution and Transformation*. Ibadan: Spectrum books.

Rapaport, A., (1989).*The Origins of Violence: Approaches to the Study of Conflict*, New York: Paragon House,

Vayrynen, R., (1991). *New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation,* London: Sage Publications.

UNIT 3 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT STYLES

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1.0   INTRODUCTION

A conflict management style refers to the various manners in which individuals, especially leadership, handle conflicts within a relationship. According to Albert (1999:34), response to conflicts can come in three major ways: by avoidance, confrontation and problem solving.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit you should be able to:

1.   Identify various conflict management styles;
2.   Explain the implications for peace and achievement of collective goals; and
3.   Highlight the strengths, weaknesses and possibilities in various styles of conflict management.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Avoidance

This refers to "a situation where a group alleging injustice or discrimination is literally ignored or denied recognition by those being accused and those who have the capacity for helping to redress the injustices done to the group".

3.2   Confrontation

This involves threats, verbal aggression, litigation or physical violence from the "avoided", ignored or "denied" party with the ultimate aim of getting a win-lose outcome.

3.3   Problem – Solving

This refers to "the situation in which the parties to a conflict, either by themselves or through the assistance of a third party, find solutions to their problems in a cordial environment". Problem-solving procedure is non-judgmental and highly participatory in character. It promotes cooperation between conflict parties who jointly analyse the structure of the conflict and carefully work out strategies for reconciling with each other. Peace and conflict scholars and practitioners consider problem solving the best method of dealing with conflict as its outcomes are usually self-supporting in the sense that it is advantageous to all parties in the conflict.

However, it is pertinent to state that as good and promising as problem-solving approach to conflict resolution is, always difficult for conflict parties to come together to negotiate or for a third party to bring them together for mediation processes. This is largely because of the polarization occasioned by the conflict. Therefore, a lot of time, resources (human and material) and planning see a successful mediation activity through.

It is equally worthy of note that most conflicts that have escalated in Africa, the Liberian Civil war for instance, were confrontational.

From another point of view, it can be said that conflict management strategy to be adopted in a given conflict situation is determined by first, the level of escalation at which the particular conflict is being managed. The level of escalation determines whether the intervener or peacemaker has come to make peace, keep peace or enforce peace. Secondly, conflict management can also be determined by the status of the participants involved in the bargaining process. A conflict could be managed through "negotiation" in which case the conflict parties engage in a direct bargaining in a bid to resolve the conflict, "Mediation"- can also be used. This is conflict management with the help of a (neutral) third party.

4.0   CONCLUSION

Imobighe (2003:4-12) states that Mediation can involve a wide range of activities, including fact finding, message carrying, providing good officers, and serving as an honest broker. He further affirms that mediation can be used in a broader sense to include virtually all form of third party involvement into conflict management. He then classifies third party involvement into three types: the legal or judicial approach; the power- politics approach and the conciliatory approach.

5.0   SUMMARY

In this unit, we have examined the various conflict management styles and their implications for peace and achievement of collective goals.

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENTS (TMAS)

(i)   What do you understand by conflict management styles?
(ii)   Outline the various management styles provided by Albert.
(iii)   Conflict   management   styles   are   very   important   to determining
         conflict outcome. Discuss.
(iv)   Discuss problem-solving as a conflict management style.

7.0   REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

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UNIT 4   COMMUNICATION   AND   CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Table of Contents

1.0   INTRODUCTION

This unit introduces communication as a critical factor in conflict outbreak and management.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

At the end of the unit, you should be able to

1. Explain the meaning of communication and its centrality to conflict management.
2. Highlight the importance of cooperative communication as it relates to various ways and stages of conflict management.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   What is Communication?

Communication is very important to conflict management. According to Wilmot and Hocker (1998) conflict management 'starts from clarification of communication and checking of perception' which involves the following:

i)   speaking out what is on one's mind;
ii)   listening carefully;
iii)   expressing strong feelings appropriately;
iv)   asking questions;
v)   remaining rational;
vi)   maintaining a spirit of give and take;

vii)   avoiding harmful or inflammatory statements;
viii)   asking directly what is going on;
ix)   telling others one's opinion;
x)   looking for flexible 'shades of grey solutions';
xi)   recognising the power of initiating a cooperative move;
xii)   identifying conflict patterns; and lastly,
xiii)   Engaging in negotiations of agreements and settlements.

The point being made is that conflict management requires a high level of communication skills especially when such managements involve cross-cultural settings.

3.2   Communication and Problem Solving

When problem solving, parties seek a mutually acceptable solution to their conflict. "The parties or their representatives talk freely to one another. They exchange information about their interests and priorities, work together to identify the true issues dividing them, brainstorm in search of alternatives that bridge their opposing interests, and collectively evaluate these alternatives from the viewpoint of their mutual welfare." Parties may either compromise; agree on a procedure to determine who should win, or develop an integrative solution. Integrative solutions are the most desirable, because they maximize both parties gain, and because they can diminish the parties perception of conflicting interests.

Pruitt and Rubin suggest five techniques for creating integrative options. Parties may "expand the pie" by increasing the available resources. "In non-specific compensation, One Party gets what he or she wants, and the other is repaid in some unrelated coin." In logrolling, parties trade concessions on low priority issues. Cost cutting seeks ways to meet a party's goals with minimal or no cost to the other party. The parties may use bridging to invent new options that substantially satisfy both of their basic interests.

In order to bridge or cost-cut effectively, the parties must have some understanding of the interests that underlie their positions, and of the deeper interests that underlie those interests. Sometimes deeper interests can be reconciled even when superficial interests conflict. "When one seeks the interests underlying divergent positions, one often finds that the issue under consideration has a different meaning to each of the two parties." For instance, one party may be concerned with substance and the others with appearances, or one with the short term and the other with the long term.

The authors suggest a four step problem-solving process. First, parties must clarify and explain the situation, to determine whether there really is a conflict of interests present. Secondly, each party must thoroughly examine their own interests, and set reasonably high aspirations. Third, the parties should solve problems together, using the techniques above, trying to create an integrative solution that satisfies both parties interests. Finally, if no integrative solution can be found, one or both parties must lower their aspirations, and search again for an integrative solution.

Parties must be firm about their basic interests, flexible about how those interests may be satisfied, and remain responsive to the other party's interests. If there are many issues at stake, then the parties will need to develop an agenda. Usually it is best to put the easiest issues first on the agenda. Deciding that no agreement is final until all are allowed for logrolling on the later issues. When issues are very complex, parties may begin by first agreeing on an overarching formula for how talks will proceed. Often, a party's interests are psychologically (but not practically) linked together. Such psychological linkages must be broken down to increase the parties' flexibility and increase the potential for an integrative solution.

There are risks in shifting toward a problem solving strategy when the other side is contending strongly. The strategic shift may be seen as a sign of weakness, and so cause the contending party to intensify their efforts. Raising integrative options may be interpreted as backing off a position. Discussing one's interests may give an advantage to the other party. To minimize these risks, parties often use covert tactics to test the other's interest in shifting towards a joint problem-solving strategy. One such covert tactics is to have back-channel contacts, meeting in informal, private or even secret venues, to explore problem solving. "Intermediaries provide greater protection against image loss and information loss than is found in back-channel meetings, because it is even less clear whether they represent the thinking of the people who sent them." Parties may also use conciliatory signals to invite problem solving. Such signals must be both noticeable, so the other side gets the message, and undeniably, so the first party can save face.

A party may also try overt persuasive tactics to draw the other side into problem solving. The key to effective recruitment is to convey a firm but conciliatory stance toward the others. Parties signal firmness by making a vigorous statement of their interests and having constituents make strong statements, by being unwilling to make unilateral concessions, and by developing a modest amount of threat capability. Careful use of contentious tactics can also signal firmness without triggering escalation. Parties can signal their conciliatory intent by

expressing their willingness to adopt integrative solutions, by expressing concern for the other party, by keeping the lines of communication open, and by rewarding the other's cooperative gestures. Parties may also make unilateral trust-building initiatives, for instance, by using the Gradual Reduction in Tensions (GRIT) strategy.

3.3   Cooperative Communication

Some ways of communicating, increase friction and anger. Other ways of communication tend to cause people to work WITH us, and not against us. While it is clear that blatant accusations, name-calling and personal attacks are confrontational (the opposite of cooperative), there are many more subtle ways to ruin a communication. To illustrate some of the techniques of cooperative communication, let's take a look at the following sentences:

"*You never finish the work on time."*
"It seems like you are having some difficulty with the timelines. What can I do to help?"

Which of these phrases do you think is more likely to elicit a productive dialogue? Clearly the first at least "sounds" antagonistic", while the second doesn't. Another example: *"If you had bothered to read the report, you would know...."*
It might be that the report wasn't clear on those points. Would you like me to explain?

What are the cooperative rules here? In our first set of examples, the initial statement uses an absolute word "never", and as a result tends to cause the other person to argue. In addition the phrase sounds blaming. The replacement phrase lacks those confrontational characteristics, uses a qualifier "seems", and offers to work together. In the second phrase set, the key word is "bothered", which suggests that the person is lazy, or uncaring, and that is what will be heard. It also is a blaming statement. In the replacement phrase, we introduce another qualifier "might", followed by an offer to solve the problem.

In both phrase sets, the first phrases are likely to create argument and personalized conflict while the replacement phrases are more likely to result in real problem solving.

4.0   CONCLUSION

Conflict management requires a high level of communication skills especially when such managements involve cross-cultural settings.

5.0   SUMMARY

In this unit, we defined the concepts, communication, communication and problem solving, and cooperative communication. We also stressed the impacts of these concepts on conflict management processes.

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENTS (TMAS)

 i)   What is communication?
 ii)   Most conflicts are the result of poor communication. Discuss.
 iii)   How important is the manner of communication to conflict resolution?
 iv)   What is cooperative communication?

7.0   REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

Pruitt, Dean G. and Jeffrey Z. Rubin. (1986). *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate and Settlement* New York: Random House.

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MODULE 2

ELEMENTS OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT PROCESS

Unit 1   Third Party Interventions
Unit 2   Mediation
Unit 3   Negotiation
Unit 4   Arbitration
Unit 5   African Traditional Conflict Management

UNIT 1   THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTIONS

Table of Contents

1.0   Introduction
2.0   Objectives
3.0   Main Content
3.1   Definition of Third-party Interventions
3.2   Role of Third Parties
3.3   Forms of Third Parties Intervention
3.4   Intervention Types
3.5   Factors that influence Intervention Decision
3.6   Achieving successful interventions
4.0   Conclusion
5.0   Summary
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7.0   References/Further Readings

1.0   INTRODUCTION

This unit exposes you to third party intervention as encapsulating broad elements of conflict management.

2.0   OBJECTIVES.

At the end of the unit, you should be able to:

i)   Identify the basic elements of third party intervention;
ii)   Explain how third party intervention works;
iii)   Highlight the challenges and ethics of third party intervention;
iv)   List the factors that affect the success of third party intervention.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Definition

The terms "third party" and "intermediary" are both used to refer to a person or team of people who become involved in a conflict to help the disputing parties manage or resolve it. Third parties might act as consultants, helping one side or both sides analyze the conflict and plan an effective response. Alternatively, they might act as facilitators, arranging meetings, setting agendas, and guiding productive discussions. Facilitators will also usually record what was said, and may write up a short report summarizing the discussions and any agreements that were reached.

A more active and powerful third party role is that of mediator. Mediators, not only facilitate discussions, but they usually impose a structure and process on the discussions that is designed to move the parties towards mutual understanding and win-win agreements. While many different styles of mediations are common, most mediators have the conflicting parties sit down together to explain to each other their views about the nature of the problem and how they think it might best be solved. The mediator often tries to get the disputants to focus on underlying interests (the things they really need or want) more than their initial opening positions (what they initially say they need or want). By clarifying the divergent views and reasons for those views, mediators can usually get the parties to develop a common understanding of the situation, which often yields a solution which satisfies the interests of all parties. While some mediators take a stronger role in option identification and selection than others, mediators do not have the power to impose a solution. At most, they can suggest a solution, which the disputants may or may not accept.

The most powerful third party role is that of an arbitrator. An arbitrator listens to presentations made by both sides, examines written materials and other evidence relating to a case, and then makes a determination of who is right and who is wrong, or how a conflict should be settled. Usually, the arbitrator's decision is binding and cannot be appealed. Thus, the arbitrator is the most powerful type of intermediary. Arbitration works well when the parties simply want a settlement, and do not worry about losing control of the process or the outcome. For parties that want to maintain control, however, the other forms of intervention (mediation or facilitation) are often preferred.

3.2   Role of Third Parties

To intervene means "to enter into an ongoing system of relationships, to come between or among persons, groups, or objects for the purpose of helping them…" Agyris (1970:15).   Stanley Hoffman describes intervention as "a move by state or an international organization to involve itself in the domestic affair of another state, whether the state consents or not" (Hoffman, 1993:88).

The point about intervention is that it usually involves a third party. Third parties change conflicts, often for the better, just by being present. Third parties can play many roles. They may act formally or informally. They may act as individuals, or as representatives of some larger group. They may be invited to participate by the conflicting parties, or they may intervene spontaneously. Usually an effective third party will be impartial; however there are occasions when a partial role can be helpful. Third parties may be limited to advising the parties, or they may be able to make binding decisions for the parties. They may intervene in conflicts between individuals or between groups. Some third parties will focus on the substance of the dispute, while others focus on improving the conflict process.

3.3   Forms of Third Party Intervention

Pruitt and Rubin describe three effective forms of third-party intervention. First, third parties may intervene to modify the physical or social structure of the conflict. They can facilitate communication, offer a neutral or private venue for talks, impose a timeline and deadlines, contribute resources, and call up public pressure. Second, third parties can change the structure of the issue in a conflict. They can help the parties identify issues and interests, and break psychological linkages. They can help the parties group and order the issues to be addressed. And they can introduce new issues, alternative solutions and super-ordinate goals. Thus, such intervention can further motivate the conflicting parties to reach an agreement. Third parties help participants save face by accepting responsibility for concessions. They manage parties' emotions and absorb hostility. They can also help sustain the parties' momentum toward a resolution.

3.4   Intervention Types

Generally, nations decide how to intervene based on three factors. The first consideration is the intervening nation's own capabilities and connection to the conflict. Secondly, they consider the status and ripeness of the conflict for resolution. Thirdly, intervention is influenced by the characters of the parties and their decision-making systems.

Crocker argues that a fourth factor should be given increased attention; Nations should compare the cost of intervention to the cost of doing nothing.

Intervention may be military or diplomatic. Currently, military intervention is not the most typical form used, although it is called for, on occasion. Diplomatic intervention may be sustained and strategic or it may be episodic. The United States has pursued long-term strategic diplomatic intervention in the Middle East. Strategic diplomatic intervention remains fairly uncommon, however. Episodic, crisis-driven interventions are the most common form of diplomatic intervention. Such interventions can be effective at containing violence, but alone, do not tend to produce settlements or resolutions.

Interventions by non-governmental organization are new, and on the increase. NGO interventions are likely more effective, than what the governments gives them credit for, but somewhat less effective than they themselves claim.

Types of intervention include:

(i)   **Preventive Intervention** before the outbreak of a conflict.

(ii)   **Pre-emptive Intervention** Crocker argues that the most effective way of dealing with violent internal conflicts is pre-emptively by acting early, before the violence becomes severe. Nations undergoing repression or violent upheaval should be encouraged to pursue negotiated alternatives. Arranging a face-saving exit for soon to be deposed leaders, can also be an effective way of preventing further violence.

Generally, pre-emptive intervention should focus on those conditions which shape and spark ethnic conflicts. Crocker argues that the key to identifying and understanding those conditions is to understand "the process by which politicized conflicts become militarized." Militarized conflicts are more complex and more costly to deal with. The goal then is to intervene pre-emptively to prevent political conflicts from becoming militarized.

Crocker describes three examples of such pre-emptive intervention. First, nations may seek to avoid premature and possibly polarizing elections. Secondly, nations should be more vigorous in their attempts to disarm and reintegrate former combatants into civil society. Thirdly, Crocker argues that simple secession is unlikely to put an end to internal conflicts. If a nation

is to break-up, the international community must insist on an agreed, negotiated separation.

(iii)   **Curative intervention** that aims at the solution, limitation, control or regulation of an existing conflict;

(iv)   **De-escalating intervention** that aims at reducing tension and must be based on insight into the factors and mechanisms that led to escalation in the first place; and

(v)   **Escalating intervention** it can be in the interest of a permanent conflict resolution to escalate a "cold" conflict (one in which the parties avoid both contact and confrontation).

3.5   Factors that influence the Intervention Decision

Opponents of intervention typically raise two points. First, they argue that ethnic conflicts are often too intense for effective intervention. The combatants should be allowed to exhaust each other, and also their desire for peace to grow, before intervention is attempted. Secondly, intervention in internal conflicts violates the target nation's sovereignty. Outsiders lack a clear mandate to justify their intervention. They often lack the skills and knowledge to intervene effectively.

Still, there have been some significant and successful interventions into internal conflicts. The UN oversight of the decolonization of Namibia, and the Cambodian elections are two notable examples. Crocker asks, when then should intervention be attempted or avoided?

He suggests that in general "we probably should avoid military entanglement in nationalist revolutions and civil wars pitting whole groups and classes against one another." Crocker notes two exceptions to this generalization. First, we may intervene militarily if there are overarching strategic reasons to do so. Secondly, we may intervene if the issue is important, and success at a reasonable cost seems likely.

3.6   Achieving successful Interventions

What exactly constitutes a successful intervention, is itself a matter of much debate. For some conflicts, merely avoiding even greater tragedy may count as a success. In defining success, Crocker argues that "the important point is that those who decide to intervene...have an obligation to develop their own definition of success, and to keep it firmly in mind while labouring to avoid becoming part of the problem and making things worse."

Whatever standard of success is adopted, certain general considerations apply. The intervention operation itself must have an efficient, responsive decision-making system. Decision-makers must be held accountable for their decisions. The operation must take measures to ensure that, its forces are not taken hostage or targeted directly by the combatants. The intervening group must retain and exercise consistent control over the nature and timing of the intervention. Interventions tend to fail if the intervening group loses the initiative. The intervention must be backed up by adequate information about the situation. Often the particular characters of the key players, makes a crucial difference in the outcome of an intervention. Successful UN interventions tend to exhibit these features.

4.0   CONCLUSION

In terms of strategy, the international community must be willing to support intervention into some internal conflicts. However, we should not seek to thrust the UN, or the United States, into every internal conflict. Engaging in interventions which are unlikely to have some measure of success and is ultimately counter-productive. Interventions must also plan for success. They must follow through with plans to implement any peace settlement which may be reached. Successful interventions will understand and exploit the link between diplomacy and military force. Diplomatic interventions usually gain their force from military backing; military force requires diplomacy to articulate its goals and interests. For this reason military intervention is most effective when employed in the context of an ongoing political peace process. In fact, linking military intervention to a larger peace process is often the key to developing a successful exit strategy.

5.0   SUMMARY

In this unit we have examined various types of interventions with particular focus on third party intervention. We have also discussed forms of third party intervention; the role of third party intervention; and the success rate in managing conflicts.

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT (TMAS)

i)   What is third party intervention?
ii)   What are the factors that affect the success of failure of third party intervention?
iii)   Discuss the various types of third party intervention.
iv)   When is it reasonable to intervene in a conflict as a third party?

7.0   REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

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UNIT 2   MEDIATION

Table of Contents

1.0   INTRODUCTION

Mediation is a popular concept in conflict management discourse.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit, you should be able to:

i.   Define mediation;
ii.   Identify the processes and dilemmas of mediation as a form of
    third party intervention;
iii.   Highlight the role of mediation in conflict situation; and,
iv.   Identify the behaviours and skills required for non-adversarial mediation.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Definition

Due to polarity occasioned by issues in the conflict, conflict parties often find it difficult to negotiate hence, the coming in of a third person

to facilitate negotiation disputants. Mediation, according to Moore (1996:1), is:

> The intervention in a negotiation or conflict of an acceptable third party who has limited or no authoritative decision-making power but who assists the involved parties in voluntarily reaching a mutually acceptable settlement of issues in dispute.

Goodpaster, (1997:203-04) sees mediation as:

> "a problem-solving negotiation process, in which an outside, impartial neutral party works with disputants to assist them to reach a satisfactory negotiated agreement. Unlike judges or arbitrators, mediators have no authority to decide the dispute between the parties; instead, the parties empower the mediator to help them resolve the issue between them."

Mediation is an informal, voluntary and confidential process in which a trained professional dispute resolver (the mediator) facilitates understanding, communication and negotiation between disputing parties and assists those parties in reaching their own mutually acceptable resolution to their dispute.

Where the dispute is already in litigation the parties are normally assisted in mediation by their legal counsel.

Mediation differs from negotiation, in that parties with apparently incompatible demands turn over the dispute resolution process, but not the dispute itself, to the mediator.

Mediation differs from arbitration, in that a mediator makes no decisions as to how the case should be resolved; rather the mediator guides the parties in making this determination.

Mediation differs from case evaluation, in that the mediator makes no finding as to the value of the claims and there is no penalty if the mediation is unsuccessful.

Mediation differs from litigations, in that it is quicker and less expensive and allows the parties to work-out their own solutions in private rather than having an unknown result imposed on them by a judge or jury in a lengthy, expensive and formal process.

Mediation is built upon all of the following concepts:

i.   Voluntariness,
ii.   Privacy,
iii.   Confidentiality,
iv.   Economy,
v.   Promptness,
vi.   Informality,
vii.   Control of hearing dates,
viii.   Lack of risk,
ix.   Lack of fear of an appeal from a favourable result,
x.   Opportunity for parties to tell their entire story without rules of evidence,
xi.   High likelihood agreement is not violated.

3.2   Types of Mediators

Albert (2001:86) identifies three major types of mediators. They are:

i.   Social network mediators,
ii.   Authoritative mediators,
iii.   Independent mediators.

3.2.1 Social Network Mediators

This consists of individuals who are invited to intervene in a conflict basically because of their close relationship with the disputants, or largely because they are in the same social group (network) with the disputants. The mediator could, therefore, be a friend, neighbour, or member of the same political group, etc. The mediator gets the co-operation of the disputants because he is considered trustworthy.

3.2.2 Authoritative Mediators

These are those in authoritative relationship with the disputants in the sense of occupying a position of authority well known to, recognized and respected by the disputants. The "authority of the mediator in this kind of situation is dependent on his access to resources which the two sides to the conflict value so much. An authoritative mediator is, however, not expected to impose his decision on the disputants. But he expected to impose his decision on the disputants. But he could persuade or indirectly influence them to reach a quick decision.

3.2.3 Independent Mediators

These are neutral persons entirely. An independent mediator has no vested interest in the conflict and, therefore is expected by the two sides to be impartial in helping them work through their problems. Independent mediators are professionals who have mediation firms that could be consulted from time to time by disputants.

3.3   Foundations of Mediation

Third parties mediate based on their desire to make peace, and and their own self-interest. Self-interest is the primary motivation for states. States are motivated by both defensive and offensive interests. Defensive interests include promoting international stability, and protecting the mediating nation's foreign interests. Often nations will attempt to mediate a conflict in order to prevent rival powers from intervening and expanding their influence. States may also fear being drawn into the escalating conflict. When motivated by defensive interests, mediators often have some stake in achieving particular outcomes.

When acting on the offence, states mediate conflicts in order to extend and increase their own influence. For instance, successful mediation may earn the gratitude of other nations. In such cases states usually have less interest in the content of the settlement. As an example of how self-interest motivates third-parties, the authors offer the case of U.S. mediation during and after the Cold War. During the Cold War, the U.S. was quick to mediate international conflicts. By doing so, they extended their influence and blocked expansion of Soviet influence. With the demise of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (U.S.S.R.), the United States (U.S.) has been less eager to intervene.

Less powerful nations also act on defensive and offensive self-interests. In addition smaller states may attempt mediation because they lack other foreign policy tools and as a way of avoiding being drawn into the conflict as participants.

Non-state organizations generally emphasize peacekeeping as their main motive. However, such groups are also motivated by an interest in upholding their reputations. Intergovernmental organizations, such as the U.N., are influenced by the policies and interests of their member states. The author's note that non-state organizations are often "interested in a particular outcome, not because it affects them directly, but because they believe in its inherent desirability."

Parties to a conflict accept mediation when they believe it is in their best interests to do so; that is, when they believe that "mediation will gain an outcome that is more favourable than the outcome gained by continued conflict." Similarly, parties will accept mediation when rejecting it will result in greater harms. Parties may fear incurring bad relationship with the proposed mediating nation or international sanctions if they refuse to negotiate. In addition, mediation may offer parties a way to negotiate compromise without losing face. The mediator may also be seen as guarantor of the final settlement.

3.4   Types of Mediation

3.4.1 Facilitative Mediation

In the 1960's and 1970's, there was only one type of mediation being taught and practiced, which is now being called "Facilitative Mediation". In facilitative mediation, the mediator structures a process to assist the parties in reaching a mutually agreeable resolution. The mediator asks questions; validates and normalizes parties' points of view; searches for interests underneath the positions taken by parties; and assists the parties in finding and analyzing options for resolution. The facilitative mediator does not make recommendations to the parties, give his or her own advice or opinion as to the outcome of the case, or predict what a court would do in the case. The mediator is in charge of the process, while the parties are in charge of the outcome.

Facilitative mediators want to ensure that parties come to agreements based on information and understanding. They predominantly hold joint sessions with all parties present so that the parties can hear each other's points of view, but hold caucuses regularly. They want the parties to have the major influence on decisions made, rather than the parties' attorneys.

Facilitative mediation grew up in the era of volunteer dispute resolution centres, in which the volunteer mediators were not required to have substantive expertise concerning the area of the dispute, and in which most often there were no attorneys present. The volunteer mediators came from all backgrounds. These things are still true today, but in addition many professional mediators, with and without substantive expertise, also practice facilitative mediation.

3.4.2 Evaluative Mediation

Evaluative mediation is a process modelled on settlement conferences held by judges. An evaluative mediator assists the parties in reaching resolution by pointing out the weaknesses of their cases, and predicting

what a judge or jury would be likely to do. An evaluative mediator might make formal or informal recommendations to the parties as to the outcome of the issues. Evaluative mediators are concerned with the legal rights of the parties, rather than their needs and interests, and evaluate based on legal concepts of fairness. Evaluative mediators meet most often in separate meetings with the parties and their attorneys, practicing "shuttle diplomacy". They help the parties and attorneys evaluate their legal position and the costs vs. the benefits of pursuing a legal resolution rather than settling in mediation. The evaluative mediator structures the process, and directly influences the outcome of mediation.

Evaluative mediation emerged in court-mandated or court-referred mediation. Attorneys normally work with the court to choose the mediator, and are active participants in the mediation. The parties are most often present in the mediation, but the mediator may meet with the attorneys alone as well as with the parties and their attorneys. There is an assumption in evaluative mediation that the mediator has substantive expertise or legal expertise in the substantive area of the dispute. Because of the connection between evaluative mediation and the courts, and because of their comfort level with settlement conferences, most evaluative mediators are attorneys.

3.4.3 Transformative Mediation

Transformative mediation is the newest concept of the three, named by Folger and Bush in their book *The Promise of Mediation* in 1994. Transformative mediation is based on the values of "empowerment" of each of the parties as much as possible, and "recognition" by each of the parties' needs, interests, values and points of view. The potential for transformative mediation is that any or all parties or their relationships may be transformed during the mediation. Transformative mediators meet with parties together, since only they can give each other "recognition".

In some ways, the values of transformative mediation mirror those of early facilitative mediation, in its interest in empowering parties and transformation. Early facilitative mediators fully expect to transform society with these pro-peace techniques. And they did. Modern transformative mediators want to continue that process by allowing and supporting the parties in mediation to determine the direction of their own process. In transformative mediation, the parties, structure both the process and the outcome of mediation, and the mediator follows their lead.

3.5   Ethical dilemmas in Mediation

Zartman and Touval describe three ethical dilemmas which arise in international conflict mediation. First, mediators are often torn between the short-term goal of ending bloodshed and the longer-term goal of settling the conflict. A cease-fire may create a tolerable stalemate, and so end bloodshed at the cost of stalling settlement negotiations.

Mediators may also be faced with a choice between pursuing "an attainable settlement that violates international norms, or [holding] out for one that is consistent with the principles of justice adopted by the international community."[p. 459] On the one hand, people argue that some settlement is better than no settlement and continued warfare. On the other hand, people point out those unjust settlements rarely last, and that tolerating such settlements may serve to undermine the foundations of international order and security. The Bosnian conflict presents a stark example of this dilemma.

Finally, mediation facilitates settlement of conflicts, but does not ensure reconciliation or remove the causes of conflict. Mediators must follow through on settlements, supporting implementation and holding the parties to their agreement. Yet to be effective, mediators must avoid becoming embroiled in the conflict.

It has been said that most of life's problems have a simple and elegant solution.   I believe that this saying is true and that mediation is very often the elegant, although frequently stressful, solution to conflicts ranging from noisy neighbour disputes to complex medical malpractice disputes.

While mediation does not always work and is not always appropriate, it almost always is a no-risk, quick and economical tool to settle disputes. Indeed, approximately 80% of all cases that are voluntarily mediated are resolved by this process.   In some senses, mediation is the opposite of litigation. In litigation the goal is generally to intimidate the other party into settling the case, but mediation persuades the parties to settle. The only requirements for successful mediation are a skilful mediator and parties who are able to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of their respective positions with civility and objectivity and who are willing to candidly discuss their interests directly with the other party. Attorneys who understand the often counter-intuitive mediation process are normally quite helpful in mediating litigated cases.

The key to understanding mediation is realizing that the party never looses control of their position to the court, their attorney or the mediator. Only a settlement that is fully acceptable to a party can ever

be established.   And because the settlement is not imposed upon the party by someone else, the party always leaves the dispute with a feeling of autonomy and fairness.   While litigation is often destructive, mediation is always constructive.   And while litigation is often very costly in both time and money, mediation is always brief and inexpensive.   Mediation allows all parties to completely eliminate the risk of a totally unacceptable outcome being imposed on them by a court.   It also eliminates the very high, and often underappreciated, emotional cost which litigation imposes on all participants.   Mediation also always turns off the "meter" of litigation costs, attorney fees and lost productivity.

The actual process of mediation is simple and transparent.   The disputing parties, and there may be more than two, agree on the selection of a competent mediator who is experienced in the process of inter-personal facilitative-mediation.   Prior experience in the subject matter of the dispute is not a requirement inasmuch as the mediator will not have to decide any substantive issues.   Insight into the actual workings of the judicial system, however, is very desirable in a mediator.   But, absolute neutrality, patience, and the ability to preserve confidences are requirements for any mediator.   A mediator will set a mutually agreeable time and place for the mediation and assure that all persons necessary for resolution of the dispute will be present in an informal and private setting.

3.6   Skills and behaviours for non-adversarial Mediation

1)   Listening, reading body language, sensing moods, and being aware of emotional issues that are not explicitly mentioned.

2)   Breaking disputes into manageable chunks, and resolving each chunk separately.

3)   Postponing discussions of very tough issues to late in the meditation session.   Once the parties have started agreeing on simple issues, an atmosphere of trust will begin to grow, and agreement on difficult issues will become faster.

4)   Keeping the discussion focussed on the issues.

5)   Restating points in appropriate language to help each party understand the other's point of view.

6)   Restating in neutral language those points on which the parties appear to agree, verifying that they do in fact agree.

7)   Using humour to bring people together and defuse tense situations. Note that most skilled arbitrators have similar skills, but do not usually use them in the same way.

4.0   CONCLUSION

Mediation is an informal, voluntary and confidential process in which a trained professional dispute resolver (the mediator) facilitates understanding, communication and negotiation between disputing parties and assists those parties in reaching their own mutually acceptable resolution to their dispute.

Where the dispute is already in litigation the parties are normally assisted in mediation by their legal counsel.

Mediation differs from negotiation, in that parties with apparently incompatible demands turn over the dispute resolution process, but not the dispute itself, to the mediator.

Mediation differs from arbitration in that a mediator makes no decisions as to how the case should be resolved; rather the mediator guides the parties in making this determination.

Mediation differs from case evaluation in that the mediator makes no finding as to the value of the claims and there is no penalty. In this case, mediation is unsuccessful.

Mediation differs from litigation in that it is quicker and less expensive and allows the parties to work-out their own solutions in private rather than having an unknown result imposed on them by a judge or jury in a lengthy, expensive and formal process.

Mediation is built upon all of the following concepts:

i.   Voluntariness
ii.   Privacy
iii.   Confidentiality
iv.   Economy
v.   Promptness
vi.   Informality
vii.   Control of hearing dates
viii.   Lack of risk
ix.   Lack of fear of an appeal from a favourable result
x.   Opportunity for parties to tell their entire story without rules of evidence
xi.   High likelihood agreement is not violated

5.0   SUMMARY

In this unit, we have discussed mediation as a concept in conflict management process. We have also examined the various types, and skills that are required in mediation.

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT (TMAS)

i)   What is mediation?

ii)   Outline the various types of mediation and discuss them

iii)   What are the ethical issues in mediation?

iv)   Elaborate the various skills required for effective mediation

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UNIT 3   NEGOTIATION

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1.0   INTRODUCTION

According to Albert, negotiation is the process whereby two or more parties, who are faced with a problem of conflict about some limited resources, attempt to agree on how best to solve the problem or resolve the conflict. In the same vein, negotiation can be viewed as any form of communication adopted with the aim of reaching a common ground and compromise.

It is also any form of verbal communication, direct or indirect, whereby parties to a conflict of interest discuss, without resort to arbitration or other judicial processes, take a joint action to manage the dispute between them. Negotiation is a back and forth communication designed to reach agreement between parties that have both shared and opposed interests.   In the process of negotiation both parties modify their demands to achieve a mutually acceptable compromise… a process of

adjusting both parties' views of their ideal outcome to an attainable outcome.

Negotiation may be facilitated by a third party. He the third party helps, the conflict parties to reach a mutually satisfying agreement. Facilitation involves the use of techniques to improve the flow of information in a meeting between parties in disputes.
Another aspect of negotiation is conciliation. It is the act of taking peace messages to and from parties in conflict. It seeks the promotion of attitudinal and behavioural changes that will build a positive relationship between parties in dispute.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

On completion of studying this unit you should be able to:

i. Explain negotiation as a vital and common occurrence in conflict management;
ii. Explain the meaning, process and challenges of negotiation in conflict situations; and
iii. Describe the skills required for effective negotiation.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Understanding the Negotiation Process

3.1.1 Pre-negotiation settings.

No matter how skilled a negotiator might be, a conflict situation is not likely to move towards resolution unless, in the words of Richard Haas, the situation is "ripe". Determining ripeness has brought the theoretician and the practitioner closer together, and if one reviews recent literature, it would seem that the Norwegian inspired Israel-Palestinian negotiations seem to have been a convenient "case study" for both.

As opposed to many of conventional diplomatic assumptions about diplomacy and diplomatic procedures, both the practitioner and the conflict analyst, or theoretician, look for less formal ways to explore how to break deadlocks, to explore possible negotiation frameworks rather than negotiate. The key in such circumstances is to facilitate or at least anticipate changes in the perceptions of contending parties, particularly when one adversary sees another as capable of cooperative behaviour. Ultimately, the objective of pre-negotiation settings should not be seen as preliminary negotiations over a specific issue, but rather a process in which problems are defined, a commitment to negotiate is made and arrangements for eventual negotiations are broached.

Linked to the issue of the "ripe moment" is a continued interest in the question of de-escalatory moves. This is an issue that Zartman has considered extensively as well as Haas, the latter in the context of Cyprus, South Africa and Northern Ireland. Also the "rules of the game" that will be central to any negotiating process have occupied the attention of various scholars. Two examples are de Nevers and Horowitz.

There is a growing interest in the role of informal and unofficial intervention in pre-negotiations as well as in the negotiation process itself. This sort of informal or unofficial involvement in gaining the consent of contending parties to begin negotiations is all part of what has become known as "Track Two" diplomacy. McDonald in a US State Department publication outlines the assumptions that underlie Track Two measures, and Pettigrew provides some interesting insights on how certain organisations, e.g., the Quaker Movement, can help move pre-negotiation processes along. Saunders, Cohen and Curle all add different perspectives to the advantages as well as the limits of Track Two methods.

3.1.2   Conflict and Negotiations.

The predominant literature in the field of conflict and negotiations concerns third party mediators, facilitators or, less frequently, third party arbitrators. Anstey, Deng and Ury all give valuable points about what such negotiators need to do and the barriers that they can anticipate. This, by no means is to ignore the stream of "getting from 'no' to 'yes'" type studies and more popular literature that seek to demonstrate that one-on-one, or bilateral negotiations, can result in "win-win" outcomes. Yet, the ways that third parties can move the negotiation process preoccupies the academic literature, and also the practitioner and negotiator at the international level, faced with inter and intra-state conflict from the Balkans to Cyprus, from the Middle East to Indonesia.

Three broad issues appear to dominate recent studies on third-party intervention, i.e., who intervenes, how and when. Various typologies have been developed to correlate appropriate types and levels of intervention to types of conflict situations. Within such typologies, it is interesting to note the focus of many upon "peacekeepers" and indeed "peace-makers" as intermediaries in conflict negotiations. Cost-benefit analyses have been considered by scholars such as Jabri in order to determine the types of interest calculations that bring third party interveners to assist in negotiations.

Under the rubric of the how of intervention, there are four essential considerations that emerge out of the analysis of third party intervention. The first concerns the different impacts upon negotiations of a

bargaining versus problem-solving approach. Cultural determinants upon third party intervention represent another area of considerable interest, as are the analysis of intentional or unintentional bias in third party interveners. Finally, there is a great deal of analysis, found mainly in what is called the decision-making literature, about the sorts of individuals who are effective as third party negotiators, analysis which relates in some respects to the typologies of who intervenes.

When to intervene incorporates a variety of concerns, including pre-negotiation settings, post-negotiation implementation as well as the negotiating process, itself. As Keashley and Fisher points out, the when of intervention have to be viewed against two critical factors, i.e., *stage* and *intervention sequence*. The former encompasses such factors as discussion, polarisation, segregation and destruction, while intervention sequences range from arbitration, power mediation to consultation and violence control.

3.1.3 Post-negotiation implementation.

There is a growing interest in the links between negotiations and compliance, or implementation. In a recent "network newsletter" of PIN [Processes of International Negotiation], it was noted that at the inter-state level the traditional diplomatic means of ensuring that states comply with their international obligations are no longer adequate. The effects of such none or inadequate compliance may nevertheless generate misunderstandings and conflict, and ways to monitor and deal with "post-negotiation" implementation become themselves means to prevent or resolve conflict.

PIN has proposed that a practical starting point to deal with some of the complex dimensions of an increasing number of international agreements, etc., is to focus upon two essential issues. The first, relates to possible ways to use international organisations to promote state compliance with its obligations. The second entails "post-negotiation" processes of re-negotiation. Whether these starting points are adequate in themselves, is a moot point. However, far more important point, is that this and related researches have clearly uncovered an area of considerable need for the practitioner as well as what should be an area of conceptual interest for those relying upon regime solutions and international legal agreements, to avoid conflict.

Post-negotiation implementation also indirectly underscores the fact that conflict resolution, peace-building and conflict prevention frequently requires a process of review and re-enforcement. Peace in that sense, is indeed a process.

3.2   Strategies for successful Negotiation Tips

3.2.1 Solicit the Other's Perspective

In a negotiating situation use questions to find out what the other person's concerns and needs might be. You might try:

What do you need from me on this?

What are your concerns about what I am suggesting / asking?

When you hear the other person express their needs or concerns, use listening responses to make sure you heard correctly.

For example:

So, you are saying that you are worried that you will get lost in the shuffle and we will forget about you...Is that right?
If I have this right, you want to make sure that the phones are covered over lunch?

3.2.2 State Your Needs

The other person needs to know what you need. It is important to state not only what you need but why you need it. Often, disagreement may exist regarding the method for solving an issue, but not about the overall goal.

For example:

I would like an hour on Tuesday to go to the doctor. I want to make sure I am healthy so I can contribute better to the organization.

3.2.3 Prepare Options Beforehand

Before entering into a negotiating session, prepare some options that you can suggest if your preferred solution is not acceptable. Anticipate why the other person may resist your suggestion, and be prepared to counter it with an alternative.

3.2.4 Don't Argue

Negotiating is about finding solutions...Arguing is about trying to prove the other person wrong. We know that when negotiating turns into each party trying to prove the other one wrong, no progress gets made. Don't

waste time arguing. If you disagree with something state your disagreement in a gentle but assertive way. Don't demean the other person or get into a power struggle.

3.2.5   Consider Timing

There are good times to negotiate and bad times. Bad times include those situations where there is:

a high degree of anger on either side
preoccupation with something else, and
a high level of stress

Time negotiations is necessary, to avoid these times. If they arise during negotiations, a time-out/rest period is in order, or perhaps rescheduling to a better time.

3.3   Barriers To Successful Negotiation

3.3.1 Viewing Negotiation As Confrontational

Negotiation need not be confrontational. In fact effective negotiation is characterized by, the parties working together to find a solution, rather than each party trying to WIN the contest of wills. Keep in mind that the attitude that you take in negotiation (e.g. hostile, cooperative) will set the tone for the interaction. If you are confrontational, you will have a fight on your hands.

3.3.2 Trying To Win At All Costs

If you "win", there must be a loser, and that can create more difficulty down the road. The best perspective in negotiation, is to try to find a solution where both parties "win". Try not to view negotiation as a contest that must be won.

3.3.3 Becoming Emotional

It's normal to become emotional during negotiation, that is important. However, as we get more emotional, we are less able to channel our negotiating behaviour in constructive ways. It is important to maintain control.

3.3.4 Not Trying To Understand the Other Person

Since we are trying to find a solution acceptable to both parties, we need to understand the other person's needs and wants, with respect to the issue. If we don't know what the person needs or wants, we will be unable to negotiate properly. Often, when we take the time to find out about the other person, we discover that there is no significant disagreement.

3.3.5 Focusing On Personalities, Not Issues

Particularly with people we don't like much, we have a tendency to get off track by focusing on how difficult or obnoxious the person seems. Once this happens, effective negotiation is impossible. It is important to stick to the issues, and put aside our degree of like or dislike for the individual.

3.3.6 Blaming the Other Person

In any conflict or negotiation, each party contributes, for better or for worse. If you blame the other person for the difficulty, you will create an angry situation. If you take responsibility for the problem, you will create a spirit of cooperation.

4.0 CONCLUSION

Negotiation is the process by which two or more parties with different needs and goals work to find a mutually acceptable solution to an issue. Because negotiating is an inter-personal process, each negotiating situation is different, and influenced by each party's skills, attitudes and style. We often look at negotiating as unpleasant, because it implies conflict, but negotiating, needs not be characterized by bad feelings, or angry behaviour. Understanding more about the negotiation process, allows us to manage our negotiations with confidence, increases the chance that the outcomes will be positive for both parties.

Negotiating is a complex process but one worth mastering. If you keep in mind that you are responsible for the success or failure of negotiation, and if you follow the tips above, you will find the process easier.

5.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, we introduced you to negotiation in conflict management, its meaning, process, stages, and challenges towards resolving conflict situations.

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENTS (TMAS)

i)   What is negotiation?

ii)   Outline the various measures/steps required to ensure successful negotiation

iii)   What are the ethical issues in mediation?

iv)   Elaborate the various elements of the negotiation process

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UNIT 4   ARBITRATION

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1.0   INTRODUCTION

Arbitration is defined by Ojielo (2001:1) as a procedure for the settlement of disputes, under which the parties agree to be bound by the decision of an arbitrator whose decision is, in general final, and legally binding on the parties. The authors of the Hal Bury's Laws of England define arbitration as 'the reference of dispute or difference between not less than two parties for determination after hearing both sides in judicial manner, by a person or persons other than a court of competent jurisdiction.' Arbitration is a process by which parties to a dispute, voluntarily refer their disputes to an impartial third person. An arbitrator selected by them for a decision based on the evidence and arguments to be presented before the arbitration tribunal.
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2.0   OBJECTIVES

On completion of studying this unit, you should be able to:

i)   Define arbitration as a element of conflict management;

ii)   Explain the history, meaning, process and challenges of arbitration;

iii)   Distinguish between the uses, and limits of arbitration.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Arbitration

Binding arbitration involves the presentation of a dispute to an impartial or neutral individual (arbitrator) or panel (arbitration panel) for issuance of a binding decision.   Unless arranged otherwise, the parties usually have the ability to decide who the individuals are, that serve as arbitrators. In some cases, the parties may retain a particular arbitrator (often from a list of arbitrators) to decide a number of cases or to serve the parties for a specified length of time (this is common when a panel is involved). Parties may select a new arbitrator for a each new dispute. A common understanding by the parties in all cases, however, is that they will be bound by the opinion of the decision maker rather than simply be obligated to 'consider' an opinion or recommendation. Under this method, the third party's decision generally has force of law but does not set a legal precedent. It is usually, not reviewable by the courts.

3.2   Kinds of Arbitration

Arbitration is voluntary when it is freely invited, or accepted by the parties to the controversy, without reference to law, when only good faith is involved in the acceptance of the decision. It is compulsory when the civil law compels the parties to the industrial conflict to submit to the decision of a board of arbitration. The law may require a legal board of arbitration to investigate a controversy, render a decision, and make public a report. The decision in this case has no binding power and no sanction other than that of public opinion. The law may provide a board which the parties may invoke if they wish, whose decision is binding when both parties join in request for action. Arbitration is governmental, when civil authority provides encouragement, opportunity, boards, of which employers and labourers may avail themselves in cases of dispute. In all such cases the law may or may not confer upon a board, power to administer oaths, to subpoena witnesses and compel the production of papers and books. In nearly all forms of arbitration the rule is to represent the conflicting interests by equal numbers of representatives who agree on an umpire and thus complete the organization.

3.2.1 Compulsory Arbitration

Sentiment throughout the powerful industrial nations seems to be unanimous against compulsory arbitration, which involves legal enforcement of decision. Labour unions, employers, and representatives of the public generally, in the United States, and in Europe as well, agree to oppose it. The sentiment against it, is particularly strong in the

United States, as is shown by the amount of testimony collected by the Industrial Commission. Compulsory investigation and decision with publication of facts and of decision is frequently favoured where great interests are involved, as in interstate commerce, and not a few are found who favour enforcement of decision where both parties invoke arbitration. New Zealand alone has attempted full compulsory arbitration. The reasons alleged against compulsory arbitration are numerous. It appears to invade the property rights of the employer, or the personal liberty of the labourer, since the former might be compelled by law to pay wages against his will, and the latter might be forced to labour in spite of himself. It is difficult to make the action of compulsory arbitration reciprocal, since the employer is more easily held than the labour union, unless the latter be incorporated and be made financially responsible, a condition from which the unions usually recoil. As arbitrators would not be governed by a rule of law, it is feared that sympathy with the weaker party might sway them, and that they would be inclined to "split the difference", thereby ensuring some gain to labour, a prospect which, it is said, might encourage strikes and prompt unreasonable demands. It is claimed that decisions unfavourable to labourers would tend to strengthen an already-growing suspicion of government and of courts.

Furthermore, the employer sees in compulsory arbitration, divided jurisdiction in his business, interference of outsiders who lack technical knowledge, probable overturning of discipline, and a weakening of his position, points that were made with some feeling against Cardinal Manning in his mediation in the great Dock Strike. Fear is expressed that employers would be driven to organize for self-protection, that they would be inclined to raise prices, or adulterate products, in order to offset losses sustained by adverse decisions of arbitration courts. There are, in addition constitutional difficulties which in most modern nations might make the operation of compulsory arbitration difficult, even if the public were to accept it. It is urged in favour of compulsory arbitration, that the prospect of it, would inevitably create a more conciliatory attitude of mind in employers and labourers, that common fear of undesirable results would develop the practice of trade agreement and conciliation, that society would thereby finally gain legal guarantee of industrial peace, and would be spared the enormous losses, confusion, and violence that result from strikes. The modified forms of compulsory arbitration — enforcement of decision when both parties agree to submit to arbitration and compulsory arbitration where vital public interests are immediately concerned, as in interstate commerce — avoid many of the objections that appear to promise good results.

3.2.2 Voluntary Arbitration

That opposition to compulsory arbitration is directed against the compulsory feature, and not against arbitration as such, is seen from the practical sympathy, and even enthusiasm, with which voluntary arbitration is received. In the United States, which may be taken as typical, we find organized labour, speaking strongly in favour of voluntary arbitration. It deplores strikes, provides careful scrutiny and a thorough test of feeling before permitting strikes, and generally provides for appeal to conciliation or arbitration.

Mr. Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labour, said before the Congress of Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration in Chicago, in 1894: "As one who has been intimately and closely connected with the labour movement for more than thirty years from boyhood, I say to you that I am yet to receive a copy of a Constitution of any general organization, or local organization, of labour which had not the provision that, before any strike shall be undertaken, conciliation or arbitration shall be tried; and, with nearly twelve thousand local trade unions in the United States, I think that this goes far to show that the organizations of labour are desirous of encouraging amicable arrangements of such schedules and conditions of labour as shall tend to peace." This is fully corroborated by the Industrial Commission, which said in its report, six years later, that "the rule of local and national trade unions, almost without exception, provides for conciliatory negotiations with employers before a strike may be entered upon".

In nearly all trade agreements, a provision is made for conciliation or arbitration whenever minor disputes of any kind arise. As to employers, one should recall that all employers who stand in friendly relations with union labour, either informally, or formally, in trade agreements, are presumptively favourable to arbitration. The employer who refuses to recognize or to deal with the labour union is inclined not to favour arbitration, since it involves recognition of the union. He may be willing to meet a committee of his men and hear complaints, and even grant demands, but his method is not that of arbitration. The following, from the Principles of the National Association of Manufacturers, adopted in 1904, is typical. The Association "favours an equitable adjustment of the differences between employers and employees by any amicable method that will preserve the rights of both parties", though at the same time the Association declares that it will permit no interference by organizations.

The Republican National Platform of 1896, as well as the Democratic, declared in favour of arbitration in interstate-commerce controversies.

Nothing on the subject appeared in either platform in 1900. The Republican platform of 1904 contained only an endorsement of President Roosevelt's mediation in the Coal Strike of 1902, while the Democratic platform declared directly for arbitration without qualification. A remarkable expression of public opinion in the United States is seen in the creation of the National Civic Federation which has held a number of national conferences in the interest of industrial peace. Representatives of employers, of labouring men, of political life, of churches, of academic circles, have met in these conventions and their endorsements of attempts to establish industrial peace, through trade agreements, conciliation, and voluntary arbitration, have been unanimous and enthusiastic. The *Protestant Episcopal Church* in the United States has a standing Committee on Labour and Capital, whose duty it is "to hold themselves in readiness to act as arbitrators should their services be desired between the men and their employers with the view to bringing about mutual conciliation and harmony in the spirit of the Prince of Peace". The action of Cardinal Manning in the Dock Strike in London, in 1889, together with his great efforts to establish boards of conciliation in the London District; the presence and activity of Archbishop Ireland in the National Civil Federation; that of Archbishop Ryan in the Philadelphia strike, in 1896; the work of Bishop Quigley in the strike of 1899, in Buffalo; of Bishop Burke in the Albany strike, in 1902; that of Bishop Hoban, of Scranton, in the street-car strike of 1903, and in 1906; the activity of Bishop Spalding in the anthracite-strike commission in 1902-3; the strong public approbation given by His Eminence Cardinal Gibbons, and as well many instances of successful activity by clergymen, all serve to show that Catholic leaders recognize the value of conciliation and arbitration in promoting industrial peace. In France, Belgium, Germany, and Italy we find the Catholic attitude equally strong. In these countries the endorsement of the organization of labour is most emphatic, as is also the demand by representative Catholics for recognition of organizations of labour, for boards of conciliation and arbitration, all of which is in harmony with the spirit and teaching of Leo XIII, who, in his encyclical on the condition of the working men, expresses strong approval of conciliatory methods in arranging disputes between labour and capital.

3.3   The limits of Arbitration

It would be a mistake to assume that arbitration is a panacea. It is not necessarily effective beyond the term for which a decision is made. While the elements of conflict remain in society, the possibility of dispute remains also. Hence, at best, arbitration is a makeshift, one of the highest importance no doubt, but it does not eradicate the evils to which it is applied. There are certain issues between employers and labourers which will not be submitted to arbitration; fundamental rights

claimed by each party and held to be beyond the realm of dispute. Thus, for instance, the labour union will not submit to arbitration the question of the right of the labourer to join a union or the right of the union to represent its members. On the other hand, the employer would not submit to arbitration, his right to manage his own business. The Industrial Commission remarks: "Whether it is as wise ordinarily to submit general questions to arbitration as questions of interpretation is perhaps doubtful. It is certainly the case that minor questions are more often arbitrated than those of great importance involving general conditions of future labour."

4.0   CONCLUSIONS

Arbitration in a general sense is a method of arranging differences between two parties by referring them to the judgment of a disinterested outsider whose decision the parties to a dispute agree in advance to, accept as in some way binding. The whole process of arbitration involves the reference of issues to an outside party, investigation, decision, acceptance or enforcement of it. The condition which invites arbitration is one wherein a number of persons of equal, or nearly equal power, disagree obstinately concerning a right, privilege, or duty, and refuse to come to terms themselves. The underlying assumptions are that the sense of fairness is dulled in the opponents by advocacy of self-interest, and by obstinacy, and that the judgment of a capable disinterested third party will more nearly approximate justice and equity. The motive which prompts appeal to arbitration is found finally in society's desire to eliminate force as a sanction of right, and to introduce effectively the principles of the ethical order into the settlement of disputes among its members. Courts, rules of law and procedure have as purpose the protection of order and justice by compelling men to settle vital differences in a peaceful manner.

In the mean time, society must always trust the common sense, honour, and conscience of men to arrange peacefully the differences which arise in everyday life. When, however, differences of actual or possible grave social consequences arise, wherein high principles or great interests are involved, and the parties in themselves, fail to agree, society attempts to secure order, by creating institutions to decide the situation according to predetermined rules of law. The movement to introduce arbitration in the settlement of disputes between labourers and employers is an effort in society to lift such conflicts from the plane of brute force to the level of the ethical order; to provide a rational method of settling such disputes as fail to be resolved by other peaceful means.

5.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, we examined arbitration as an element of conflict management, explored its history, meaning, process, challenges, use and its limitations.

6.0 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT (TMAS)

i) What is arbitration?

ii) What are the limits of arbitration?

iii) Outline and discuss the various types of arbitration.

iv) Elaborate on the various elements of the arbitration process

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UNIT 5   AFRICAN   TRADITIONAL   CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT

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1.0   INTRODUCTION

There is a variety of African Traditional Methods of dispute management. This explores some these various traditional approaches to conflict resolutions that are consideration the unique African Culture. The major point about conflict management in Africa is the emphasis on resolving of conflicts amicably through elders, traditional leaders, healing and reconciliation rituals. Thus, in contemporary traditional African conflict management practices the following key players can be identified: religious leaders, the Police and the armed forces, policy makers, the government and those involved in making modern law, the youth, especially those involved in cattle rustling and the rest of the community.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit you should be able to;

i.   Highlight the various conflict management approaches in Africa before colonialism;

ii.   Highlight the values that distinguish African conflict management approaches,

iii. Describe traditional conflict management approaches;

iv.   Explain the relevance of traditional conflict management approaches to the challenges of conflict in the contemporary world.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Case Studies of African Approaches

Below are samples of African methods as presented by some scholars.

3.1.1 African Traditional Methods In Kenya:

A Case Study Of The Pokot And Maasai Peace Building Cultures
Presented by Dr. Somjee Sultan from Peace Museums, Kenya.

The Maasai and Pokot are two ethnic groups that have been involved in ethnic clashes for over a decade. Both groups come from a Nilotic background, with territories that stretch over the political boundaries of East Africa.

Reconciliation among the two ethnic groups is not usually a one time event, like the signing of a peace accord after battle, it occurs in series, building on and affirming peace symbols with rituals related to the community's experiences and memories handed over from past generations.

3.1.2 Peace Concepts and Symbols

Peace concepts and symbols are used in this process of reconciliation. *Osotua* - The Maasai word for Peace *Osotua* and it means a gift out of relationship. The Maasai refer to the umbilical cord as *Osotua* for it symbolizes the first relationship, which is between the mother and her child. At birth the umbilical cord is cut reluctantly by taking the knife three times in a mock cutting motion and then stopped because all relationships are sacred and they may not be severed.

Then finally, grass is tied on either side of umbilical cord so that the mother and child may separate and continue to have a good relationship and hence separate in peace. Today grass is a symbol of peace among the Maasai and several other groups, and is carried to demonstrate peace during war and times of ethnic tensions. Grass mediates a relationship when individuals or groups live separately but in respect of each other's separateness as everyone else does after separating from the womb. This is a symbol of humanity that all people share irrespective of their ethnic loyalty.

Grass - This is another symbol used by the Maasai and other groups like the Kalenjin to demonstrate peace in war times and ethnic tensions. Whenever there is a fight and a Maasai picks up grass, the fighting stops because they believe they all come from one womb, one mother and the

one relationship. To the Kalenjin grass is pasture and pasture is milk for cows. So grass is a life-sustaining element.

Leketio - Among the Pokot is a pregnancy belt called *Leketio*, which supports pregnancy hence life. This belt is studded with cowrie shells. When the Pokot are fighting and a mother removes her pregnancy belt and puts it between the men, the fighting must be stopped. She does not have to be the biological mother for in this community, a mother is a mother of the community. It is the same among the 18 Kalenjin groups.

The Maasai word for *Osotua* is also the word for beauty. They believe that where there is no beauty there is no peace. For the Pokot the word is "*Pichio*" which also means beauty. Beauty follows peace. Where there is peace, there is beauty.

Ol Donyio Mount Kenya is a mountain of peace because it is a mountain of Keri - beauty. Amongst the Maasai it is referred to as "*Ol Donyio Keri*" because the white glaciers contrast with the dark valleys, forming one sacred mountain. This contrast reflects the contrast in human society. The Maasai accept and follow the philosophy of *Osotua*, which is not only harmony, but also harmony brought by living with contrast or differences. Thus they say, "*In disorder, there is order*".

This appears again in the discipline of making ornaments. They make 150 different types of ornaments following six aesthetic systems that are based on the understanding of the philosophy of peace. These then relate to other environmental symbols like trees. Trees are still living symbols of peace-making in this part of Africa.

Oloip - When the Maasai are making peace they sit under a shade of a particular tree. This shade is referred to as "*oloip*". But before they sit, each one of them has to drop all the weapons that he is carrying and then proceed under the tree to begin the negotiations.

When there has been a murder in the clan or within a group, the Maasai meet under a dead tree where there is no "*oloip*" because they are discussing something very grave. These are some of the different examples of a *culture of peace* that still exists today in resolving conflict. Very often ethnic groups that are neighbours to each other, use similar symbols. Peace is a holistic issue, a heritage within different groups in society.

3.1.3 African Traditional Methods in Rwanda:

A Case Study Of The *Agacaca* Method Of Conflict Resolution Amongst The Banyarwanda. B*y Dr. Ephraim Kamuhangire, Commissioner of Antiques and the Uganda Museum.*

For external forces sometimes misconstrue the reasons of the conflict and at times politicise or aggravate it to higher proportions than the real reasons for that conflict.

Today, the government of Rwanda has adopted *agacaca* to deal with some of the 1994 genocide cases rather than resorting to the international or Arusha tribunals.

Agacaca - Is a traditional mechanism of conflict resolution amongst the Banyarwanda. This method is used to resolve conflict at the grassroots level through dialogue. It is an intricate system of custom, tradition, norm and usage.

Urucaca - The word *Agacaca* comes from another word"*Urucaca*" which is a type of grass that is commonly found in various parts of Rwanda, Burundi, Western Uganda and Northern Tanzania. In Western Uganda this grass is referred to as *"Orucwamba"*.

Many African homes are clusters of clan and family enclosures and when such a cluster is well established, an evergreen grass, which is the *Urucaca,* grows around the home, especially in front of the home.

4.0   CONCLUSION

When there is a problem within the clan family or the neighbourhood, the elders gather at the site in front of the home and each party is then asked to present its case. The problem has to be solved amicably to the satisfaction of the parties involved and the culprit, buys a pot of local brew for the elders. This culprit is later fined or reprimanded by the elders.

The significance of such a dialogue of conflict resolution is that: It is safe and better for conflicting parties to resolve their differences as soon as the problem arises without going out of the inter-family or inter-clan confines which would otherwise require the intervention of external forces.

5.0   SUMMARY

In this unit we have examined the role of African traditional approaches to resolving conflict situations in the contemporary world. Some case studies were also discussed.

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT (TMAS)

i)   To what extent is traditional Media like song, drama and dance used in solving conflict?

ii)   Describe a traditional method of conflict resolution in your community of descent.

iii)   What role do symbols play in traditional conflict management?

iv)   How do we relate African traditional methods with the society today?

v)   African cultures used to counsel and resolve conflict peacefully. Discuss using a case study.

7.0   REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

For Nigerian Case studies see:

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MODULE 3

STRATEGIES OF PEACE BUILDING

Unit 1   Conflict Transformation
Unit 2   Peace Building and Early Warning System
Unit 3   Peacemaking and Peacekeeping
Unit 4   Disarmament and Arms Control
Unit 5   Preventive and Multi-track Diplomacy

UNIT 1   CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

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1.0   INTRODUCTION

A number of conflict theorists and practitioners, including John Paul Lederach, advocate the pursuit of "conflict transformation," as opposed to "conflict resolution" or "conflict management." Conflict transformation is different from the other two, Lederach asserts, because it reflects a better understanding of the nature of conflict itself. "Conflict resolution" implies that conflict is bad--hence something that should be ended. It also assumes that conflict is a short term phenomenon that can be "resolved" permanently through mediation or other intervention processes. "Conflict management" correctly assumes that conflicts are long term processes that often cannot be quickly resolved, but the notion of "management" suggests that people can be directed or controlled as

though they were physical objects. In addition, the notion of management suggests that the goal is the reduction or control of volatility more than dealing with the real source of the problem.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit, you should be able to:

i.   Identify positive and forward aspects of conflict management;

ii.   Explain these concepts, and describe their usage in conflict management; and

iii.   Apply aspects of it in day to day interaction with peers and within conflict prone situations.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Conflict Transformation

Conflict transformation, as described by Lederach, does not suggest that we simply eliminate or control conflict, but rather recognize and work with its "dialectic nature." By this he means that social conflict is naturally created by humans who are involved in relationships, yet once it occurs, it changes (i.e., transforms) the events, people, and relationships that created the initial conflict. Thus, the cause-and-effect relationship goes both ways--from the people and the relationships to the conflict and back to the people and relationships. In this sense, "conflict transformation" is a term that describes a natural occurrence. Conflicts change relationships in predictable ways, altering communication patters and patterns of social organization, altering images of the self and of the other.

Conflict transformation is also a prescriptive concept. It suggests that left alone, conflict can have destructive consequences. However, the consequences can be modified or transformed so that self-images, relationships, and social structures improve as a result of conflict instead of being harmed by it. Usually this involves transforming perceptions of issues, actions, and other people or groups. Since conflict usually transforms perceptions by accentuating the differences between people and positions, effective conflict transformation can work to improve mutual understanding. Even when people's interests, values, and needs are different, even non-reconcilable, progress has been made so that each group gains a relatively accurate understanding of each other.

Transformation also involves transforming the way conflict is expressed. It may be expressed competitively, aggressively, or violently, or it may be expressed through nonviolent advocacy, conciliation, or attempted cooperation. Unlike many conflict theorists and activists, who perceive mediation and advocacy as being in opposition to each other, Lederach sees advocacy and mediation as being different stages of the conflict transformation process. Activism is important in early stages of a conflict to raise people's awareness of an issue. Thus activism uses nonviolent advocacy to escalate and confront the conflict. Once awareness and concern is generated, then mediation can be used to transform the expression of conflict from "mutually destructive modes toward dialogue and interdependence." (Lederach, 1989 p. 14)

Such transformation, Lederach suggests, must take place at both the personal and the systemic level. At the personal level, conflict transformation involves the pursuit of awareness, growth, and commitment to change which may occur through the recognition of fear, anger, grief, and bitterness. These emotions must be outwardly acknowledged and dealt with in order for effective conflict transformation to occur.

Peacemaking also involves systemic transformation--the process of increasing justice and equality in the social system as a whole. This may involve the elimination of oppression, improved sharing of resources, and the non-violent resolution of conflict between groups of people. Each of these actions reinforces the other. In other words, transformation of personal relationships facilitates the transformation of social systems and systemic changes facilitate personal transformation. Key to both kinds of transformation are truth, justice, and mercy, as well as empowerment and interdependence. These concepts are frequently seen as being in opposition to each other; however, they must come together for reconciliation or "peace" to occur, Lederach asserts.

3.2   Forms of Conflict Transformation

According to Institute for Democracy in South Africa's (IDASA) "Toolkit on Peace Practice in Nigeria" (2004:2-26), transforming conflict requires a concerted effort at removing all the root causes of conflict, and moving the process to social change. It is a healing process that helps conflicting parties to put the past behind them and forge new relationships of harmony and cooperation. Conflict transformation addresses the wider social and political sources of a conflict and seeks to transform the negative energy of war into positive social and political change. Conflict transformation, therefore, is the most thorough and far-reaching strategies for bringing about sustainable positive peace in a conflict situation, to avoid a relapse into conflict or what experts call "return wars".

Conflict transformation theory assumes that conflict is caused by real problems of inequality and injustice expressed by competing social, cultural and economic frameworks. The goals of work based on conflict formation theory are:

i. To change structure and frameworks that cause inequality and injustice, including economic redistribution;

ii. To improve longer-term relationships and attitudes among the conflicting parties;

iii. To develop processes and systems that promotes empowerment, justice, peace, forgiveness, reconciliation, recognition etc.

Spencer and Spencer, l(1995:163-164) recommend that conflict transformation can take the following forms;

3.2.1 Actor transformation:

International changes in major conflict parties, or the emergence and recognition of new actors;

3.2.2 Issue transformation:

A change in the political agenda of the conflict, downplaying the importance of original conflict issues and emphasizing shared concern for new issues;

3.2.3 Rule transformation:

A re-definition of the norms, actors are expected to observed when dealing with each other;

3.2.4 Structural transformation:

This refers to profound changes relating to the entire structure of inter-actor relations. Conflict transformation is therefore an integrative approach to conflict resolution, it involves a re-definition of the relationship between the conflict parties through which opportunities are opened and new compensation arrangements are introduced. This can create a framework based on a positive-Sum, rather than a Zero –sum agreement. New cooperative arrangements are initiated in which the previously disputed issues become less or no longer relevant, and other issues or values become more relevant to all parties to the conflict, Schmid, (2000:30).

4.0   CONCLUSION

The issues that fall under the heading of peace processes and conflict transformation could also be labelled peace-building. To some extent, conflict transformation – like the issue that it seeks to replace, namely, deep-rooted conflict – assumes a commitment to a process of building and sustaining peace over an extensive period of time. To that extent, there is a sense that peace-building, per se, is regarded from a shorter-term perspective that is perhaps, a bit more mechanistic.

Peace processes and conflict transformation normally are viewed in the context of confidence-building measures, reconstruction of civil society and re-building of communities. How this actually is to be done is an issue that has triggered considerable debate.

After reviewing means of dealing with conflict in multi-ethnic societies (e.g., partition, succession, power-sharing), Lijphart, for example, opts totally for power-sharing as the only choice for creating enduring peace. Lembarch argues, however, that the reason power sharing works is because of certain cultural differences, including acculturated attitudes towards compromise, and McRae concludes that power-sharing does not work in situations of intractable conflict.

The conclusion that one should draw from such debates is not their own intractability, but rather the fact that an array of practical variables are being drawn into the debate which could result in very useful typologies of appropriate peace processes and preferred outcomes.

5.0   SUMMARY

In this unit we have examined the various types of conflict transformation, and their classification according to the concepts of conflict transformation, peace building, and early warning systems.

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT (TMAS)

i)   What is conflict transformation?

ii)   Sketch the debate on conflict management vs conflict transformation

iii)   What forms can transform take in conflict situations

7.0   REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

Adam Curle, (1995) *Another Way: Positive response to contemporary violence*, (Oxford: Jon Carpenter Publishing.

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UNIT 2   PEACE-BUILDING AND EARLY WARNING SYSTEM

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1.0   INTRODUCTION

Peace–building, as concept, gained popularity in the recent times through the widely cited publication of Boutros Ghali (1992:11) former UN Secretary-General entitled: **An Agenda for Peace.** He defines "post-conflict Peace-building" as "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict". International Alert (1995) cited in Albert (2001:131) Considers peace-building to be "the employment of measures to consolidate peaceful relations and create an environment, which deters the emergence or escalation of tensions which may lead to conflict".

2.0   OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit you should be able to:

i)   Explain peace-building and early warning systems as important dimensions of conflict management; and

ii)   Describe the various strategies of peace-building and importance of early warning systems.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Peace-Building and EWS

To the British Army (1997:2) cited in (Albert 2001:131) peace –building includes:

> Action which support political, economic, social and military measures and structures aiming to strengthen and solidity political settlements in order to redress the causes of conflict. These include mechanism to identify and support structures that tend to consolidate peace, advance a sense of confidence and well-being and support economic reconstruction.

In 1995, Boutros Boutrous- Ghali came up with the concept of "Pre-conflict peace-building". This was because in 1995 he used the concept of "peace-building" to refer exclusively to military and civilian post-conflict support for forestalling future eruptions by strengthening structures necessary for promoting sustainable peace and post-war reconstruction. He describes "Pre-conflict peace-building" as activities including "(de) militarization, the control of small arms, institutional reform, improved police and judicial systems, the monitoring of human rights, electoral reform and social and economic development" Bertrand, (1997:34).

Peace-building, therefore, means undertaking programmes designed to address the causes of conflict and the grievances of the past and to promote long-term stability and justice. Peace-building and conflict transformation can therefore be seen as back-and-forth concepts. Conflict transformation is part of peace-building but peace-building essentially involves more enduring and sustained activities that take longer period to accomplish.

3.2   Peace-Building Strategies

3.2.1 Promoting Interaction (Contact Hypothesis)

The contact hypothesis is the "belief that interaction between individuals belonging to different groups will reduce ethnic prejudice and inter-group tension". Interaction can come through trade, business, trade unions, professional meetings, sports and the like. However, research shows that contact only improves attitudes when that contact is intimate, pleasant, between equals, socially supported, and in pursuit of common goals. Absent those conditions, increased contact may lead to increased

hostility. Many theorists question whether inter-group conflicts can be resolved by interpersonal contact. When contact does lead to improved personal attitudes, the changed individuals face a re-entry problem as they return to their communities. Their new more positive attitudes toward the opponent are likely to be greeted with suspicion by their own community. Hence, contact alone is not sufficient to build peace.

3.2.2 Contact with Forgiveness

Forgiveness has been an important element of religious peace traditions. These traditions emphasize reconciliation. Martin Luther King and Gandhi both exemplify this tradition. This approach tends to emphasize adversaries' common humanity, common suffering as a basis for understanding and redemption, shared responsibility for the acts of the adversary, and the obligation to love the enemy.

This approach can have great impacts on individuals. However, there are two criticisms. First, the forgiveness approach focuses on cultural factors, and neglects structural factors. Again, there is some doubt that personal transformations can address group conflicts. Second, the approach may not be pragmatic enough for wide-scale use, as it is based on a degree of religious faith that many do not share.

3.2.3 Contact with Super-ordinate Goals

A super ordinate goal is "an urgent goal that could only be achieved by cooperation between the conflicting groups."[p. 137] Experimental research has found that pursuit of such goals can help reduce stereotyping and hostility between adversarial groups. Drawing on this research, some theorists have suggested the creation of supra-national institutions to pursue key economic and social goals. Their hope is that the interdependence will broaden narrowly defined identities and reduce conflict. Ryan cautions that when the costs and benefits of interdependence are not equally shared, interdependence may become a source of conflict. The creation of European supranational bodies has had mixed effects.

This approach has had some success on local levels. In Sri Lanka multiethnic teams have been formed to dig wells and rebuild houses. In Northern Ireland the mid-Ulster Basketball Club brings together children and parents from both Protestant and Catholic communities.

3.2.4 Achieving Economic Development

Violent conflict usually results in underdevelopment. It is often hoped that economic development can reduce ethnic violence. However, Ryan is critical of this idea. Ryan notes that there is little evidence that development promotes peace. He points out that this theory tends to "overstate the power of economic development to change identity and underestimate the attachment to ethnic identity, whatever the economic situation."[p. 141] For example, standards of living were rising when violence erupted in Northern Ireland. Inequalities in the distribution of new wealth may simply reinforce existing divisions, or may themselves spark new conflict. Still, economic development which is sensitive to cultural differences and which aims at fulfilling local needs and increasing local participation could be a valuable element in the peace-building process.

The Malaysian case shows the complex relations between economic development and peace. Through the 1960s, Malaysia's increasing wealth tended to go to the non-Malay communities. Ethnic tensions increased, and rioting broke out in 1969. The government instituted policies designed to distribute economic benefits more evenly. Ethnic violence was largely ended. However Indian and Chinese communities resented the perceived favouritism shown Malays. Growing wealth disparities within the Malay community have been ignored in pursuit of inter-group parity. Poor Malays have demanded more positive discrimination in their favour, and that has increased concerns in the non-Malay communities. Finally the move toward a state-enforced economic distribution has undermined consocial politics and the quality of democracy in Malaysia.

3.2.5 Contact with Confidence Building

Effective communication and negotiations require some degree of trust between parties. Confidence building measures aim to create that trust. One important confidence building strategy is the Gradual Reduction in Tensions (GRIT) approach. GRIT begins with one side making a verifiable, unilateral concession, and signalling its expectation that the other side will respond in kind. The concession should involve some cost, but should not affect safety and security interests. If the other side responds in kind, a series of unilateral initiatives may ensue. If not, nothing substantial has been lost. Third-parties can help the process along by verifying concessions or maintaining neutral zones. Confidence building measures can be undermined by the well-established psychological tendency toward "hypothesis conformation." People tend to interpret others' actions in ways that reinforce their existing attitudes toward those others. And so, conciliatory gestures are

likely to be misinterpreted, or to be attributed to circumstances beyond the other's control.

3.2.6 Contact with Education

Education for mutual understanding (EMU) or multi-cultural education focuses on children and young adults, and seeks to produce generational changes in attitude. Such educational programs emphasize reason, imagination, critical thinking, openness and love of truth. They introduce students to the languages, cultures, histories and religions of other societies in addition to their own. The EMU movement has been influential in Northern Ireland. Ryan cautions that schools are only one source of influence for children. Formal education alone is unlikely to overcome negative images perpetuated by the family, community, church and media.

Prejudice reduction in adults is also an important part of peace-building. Programs to reduce prejudices include formal education, community conferences or festivals, mass media campaigns, encouragement from respected leaders, and individual therapy. Attempts to address prejudice encounter the same "hypothesis conformation" problem noted above. Prejudices against others may also play a significant role in maintaining an individual's own positive self- image.

Just as personal attitudes must be examined, so must cultural attitudes. National identities can be exclusionary. Intellectuals and artists can play an important role in peace- building by examining cultural traditions and myths, by deconstructing exclusionist myths, and by reconstructing a more pluralist, inclusive set of cultural myths and traditions. The Field Day project in Northern Ireland is an example of such cultural exploration. Field Day is an association of poets, actors and playwrights who seek to shift understanding of Irish culture away from the romantic Celtic approach of Yeats by drawing on the more pluralistic approaches of Joyce and Beckett. The group is also producing an anthology of Irish literature which highlights the various traditions which have contributed to Irish literature.

3.2.7 Early Warning Systems for Peace Building

An Early Warning System (EWS) is an organized mechanism for tracking, measuring and monitoring conflict and its progression in a given society.   Diller (1997:7) describes Early Warning Systems as mechanisms or sets of procedures designed to detect, process and communicate signals of potential or impending threat to allow early counter-measures to prevent or mitigate negative impact. Diller further describes Early Warning as "process of monitoring, recording,

analyzing, and transmitting information about escalating conflict to enable responses to avert or mitigate destructive consequences".

4.0   CONCLUSION

The foregoing definitions notwithstanding, an interesting definition is that given by Dorn. Dorn (1997:162-163) defines Early Warning as: 'The act of alerting a recognized authority (e.g. UN Security Council) to the threat of a new (or renewed) armed conflict at a sufficiently early stage for that authority to attempt to take preventive action.' As the International Alert, (1995) puts it;

> Early Warning is the backbone of preventive diplomacy. It involves the identification of tensions and potential crisis situations, which may escalate into conflict. Advance information of this kind permits public pressure, international or otherwise, to be applied to the parties in conflict. Early Warning may also involve monitoring existing social conflict and seizing new opportunities, which may arise to contribute to their resolution.

5.0   SUMMARY

In this unit, we have examined the relation between peace building and early warning mechanism as it applies to conflict management. Early Warning has a twin concept referred to as Early Response. The former is of no use if not responded to early enough. The latter has been described as a category of pro-active and re-active measures to reduce tensions and block conflict escalation. It involves both Early Prevention and Early Action. A synergy of the two concepts brought about the acronym EWER (Early Warning and Early Response) tracking.

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT (TMAS)

i)   What is early warning system?

ii)   What do you understand by Gradual Reduction in Tensions (GRIT) ?

iii)   What do you understand by the contact hypothesis?

iv)   What is peace building?

7.0   REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

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UNIT 3   PEACEMAKING AND PEACE KEEPING

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1.0   INTRODUCTION

Peace building is a long term process which involves so many things like peacekeeping and peace making. So, in this unit, peacekeeping and peacemaking would be adequately dealt with.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

i)   Explain peacemaking as a process of Peace building;

ii)   Explain peacekeeping as an element of peace process;

iii)   Describe how to create an enabling environment for the peace process.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Peacemaking

Curle notes that traditional methods of diplomatic peacemaking have been unsuccessful in dealing with the many "mini-wars." Traditional diplomacy rests on the assumption that the combatants are rational and motivated by self interested objectives, rather than by violence or destruction. Curle argues that "such assumptions are not valid in the tangle of phobias, cavorting egos, crazed convictions, vanity and greed that make up the psychic worlds of the mini-war." This situation is paralleled in the rise of motiveless, random violent crime.

It is in this context that peacemaking becomes important. Curle argues that peacemaking is primarily a psychological activity. Peacemakers seek not just to settle a conflict but to create more peaceful relations between the parties. To be effective, peacemakers must cultivate a strong awareness of themselves, of others, and of the interconnectedness of life. Peacemakers must also cultivate a nonviolent attitude of mind. Nonviolence is more than just the will to refrain from violence; it is "an emotional orientation towards loving care and concern."

Aid in development has often been thought of as a way to promote peace by promoting prosperity. Curle points out that much of this development aid has not benefited the poor masses, and has even harmed them. If aid is to be an effective element in peacemaking, we must revise our ideas of development. Curle argues that development should focus on assuring all people of sufficient resources to live and flourish, a safe environment, the satisfaction of a rich cultural life, and of stimulus for further growth and human development.

Nonviolence training is a fairly recent approach to peacemaking. Workshops have become common. These workshops generally focus on training people to act nonviolently--, to prevent and mediate conflicts, to support victims of violence, and to train other to do the same.

3.2   Peacemaking Workshops (A Case Study)

Curle discusses the Peace Centre in Osijek, Croatia and argues that it offers a model for dealing with violent alienation. The Centre's founding members were concerned not only with the physical damage caused by the war, but also with the psychological damage. The central goal of the Centre is to "both stimulate and preserve the values on which harmony can eventually be restored."[p. 129] The Centre has a strong nonviolent orientation, and focuses on offering healing and care wherever needed. Centre activities include nonviolent intervention to protect human rights, education programs, and a variety of programs for refugees. Curle argues that the Centre models an alternative to the alienated and militarized mindset. This alternative has "spread like leaven through the community, changing it; to use another metaphor, it is the antidote to the death dealing virus of alienation."[p. 128]

Curle draws five implications for UN policy from the Osijek case. First, the use of UN military force should be sharply limited. Second, peacemaking should focus on preventing or ending violence. Preventative mediation should take into account the need to make psychological changes in the parties. More use should be made of nonviolent workshops. Third, preventative work will be more effective if pursued in cooperation with local people. Fourth, the UN should shift

some of its attention from governments and officials to the people themselves. Finally, regional and even sub-regional groups would be better able to organize culturally specific development activities and mediation training than the UN. Curle concludes by sharing four basic understandings, reached after and confirmed by a lifetime of experience. The first is that violence is often pursued in the mistaken belief that some greater good will come of it. The second is that bad actions do not come from bad people, but are performed by confused, unskilled or misdirected people. Third, Curle observes, "violence lies not so much in action as in a state of mind: it is ultimately the violence of the heart rather than of the body which damages us."[p. 135] finally, we all share a common human nature. Our common humanity is the foundation of a basic equality, which calls on us to care for each other as we care for ourselves.

3.3   Peacekeeping

Dealing with serious conflict is a bit like emergency medicine. The first step is to protect the injured person from further harm. Only then can one start the treatment and then healing processes (surgery and recovery, for example). In violent conflict the first step is to get people to stop hurting each other. This is often done by putting a neutral intermediary between the fighting factions to physically keep them apart.   This is termed "peacekeeping." Once the shooting has stopped, then political leaders will sit down to try to negotiate a political resolution to the problem – which is generally referred to as "peacemaking." Lastly, efforts will be made to diminish the hostility and the fear among the ordinary people--this is referred to as peacebuilding.   Sometimes the order of these activities is switched around--peacekeeping may come after peacemaking, instituted as part of the settlement agreement (for example, U.S. peacemakers entered the Sinai after the negotiation of the Camp David Accords).   At other times peacebuilding can take place before peacemaking succeeds. This happens more and more as efforts are made to reconcile the differences between citizens even when the governments cannot negotiate a settlement of their differences.

Since peacekeeping principles are most generally applied to violent or at least potentially violent confrontations, this topic will be discussed first. We will then show how these basic principles can be extended to include non-violent types of force.

Most often peacekeeping is done by military personnel. In international conflicts it is done with a neutral, usually multi-national force.   Often these forces are organized and sponsored by the United Nations and/or regional organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS) or the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Typically, the

forces are lightly or entirely unarmed--they work through persuasion and moral force, not physical force. Their job is to monitor cease-fires, patrol demilitarized zones, and to create buffer zones between fighting forces, so that the fighting will stop. Sometimes they are assisted by other, non-military personnel such as police offers, humanitarian aid workers, and/or citizen diplomats and peace workers.

4.0   CONCLUSION

Since they are only lightly armed, peacekeepers cannot succeed unless the warring parties want to stop fighting. If they do not, there is little peacekeepers can do. If they stay in between the groups, they are likely to get killed. In this case, the sponsoring organization needs to withdraw the peacekeepers, and consider undertaking what is called "an enforcement action" instead, where well-armed troops move in to stop a war. (This occurred in Gulf war, in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Albania, for example.)

In addition to the cooperation of the parties, several other factors are important to the success of peacekeeping operations. One is the provision of adequate resources. The UN has often had a difficult time getting the help it needs – either in terms of manpower or in terms of equipment for the peacekeepers--from the member states. This has meant that UN peacekeeping forces are often much smaller than what is needed and more poorly equipped. Needless to say, such shortages compromise effectiveness. A second problem is the peacekeeper's mandate – when they are told they are supposed to do. When their mandate is relatively narrow and clear--when they are just supposed to keep the warring factions apart--they have generally been successful. When their directives are broader and less clear--when they are asked to provide humanitarian assistance, police protection, election monitoring, and a host of other services for which they are not equipped or trained--their effectiveness has not been as great. Problems also arise when peacekeepers find themselves being drawn into the conflict on one side.

5.0   SUMMARY

In this unit we have examined the concepts of peace making and peace keeping; and their application to the conflict management process.

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENTS (TMAS)

1.   What is peace keeping?

2.   Distinguish between peace building and peace making.

3.   How useful are peacemaking workshops?

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UNIT 4   DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL

Table of Contents

1.0   INTRODUCTION

Disarmament is essentially a post-conflict activity targeted at retrieving arms from armed ethnic guerrillas, disbanding the groups, making members to renounce their membership and subsequently forming integrated national armed forces for the emerging post-conflict state.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

Upon completion of this unit, you should be able to:

i.   Explain disarmament and arms control as two important concepts in peace building;

ii.   Explain the stages and trace their evolution.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Disarmament

Disarmament means handling in or surrendering of arms and weapons by the various armed ethnic formations engaged in a conflict. Dupuy et al. (1986:73) define disarmament as removal or elimination of arms, usually following cessation of hostilities, voluntary or compulsory.

Disarmament encompasses three other activities in a back- and-forth relationship.   They are: demobilization, demilitarization and re/integration.

3.1.1 Demobilization

This is the nullification or disbandment of the structural set up or formation of the armed ethnic guerrillas.

3.1.2 Demilitarization

This means the official denunciation of the hitherto existing armed ethnic formations.

3.1.3 Reintegration

This is the putting together of elements from the various groups engaged in armed conflict to form national armed forces based on an agreed arrangement.

3.2 The Movement for Disarmament

The movement for disarmament has varied from nation to nation over time.

In the United States, where nuclear weapons were first created, the movement for disarmament had a few prominent proponents in the earliest days of the Cold War who argued that the creation of an international watchdog organization could be used to enforce a ban against the creation of nuclear weapons. During the 1960s, a much stronger popular movement against nuclear weapons began to develop, rallying primarily around the fear of nuclear fallout from nuclear testing. After the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963), which prohibited atmospheric testing, the movement against nuclear weapons somewhat subsided by the 1970s (and was replaced in part by a movement against nuclear power). In the 1980s, though, a popular movement for nuclear disarmament again gained strength in the light of the weapons build-up and rhetoric of President Ronald Reagan. After the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, though, the momentum would again fade.

In the USSR, voices against nuclear weapons were few and far between as there was no "public" to speak of as a political factor. Certain citizens who had become prominent enough to be safe to criticize the Soviet government, of which Andrei Sakharov is exemplary, did speak out against nuclear weapons to little effect.

Only one country has been known to ever dismantle their nuclear arsenal completely—the apartheid government of South Africa apparently developed half a dozen crude fission weapons during the 1980s, but they were dismantled in the early 1990s. After the fall of the Soviet Union, a number of former Warsaw Pact states (Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan) found themselves in possession of Soviet nuclear weapons, but they were apparently given to Russia (who took responsibility and ownership of the Soviet arsenal), though due to a clerical error it has been reported that Ukraine may still be in possession of some number of nuclear missiles.

A number of nations have aborted nuclear weapons programs that were not successful as well.

Many organisations and networks exist which distribute information and put pressure on governments, e.g. Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). There was also a strong peace camp movement.

In 1955, 11 leading scientists and intellectuals signed the Russell-Einstein Manifesto, warning of the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and calling on world leaders to find peaceful solutions to international tensions. This was followed in 1957 by the first of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs.

3.3   Arms Control (Definition)

Arms control is a broad term alluding to a range of political concepts and aims. In international affairs, arms control generally refers to limitations on the development, production, stockpiling, proliferation, and usage of weaponry. Arms control typically takes the form of multi-lateral efforts to agree to such limitations upon consenting participants in treaties and agreements, although it can also include efforts by a nation or group of nations to enforce limitations upon a non-consenting country.

On a national or community level, *arms control* can amount to programs to control the access of citizens to weapons. This is often referred to as *gun control*, as firearms are the primary focus of such efforts in most places.

While arms control is often seen as synonymous with disarmament, this is not always the case. Especially in international affairs, arms control often does not affect current weapons or force their demobilization, but instead limits future development, production, and use of weapons. Multi-lateral arms control treaties are often seen by participants as a way to avoid costly arms races which would prove counter-productive to

national aims. Some are used as ways to stop the spread of certain military technologies (such as nuclear weaponry or missile technology) in return for assurances to potential developers that they will not be victims of those technologies. Additionally, some arms control agreements are entered in order to limit the damage done by warfare, especially to civilians and the environment, which is seen as bad for all participants regardless of who wins a war.

While arms control treaties are seen by many peace proponents as a key tool against war, by the participants, they are often seen as simple ways to limit the high costs of the development and building of weapons, and even reduce the costs associated with war itself. Arms control can even be a way of maintaining the viability of military action by limiting those weapons that would make war so costly and destructive as to make it no longer a viable tool for national policy.

Enforcement of arms control agreements has proven difficult over time. Most agreements rely on the continued desire of the participants to abide by the terms to remain effective. Usually, when a nation no longer desires to abide by the terms, they usually will seek to either covertly circumvent the terms or to simply end their participation in the treaty. This was seen in Washington Naval Treaty, where most participants sought to exceed the limitations, some more legitimately than others.

The United States developed better technology to get better performance from their ships while still within weight limits, the United Kingdom exploited a loop-hole in the terms, the Italians misrepresented the weight of their vessels, and when up against the limits, Japan simply left the treaty. The nations which violated the terms of the treaty did not suffer great consequences for their actions. Within little more than a decade, the treaty was abandoned. The Geneva Protocol has lasted longer and been more successful at being respected, but still, nations have violated it at will when they have felt the need. Enforcement has been haphazard, with measures, more, a matter of politics than adherence to the terms. This meant sanctions and other measures tended to be advocated against violators primarily by their natural political enemies, while violations have been ignored or given only token measures by their political allies.

More recent arms control treaties have included more stringent terms on enforcement of violations as well as verification. This last arrangement, has been a major obstacle to effective enforcement, as violators often attempt to covertly circumvent the terms of the agreements. Verification is the process of determining whether or not a nation is complying with the terms of an agreement, and involves a combination of release of such information by participants as well as some way to allow participants to examine each other to verify that information. This often

involves as much negotiation as the limits themselves, and in some cases questions of verification have led to the breakdown of treaty negotiations (for example, verification was cited as a major concern by opponents of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, ultimately not ratified by the United States).

Nations may remain in a treaty while seeking to break the limits of that treaty as opposed to simply withdrawing from it. This is for two major reasons. To openly defy an agreement, even if one withdraws from it, often is seen in a bad light politically and can carry diplomatic repercussions. Additionally, if one remains in an agreement, competitors who are also participatory may be held to the limitations of the terms, while withdrawal releases your opponents to make the same developments you are making, limiting the advantage of that development.

3.4   History of Arms Control

One of the first recorded attempts in arms control was a set of rules laid down in ancient Greece by the Amphictyonic Leagues. Rulings specified how war could be waged, and breaches of this could be punished by fines or by war.

There were few recorded attempts to control arms during the period between this and the rise of the Roman Catholic Church. The church used its position as a trans-national organisation to limit the means of warfare. The 989 Peace of God (extended in 1033) ruling protected non-combatants, agrarian and economic facilities, and the property of the church from war. The 1027 Truce of God also tried to prevent violence between Christians. The Second Lateran Council in 1139 prohibited the use of crossbows against other Christians, although it did not prevent its use against non-Christians.

The development of firearms led to an increase in the devastation of war. The brutality of wars during this period led to efforts to formalise the rules of war, Nuclear No with, humane treatment for prisoners of war or wounded, as well as rules to protect non-combatants and the pillaging of their property. However during the period until the beginning of the 19th century few formal arms control agreements were recorded, except theoretical proposals and those imposed on defeated armies.

One treaty which was concluded was the Strasbourg Agreement of 1675. This is the first international agreement limiting the use of chemical weapons, in this case, poison bullets. The treaty was signed between France and Germany

The 1817 Rush-Bagot Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom was the first arms control treaty of what can be considered the modern industrial era, leading to the demilitarisation of the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain region of North America. This was followed by the 1871 Treaty of Washington which led to total demilitarisation.

The industrial revolution led to the increasing mechanisation of warfare, as well as rapid advances in the development of firearms; the increased potential of devastation (which was seen in the battlefields of World War I) led to Tsar Nicholas II of Russia calling together the leaders of 26 nations for the First Hague Conference in 1899. The Conference led to the signing of the Hague Convention (of 1899) that led to rules of declaring and conducting warfare as well as the use of modern weaponry, and also led to the setting up of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

A Second Hague Conference was called in 1907 leading to additions and amendments to the original 1899 agreement. A Third Hague Conference was called for 1915, but this was abandoned due to the First World War.
After the First World War, the League of Nations was set up which attempted to limit and reduce arms. However the enforcement of this policy was not effective. Various naval conferences were held during the period between the First and Second World Wars to limit arms.

The 1925 Geneva Conference led to the banning of chemical weapons (as toxic gases) during war as part of the Geneva Protocol. The 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, whilst ineffective, attempted for "providing for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy".

After World War II the United Nations was set up as a body to promote world peace. In 1957 the International Atomic Energy Agency was set up to monitor the proliferation of nuclear technology, including that of nuclear weapons. The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed to prevent further spread of nuclear weapons technology to countries outside the five that already possessed them: the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and China.

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and Soviet Union in the late 1960s/early 1970s led to further weapons control agreements. The SALT I talks led to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and an *Interim Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement* (see SALT I, both in 1972. The SALT II talks started in 1972 leading to agreement in 1979. Due to the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan the United States never ratified the treaty; however the agreement was honoured by both sides.

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was signed between the United States and Soviet Union in 1987 and ratified in 1988, leading to an agreement to destroy all missiles with ranges from 500 to 5,500 kilometres.

The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention was signed banning the manufacture and use of chemical weapons.

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties were signed, as START I and START II by the US and Soviet Union further restricting weapons. This was further moved on by the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was signed in 1996 banning all nuclear explosions in all environments, for military or civilian purposes.

3.5   List of Treaties and Conventions related to Arms Control

Some of the more important international arms control agreements follow:

Washington Naval Treaty, 1922 (as part of the naval conferences)
Geneva Protocol on chemical and biological weapons, 1925 and its two augmentations:
Biological Weapons Convention, 1972
Chemical Weapons Convention, 1993
Outer Space Treaty, 1967
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 1972
Environmental Modification Convention, 1976
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 1987
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), 1987
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 1992
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), 1994
Wassenaar Arrangement, 1996
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 1996
Open Skies Treaty, 2002
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), 2003

4.0   CONCLUSION

More recent arms control treaties have included more stringent terms on enforcement of violations as well as verification. This last arrangement, has been a major obstacle to effective enforcement, as violators often attempt to covertly circumvent the terms of the agreements. Verification is the process of determining whether or not a nation is complying with

the terms of an agreement, and involves a combination of release of such information by participants as well as some way to allow participants to examine each other to verify that information. This often involves as much negotiation as the limits themselves, and in some cases questions of verification have led to the breakdown of treaty negotiations (for example, verification was cited as a major concern by opponents of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, ultimately not ratified by the United States).

Nations may remain in a treaty while seeking to break the limits of that treaty as opposed to simply withdrawing from it. This is for two major reasons. To openly defy an agreement, even if one withdraws from it, often is seen in a bad light politically and can carry diplomatic repercussions. Additionally, if one remains in an agreement, competitors who are also participatory may be held to the limitations of the terms, while withdrawal releases your opponents to make the same developments you are making, limiting the advantage of that development.

5.0   SUMMARY

In this unit, we have examined the origin, purpose, and role of disarmament and arms control in conflict management. The role of the various agencies, and the challenges face therein was also discussed.

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENTS (TMAS)

i)   What do you understand by the arms race?

ii)   What is the origin and purpose of disarmament?

iii)   What is arms control?

iv)   How effective are arms control treaties?

v)   What are the challenges of disarmament?

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UNIT 5 PREVENTIVE AND MULTI-TRACK DIPLOMACY

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The term "diplomacy" refers to the interaction between nation-states. Traditionally, diplomacy was carried out by government officials--diplomats--who negotiated treaties, trade policies, and other international agreements. The process of negotiations ranges from very formal to informal, but it tends to be fairly adversarial and competitive, relying on distributive or positional bargaining strategies that assume a win-lose situation.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit, you should be able to:

i) Explain diplomacy as a concept,

ii) Describe the role of diplomacy its various dimensions,

iii) Describe the evolution of diplomacy as an approach to conflict management.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Diplomacy

The goal is to maintain power over weaker nations and a balance of power with nations of equal status. Although conflict resolution theorists have developed a multi-faceted understanding of power, diplomacy still focuses on the "power over" approach, believing that power is a zero sum commodity--the more you have, the less I have. This encourages positional bargaining, rather than a more integrative or cooperative approach.

Although several efforts have been made to alter the adversarial nature of traditional diplomacy, none has been very successful. The first was the League of Nations which called for open diplomacy and collective security. Although the plan was developed by the U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, the United States failed to support the idea, and the League quickly failed.

The United Nations was a second attempt at collective security and international cooperation. The UN has certainly been much more successful than the League of Nations, but it still has not been able to overcome power rivalries (especially during the Cold War, but, to some extent, even now) and lacks the money to enable it to completely carry out its mandate. For this reason, and given the general ineffectiveness of traditional diplomacy, more and more attention is being given to what has come to be known as "track two" or "citizen" diplomacy-- international negotiations carried out by private citizens, rather than official diplomats. Most advocates of track two approaches argue that they are not a replacement for track one, but rather a supplement to them. Often track two approaches can precede official negotiations, laying the groundwork and establishing a certain level of trust between people; sometimes they occur simultaneously.

The art of diplomacy has a long-storied history. It is the practice of verbal discussion with the intent to influence, transmit a position or negotiate on a given issue or situation for a mutually acceptable outcome. It is often called an art because each situation requires a unique mixture of empathy, persuasion, bluster, and cajoling amongst other things. The sentiment expressed in the Stinnett and Goldberg quotes above is typical of how diplomacy has often been viewed. It has traditionally been a method of conducting interstate relations involving discussions and negotiations between heads of state or their representatives in order to advance national interests. As one may imagine, these efforts may not always be sincere. More broadly, however, diplomacy often involves efforts to keep channels of

communication open between different sides of a dispute in the hopes that tension can be diffused and violence averted. Modern diplomacy is in many ways more complicated with intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) involved and the globalization of communication and transportation opening up new avenues for the conduct of diplomacy and helped new participants get involved.

Much of modern diplomacy continues to involve the interaction of state and/or official actors in what has become known as Track I diplomacy. These diplomats are acting in an official capacity with the authority and on behalf of the state or IGO they are representing. The entity they are representing may have a direct stake in the dispute or they may be acting as an intermediary. The goal, if a disputant, is to realize an outcome as favourable to one's side as possible. Third parties often become involved in the discussion in order to find ways through stalemates or to even get the parties talking in an effort at peacemaking. This being said, much of diplomacy is routine in order that issues do not reach crisis level.

There has been recognition that high-level official engagement is not always effective. Animosity and distrust may be too prevalent. The sides may question the motivations of representatives from third party states or from IGOs. In other instances, these third parties may lack a strategic interest or deem it too risky to get involved. Particularly in these circumstances, informal channels of communication can be effective at maintaining dialogue. These instances of Track II diplomacy are more subtle and   personal, involving conflict resolution professionals from non-governmental organizations engaged in activity often through back channel measures. Track II diplomacy is important in maintaining support at the local level for negotiated agreements and terms to a peace settlement. Track II diplomats are also more often engaged "on the ground" in peace building efforts in addition to their back channel peacemaking efforts.

With increased internationalism and globalization, the sphere of participants in inter-communal conflicts is expanding. Participants include not only state actors but also the opposition parties and adversaries within the conflict itself, not to mention regional, multinational and non-governmental organizations. Third parties in Track I and Track II diplomacy can provide several different roles in conflicts and in their de-escalation. They can fill the role of supporter or mediator during the peacemaking process. A third party supporter or mediator can provide space for and initiate negotiations or discussions, gather information, help penetrate emotional barriers, help expand the negotiable pie, represent absent persons or views, provide resources, create pressure to reach an agreement, and generate support for an

agreement. They do this with the intent to de-escalate conflicts, reach and sustain agreements and prevent future conflicts from occurring.

3.2   Preventive Diplomacy

This is a very broad topic that does not really fit with our incremental approach, but so much is being written about it, and so much is being done in the name of "preventive diplomacy", that we thought it was important to address it here in some way.

The assumption with both conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy is that intractable conflicts are easier to avoid before they happen, rather than fix once they have occurred. There is a great deal of truth to this assumption, although some conflicts are likely to be unavoidable.

A fundamental assumption of constructive confrontation is that the *destructive nature of conflict* is largely avoidable. Hence we would advocate an incremental approach to both conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy. This means that latent conflicts should not be repressed or submerged altogether. (When this is done, they just tend to erupt, sometimes quite violently, at a later time.) To avoid this, conflicts should be allowed to surface, but that the complicating factors, especially escalation, should be limited to the maximum extent possible, and an effort should made to confront the core conflict with the most beneficial and least destructive strategies available. This means trying to put the emphasis on the exchange and integrative strategies, moving away from force-based strategies--especially illegitimate and excessive force.

The term "preventive diplomacy" is usually used in the international arena and refers to efforts of outside nations or groups of nations (for example, the UN) to prevent the escalation of conflicts between or within other nations. Although potentially effective, often nations feel that they should not intervene in the internal affairs of others if the situation has not yet become dire. By that time, preventive measures are likely to be impossible. (This happened in the Bosnian situation, for example).   Nongovernmental organizations can also engage in what is generally referred to as conflict prevention (since they are not state actors). Given their ongoing presence in much of the two-thirds world, they are in a far superior position to try to intervene in developing conflicts early enough to put them on a constructive, rather than destructive course. Discussions about how this can be done can be found in some of the examples, below.

Conflict prevention also is useful in smaller-scale conflicts. To the extent that the parties can control complicating factors from the outset,

define the conflict as a mutual problem rather than a competitive or win-lose situation, and utilize a strategy that depends most on integrative and exchange approaches more than force, the conflict is likely to be more productive than destructive. Once escalation sets in and other complicating factors develop, the strategy must change from conflict prevention to conflict management or resolution, which is generally considerably harder to accomplish successfully.

3.3   Case Study: Yugoslavia and the failure of preventative Diplomacy

Western nations have long recognized the nationalist tensions within Yugoslavia. During the Cold War era, the West saw Yugoslavia as an ally in preventing Soviet expansion. For this reason, western diplomatic efforts maintained a sharp focus on maintaining a unified Yugoslavia. Under Tito's rule, nationalist tendencies were repressed and unity maintained.

As expected, those nationalist tensions resurfaced with Tito's death in 1980. Croatian, Muslim and Serbian factions began to agitate for secession. By this time the Cold War was ending, and western priorities were changing. While the western nations still wanted a unified Yugoslavia, they were also increasingly concerned with promoting democratization and economic reforms. Western nations perceived these goals as compatible. Democracy, it was thought, would "redress human rights, alleviate ethnic tensions, and keep the country united." Ironically, democratic and economic reforms appear to have fuelled the conflict. Economic reforms resulted in short-term hardships. The frustration and dissatisfaction caused by economic hardships was in turn exploited by faction leaders and used to fuel nationalistic fervour. Democratic reforms allowed the widespread electoral victory of candidates running on extremist nationalist platforms.

By 1990, the break up of Yugoslavia seemed inevitable. In December 1990 Slovenia voted to secede at the end of June 1991, unless some confederacy agreement could be reached in the interim. Western nations still hoped that open warfare could be avoided, and a negotiated separation achieved. Unfortunately, western diplomatic efforts to prevent war failed.

Touval argues that western preventative diplomacy failed in Yugoslavia for two main reasons. First, the western nations did not project clear goals for Yugoslavia. The West's message was ambiguous, and Touval argues that this ambiguity "stemmed from the West's definition of goals in terms of broad values, some of which were contradictory in the context of time and place."[p. 406] In the current Yugoslavian context,

democratization was allowing people to vote to secede, and break up the nation. Maintaining Yugoslavian unity required repressing nationalist views, which would be both anti-democratic and would likely entail further violations of human rights.

Second, Touval argues that western diplomatic effort lacked credible leverage. Western nations attempted to enforce their goals via economic incentives and threats. Economic incentives were practically the only tool available at the time. However, economic pressure was not effective. Withholding economic assistance contributed to the popular frustrations which were in turn exploited to fuel nationalist sentiments. The ambiguity of western goals made it unclear under what conditions aid would be given or withheld. The credibility of economic threats was further undermined by political divisions within the European community.

"Finally," Touval notes, "economic punishments (or rewards) were not well attuned to the psychology of the nationalist leaders."[p. 407] The factions were primarily concerned with issues of physical security and group identity. Economic prosperity was of only secondary concern. Touval suggests two reasons why the western nations did not attempt mediation of the conflict. One, mediation would have implied tacit acceptance of Croatia and Slovenia as sovereign powers. Two, mediation would have constituted interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. Moreover, Touval argues that even had it been attempted, mediation would have likely been unsuccessful. Neutral, non-intrusive mediation would have simply been perceived as further western equivocation and ambiguity, hence encouraging the various sides to intensify their positions. Directed mediation in which the mediating party suggests a settlement relies on credible threats and promises. However the West at that time lacked credible, effective leverage.

3.4   Lessons for Preventative Diplomacy

Touval draws five lessons for future attempts at preventative diplomacy from the Yugoslavian case. First, the international community must prioritize its goals. By demanding both democratization and unity, the West presented Yugoslavia with a confusing and contradictory mandate. The West's demands would have been clearer had they ranked the importance of these goals.

Second, the international community should avoid presenting vague, equivocal or ambiguous goals. They should "refrain from reciting broad values and instead define in concrete terms what they expect from the disputants."[p. 414] Touval concedes that this may be difficult.

Generally it is easier to generate international agreement on basic values than on specific proposals. However, goals must be clear to be credible. The Yugoslavian case also shows that economic threats and incentives are likely to be ineffective in cases of ethnic conflict. Group identity, historic grievances, and physical security issues tend to overshadow economic concerns in such situations. Economic incentives have little relevance to the disputants' concerns, and so produce little leverage.

The Yugoslavian conflict reveals an even more basic lesson about timing. Touval argues the ethnic conflicts are an exception to the conventional wisdom, which says that conflicts are easier to prevent than end. Unlike many other types of conflict, in ethnic conflicts the participants tend to become fully committed to their positions very early on. What is worse, Touval suggests, is that early preventive interventions are "likely to be launched at a highly inauspicious moment after the parties have committed themselves to their goals, but before they have reached a hurting stalemate that might dispose them to rethink their policies."[p. 415]

Finally, Touval notes that nations are often unwilling to commit themselves, their resources, and possibly their citizen's lives to preventing foreign conflicts. Yet without such commitment, diplomatic threats and incentives lack force and credibility. For preventive diplomacy to be effective, it must be backed by the strong commitment of the intervening nations.

3.5   Multi-track Diplomacy

Multi-track diplomacy is a conflict transformation approach premised on the assumption that conflict is better transformed from a multi-dimensional approach. It is a synergetic peace-making effort by several categories of actors, each using his own "track", leverage or influence to bring about peaceful transformation of a conflict. The tracks are nine, namely:

i.   Governments;
ii.   Non-government and professional organization;
iii.   Business community;
iv.   Private citizens;
v.   Training and education institutions (Research, training and education);
vi.   Activism;
vii.   Religion;
viii.   Funding organizations;
ix.   The Media.

Diamond, L. and MacDonald, J. (1996:1) describe Multi-Track Diplomacy as a conceptual framework designed to reflect the variety of activities that contribute to international peacemaking and peace building. It is therefore a conceptual way to view the process of international peacemaking as a living system; its web of interconnected parts being; activities, individuals, institutions and communities.

Many types of third parties can be introduced in a conflict, simultaneously working together, or at different points in a conflict when their form of assistance is most needed. Lederach (1997, 70) identifies nearly 25 different functions intermediaries perform over the life of a conflict. Intervention could begin with the "explorer," who assures the contenders that total victory is not the goal of the other side and end with the work of the "reconciler," who facilitates the healing process. Along the path of resolution, "unifiers", "facilitators," "legitimators" and many other specialist roles are introduced. Such a multi-modal approach is necessary with large-scale conflict such as civil war. An intervention team must use particular skills and relationships with the contenders at the right time, in the right context. Even intraorganizational and two-person conflict could benefit from the team approach, though the types of interveners would be smaller. "Who is there who could help us out of this conflict?" This should be the first question conflict opponents should ask. The more varied their concept of "third party," the more intermediary potential they will see as they look around.

An important function of third parties in a conflict, particularly in its latent stage, is conflict prevention. At the international level, multinational peacekeeping has for almost forty years been a common way of preventing conflict and violence. Military forces and observers are placed between opposing sides; interposition is the term. As Yugoslavia was coming apart in the early 1990s, a new variant of peacekeeping was tried; preventive deployment. (Carnegie 1997, 64) Macedonia, intending to become an independent state, was threatened with attack from Serbia. A United Nations military and political contingent was sent to Macedonia as a deterrent. It has also played an intermediary role between the Macedonian and Serbian governments.

A preventive presence of third parties is not necessarily a military or governmental one. Private citizen groups have increasingly intervened to prevent violence in conflict situations. (Wehr 1996) Citizen interposition was practiced in the Nicaraguan civil war in the 1980s. International teams from Witness for Peace were stationed along Nicaragua's borders and in strategic villages at high risk from Contra attack. (Griffin-Nolan 1991) The assumption underlying such a practice is that the presence of unarmed foreigners deters attacks on civilians in

war zones. The same principle motivates international accompaniment, where foreign observers stay with human rights leaders whose protest work puts them at risk in civil conflicts. (Mahony & Eguren 1997)

3.6   Track I vs. Track II Diplomacy and Conflict Management

There is continued debate about the particular roles played by Track I and Track II actors in conflict management. Table 1 suggests some ways in which the two can be distinguished, although this division is not always clear-cut. Track I and Track II cooperation can be an issue. While it is generally recognized that both actors fill useful functions, boundary issues and other role-related issues continue to create tensions between the two tracks. In fact, the interests and actions of those involved in different levels of diplomacy may often be at cross-purposes. If done effectively, however, Track I and Track II diplomacy can be mutually reinforcing processes in conflict management. Each track is effective in unique ways and, despite some overlap in methods used by both tracks, the role of Track I and Track II diplomacy cannot be entirely filled by the other.

Distinguishing Track I and Track II Diplomacy

	Track I	**Track II**
Actors	Official Representatives, Governments, Multi-national Organizations, Elites, Adversarial Leaders	Unofficial Representatives, Nongovernmental Organizations, Regional and Local Leaders, Grassroots Groups
Methods	Positive or Negative Incentives, Mediation, Political or Economic Support	Back-channel Discussions, Education Programs, Workshops, Grassroots Reconciliation
Stages of Conflict	Present in all stages, but of particular importance during **Peacemaking** and **Peacekeeping**, when official actors determine cease-fires, peace accords and terms to negotiated agreements.	Present in all stages, but of particular importance during **Conflict Prevention** and **Peacebuilding**, when local and regional actors can detect early warning signs of violence, and can help foster personal reconciliation techniques between adversarial parties.

A number of practitioners and scholars have suggested that talking about Track I and Track II is, in fact, inadequate. What we often see is what Louise Diamond and John McDonald refer to as multi-track diplomacy where a whole range of actors with varying interests in the situation are involved at different levels to keep channels of communication open and hopefully de-escalate the conflict.

4.0   CONCLUSION

The goal is to maintain power over weaker nations and a balance of power with nations of equal status.

5.0   SUMMARY

In this unit, we have discussed the concept of Diplomacy and the various types of diplomacy.   We also discussed its evolution into a process of conflict management.

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT (TMAS)

i)   What is Diplomacy?

ii)   Distinguish between traditional diplomacy and preventive diplomacy?

iii)   What is multi-track diplomacy and useful is it an approach to conflict management?

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MODULE 4

ETHNICITY, CULTURE AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Unit 1   Post-Conflict Reconstruction
Unit 2   Ethnicity and Conflict Management
Unit 3   Culture, Identity and Conflict Management
Unit 4   Policy-making and Conflict Management

UNIT 1   POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

Table of Contents

1.0   INTRODUCTION

Post-Conflict Reconstruction is a vital aspect of peacebuilding process particularly for countries that have just come out of a conflict situation. It involves programmes reconciliation and development and involves every citizen of that society.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit, you should be able to:

i)   Explain post-conflict reconstruction;

ii)   Describe it as a critical peace building strategies in conflict management.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Post-Conflict Reconstruction (Definition)

Post–conflict reconstruction, as an aspect of development study, typically involves the repair and reconstruction of physical and economic infrastructure in a country that has recently experienced widespread violence, or where the preoccupation of the state is armed warfare, or where a significant part of the population is engaged in armed struggle with the state.   In a post-conflict situation, the state institutions are usually so weakened that they exhibit little capacity to carry out their traditional functions hence, post– conflict reconstruction also entails a number of external interventions aimed at rebuilding the weakened institutions.

Those critical interventions include revering the economy, restructuring the framework for democratic governance, rebuilding and maintaining key social infrastructure, and planning for financial normalization.

> *Post conflict intervention tend to have explicit objectives such as supporting the transition from war to peace, resumption of economic and social development, reconciliation and reconstruction, human and institutional capacity building, and establishing special investment funds to maintain social cohesion during the period of economic adjustment and poverty reduction and decentralization…*

From the foregoing, it is obvious post-conflict reconstructive operations require intensive monitoring to ensure their continued relevance, effectiveness and efficiency.

Because it is an undeniable fact that the four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction-security, social and economic well-being, justice and reconciliation, and governance and participation – are all in extricable linked, and a positive outcome in each area depends on successful integration and interaction across them.

As earlier adumbrated in the preceding chapter, Adekanye (1997) has argued that the entire reconstruction process in post-conflict society:

> *is more usefully conceptualized as a multi-faceted one, in which military, political, psychosocial, humanitarian, as well as economic are seen as closely interwoven.*

If post-conflict reconstructions are not effectively implemented and all stakeholders adequately reintegrated into the state (in the post-conflict era), there is the potential danger of return to war.

> *The implication for stability and sustainable development of emergent post-conflict societies have attracted the rising interest of scholars and policy-makers in the reduction of defence outlays to supportable levels, demobilization, reintegration, and rehabilitation of ex-combatants, as well as demilitarization, democratization, economic reconstruction and structural adjustment.*

3.2   Issues in Post-Conflict Reconstruction

Adekanye argued that certain issues could be internationally identified as "key issues" in post-conflict environment because there are empirical interconnections which should not be ignored between "conflict" and the "the post-conflict stage", between "violence" and "politics", between "war" and "peace". So, the key issues that are germane to the peace process are identified thus:

i.   The contradiction of three Transitions in one;
ii.   Reintegration of Ex-combatants;
iii.   Problems of illegal surplus Arms;
iv.   Power-sharing versus political inclusion;
v.   Making committed Electoral Players out of former Guerrilla Leaders;
vi.   Reconciliation versus Justice;
vii.   Market-Driven Liberalisation versus post-conflict peace building;
viii.   Countering the phenomenon of "Return Wars".

Reconstructive Peacebuilding vs. Transformative Peacebuilding

In an attempt to redress what he called the "structural appropriation of Reconstruction over Transformation in peace-building, Bronwyn Evans-Kent (2004), distinguished between Reconstructive peace-building and Transformative peace-building? While the one is a creation of the United Nations (UN) and peace operations, the other (which is the less widely used form) addresses the causes of conflict and the community-level needs of post-conflict societies. Each of these needs to operate in conjunction with the other and peace cannot be attained without addressing both the reconstruction of a community and the transformation of the conflict.

Reconstructive peace-building is a short term structural rebuilding. The physical and political reconstruction of this form of peace-building begins with the United Nations, which has endeavoured to produce a model that achieves these outcomes.   Reconstructive peace-building concerns the more tangible aspects of peace building such as addressing infrastructure needs, the development of healthcare systems and political institutions. On the reconstructive side are activities such as:

> *relief, humanitarian assistance, disarmament;*
> *demobilization; political restructuring; elections;*
> *mine clearance; and health.*

Transformative peace-building on the other hand is a long term reconciliation. It is a broad term for approaches that focus less on physical reconstruction than on the broader social relationships that exist within conflict-prone societies. It is an attempt to alter conflict such that lasting forms of peace may be built. This form of peace-building usually encompasses those aspects that work towards the long term transformation of the conflict environment. They can include:

> *inter-ethnic contact, contact between professions, stereo-*
> *type elimination, work collectives, school projects,*
> *conflict resolution training, justice, police and military*
> *training, cross-cultural television and ratio efforts and*
> *acknowledgement.*

Conflict is a socially constructed cultural event and people are active participants, it is therefore difficult for political level resolutions to transform the conflict alone.   The principal differences between Reconstructive and Transformative peace-building are set out as follows:

3.3   Differences between Reconstructive and Transformative Peace-Building.

	Reconstructive Peace-building	Transformative Peace-building
Aim	"action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict."	"a comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships."
Concerns	Political elites, international organizations, multilateral institutions	Ordinary people, non-governmental organisations, local/community level leaders
Seeks to	Achieve specific goals with clear exist strategies	Transform the conflict
Addresses	Symptoms of the conflict	Causes of the conflict
Aims to restore	Political, social, economic infrastructure	Relationships
Utilises	Existing set of tools (deductive)	Local knowledges and conflict resolution practices, cultural/conflict-specific tools (inductive)
Implemented by	International organizations, NGOs, multilateral Institutions	International and local NGOs, ordinary people, women's groups, youth groups, churches

Source: http://www.isanet.org/noarchive/evanskent.html

4.0   CONCLUSION

The missing part of peace-building in most literature is the long-term causative elements of conflicts; the aspect that concerns the relationships between the people or groups in conflict; and as this present study argues, effective post-conflict reconstruction must incorporate both the reconstructive and transformative sphere of peace-building. Because as those who use reconstructive peace-building alone, they may find, peace-building does not build sustainable peace. It is only by acknowledging that reconstructive peace-building is part of the larger and more comprehensive process of transformative peace-building that peace can be maintained indefinitely.

5.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, we have discussed post-conflict reconstruction as a critical aspect of peace-building. The definition, process and focus were also examined.

6.0 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENTS (TMAS)

i) What is post conflict reconstruction?

ii) Distinguish between reconstructive peace building and transformative peace building.

iii) What is conflict transformation?

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UNIT 2   ETHNICITY AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

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1.0   INTRODUCTION

Ethnicity as a terminology has a fluid, complex and somewhat amorphous nature. This has been responsible for its usual overlook in the conflict resolution discourse in the past. But the dimension that armed conflicts in Africa have taken in the recent times brought to the fore the centrality of ethnicity to conflict generation, escalation and transformation.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to;

i)   Identify the various uses of the concept of ethnicity;

ii)   Explain Ethnicity as an approach to understanding sense of conflicts;

iii) Describe the nature and character of ethnic conflicts;

iv)   Identify the various forms of ethnic-based conflicts in Africa.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Understanding Ethnicity

African scholars, both of instrumentalist and primordial schools of thought on ethnicity agree that (divisive) ethnicity, in Africa, has its genesis in Colonialism. Colonial activities with the new concept of state and new system of government played up ethnic awareness, sentiment and consciousness and subsequent rivalry and competition in all sort of manner.

Ethnicity, according to Nnoli (1980:5-7) is a social phenomenon associated with interaction among members of different ethnic groups. Ethnic groups are social formations distinguished by communal character of their boundaries. The relevant communal factor may be language, culture or both. In Africa, language has clearly been the most crucial variable. Ethnic exists only within a political society consisting of diverse ethnic groups. Ethnicity is characterized by a common consciousness of being one in relation to the relevant ethnic group. It is necessary to quickly make a distinction between the "ethnic group in itself" and the "ethnic group for itself". The former refers to a group marked out by linguistic and/or cultural similarity but without a common consciousness or identity. The latter identifies a group with both linguistic and/or cultural similarity and a common consciousness or identity. It is the later that defines ethnicity as it is meant in this study.

Bah, (2003:6-8) states that for ethnic groups inhabiting the same state, the interaction is frequently characterized by competition for resources, power and the assertion of cultural identity. Conflict arises out of the attempt to include one's members and at the same time exclude people from other groups. Bah further gives two types of ethnic conflicts. First, he calls symbolic ethnicity; this takes the form of continuous contestation over cultural and identity issues. Second, he tags clientelistic ethnicity. These are cases in which ethnicity becomes a destructive force for the economic and social development of the state. In particular, ethnic favouritism replaces merit and need in determining who benefits from the resources controlled by the state. In turn, this undermines the efficiency of the state and promotes widespread corruption, prebendalism and sense of injustice.

Stabbbert and Welsh (1979:133) recommend that ethnic group should be defined in the broadcast terms as 'a group that is bounded off from other comparable groups or population categories in the society by a sense of its difference which may consist in some combination of a real or mythical ancestry and a common culture and experience…'

Smith (1991:12) gives a taxonomy of "six main attributes of ethnic community" as follows: "a collective proper name; a myth of common ancestry; shared historical memories; one or more differentiating elements of common culture; association with a specific homeland; and a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population:.

Scholars like Osaghae (1994, 1998), Richmond (1978), Young (1979) distinguish between the inscriptive or primordial nature of ethnic group membership and the instrumentalist paradigm of ethnicity. They also insist that ethnicity is situationally defined, that ethnic group boundaries are malleable and permeable and that ethnicity may be acquired and divested at will. Ethnicity, though a structural-cum motivational precondition for precipitated and finally triggered off by avoidable but not avoided (ethnicity) manipulation for conflict exacerbation, Adekanye (2003, 1997). Communal groups whose competitive interactive interaction produces ethnicity are called ethic groups. Prejudice and discrimination characterize ethnicity.

3.2 Types of Ethnic-based Conflicts

What therefore emerges from the foregoing explanation is the fact that ethnicity is a pliable instrument in the hands of power contenders or Warlords in a polity to galvanize support fight a cause and achieve set goal (s); commonly to wrest political power: Ethnicity, in Africa as does elsewhere, remains a potent tool for generating violent conflicts.

The explosion of internal armed conflicts in Africa from the 1960s when most of the states became independent was not unexpected. Actually, the seeds of internal strife and discord were well sown in the origins of the states themselves. Du Toit, (1978:11) observes that:

3.2.1 Decolonisation

The earliest somewhat violent conflicts in Africa were that of decolonisation. Shortly after independence, what followed in form of violent conflicts till date on the continent have been largely predicated upon the apparent internal incongruence in the political entities lumped together by the colonial masters in the building of the states they gave independences to across Africa. The artificiality of the partitioning of Africa by the colonial powers brought about situations in which kingdom, nations and the same people were separated arbitrarily, into different states, without taking due cognizance of ethnographic affinities. And in some cases, erstwhile hostile ethnic groups were forced on each other in a state. This line of thinking is justified by the nature and manner of conflicts that have been making waves on the continent of Africa, right from the 1960s and which doubled in velocity

and became more clearly identifiable sine the end of the "Cold War" that is, starting from 1989 till the time of this study. The conflicts/wars are not wars of conquest between nations but, more often than not, they are fought within nations in Africa.

3.3   Causes of Conflict in Africa

Having discussed the nature and forms of the conflicts prevalent in Africa that they are all destructive in nature, and that most of them escalate without enough early warning signs to justify their magnitude; it is pertinent also at this juncture to delve into what their causes are. In the first place, opinions of scholars are similar on colonialism being the very root cause of the unending internal conflicts and wars that are making the rounds of African nations. Nnoli (1998:216-217) asserts that:

> "Colonialism unleashed deep seated socioeconomic and political upheavals which questioned people's pre-colonial identities. In the process it gave rise to redefinition of the identities created and nurtured during pre-colonial times…" …."the ethnicity emanating from contradictions among these colonially induced ethnic identities was fiercely exclusive, competitive and intolerant of ethnic minority views and feelings".

3.4   Typology of Ethnic Conflict

Given this terrain upon which African states are operating, violent conflicts of diverse types have been experienced. Goor, (1994:26) gives a typology of ethnic conflict, which is suitable for our discussion here:

i)   **Irredentism:** a form of nationalism, which claims that a group living outside the borders of a state actually belongs to that state and ought to be brought within the state's borders by means of annexation of the territory in which it lives.

ii)   **Separatism:** a group's desire to separate itself from the state to which it belongs.

iii)   **Autonomy:** the desire of a group concentrated in a particular territory of a state to acquire greater influence over the government of that territory. The desire for autonomy is often seen as the first step towards separation.

iv)   **The demands of interest groups:** reference is here being made to groups that are spread throughout the country, but whose members have common interests in the educational, religious, or economic fields. Such groups often strive for education in their own language, religious freedom, and an end to discrimination.

v)   **Ethnic corporation:** the demand of an ethnic group to be recognized as such and obtain certain rights on the basis of this recognition, such as right to appropriate share in the country's government.

vi)   **Nativism:** the demand of a group that regards itself as indigenous for greater political, cultural or economic authority as other groups in the running of the state.

vii)   **Hegemonic demands:** the demand of the one group for the right to dominate others, based on cultural or racial arguments often accompanied by an appeal for the survival of the state.

viii)   **Fundamentalism:** the assertion by fundamentalist groups that some former golden age will return, provided the community reverts to its fundamental religious values. Fundamentalism can come in the form of religious reformism or religious nationalism.

You can see that virtually, a good number of the ethnic conflicts in Africa can be conceptualized within the framework of the above ethnic conflicts typology.

3.4.1 Dealing with Ethnic Conflicts

In response to the claim that ethnic conflicts are too intense for effective intervention, Crocker concedes that "it may be that internal wars based on primordial sentiments tend toward zero-sum thinking and the progressive elimination of neutral or common ground." However, very few conflicts are in fact based purely on such primordial sentiments. The author argues that ethnic conflicts are shaped by a number of factors. These factors include the actions of foreign powers, the current balance of power and potential for change, the leader's goals and opportunities, and access to appropriate military hardware.

So-called ethnic conflicts are precipitated by a number of other factors also. The collapse of a nation's basic institutions, holding faulty or premature elections, politicians who exploit ethnicity to promote their own agendas, the availability of the means and resources to wage war: such situations can set the spark which erupts into ethnic conflict. The

most effective way of dealing with ethnic conflicts is pre-emptively – by acting early before violence becomes severe.

3.4.2 Ethnic Conflict and Governance.

As with deep-rooted conflict, the governance options for addressing power inequalities and asymmetries are very similar. The reason is clearly that in so many respects deeply-held grievances that result in deep-rooted conflict are often the result of structural power imbalances. They are asymmetries that are assumed and built into systems that usurp and dominate the rights and access of the "unequal".

That said, it nevertheless is worth focussing upon power inequalities and asymmetries because there is an important literature that has sought to bring some of the more blatant – if not universal – examples of power inequalities into the realm of promoting good governance. Gender is the mainstay of this sort of analysis. In that regard, it is interesting that race and religion, seemingly two of the most blatant reflections of potential societal asymmetries, rarely emerge in the governance context.

James's study on the Haitian revolution as well as his work on the "sports/war intertext" introduces the theme of race in the context of potential conflict and governance in a more Marxist sense. Similarly, Rodney and Sivanandan introduce race as a category of power inequality along Marxist lines. However, there is no literature that inter-relates governance and power inequalities with the same depth as that involved in gender symmetries. One reason for this may be because "ethnicity" now subsumes religious as well as racial categories. In that context, it is interesting to note that McGarry and O'Leary as editors of *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation* incorporate various sorts of religious conflict in India, the former Yugoslavia and in Northern Ireland under the rubric of "ethnicity".

Gender inequality, while never seeming to have been the source of conflict in modern history, at least serves as a possible platform or test case for governance approaches to offset other sorts of power inequalities. Gasa's view, though, is even more limited than that. He feels that gender inequalities should be addressed as a bi-product of addressing far more fundamental asymmetries, an opportunity for good governance to deal not only with conflict but also injustice.

Yet, there are perhaps more important lessons to be learned from the literature that links governance with the power inequality of gender. One such lesson is that, as in all situations of power inequality, the key is to have the issue, the asymmetry, itself, recognised. To what extent can focal points be established within institutions that can keep injustices,

such as gender and other inequalities, on the agenda? In what ways can non-governmental structures effectively promote anti-discrimination or related measures that offset power inequalities, and what sort of government system will be responsive to such special pleadings?

Perhaps the single most important difference between groups that is unempowered or holds deeply held grievances and ethnic groupings, is that the latter for the most part seek to break away from the state or at least the form of state governance to which that ethnic group is tied. Unless governance structures can reconcile what Shehadi has called "the drive towards ethnic-national self-determination", the ultimate objective of ethnic groups in conflict is to change the basis of their relations with the state or states.

Such ethnic determination poses a host of complex issues for governments and governance structures. Governments that ignore even the most radical demands of a state's ethnic minorities are in danger of losing their legitimacy. Thus, the literature concerned with ethnicity and governance more often than not is concerned with ways either to meet the demands of ethnic groupings through major public policy initiatives, accede to certain kinds of territorial arrangements or alter constitutional structures in ways that will satisfy the self-identity objectives of the ethnic grouping.

Sisk maintains that when it comes to meeting the demands of ethnic groupings through a public policy process, "the answer to such vexing problems is not to specify their solution in constitutional terms, but to set up new institutions and procedures to which all groups can subscribe." One such way is to ensure that an all encompassing human rights agenda is established with institutional force to promote compliance. This has been seen by several analysts as an acceptable basis for dealing directly with certain kinds of ethnic demands.

Ethnic demands can also be met through territorial concessions. In some respects, the recent peaceful separation of Czechoslovakia into two distinct entities reflects what might be regarded as a most positive though extreme approach for dealing with ethnic territorial/constitutional demands. Confederal or polycommunal federal arrangements can be created, leaving ethnic groups with their own territory but within a larger state construct. It has benefits, according to Duchacek, as well as serious drawbacks, according to Hermans. A key variable for governments willing to take the longer term view is the extent to which such semi-autonomous territorial concessions can be linked with other parts of the state through functional, eg, trade, economic and infrastructural relations.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The sorts of constitutional issues that need to be addressed to deal with the threat or resolution of ethnic conflict include many of the issues noted in the chart on *Approaches to Power-Sharing*, above. However, within those structures decisions about law and adjudication, education and language as well as security issues and "international relations" will all have to be agreed under the heading of "constitutional issues", particularly within a confederal or polycommunal federal system.

5.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, we have examined the concept of ethnicity and how it engenders conflicts. We have also discussed the nature and character of ethnic conflicts as well as its various forms as it occurs in Africa.

6.0 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENTS (TMAS)

i)   What are the various uses of the concept of ethnicity?

ii)   Ethnic conflicts are deep-rooted conflicts. Discuss.

iii)   Identify the same forms of ethnic-based conflicts in Africa and discuss them.

iv)   Can we resolve ethnic conflicts by good governance?

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UNIT 3   CULTURE, IDENTITY AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Table of Contents

1.0   INTRODUCTION

Culture refers to the social and behavioural conditions of a group, its life experience, its manner of thinking and its world view. It is carried in language all forms of symbolic expressions, religion and social practices.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

After studying this unit you should be able to:

i.   Explain the meaning of culture;

ii.   Highlight the implications of culture for conflict management;

iii.   Describe the cultural aspects of conflict.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   The Role of Culture in Conflict Situation

Conflicts management in plural societies can be quite complex, principally because of the determinate effects of culture and language symbolism. Hence, as Avruch and Black (1993) point out, it is could be counter productive to relegate culture to the background in conflict resolution. This is especially so in multi-ethnic/multicultural societies. Naturally, people perceive conflicts through divergent cultural lenses. People interpret social action and social reality through their indigenous

conceptions and knowledge. Understanding the local indigenous theories of conflicts is therefore essential to resolving conflicts.   As Avruch and Black (1990, 1993:132) have emphasized, it is sometimes necessary to utilizing what they labelled "ethno-conflict theories" because symbols are associated with values placed on resources.

Culture also determines the how information is processed, how metaphors and language are used in the bargaining process. Even the most apparently irresolvable conflicts can be broken down by paying attention to cultural issues. This is the case because cultural issues sometimes muddle up and compound conflicts and there fore make then look impossible to resolve.

3.2   Identity and Conflict Transformation

Identity is a psychological sense of self as well as self as it relates to the world. Self-definition takes place on different levels: interpersonal, community, organizational, cultural or international. If conflict involves a threat to identity, it becomes intractable. Terrell A. Northrup talks about "the role of identity in the development, maintenance, and transformation of intractable conflicts" (p. 55).   She uses the model below in analysis the role of identity in conflicts. According to her the dynamics of conflicts consists of five components: (1) conflicts unfold over time; (2) conflict is a multidimensional phenomenon (intrapersonal aspects of the conflict interact with social or relational ones, and both of them are influenced by higher level political, economic and social changes); (3) conflicts evolve around multiple issues; (4) conflicts contain realistic and non-realistic issues; (5) power distribution among the parties plays an important role in conflict development. Identity, according to Northrup, operates as a dynamic. It evolves in a party's relationships with the surrounding world. Identity dynamic   is "the tendency for human beings, individually and in groups, to establish, maintain, and protect a sense of self-meaning, predictability, and purpose" (p. 63). The dynamic of identity provokes changes toward escalation and rigidification of conflict. This involves four stages: threat, distortion, rigidification, and collusion. The process is sequential, with a movement to the next stage increasing intractability of the conflict and decreasing the possibility of de-escalation.

3.3   The Transformation of Intractability

Based on the theoretical framework described above, the transformation of intractable conflicts involving identity issues is not likely to happen from within. Hence the need to distinguish between the settlement of a specific conflict and its transformation, and strategies of transformation of a destructive identity dynamic.

3.4   Settlement vs. Transformation

In order to understand the difference between settlement and transformation, there is a need to look at different levels where change in conflict can occur. Those levels are determined by how strong the impact of the change is on the core identity. The first level includes changes that are peripheral to the core identity, such as those happening outside the original issue of confrontation. Second level changes influence the dynamic of the parties' relationships. Changes in the core identity belong to the third level. The effect of the change will vary depending on what level the change occurs. Peripheral changes can create settlements, but they will not produce long-term transformation. Prospects for transformation are better when the nature of the parties' relationships is altered (second level). Identity changes (third level) encourage changes in relationships and behaviour. These might not involve short-term peripheral settlements, but they transform the conflict itself.

The second level transformation can be encouraged by a common external threat to both parties that would make them cooperate and, as a result, change their perceptions about each other. Another possible way is for a third party to intervene and force the parties in conflict to redefine their relationships. The third way might exist if a subgroup within a party is able to establish some cooperation with the opponent. The final possible way to alter the nature of parties' relationships is for conditions to change unexpectedly. For example an ethnic conflict where a horrible accident happens like a bomb killing schoolchildren can produce a change in the way the two groups deal with their disagreements.

4.0   CONCLUSION

Identity plays a very significant role in escalation, maintenance and transformation of conflicts. It cannot be ignored in any conflict situation, especially where it becomes central. The danger of level two transformations is that it depends on the longevity and institutionalization of the cooperative relationships. If the time of cooperation was short and the new patterns of relationships were not structuralized and ritualized, a real transformation might not happen and the parties might get back on the conflict track. Transformation is more likely when the parties' identities are changed. For example, they might start seeing similarities between themselves and accept differences. These are third level changes. They require long-lasting efforts, but they transform intractable conflicts more completely.

5.0   SUMMARY

In this unit, we have examined the meaning, concept, and role of culture and identity in resolving conflict. The impact of culture and its implications on the process was also discussed

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT (TMAS)

i)   What is culture and how is it implicated in conflict?

ii)   What are the implications of identity for conflict management?

iii)   What are the cultural aspects of conflict?

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UNIT 4   POLICY-MAKING AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

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1.0   INTRODUCTION

Policy has become an important aspect of human life experience in a social setting. This is the case because modern man lives in very complex and challenging contexts and relationships and as such has to deal with problems that require rational and systematic activities. It is these complexities that have given birth to policy and subsequently its analysis.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

After studying this unit you should be able to:

i)   Define the meaning of public policy;

ii)   Explain the uses of public policy;

iii)   Describe the relationship between public policy and conflicts;

iv)   Explain the policy making process; and

v)   Highlight the different types of policies.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Definition of Public Policy

Policy in its simplest meaning is a plan or guide to action, a statement of ideals governing actions to be taken in order to achieve a particular state of things in society. Policy is always identified with the public arena even though policies are designed and adopted by individuals, private organizations as well as public institutions, such as governments and political parties.   The idea of "public" often attached to policy defines it as a property of social or collective action, which is in modern parlance governmental action. Ira Sharkansky defines policy as "an authoritatively and publicly determined course of action that achieves totally, partially or not at all a particular goal or purpose."

3.2   Characteristics of Public Policy

Pollit et al (1979: x) identifies the following as the essential characteristics of public policy:

Policy involves decision-making and activity.

It involves a series of decisions taken over an extended period of time including an exercise of power or rationality.

The process occurs within a framework of prescribed organizational roles (Public policy involves institutions of state with special legal characteristics).

It involves exchange of information and resources, discussion, and bargaining between the public, pressure groups and state agencies. In other words, it involves interaction with a variety of interest groups.

It aims at increasing the probability of occurrence of desired states of the world in future.

The state institutions that are involved in the policy often legitimise their activities by claiming that their policies are in the general (public) interest rather than favouring sections, groups or individuals.

3.3   Goal of Public Policy

It is the responsibility of government to ensure that citizens live in a peaceful orderly society, conducive for the pursuit of happiness. Hence, government make policies that ensure conflict does not make such an environment impossible.   Interestingly, some public polices generate conflicts. A typical example in Nigeria is the 1996 local government reorganisation exercise that led to widespread violent actions of some communities to their inclusion in Local Governments they did not want

to be part of or the selection of unacceptable towns for their Local Governments' headquarters.

3.4   Types of Public Policy

There are several policy options for managing conflicts in its various forms. These range from constitutional formulas, cultural policies, distributive policies, redistributive policies, re-organisational policies, regulatory policies and symbolic policies.

3.5   The Policy Process

Policy is often dealt with as if it consists of several distinct stages. For all the heuristic values of these stages, political scientists tend to differ in their interpretations as well as classification of these stages. John Healey and Mark Robinson (1994:47) identify three stages, viz.:

(i)   Agenda setting, i.e. how do issues get into the policy agenda? (ii)

Formulation, i.e. the criteria and influences which determine the
        content of policy and

(iii) Implementation, i.e. introducing and sustaining a new policy or
        operating the policy where this requires continuing administration.

In the policy circle literature, one can identify as many as seven stages, more or less distinct and logically sequential: generation, formulation, adoption, implementation, impact evaluation, and adaptation or reformulation (Craig, 1990:8).

3.6   Conflict Management Policies

While there was no formal field of "conflict research" until well after the Second World War, earlier views of *conflict* seem to reflect three fundamental assumptions. In the first place, a distinction was made between what one might call interpersonal conflict and inter-state conflict. The former was regarded as not necessarily rational, and could to some extent be understood in terms of what social psychologists have called "individual differences". The latter was regarded as inherently rational. In other words, conflict at the inter-state level was assumed to be based upon a "win-lose" calculation of interests and cost-benefits.

A second assumption was that conflict was inherent in human nature. Although 18th and 19th century philosophers from Locke, Rousseau, Hegel and Marx as well as the utilitarian such as Mills and Owen had assumed the eventual "perfectibility" of mankind, human beings as they

existed in their present state were for all intents and purposes essentially Hobbseian.

Finally there was an issue of perceived legitimacy that separated inter-state conflict from intra-state conflict. Scholars accepted that there were "just" and "unjust" inter-state conflicts, or, wars, but legitimacy had not until relatively recently been extended to the sort of intra-state conflict that stemmed from ethnic, religious and economic oppression. One might argue that since the Treaty of Westphalia, that concept of sovereignty – with all its presumptions of legitimacy and inviolability – was regarded for almost four centuries as a right equivalent and, more often than not, surpassing that of so-called "human rights".

The growth of the social sciences such as psychology and sociology, the calamities that triggered substantial interest in the behaviour of states at a broad systemic level of analysis and a slowly emerging sense of global interdependence began to challenge the three assumptions. Non-rationality or indeed irrationality was regarded as perhaps as relevant an explanatory factor for state behaviour as it was for personal behaviour. Human behaviour could not necessarily be explained from solely Lockeian or Hobbseian perspectives, but could be analysed and could possibly even be tested based upon a complex set of inter-active variables and conditions. And the natural legitimacy of states and even the concept of sovereignty began to be called into question as the state-centric system moved from a small, relatively homogenous "club" to a more diverse, heterogeneous collection of accidents and impositions.

Since the early 1960s, the conventional assumptions about power, rationality and sovereignty were increasingly challenged. Fundamental to such challenges was the emergence of a profound discourse on the very nature of knowledge itself. This endeavour to explain "how we know what we know" was led by scholars such as Popper, Ravetz, Lakatos and Kuhn. Hand in hand with this epistemological debate emerged a group of scholars ready to go well beyond the traditional disciplines of history, the classics and moral philosophy to explore the roots and dynamics of conflict. Rapaport, Brickman, Gunn and Lorenz, for example, introduced a range of social scientific disciplines into the study of conflict, including psychology, sociology and anthropology. In addition, Boulding, Nicholson and Runciman were among a growing group of conflict analysts who were using relatively sophisticated social science methodology, methodology that perhaps might open the way to testable hypotheses about conflict.

Ironically, the state-centric school of rational power-politics was challenged by an event that ostensibly reflected all the traditional rules of power calculations, namely, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The

complexities of world politics were becoming more evident at the same time they seemed to become more inter-dependent. Regime issues – be they concerned with the law of the seas, patents and copy rights or the environment – could no longer be regulated by the manipulation of conventional power alone. More and more actors were affecting what increasingly became referred to as the world, or global system. Multinational corporations, multilateral organisations, religious and ethnic groupings, non-governmental organisations were all directly impacting upon what heretofore had been seen as a system of sovereign, holistic state actors.

The challenge for policy-makers as well as scholars was to explain the dynamics of this emerging global order and the threats facing it. Allison, Halperin, Jervis, Steinbruner and Wohlstetter were among the growing number of analysts who saw that the Cuban Missile threat – and conflict in general – could be interpreted in terms of the ways in which organisations functioned internally the interactions between organisations the interplay between domestic and inter-state politics and, indeed, in terms of the very processes by which human beings make decisions. Not only was the rational actor model that underpinned classical conflict analysis ripe for a major rethink, but perhaps even more worrying for many was that the very mechanisms designed to make rational decisions [e.g. ministries of foreign affairs, defence departments] could be themselves the inadvertent, non-rational source of conflict.

To what extent were, for example, the factors that led up to the super power stand-off over Cuba unique? Could they explain the sorts of potential confrontations one might face in the future, or even the conflicts that one had suffered in the past? And in posing such questions, to what extent could one generalise about the nature of conflict not only over time, but also at various levels of the system – within communities, within the state, between and among states?

Eventually, as these questions were posed, intricately related issues emerged. If one understood the nature of conflict, could one also resolve or prevent it? In a world in which there seemed to be an increasing belief that one could understand the complexities of human-beings and those forces that led to violence, could one in turn transpose such understandings to other types of structures and systems? In so doing, could conflict be prevented? To what extent could one generalise about the nature of conflict, conflict prevention and resolution, and to what extent could such generalisations serve a practical use?

As a major "conflict researcher" note:

> …conflict researchers continue to employ a wide variety of approaches but hold to a common belief that a general understanding (if not a general theory) of all social conflicts is possible. It can be attained by seeking common patterns and processes in conflicts in all social arenas, from the local community to the international system, and transferring findings between different areas (or levels) to increase understanding of this complex and universal phenomenon.

3.7   Conflict Management Policy Analysis: "A Case Study of the dispute between Israel and Egypt"

It is often difficult to transfer knowledge and insights gained from conflict resolution training and intervention methodologies to public policy because those who possess such knowledge and insights are not always those in power. Although multilateral, interactive negotiation planning and conflict management policy-making are rare at high levels, it is still useful for policymakers on all sides of a conflict to use these approaches unilaterally. The most constructive solutions to intense conflict situations are those resulting from intrinsically motivated efforts by both sides to seek mutually satisfactory solutions. In this subunit we review the conflict between Israel and Egypt over the Taba area using policy analysis techniques.

History of the Taba Dispute - This dispute between Israel and Egypt was over the locations of border markers on 900 square meters of sand between the two countries. This dispute came in the wake of the 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in which Israel agreed to withdraw from Sinai and a bilateral commission was established to demarcate the new Israeli-Egyptian border. The Taba area, which is on the Red Sea along the Gulf of Aqaba, was one of several areas in which border marker locations were disputed. Negotiations between Egypt and Israel about the exact location of these markers failed. The original dispute was then bogged down in a further dispute as to whether arbitration or conciliation procedures should be followed, as provided in the Camp David peace treaty of 1979. Talks were suspended in 1982, and it wasn't until 1986 that the two countries finally agreed upon arbitration. In 1988, the arbitration commission finally decided in favor of Egypt, after many delays and mutual threats between the two countries. Israel then withdrew from Taba.

Adversarial Approach - Egypt and Israel's adversarial approach to this dispute affected all phases of the negotiation over Taba and left both

countries feeling dissatisfied with the settlement process as well as the settlement itself.

Adversarial Problem Definition - Egypt and Israel framed this dispute in terms of contradictory facts regarding the location of border markers. The conflict was framed as zero-sum and thus the arbitrated settlement was a win lose outcome in which Egypt won and Israel lost.

Adversarial Analysis of Causes - The conflict over Taba was framed as a competition between adversaries over a scarce resource. Each side attributed the dispute to the other's negative dispositional traits, while claiming that its own behavior was motivated by situation constraints. Egypt couldn't give up Taba without losing face both in the Arab world and within Egypt itself. Egypt saw the Taba dispute as unwarranted Zionist expansionism. Israel's invasion of Lebanon confirmed the Egyptian's distrust of Israel. The Taba dispute was seen by Israel as evidence that Egypt was greedy and not really interested in peace, since Israel had already given most of Sinai back to Egypt. Israel's view of Egypt was confirmed by Egypt's siding with other Arab states which were in conflict with Israel.

Adversarial Generation of Alternatives ("Distributive Bargaining")- The eventual arbitrated settlement was a function of adversarial framing of the dispute by Israel and Egypt. This kind of win-lose settlement is typical of results obtained by traditional diplomacy in such disputes. The initial negotiations were characterized by power-based, give-and-take bargaining ending in no compromise and leading to the necessity of arbitration. The arbitration commission had little choice but to work within this adversarial framework using precedents in international law to decide boundaries and then hand over a win-lose verdict. Adversarial Implementation & Implications - Although the Taba dispute was settled nonviolently, both Israel and Egypt were unhappy with the verdict. Israel threatened to seek to have the arbitration agreement cancelled, but eventually honoured the decision under pressure from the U.S. to do so. Egypt was dissatisfied because it felt that an undesirable precedent had been set for handling future disputes. The result was a residue of bitterness on both sides, causing cold Israeli-Egyptian relations in which one dispute was settled while the underlying conflict was left unresolved. Unfortunately, this arbitrated settlement process did not lead to increased motivation or skill on either side for pushing ahead with cooperative conflict management initiatives.

Reflexive Approach - The adversarial approach taken by both parties to this dispute did not yield a truly satisfactory solution for either country because it did not address either country's underlying needs, fears, hopes, or constraints. A more satisfactory outcome might have been

achieved if the two countries had been able to broaden their range of options by taking what he calls a "reflexive" approach to framing the problem.

Reflexive Problem Definition – A Reflexive approach to the Taba dispute would have revealed that the dispute was, in fact, being used by both sides to prevent a summit between Mubarak and Peres, the respective leaders of Egypt and Israel. There were two reasons for this avoidance of a summit. First, the Egyptians felt that normalization of relations with Israel would have damaged Egypt's acceptance in the Arab world, thus threatening their national identity. Second, the Israelis felt that normalization of relations with Egypt would have made them look weak. According to the author, a reflexive approach to the dispute would have lead to an exploration of the fundamental values and important experiences of both sides. It would have helped both sides to look at ancient and modern historical precedents for mistrust. It would also have led the two parties away from seeing the dispute as a legal battle over boundaries and toward an understanding by both sides of underlying psychological issues and motives.

Reflexive Analysis of Causes – When conflicts are defined in terms of mutual threats and frustrations based upon each side's unique history and experiences, it becomes possible to identify key issues on both sides. For example, in the Taba dispute one of Israel's key needs was to insure national survival, whereas one of Egypt's key needs was to restore their national pride and sense of importance in the region. A transitional, reflexive dialog would have made it possible for both countries to gradually move away from mutual attributions of blame and evil intent and toward mutual understanding based upon situational attributions for their own and the other's aggressive actions.

Reflexive Generation of Alternatives - In order for disputing parties to begin to doubt the usefulness of adversarial approaches, they need to be able to consider the other's history, fears, needs, and values in problem-solving strategy discussions. At this stage more emphasis should be placed on articulating goals than on generating concrete solutions.

Reflexive Implementation - At the reflexive implementation stage the focus should be on identifying as many barriers as possible to successful implementation of problem-solving strategies.

Integrative Approach - The integrative approach could have allowed Israel and Egypt to settle the Taba dispute in ways that were more constructive and mutually satisfactory.

Integrative Problem Definition - Israel and Egypt were engaged in five wars with each other between 1954 and 1979. When, in 1979, they finally sought to change their relationship to one of peace and cooperation, the relationship was already marked by a long history of negative attributions for the other's aggressive behaviour. Their adversarial approach to the Taba dispute was therefore quite understandable and predictable. However, if Egypt and Israel had taken an integrative approach to defining the problem, they might have framed the Taba dispute as a dysfunctional relationship between the two countries which hindered a bilateral, creative problem-solving process. They might have recognized that the real problem lay not with "them" but with "us."

Integrative Analysis of Causes - An integrative analysis of causes could have revealed the unhealthy nature of the relationship between the two countries. Both Israel and Egypt felt their needs for security and recognition were being threatened by the other's insistence upon the importance of keeping the Taba area, and both countries were projecting their own exaggerated fears onto the other. If the Taba dispute had been framed in terms of a dysfunctional relationship between Israel and Egypt, it would have been possible for them to assess more accurately the true causes of the dispute. Only when the true causes of a dispute are recognized by both sides is it possible for them to work together to generate creative solutions that will adequately address these underlying causes.

Integrative Generation of Alternatives (" Integrative Bargaining") - When disputes like the Taba dispute are framed in adversarial terms, it is typical for the parties to persistently pursue unilateral solutions. Only when both sides attempt to understand the other's needs in relations to their own is it possible to generate alternative proposals that will satisfy the needs of both. Ideally, such proposals can take the form of cooperative, precedent-setting joint ventures which allow both sides to win and which offer ongoing opportunities for building a more trustworthy and productive relationship over time.

4.0   CONCLUSION

Possible routes to this type of mutually beneficial paradigm shift may include: -

(1) Problem-solving workshops,
(2) Controlled communication,
(3) Track Two diplomacy, and
(4) Pre-negotiation.

The use of third parties to facilitate joint analyses of conflict tends to yield common definitions of problems and deeper understandings of the other party's needs and motives. This, in turn, allows disputing parties to eventually step out of combative roles and into more cooperative roles. He concludes that although the settlement of the Taba dispute was positive in that it was achieved without war, it was negative in terms of lost opportunities for greater mutual understanding, recognition, acceptance, cooperation, and trust between Israel and Egypt.

5.0   SUMMARY

In this unit, we have examined the role of policy-making in conflict management. The definition of public policy, types, uses and processes were discussed.

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENTS (TMAS)

1)   What is policy-making?

2)   What are the essential characteristics of public policies?

3)   With regard to conflict Management, how many types of policies do you know?

4)   Outline and explain at least three types of policies.

5)   Can public policies generate conflicts?

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MODULE 5

SOURCES AND CAUSES OF CONFLICTS IN AFRICA

UNIT 1   SOURCES OF CONFLICTS IN AFRICA

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1.0   INTRODUCTION

Just as a simple law in physics states that "actions and reactions are equal and opposite". The most veritable source of conflict, universally, is human interactions and relationships. Where there are series of actions there is bound to be occurrences.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit you should be able to:

i)   Highlight various elements of society that could lead to conflict;

ii)   Explain how conflicts are managed;

iii)   Distinguish between factors causing conflicts;

iv)   Explain the causes of conflict; and

v)   Explain how these causes, change across space and time.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Sources of Conflicts

From a scholarly perspective, Stedman cited in Onyike (2003:51) writing on sources of conflict in Africa asserts that:

> "Conflicts in Africa arise from basic problem to all population: the tugs and pulls of different identities, the distribution of resources and access to power, and competing definitions of what is right, fair and just".

One can rightly say then that societies have always been in potential or actual conflict because while some segments of the population yearn for change to fulfil their needs and allay their fears, others fear change from their political position as it may pose danger and threats to their political and other interests.

Again, one cannot but also make necessary recourse to colonialism as source of most causes of African conflicts. Although colonialism is no longer here, its embers are still very much staring us in the face. It does not require the "sixth sense" to note that most of the countries that emerged at independence could best be described as petty states, extremely vulnerable to external pressures and internal disruptions.

However, it will be pretty unfair blaming the whole problem on colonialism and the colonial masters, after all, decades have passed without any significant progress made. African leaders too are to be blamed. Immediately after independence, indigenous African leaders that emerged saw the trade unions, student bodies and other progressive forces whose sacrifices brought independence as threats to national unity. This opened a new chapter in the history of violent conflicts in Africa or indeed a paradigm shift from anti-colonial or decolonisation struggles to activists- national government face-offs. The latter is still a vibrant source of violent conflicts across Africa today. The bane of this conflict, over time, remains injustice on the side of the government.

One other fundamental and perennial source of conflicts in Africa is the adoption or recognition of the sanctity or inviolability of the state boundaries left by the colonial masters by Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1964. Socio-political and ethno-national marriages of

inconveniences put in place by the colonial masters continue to witch-haunt African political stability till date.

3.2   Causes of Conflicts

In the view of Adekanye (2003:13-17), root causes of conflicts in Africa can be categorized into what he calls "background/structural cum predisposition conditions," "precipitant", "accelerators or triggers". The "structural cum predispositional conditions' he states "encompasses (among others) such things as the colonially imposed, artificial boundaries, the configuration of given society including the differences between groups as regards language, culture, religion, class and social organization…"

In the same vein, Nwolise (2003:41) quoting Diallo (1986:15-16) states that: It was only after the introduction of slavery and the inroads of colonialism into Africa…that traditional societies began to disintegrate, causing the code of honour to fall into disuse in war.

Nwolise (2003:41 – 422) asserts further that four intervening destructive pathogens that changed the characters, chemistry and nature of Africa's conflict- prevention, management and resolution are: slavery, colonialism, foreign religion and emergence of a new concept of state. He summarily gives a catalogue of other factors to include: unclear national boundaries, foreign instigation from former colonial masters, petroleum discoveries near borders, ideological disputation (Capitalism vs. Communism), 'Cold War' vagaries, religious fanaticism, and oppositions to dictatorship, racism, military rule, inter-ethnic power struggles and others. The foregoing view is also alluded to by Osaghae (1998) and Jinadu (2003).

3.2.1 Causes of Conflict in Africa: Cold War

One major cause of violent conflicts in Africa was the 'Cold War" while it lasted. The West –East unhealthy hegemonic rivalry, patterned in much semblance to the colonial scramble for and partition of Africa, which culminated in the Berlin Conference of 1884, further deepened escalation of violent conflicts in Africa. The West –U.S.A. and the European allies and the East-the U.S.S.R. had their different spheres of control in Africa. Rogge (1987:5) explains that conditions in the Horn of Africa continued to deteriorate especially in the 1980s at the instance of conflicting external influences: the USA, USSR, Saudi Arabia and Libya. These external actors added to the internal political complexities of the region he asserts.

Left –leaning pan-Africanists and nationalist leaders, like Nkrumah in Ghana, Sekou Toure in Guinea and Lumumba in Congo, sought to counterbalance the designs of the West by turning towards thee Soviet Union. A system of client state then emerged, in which African governments were maintained in power in return for their allegiance to one of the superpowers. In countries such as Somalia, Zaire and Sierra Leone corrupt leaderships were proposed up and sustained in power while the institutional basis of the state atrophied. Arms flows and military expenditure increased dramatically with the dire economic and social consequences.

Sequel to the end of the "Cold War" in 1989, there occurred the phenomenon of 'surplus arms' in the international arms market. What followed was the proliferation of small arms and weapons it the African continent. The arms in the armoury of the East block-Russia, consequent upon the disintegration of the latter started diffusing out across the globe. One of the major markets for thee arms was the continent of Africa. The reason being that most conflicts that were hitherto being suppressed during 'Cold War' era had started finding conducive atmosphere for escalation and new ones had a clear coast for manifestation. This accounted for the unprecedented wave of conflict that started blowing across Africa since the late 1980s till date.

Department for International Development (DFID) Framework Document entitled **"The causes of Conflict in the Sub-Saharan Africa"** asserts that the scale of state-to-state arms transfers during the Cold War was colossal. In 1988 alone, at the end of the Cold War, they amounted to more than $4billion. By 1995, they had dropped to $270 million. However, state to state flows were replaced by a major growth in commercial arms dealing and illegal arms trafficking in low maintenance light weaponry, primarily items such as the AK 47 rifle and rocket propelled granade launchers DFID, (2001:6-7). The document further claims that: "Both sides in the Cold War contributed to promoting or exacerbating conflict in Africa throughout the 1960s, 70s and 80s. Much of the present conflict on the continent is, in part, a legacy of Cold War policies of both East and West. During this era, questions of principles like good governance, the rule of law and transparent, equitable economic management, were often overlooked in the interests of political pragmatism and commercial gain."

Adekanye (1996) in the report of a Toyota funded Disarming Ethnic Guerrillas (DEG) programme covering South Africa, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Uganda establishes that post Apartheid South Africa, and indeed the whole of Africa, is awash with arms.

Adekanye further explains, based on his practical experience during disarmament activities carried out in the countries mentioned above, that each of the guerrilla had up to four weapons with them but at the point of disarmament they all always surrendered one, keeping the rest in a safe place so that at the slightest provocation war can resume again. This practice puts the society at the risk of what has technically been referred to as the phenomenon of "return wars'".

3.2.2 Structural Violence

The issue of structural violence also loom large as a cause of violent conflicts in Africa. According to Galtung (1985) structural violence threatens needs for welfare and identity. But more succinctly put, structural violence is the instructionalised framework or predetermined long-term arrangement targeted at putting limitation to the efforts of an actor/entity at performing to the fullest of its potentials in any undertaking. The structural violence originates from the Western World against Africa. International financial institutions such as International Monetary Fund (IMF), The World Bank, and Paris Club etc. are the executors of these obnoxious projects.

Since the mid-1980s Africa has been faced with a debt crisis, the overhang of which has persisted into the 1990s. It all started years back in the 1970s when African governments resorted to heavy borrowing in order to sustain their imports and investment needs, only to be further burdened by a combination of rising interest rates, worsening terms of trade and mismanagement of shrinking foreign exchange earnings. Total debt stocks for Africa amounted to a little over $US 109 billion in 1980, by 1990 these had increased by as much as 150percent to $US272.7 billion. Debt stocks for the continent in 1995 were an estimated staggering $US 313 billion Adekanye (1998:173).

Under this burden of debts, African governments were enjoined by these international financial institutions mentioned above to embark on Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and a host of other austerity measures which include: trade liberation; currency devaluation; tight control of money supply; cutbacks in social expenditures, particularly education, health and housing; removal of food subsidies; reduction in public employment; and privatization of state- owned enterprises. In short, "market forces" regulate all matters relating to prices, incomes and productivity. This has been the grand net into which African countries have fallen headlong, and it has been having ripple effects in all spheres of their national lives.

3.2.3 Environmental and Demographic Insecurity

Another cause of violent conflicts in Africa is stresses from environmental and demographic insecurity. Most African countries bordering the shahelian region and through the Horn have been facing problems of droughts and unprecedented desertification over the last two to three decades. Among the hardest hit are: Mauritania, northern parts of Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, the Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. The deterioration of land as the natural resource base resulting form demographic pressure and chronic poverty has meant that thee little available arable land has become subject of intense disputes and life-and-death struggles, as the case in the Senegal River basin.

3.2.4 Democratization

Pressure of democratization is another conflict sources in Africa. Many contemporary African states have suffered under authoritarian, corrupt, self-perpetuating oligarchies and one-person rulerships and this has brought them under intense pressures from both domestic social forces and external donor interests to democratize. The pattern across Africa has always been mobilization of ethnic identities, religious affiliations or other social affinities for electoral competition in which the interests of the ethnic minority, religious or other social minority groups become jeopardized. This always leaves much to be desired and more often than not, it results in bloody violent conflicts.

3.2.5 Loss of State Capacities

Adekanye (1998 op cit) also identifies increasing loss of state capacities as a major cause of conflict in Africa. He describes most African states as experiencing regime breakdown, state collapse or others, failed states. He maintains this position as a result of failure on the part of many of the states to carry out the basic functions of a state. These include: creating (and maintaining) public order, organizing (and controlling) the military; running a government; administering the machinery of state; dispensing justice; managing conflicts among groups and individuals living in the territory; promoting the general welfare; increasing the national wealth (along with development); reducing inequalities; regulating external relations; and conducting war and peace.

4.0   CONCLUSION

What is clear in Africa today is the fact that most avoidable violent conflicts escalate and a host of dying ones are exacerbated as a result of governments' inability or failure to perform some or all of the functions itemized above. A corroboration of the foregoing is what follows.

Nathan (1999:2) asserts that:

> The root causes of civil wars in Africa and elsewhere are complex: weak or failed states; authoritarian rule; a lack of coincidence between nation and state; the exclusion of minorities from governance; and acute socio-economic deprivation and inequity. The conventional approach to 'early warning' and preventive diplomacy relegates these factors to "background conditions" and assumes naivety that mass proximate rather than its structural causes.

5.0   SUMMARY

The major sources of conflict arise from resource, and power distribution.   Some causes of conflict discussed are the cold war, structural violence, environmental and demographic insecurity, democratization and loss of State capacities.   In addition, what looks like an epitome of the foregoing discussion on the causes of violent conflicts in Africa, Onyike, (2003:47) gives the following as prominent among the causes:

i)   Inequitable access to power and resources;

ii)   Total absence or abandonment of moral and ethical restraint in the use of power and management of public resources;

iii)   Discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, ethnic origin and socio-economic status;

iv)   Non democratic and exclusive governance;

v)   Denial of basic human rights; and

vi)   Failure of institutions of government.

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENTS (TMAS)

i)   What are the various elements of society that could lead to conflict?

ii)   Explain the causes of conflicts.

iii)   Distinguish between causes and sources of conflicts.

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UNIT 2 TAXONOMY OF CAUSES OF CONFLICTS IN AFRICA

Table of Contents

1.0 INTRODUCTION

We have earlier discussed several causes of conflicts, not only in Africa, but the entire world. But this unit introduces us to the new typology of causes of conflicts in Africa, as revealed by a recent study conducted by DFID in Africa.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

i)   Explain the causes of conflict; and

ii) Explain the reasons supporting the classification.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 The DFID Typology of cause of Conflicts in Africa: A Review

The UK's Department for International Development (DFID), (2001:14-16) identifies, explains and distinguishes between the root causes, the secondary and tertiary causes of conflicts in Africa. Most of these causes have been identified but what catches our fancy here is the classification. To this effect, listing of the points under each of the classifications is presented below:

3.2 Root Causes

i)   Weak states and state collapse
ii)   Economic decline and economic shock
iii)   Historical factors
iv)   Natural resources wealth

3.3 Secondary Causes

i)   Unemployment, lack of education and population pressure
ii)   The abuse of ethnicity
iii)   Availability of arms
iv)   Absence of independent, well-informed civil society sector

3.4 Tertiary Causes

i)   Regional and Interlocking conflicts
ii)   Failure to consolidate peace
iii)   Lack of guarantors
iv)   Inadequate and inappropriate mediation
v)   Misplaced humanitarian and development assistance

Fayemi, (2003:67-68) gives the following reasons as the most critical elements in understanding the new conflict equation arising out of the 1990s political transition on the African continent:

(1)   The shifts in global and geopolitical power relations; in particular the end of the cold war and the withdrawal of the metropolitan security umbrella which paved the way for serious challenges to some client regimes in a manner previously considered impossible.

(2)   With the demise of the universalistic ideological battle between socialism and capitalism, new forms of conflict emerged in the form of identity issues anchored on religion and ethnicity in particular.

(3)   The withdrawal of assistance by big states also resulted in the search for new forms of sustenance, leading to the exploitation of resources and criminal activity.

(4)   Increasing availability and privatization of instruments of violence, transforming the military balance between the state and society.

(5)   New forms of violent and trans-national crime.

He further states that a recent study indicates that the permanent members of the Security Council were together responsible for 81% of world arms exports from 1996-2000. The G8 nations sold 87% of total arms exports to the entire world. US' share of that is over 50 percent and 86% of arms supplied to the developing world come from the United States.

4.0   CONCLUSION

To sum up, we can say that justification for the saying "accidents do not just happen, they are caused" is locatable within the context of the causes of violent conflicts in Africa. It is now obvious, against the background of the foregoing discussion, that Africa's conflicts share a common backdrop of economic stagnation and faltering democratic rule that undermined state capacity and legitimacy in the 1980s. It then follows that, for Africa to wriggle out of her myriad of violent conflicts their root causes need be properly identified, agreed on and exhaustively transformed accordingly.

5.0   SUMMARY

In this unit, we have examined taxonomy of causes of conflict in Africa. They are classified under root, secondary and tertiary causes.

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT (TMAS)

i)   What is the basis of DFID's typology of causes of conflicts in Africa?

ii)   Outline DFID's typology of conflicts.

iii)   There a variety of wars and conflict in Africa today. Discuss.

iv)   What do you understand by the New Warfare in Africa?

v)   Explore the psychological approach to conflict types.

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UNIT 3   TAXONOMY OF CONFLICTS WORLDWIDE

Table of Contents

1.0   INTRODUCTION

This unit introduces you into the typology of global conflicts.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit you will be able to;

i)   Classify conflicts across the world;

ii)   Explain the basis of classification of conflicts;

iii)   Describe the dimensions and contours of contemporary conflicts in the world.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Schmid's Typology of Global Conflicts

On a broader platform and at a global level, Schmid (2000:77-78) gives a typology, which is more encompassing of all types of contemporary (armed) violent conflict. The percentage indicated against each type shows the frequency with which they occurred between 1985 and 1994 from a total of 102 violent conflicts around the world.

Type A: Anti-regime wars or Political and Ideological conflicts (19.6%): State Versus Insurrection. There are different forms: liberation movements Vs. Colonial powers; popular movements and/ or social-revolutionary movements vs. authoritarian state; destabilizing or re-establishing a status ante e.g. Contrast Vs. revolutionary state. Today some former destabilization conflicts are mutated to become dominantly ethno-nationalist or ethnic – tribalist (e.g. in Afghanistan and Angola).

Type B: ethno-nationalists conflicts (44.1%): These conflicts come in diverse forms but mostly as intra-state conflicts (state versus nation); sometimes as interstate conflicts. Ethno-nationalist conflicts are the most frequent types of contemporary armed conflicts and wars in Africa and elsewhere; such conflicts are generally of long duration (decades), only in a few cases would conflict resolution help to create new states. Possibilities for conflict resolution in such cases range from concessions regarding cultural autonomy and diverse degrees of autonomy to (con) federal solutions and sovereign statehood.

Type C: interstate Conflicts (11.8%): State Versus state, this is earlier seen as the "classic type" of warfare. Examples are: Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), the 11-day war between Mali and Burkina Faso (Dec. 1985) or the Invasion of USA in Panama (Dec. 1989).

Type D: Decolonisation Wars or Foreign –State- Occupations (FSO) (4.9%). Since the 1940s former European Colonial territories have been liberated, occupied and annexed by non-European regional powers. There are also a number of Afro-Asian cases where non-European powers act as occupying forces; e.g. Western Shara, East-Timor, West-Papua, Palestine and Eritrea (until 1991-1992). Most examples of type D conflicts are predominantly ethno-national in character. Since the United Nations General Assembly generally looked upon anti-European and anti-colonial struggles favourably, international law treats such conflicts differently from type B conflicts.

Type E: Inter-ethnic or tribal Conflicts (13.7): Type E falls under the broad banner of 'banner of 'ethnic conflict' also but is differentiated by the actors and aims involved. Such conflicts are often fought without a state actor taking part; the issues are sectarian and Sectoral i.e. particular interest, tribalism, clan conflicts, chauvinism, and narrow nationalism.

Type F: Gang Wars (3.9%): This involves predominantly non-state (mixed with criminal elements), especially in situation of state

collapse. Actors are often village militias, demobilized soldiers or mercenaries. Other actors are death squads, professional killers, the Mafia, Syndicates or professional groups. Another type opposes settlers, migrants and indigenous peoples as the case in the mountainous areas of Bangladesh, in the Kenyan Rift Valley, and in Eastern Nicaragua.

Genocide (2.0%): This is state- organized mass murder and crimes against humanity characterized by the intention to exterminate a particular national, ethnic, "racial" or religious group. Mass murder committed against   members of   a   particular political group **(politicide)** or social group **(democide)** are equally horrifying crimes against humanity.

A careful study of Schmid's typology above shows that all types of conflict identified have featured, albeit at varied degrees, in Africa. Type F is the least frequent but with the trend of economic downturn in the continent, this type is also more probably to increase.

3.2   DFID's Typology of Conflicts in Africa

In the same token, DFID (2003:8-9) identifies four distinct types of conflict in Africa. They are;

Conventional warfare- wars of attrition
Factional warfare
Genocide and ethnic based conflict
The "new warfare"- regional conflict

We now explain them:

1)   **Conventional Warfare- Wars of Attrition:** The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea was the only conventionally fought war in Africa during the last one and a half decades. It was fought with regular troops along a defined series of fronts. Targets and objectives were primarily military and strategic.

2)   **Factional Warfare:** Factional wars are fluid by nature. There is rarely a defined front line and fighting is frequently opportunistic rather than strategic. Warfare is low tech and small arms are the main weapon. Such wars are not costly and can easily be sustained without external support. Countries currently affected by factional warfare are Somalia, Liberia (Internally), Uganda (internally), Namibia and Cote D'voire.

3)   **Genocide and Ethnic Based Conflict:** Terrible levels of ethnic violence and genocide, as earlier witnessed in Rwanda and Burundi between the ethnic Tutsi and Hutu, re-emerged in the last decade of the 20th century Africa. At this time, failed states such as Liberia, Somalia, Sierra Leone and Zaire became centres of regional insecurity and had degenerated into crosscutting politico-ethnic conflicts resulting in genocidal wars., with particular reference to Liberia, Doe's ethnic Krahn and Mandingo its ally, and Quitwormkpa's Gio and Mano groups engaged in a genocidal conflict, groups started proliferating. This type of conflict spread like wildfire and leaves a huge death toll, massive displacement, fear and confusion. Ethnic and genocidal fighting tends to involve the use extremely low technology, the use of knives, machetes, and occasionally small arms. A distinguishing characteristic is the speed with which genocidal attacks take place and the high degree of central organization and planning involved.

4)   **The "New Warfare"- Regional Conflict:** All three elements of warfare above have coalesced into what can be described as Africa's "new warfare"-regional conflict. African countries increasingly intervened militarily in neighbouring states and justify their actions on thee grounds of necessary self-protection. Conflicts become increasingly regional in nature as collapsed states threaten the security of their neighbours. The war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) involves the armed forces of eight countries, and the DRC has sought to take the war back into Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda where it, allegedly, came from. The war in Liberia also developed a similar regional dimension. It begat wars in Sierra Leone, Guinea and Cote D'Ivoire respectively.

5)   **Interpersonal and psychological dimensions of conflict.** The relationship between interpersonal and more general psychological approaches to conflict is that both in different ways reflect conflict researchers' general assumption that conflict has common patterns and processes at different levels, e.g. from the local community to the international system level.

Traditionally, interpersonal and psychological dimensions of conflict have been discussed in terms of cognitive psychology, or concerns with images, perceptions, stereotyping and group processes. The relationship between cognitive psychology and conflict has been particularly evident in the literature on decision-making and in analyses of conflict as a non-rational process.

4.0   CONCLUSION

The assumption that conflict might stem principally from more "subjective" psychological dynamics continues to be part of a broader debate between *subjectivists* and *objectivists*. The latter views conflict as "real" and independent of perception, though the former may also see conflict as real but not "true".

However, psychological and inter-personal studies are increasingly impacting upon conflict analyses in other ways. Elements that appear to be inherent parts of conflict such as the sense of *victimization* are adding potential understanding to the field, as is the growing attention given to the issue of *entrapment.* Among other things, entrapment helps to explain ways in which conflicts are maintained over long periods of time.   Perhaps surprisingly, given the seeming centrality of its importance, the psychological dynamics of conflict resolution have only recently become a core issue in the armoury of conflict analysis. Under this overall rubric, various scholars have introduced such concepts as *framing* as a means to understand "what a conflict is really about", and "non-rationality" as an issue to address in promoting peace.

5.0   SUMMARY

In this unit we have discussed two major taxonomies of conflicts, their categories and basis for categorisation. We have also examined the taxonomies in relation to the variety of conflicts in Africa.

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENTS (TMAS)

i)   What is the basis of Schmid's typology of conflicts in the world?

ii)   Outline Schmid's typology of conflicts

iii)   There a variety of wars and conflict in Africa today. Discuss.
iv)   What do you understand by the New Warfare in Africa?

v)   Explore the psychological approach to conflict types.

7.0   REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

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MODULE 6

GLOBAL FRAMEWORK OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Unit 1   National and International Peace Institutions
Unit 2   United Nations and Peace Initiatives in Conflict Situations
Unit 3   UN Peace Initiatives in Africa
Unit 4   UN Intervention Strategies
Unit 5   Globalisation, Civil Society and Conflict Management

UNIT 1   NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE INSTITUTIONS

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1.0   INTRODUCTION

By National and International Peace Institutions, we mean organisations and institutions that contribute to research and analysis, advocacy and training in the fields of conflict and peace building. In principle, the range of relevant organisations would encompass virtually all universities, many research institutions and probably most national governments as well as a host of multilateral organisations.

Each organization to be included is those that have a proven and on-going capacity to undertake research in areas that directly impact upon conflict and peace. They also have in one way or another seeming capacity to disseminate the results of their work and provide related services such as training, teaching or advocacy over time.

It should also be noted that most governments in one way or another are involved in issues of conflict and conflict management as well as in ways to enhance governance. Some governments in the developed world have over the years been involved in actively supporting extensive research and analysis in governance and conflict-related areas through overseas development assistance.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

This unit introduces you to several national and international actors in involved in conflict management globally. After reading this unit, you should be able to:

i.   Identify stakeholders at the national and international levels, and;

ii.   Discuss their roles and significance in ensuring a more peaceful world.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Case Studies

Below is a sample of organisations (with their and Address) involved in conflict and peace building activities in African.

In Nigeria we have the *Academic Associates PeaceWorks b*ased in Lagos. The Academic Associates PeaceWorks focuses principally on conflict management and peace education training. Its emphasis is to target students who will become future leaders, and in so doing, it works with seven of the main universities in Nigeria. The training for community and local government leaders led in 1997 to the creation of a Nigerian Conflict Peace Network, and during that same year a Corps of Mediators was formed to deal with conflicts at the community level. The *Centre for Action-oriented Research on African Development is a* Cameroon-based, academic non-governmental organisation that has interests in governance, conflict prevention and resolution, as well as in development. Not only does it serve as a research body, but it also provides educational and consultancy services on conflict prevention.

Some of these organisations are university based like the *Centre for Conflict Resolution,* an independent institute linked to the University of Cape Town; the Centre concentrates on conflict management training, promotion of democratic values, disarmament and demilitarisation. Recently the Centre has developed programmes for training senior African officials in conflict management as well as for students, community leaders, teachers and others in peace-building.]

Inter-Africa Group is essentially focused on the Horn of Africa; the Inter-Africa Group is principally concerned with conflict prevention and resolution as well as development. Its programmes include research, advocacy and public education, and it has been engaged in work relating to so-called "complex emergencies".

Inter-governmental Authority on Development [IGAD] is presently engaged in peace facilitation efforts for the Sudan and Somalia, IGAD focuses upon capacity-building and awareness as well as early-warning systems. Though its mandate is quite extensive within the Horn of Africa context, its resources are normally quite limited. That said, it could play a useful network role if ways were found to enhance its conflict prevention and resolution.

Although the *Organisation of African Unity [OAU]* is not a research organisation, per se, it has made major strides to develop a response capacity for dealing with conflict prevention and resolution. Lack of funds and the well-known constraints that all too often affect multilateral organisations limits the full potential of the OAU in the fields of peace building and conflict resolution.

The *United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations [DPKO]* is responsible for establishing peacekeeping and peacemaking operations mandated by the UN Security Council, DPKO also monitors actual and potential conflict areas, and assesses the effectiveness of UN peace initiatives through its Lessons-learned Unit.

The *All Africa Conference of Churches* is supported by churches throughout the world. The AACC is involved in the fields of conflict prevention and resolution, including mediation, citizen diplomacy, fact-finding and early warning. Normally the Conference responds to the requests of local churches, and has focussed its efforts in the area of the Great Lakes, Sudan, Sierra Leone and Lesotho.

Another import institution is the *United Nations Volunteers [UNV]*. The organization is set up to promote efforts to address some of the causes of conflict at the community level, UNV has launched since 1994 projects which aim to enhance effectively inter-communal confidence-building activities through the use of experienced conflict resolution facilitators with a proven record in non-violent conflict resolution and confidence-building activities. The activities under these projects focus on a) building a nucleus of local capacity through training of trainers in conflict resolution / transformation skills b) support to third sector and local NGOs c) youth activities, and d) support to the dialogue process between the opposing groups.

4.0   CONCLUSION

One of the most important international non-governmental players in the conflict situations is the *International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC]*. The ICRC acts as a neutral intermediary between parties concerned in war, civil war or internal disturbance. It attempts to ensure

that civilian and military victims of conflict are afforded protection and assistance, and those humanitarian principles, as set out in the Geneva conventions, is observed.

Among the noted countries of the developed world involved in peace building is Austria through its *Department of Development Cooperation (DDC)* located in the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, it is responsible for policy questions and contributions to UNDP, UNIDO, UNFPA, UNICEF and smaller UN funds and programmes. Other ministries responsible for multilateral development institutions include the Federal Ministry for Finance (responsible for international financial institutions) the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) the Federal Ministry of Agriculture (WFP, FAO) and the Federal Ministry of the Interior (UN High Commissioner for Refugees). Austria works closely within the European Union and with the UNHCHR to conduct peace building, conflict prevention and rule of law initiatives in developing countries. Austria also features several important institutions that undertake or support research, training, advisory and advocacy work related to conflict and governance issues. These include the Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR) the Institute for International Politics and the Institute for Peace. The ASPR supports UN-led peacekeeping efforts through training and other activities. [Federal

The United Kingdom's *Department for International Development [DFID*] is the British government's main focal point for providing poverty alleviation assistance directed in part at conflict mitigation, conflict resolution and good governance. Within DFID, the Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department [CHAD] is the primary operational actor that deals with countries in crisis. However, the Government's Foreign and Commonwealth Office [FCO] also has specific sections dedicated to conflict analysis and prevention.

5.0   SUMMARY

In this unit, we have examined the role of institutions who are also stakeholders in the conflict management. Major institutions that have played such roles were identified.

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENTS (TMAS)

i)   What roles do institutions play in conflict management?

ii)   Name three institutions and discuss their roles in conflict management in contemporary Africa.

iii)   What is the role of foreign aid in conflict resolution across the world?

iv)   How significant is the United Nations System to global conflict management?

7.0   REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

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UNIT 2   UNITED NATIONS AND PEACE INITIATIVES IN CONFLICT SITUATIONS

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1.0   INTRODUCTION

The name "United Nations", coined by President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the United States, was first used on January 1st 1942 when representatives of 26 nations pledged to continue fighting together against the Axis Powers (i.e. Germany, Italy and Japan) during the Second World War (UN 1998:3). Actually, the term was not, as at this time conceived as denoting a global organization for the maintenance of peace and security. It was evolved as a military alliance to defeat the Axis Powers. However, the United Nations has, in the face of conflict situations around the world, assumed its position in spearheading conflict management.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

i)   Explain the role of United Nations (UN) as a veritable organ of conflict management; and

ii)   Critically appraise the United Nation's interventions project.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Historical background of the UN

Up to April 1943, the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and American President F. D. Roosevelt, were still in favour of the post-war international system on regional rather than global basis, both of them had apparently changed their mind by October of the same year. Along with the leaders of Soviet Union and China, Roosevelt and Churchill had in the famous Moscow Declaration come to recognize and accept the necessity of establishing a universal international organization, which is based on the principle of sovereign equality of all peace-loving states and open to membership by all such states, large and small, and committed to the maintenance of international peace and security. The United Nations Charter was drawn up by the representatives of 50 countries at the United Nations Conference on International Organisation, which met in San Francisco from 25 April to 26 June 1945. Those delegates deliberated on the basis of proposals worked out by the representatives of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States at Dumbarton Oaks in August – October 1944. The representatives of 50 countries signed the charter on 26 June 1945. Poland, which was not represented at the Conference, signed it later and became one of the original 51 member states.

The United Nations officially came into existence on 24 October 1945, when the Charter had been ratified by China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States and by a majority of other signatories. Since then, United Nations Day is celebrated on 24 October each year. A comprehensive list of the member states of the United Nations and dates of their admission is provided as an appendix to this work.

3.2   The United Nations' Charter

The United Nations Charter is the constituting instrument of the organization, setting out the rights and obligations of member states, and establishing the United Nations organs and procedures.

The Charter opens with a preamble, and includes following Chapters: United Nations Purposes and principles, Membership, organs, Pacific settlement of Disputes, Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression, International Economic Cooperation, and Non-Self-Governing Territories..

3.3   Preamble to the Charter

The preamble to the charter expresses the ideals and common aims of all the peoples whose Governments joined together to form the United Nations:

> *"WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our life time has brought untold sorrow to mankind….."*

3.4   UN Organs for World Peace

The Charter established six principal organs of the united Nations, which are the: General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council, International Court of Justice and Secretariat. However, our discussion in this study touches on three of these organs that have direct or somewhat interrelated responsibility for International conflict resolution and World Peace and Security. By this, we mean the General Assembly, Security Council and International Court of Justice (ICJ). The secretariat is discussed within the context of the Secretary-General as the arrowhead of the activities at the Secretariat and the spokesperson of all the organs.

3.5   The General Assembly

The General Assembly is the main deliberative organ. It is composed of representatives of all Member States, each of which has one vote. Decisions on important issues, such as those on peace and security, admission of new members and budgetary matters, require a two-thirds majority.

Functions and Powers

Under the Charter, the functions and powers of the General Assembly include:

i)   To consider and make recommendations on the principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and arms regulation;

ii)   To discuss any question relating to International Peace and Security and, except where a dispute or situation is being

discussed by the Security Council, to make recommendation on it;

iii) To discuss and, with the same exception, make recommendations on any question within the scope of the Charter or affecting the powers and functions of any organ of the United Nations;

iv) To initiate studies and make recommendations to promote international political cooperation, the development and codification of international law, the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, and international collaboration in economic, social, cultural, educational and health fields;

v) To make recommendations for the peaceful settlement of any situation, regardless of origin, which might impair friendly relations among nations;

vi) To receive the consider reports from the security council and other united Nations organs;

vii) To consider and approve the United Nations budget and to apportion the contributions among members;

viii) To elect the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the members of the Economic and Social Council and those members of the Trusteeship Council that are elected; to elect jointly with the security council, the judges of the International Court of Justice; and, on the recommendation of the Security Council, to appoint the Secretary-General.

The General Assembly's regular session usually begins each year in September. At the start of each regular session, the Assembly elects a new president, 21 Vice-Presidents and the chairpersons of the Assembly's six main committees.

At the beginning of each regular session, the Assembly holds a general debate, often addressed by heads of state and government, in which Member States express their views on a wide range of international matters. Most questions are then discussed in its six Main Committees:

i) First Committee (Disarmament and International Security);
ii) Second Committee (Economic and Financial);
iii) Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural);
iv) Fourth Committee (Special Political and Decolonisation);
v) Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary);
vi) Sixth Committee (Legal).

The work of the United Nations year-round derives largely from the decisions of the General Assembly – that is to say, the will of the majority of the Members as expressed in resolutions adopted by the Assembly. That work is carried out:

By committees and other bodies established by the Assembly to study and report on specific issues, such as disarmament, peacekeeping, development and human rights;

In International conferences called for by the assembly; and

By the Secretariat of the United Nations – the Secretary-General and his staff of international civil servants.

3.6 The Security Council

The Security Council has primary responsibility, under the Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security.
In accordance with Article 23, (1), (2) and (30 of the united Nations Charter, as amended in (1965).

(1)   The Security Council shall consist of fifteen 915) members of the United Nations. The republic of China; France; the union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) now the Russian Federation; Great Britain and the United States of America are recognized as permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly elects ten other members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the organization, and also, to equitable geographical distribution.

(2)   The non-permanent members of the Security Council are elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the non-permanent member after the increase of membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, two of the four additional members were to be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member is not eligible for immediate re-election.

(3)   Each member of the Security Council has one representative. The present system for allocation of seats at the Security Council is based upon the General Assembly resolution 1991 (xviii).

The numbers of non-permanent members were increased from six to ten on 1st January, 1966, as a result of an amendment to the United Nations

Charter. As the membership of the United Nations increased; it was considered that the membership of the Security Council should also be increased, in order to give more states an opportunity of sitting on the Security Council (Bamidele, 2003:36).

Each Council member has one vote.   Decisions on procedural matters are made by an affirmative vote of at least 9 of the 15 members. Decisions on substantive matters require nine votes, including the concurring votes of all five permanent members.   This is the rule of "great power unanimity", often referred to as the "Veto" power.   If a permanent member does not agree with a decision, it can cast a negative vote, and this act has power of veto.   If a permanent member do not support a decision but does not wish to block it through a veto, it may abstain.

By virtue of Article 25 of the Charter, all Members of the United Nations have legal obligation to carry out the decisions of the Security Council.   "While other organs of the United Nations make recommendations to Governments, the council alone has Power to take decisions which Member States are obligated under the Charter to carry out" UN (1998:9).

The functions and Powers of the Security Council as stated under Articles 24, 25 and 26 of the United Nations Charter address several aspects of conflict management. They are:

To maintain international peace and security in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations;
To investigate any dispute or situation which might lead to international friction;
To recommend methods of adjusting such disputes or the terms of settlement;
To formulate plans for establishing a system to regulate armaments;
To determine the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression and to recommend what action should be taken;
To call on members to apply economic sanctions and other measures not involving the use of force to prevent or stop aggression;
To take military action against an aggressor;
To recommend the admission of new Members;
To exercise the trusteeship functions of the united Nations in "strategic areas";
To recommend to the General Assembly the appointment of the Security-General and, together with the Assembly, to elect the judges of the International Court of Justice.

3.7   International Court of Justice (ICJ)

The International Court of Justice, based at The Hague, the Netherlands, is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It handles conflict issues as it affects legal disputes between states parties and gives advisory opinions to the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Its statute is an integral part of the United Nations Charter.

The court is open to the parties to its statute, which automatically includes all members of the United Nations.   A state, which is not a United Nations Member, may become a party to the statute, as is the case for Switzerland and Nauru. The court is not open to private individuals.

The jurisdiction of the Court covers all questions, which states refer to it, and all matters provided for in the United Nations Charter or in treaties or conventions in force.

In accordance with its statute, the court decides disputes by applying:

International conventions establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
International custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
The general principles of law recognized by nations; and
Judicial decisions and the teachings of the most qualified scholars of various nations.

The Court consists of 15 Judges elected by the General Assembly and the Security Council, voting independently.   They are chosen on the basis of their qualifications, not on the basis of nationality, and care is always taken to ensure that the principal legal systems of the world are represented in the court. No two judges can be from the same country. The judges serve for a nine-year term and may be re-elected.   They cannot engage in any other occupation during their term of office.

The court normally sits in plenary session, but it may form smaller units called Chambers if the parties so request.   Judgements given by Chambers are considered as rendered by the full court.

3.8   The Secretariat

The Secretariat is one of the principal organs of the United Nations. It is headed by a Secretary-General. The Secretary-General is the Chief Administrative Officer of the United Nations.

In accordance with Article 97 of the Charter, he is appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council for a five-year, renewable term.

Among the functions performed by the Secretary-General, as entrusted on him by the General Assembly, the Security Council and other organs of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 98 of the charter, is to be an ambassador of peace and to evolve ways of managing conflict. Under Article 99, the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council, any matter that may, in his opinion, threaten the peace and security. Articles 12, (2), 20, 73 (e), 101, 110 93) further spell out specific functions of the Secretary-General.

4.0   CONCLUSION

The work of the United Nations' as embodied in the post of the Secretary-General is to ensure consultations with world leaders and other individuals, attendance at sessions of various United Nations bodies, and Worldwide travel as part of the overall effort to intimate himself and the views of member states, as well as the concerns of representatives of civil society.

5.0   SUMMARY

In this unit, we have examined the structure and terms of reference of the United Nations'. We have also discussed its evolvement since inception into a powerful tool in conflict management around the world.

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENTS (TMAS)

i)   What is the place of conflict management in the UN charter?

ii)   Outline the strategies of intervention used by the UN?

iii)   How will the reform of the UN improve conflict management globally?

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UNIT 3   UN PEACE INITIATIVES IN AFRICA

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1.0   INTRODUCTION

In 1997, the Security Council held a special meeting at the ministerial level on Africa at which it expressed "grave concern" over the number and intensity of armed conflicts on the continent and called for an international effort to promote peace and security within the continent (UN, 1998:79).

One of the earliest and largest peacekeeping forces of the United Nations was deployed to Africa, from 1960 to 1964, in what is now the Democratic Republic of Congo. The peacekeeping force was tagged "United Nations Operation in the Congo, (ONUC) with a strength of nearly 20,000 military personnel.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

Upon completion of studying this unit, you should be able to:

i)   Highlight the UN's various peace initiatives in Africa; and
ii)   Critically appraise these initiatives against the backdrop of the proliferation of violent conflict in the continent.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   A Review of U.N. Peace Initiative in Africa

Violent conflicts were prevalent in Africa in the early 1960s partly as a result of decolonization struggle in some parts of the continent and partly as a fall-out of the in congruencies among some hitherto mutually hostile peoples lumped together in the various newly independent states. Most of these conflicts did not actually attract the attention of the United Nations. The latter type of conflict just mentioned hibernated in the economic boom of different states across Africa in the 1970s and very early 1980s only to find expression in the 1990s' Post-Cold War Political vagaries in the form of armed ethnic conflicts. United Nations record on conflict interventions and peacekeeping operations in Africa establishes this fact, as ONUC happened to be the only UN peacekeeping force deployed to Africa from 1960-1988 while not less than sixteen (16) peacekeeping forces, observer and verification Missions have been sent to Africa between 1989 and 2004.

The record shows the following:

1.   **ONUC:** United Nations Operation in the Congo
      July 1960 – December 1964.

2.   **UNAVEM 1:** United Nations Angola Verification Mission 1
      January 1989 – June 1991.

3.   **UNTAG:** United Nations Transition Assistance Group (Namibia and Angola)
      April 1989 – March 1990.

4.   **UNAVEM II:** United Nations Angola Verification II
      June 1991 – February 1995

5.   ***MINURSO:**   United Nations Mission for the Referendum in West Sahara
      April 1991 –

6.   **UNOSOM 1:** United Nations Operation in Somalia 1
      April 1992 – March 1993.

7.   **ONUMOZ:** United Nations Operation in Mozambique
      December 1992 – December 1994.

8.   **UNOSOM II:** United Nations Operation in Samalia II
      March 1993 – March 1995.

9.   **UNOMUR:**   United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda. June 1993 – September 1994.

10.   **UNOMIL:**   United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia September 1993 – September 1997.

11.   **UNAMIR:**   United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda October 1993 – March 1996.

12.   **UNASOG:**   United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (Republic of Chad)

13.   **UNAVEM III:**   United Nations Angola Verification Mission III February 1995 – June 1997.

14.   ***MONUA:**   United Nations Observer Mission in Angola July 1997.

15.   ***MINUCRA:**   United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic March 1998.

16.   ***UNOMSIL:**   United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone July 1998.

        KEY: *Means Ongoing as of July 1998.   Source: *Basic Facts About The United Nations, New York: UN (1998) pp. 301 – 304.*

In addition to the list above is the recently deployed **MINUCI:** United Nations in Cote d'Ivoire in response to the civil war that erupted in the country in September 1999.

Among the tasks discharged by peacekeeping operations over the years are:

     Maintenance of ceasefires and Separation of forces: By providing "breathing space", an operation based on a limited agreement between parties can foster an atmosphere conducive to negotiation;

     Preventive deployment: Deployed before conflict breaks out, an operation does provide a reassuring presence and a degree of transparency which favour political progress;

     Implementation of a comprehensive settlement: Complex, multi-dimensional operations, deployed on the basis of comprehensive

peace agreements, do assist in such diverse tasks as monitoring human rights, providing electoral assistance, observing elections, furnishing humanitarian assistance and coordinating support for economic reconstruction;

Protection of humanitarian operations during conflict: In many conflicts, civilian populations have been deliberately targeted as a means to gain political ends. In such situations, peacekeepers have been asked to provide protection and support for the delivery of humanitarian aid.

Conflict experts agree that to completely resolve a conflict, its root causes have to be removed first. It was in this regard that the United Nations, having recognized "the link between war and dire poverty" in Africa, has, of recent; started going into close cooperation with regional organizations, such as the organization of African Unity (OAU) now African Union (AU), and sub-regional organizations such as Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as demonstrated in Liberia, 1993 – 1997. At its 1997 meeting, the Security Council called for a further strengthening of such collaboration to enhance conflict prevention and resolution on the Africa continent.

In a bid to reduce or eradicate poverty, as a major cause of conflict in Africa, the United Nations has taken giant economic policy steps over the years. At its 1986 special session on Africa, the General Assembly adopted the *Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development 1986 – 1990 (UNPAERD),* which sought to mobilize political and financial support for economic reforms.   Reviewing the programme of Action in 1991, the Assembly called for a *New Agenda for Development of Africa in the 1990s* to ensure continued support for the region by achieving an average real growth rate in gross domestic product of at least 6 percent a year throughout the 1990s.

To further ensure coordination of its extensive programmes in Africa, the General Assembly launched in 1996 the *United Nations System-wide Special Initiative on Africa (UNSIA)* to help accelerate Africa's development in the decade to 2005.   UNSIA is designed to rationalize and maximize the impact of United Nations assistance in the region, (UN, 1998: 79 – 80, 131).

There is no gainsaying the fact that the steps so far discussed are all geared towards engendering sustainable peace in Africa: whether through deployment of peacekeeping forces, Observer and Verification Missions or through the leeway of sound economic development; within the context of which viable political institutions and activities can operate.

3.2   United Nations Intervention in the Liberian Civil War (Case Study)

At the early stages of the ECOMOG initiative, there were allegations that the United Nations had failed to show any significant concern for the tragedy that was unfolding in Liberia.   Some speculated that the major powers at the Un felt slighted by the ECOWAS initiative towards solving the Liberian problem and therefore decided to look the other way, leaving the sub-regional organization to spend itself to exhaustion. There were also speculations that the UN's peacekeeping budget had already been overstretched by the upsurge of missions which it had embarked on since the end of the Cold-War (late 1980s). The view in some quarters was that the United Nations was neither interested in the restoration of Peace in Liberia nor did it specifically endorse the ECOMOG mission to Liberia.

However, the UN position was made known in February 1992, when the UN Secretary-General Boutrous-Ghali lauded the joint meeting in New York between the UN, OAU and other regional organizations which sought to bring the belligerent factions in Somalia to agree on an immediate Cessation of hostilities and conclude a ceasefire arrangement. He appreciated regional efforts at restoring peace, Obasi (1992:349) notes:

This joint effort will help establish a pattern for future cooperation and the means by which the United Nations could help enhance the role of regional organizations and render assistance to help them contribute to peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts.

Shortly after, during his two-day official visit to Nigeria, the Secretary-General further elaborated on UN's true position. He debunked the allegations that the United Nations was unconcerned about Liberia. He stressed the concern of the UN on Liberia and particularly on loss of lives, property and the suffering, which the situation had brought on the country.   He also drew attention to humanitarian and emergency assistance given to the country by agencies of the United Nations, notably, United Nations Children Endowment Fund (UNICEF)(and United Nations High commission for Regugees (UNHCR).

In early November 1992 ECOWAS made a representation to the UN Security Council. In the Council's meeting of 19 November, the discussion within the council favoured and approved a regional solution to the Liberian conflict. The Security Council meeting formed basis of Resolution 788, which reaffirmed its belief that the Yamoussoukro IV

Accord offered the best possible framework for a peaceful resolution of the Liberian conflict. Resolution 788 also requested that the Secretary-General dispatch a special Representative to Liberia to evaluate the situation and impose a general and compete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Liberia. The arms embargo did not however extend to ECOMOG (Ero, 1995:9).

The Harbel Massacre, an incident in which not less 600 civilians were slaughtered, heightened the pressure upon ECOWAS and the International Community to try to bring together the rival factions in order to resume negotiations and find a consensus to the crisis. Peace-talks were therefore conducted in the summer of 1993 with the assistance of the UN and the OAU.

The talks resulted in the Cotonou Agreement, which was signed, by the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU), National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO). The agreement contained actions ranging from ceasefire through disarmament and demobilization to the holding of national elections. The parties agreed to establish a joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JCMC), comprising representatives of the three warring factions, ECOMOG and an advance team of 30 UN observers. This was the beginning of the United Nations intervention in the Liberian civil war.

3.2.1 The UNOMIL and Its Mandate

On 22nd September, 1993 and by resolution 866 of 1993, United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was established by the UN Security Council. UNOMIL was an observer mission to remain unarmed. ECOMOG troops were to provide the UNOMIL with security. This was the first joint UN/regional peacekeeping mission undertaken by the United Nations in cooperation with a peacekeeping mission already set up by another organization, (UN 1998:90).

The UNOMIL mandate was to support ECOMOG in implementing the Cotonou peace agreement, especially compliance with and impartial implementation of the agreement by all parties.

3.3   UNOMIL – ECOMOG Joint Peacekeeping Operation in Liberia

One would think that the intervention of the UN in the war would bring an immediate end to the crisis based on the fact that, Charles Taylor had consistently declared that he would only disarm his troops to UN forces or some international body other than the Nigerian-dominated

ECOMOG which he saw as being partial. However, the progress towards implementing the Cotonou Agreement, which formed the core mandate of UNOMIL, was slow with all the options that were outlined being undermined.

What was different about the Cotonou Agreement in view of the past agreements was that ECOMOG was to be expanded to include two contingents from outside the West African Sub-region – Tanzania and Uganda – and a UN observer mission. Even with all these antidotes on ground, like the Yamoussoukro IV Accords, the Cotonou Agreement did not bring peace but multiplication of warring factions.

1994 was a very rough year in the annals of the history of the Liberian war as the joint UNOMIL/ECOMOG efforts suffered serious setbacks and it became apparent that the continued fighting between the rival factions undermined the implementation process and the election of September 1994. For instance, on 9 September 1994, NPFL elements detained 43 unarmed UNOMIL military observers and 6 non-governmental organization personnel at nine sites in the northern and eastern regions. After several negotiations between UNOMIL, NPFL and neighbouring ECOWAS Countries, all military observers and non-governmental organization personnel were released by 18 September. However, two Tanzanian soldiers were killed, a third later died from his wounds.

As a number of obstacles continued to impede the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement several meetings were convened leading to two other agreements. These were the Akosombo Agreement (September 1994), which was a supplementary agreement to the Cotonou Agreement and the Agreement on the clarification of the Akosombo Agreement and The Acceptance, and Accession Agreement signed in Accra in December 1994. These agreements were signed to take care of the loopholes and inadequacies of the Cotonou Agreement. The UN Representative to Liberia, Trevor Gordon – Somers admitted that mistakes were made over the disarmament process that was decided in the Cotonou Agreement:

> *"In the Cotonou Agreement we all negotiated on the assumption of good faith ... and therefore, three are aspects we did not pay sufficient attention to. For one, we did not address the issue of internal security arrangements in the country", (UN Doc. S/1994/1167, 14 Oct. para. 2).*

Though the terrain was very rough for the UNOMIL/ECOMOG, as the joint operation had to weather different storms in the course of restoring peace to the war – torn state of Liberia, but with ceasefire finally in

force, ECOMOG with UNOMIL lending credibility and impartiality to its activities, ranging from disarmament and demobilization to the holding of national elections, the joint operation was able to fulfil its mandate which climaxed in the July 1997 national elections and enthronement of democratically elected government.

3.4   UN Post-Conflict activities in Liberia

In November 1997, following the completion of the UNOMIL's Mandate, the UN established a post-conflict, peace-building support office (PBSO) in Liberia. Headed by a Representative of the Secretary-General, the office was intended to strengthen and harmonise United Nations peace-building efforts, to help promote reconciliation and respect for human rights, and to help mobilize international support for reconstruction and recovery.   The UN post-conflict peace-building is essentially a preventive strategy. It prevents a relapse to conflict and it ushers in sustainable peace.   It is therefore a long-term project, which involves the following:

demilitarization of combatants;
electoral assistance;
re-establishing the rule of law;
re-construction of civil society;
economic assistance; and
the return of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPS).

The UN and the ECOMOG did extensive work in the area of disarmament and demilitarization of combatants despite the uncooperative attitudes of the warring factions.   This is elaborately discussed under the next sub-heading.   The efforts of the UNOMIL – ECOMOG joint operation in the direction of electoral assistance and re-establishment of the rule of law resulted in the national elections of July 1997; adjudged free and fair by international observers.   In the area of economic assistance and re-construction of civil society, the Secretary-General, on 3 February 1995, launched an inter-agency consolidated appeal for Liberia; seeking the US $65 million in extra-budgetary resources required by the UN agencies to embark on humanitarian assistance and initial physical re-construction in post-conflict Liberia. Consequent upon return of peace, Afolayan (2003:77) reports that 23.1 per cent of Liberian refugees returned from Cote d'Ivoire and 35.7 per cent from Guinea in 1998.

3.5   Disarmament of the armed Ethnic Militias

The transition from war to peace commenced after the signing of the Accra Agreement in December 1994, which was a follow-up, and a fine

tune of the Cotonou Agreement. The aim of the disarmament exercise was to retrieve all weapons of destruction from the combatants to ensure and maintain the security of the Liberian State. It was a military process targeted at the collection, registration and destruction of all conventional weapons and ammunitions retrieved from the combatants.

With particular focus on the Liberian case, the Cotonou Agreement and its follow-ups the Akosombo and Accra Agreements; formed the guiding post for the encampment, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the Liberian ex-combatants. Disarmament being the ultimate objective of the ceasefire, the agreements put appropriate measures in place to enable the AFL (Armed Forces of Liberia) to assume its character as a National Army. But until such measures are completed the AFL like all other parties and warring factions shall be completely disarmed in accordance with the Cotonou agreement.

In order to ensure a secure environment for the proper functioning of the unified government in Moronvia, the LNTG (Liberian National Transitional Government in collaboration with ECOMOG shall ensure that no group or individuals bear arms in the perimeter of the capital.

Concerning disarmament, the following are stipulated in Section E and Article 6 of the same Cotonou agreement:

Count 1: All weapons and warlike materials collected shall be stored by the ECOMOG in armouries designated by ECOMOG, monitored and verified by UN observers.

Count 2: All weapons and warlike materials in the possession of the parties shall be given to ECOMOG in designated armouries.

Count 3: Said armouries shall be secured by the ECOMOG, monitored and verified by UN observers upon proper documentation or inventory of all weapons and warlike materials received.

Course 4: Each of the warring parties shall ensure that its combatants report all weapons and warlike materials to ECOMOG which would be inventories by ECOMOG, monitored and verified by the LNTG and UNOMIL. Upon proper inventory such weapons and warlike materials, shall be taken by ECOMOG to the designated armouries, monitored and verified by UNOMIL and LNTG.

Count 5:   All non-combatants who are in possession of weapons and warlike materials shall be reported and surrender same to ECOMOG, monitored and verified by LNTG and UNOMIL.   Such weapons and warlike materials shall be returned to the owner after due registration, licensing and certification by the governing authority after elections.

Count 6:   The ECOMOG shall have the authority to disarm combatants or non-combatants in possession of weapons and warlike materials. The UNOMIL shall monitor all such activities.

Count 7:   For the sole purpose of maintaining the ceasefire, ECOMOG shall conduct any such to recover lost or hidden weapons, observed and monitored by UNOMIL and LNTG.

The parties agreed and fully committed themselves to the encampment of their combatants, and maintenance of command and control in encampment centres, established by ECOMOG, UNOMIl and LNTG in collaboration with the parties.   The encampment centres shall, in addition to disarmament and demobilization, serve as transit points for the further education, training and rehabilitation of said combatants.

In pursuit of the above, the parties agreed to submit to the ECOMOG and the UNOMIL, complete lists of their combatants and weapons and warlike materials and their locations to the nearest encampment centres.

4.0   CONCLUSION

In consultation with the parties, the ECOMOG and the UNOMIL and LNTG shall identify location for encampment, security of encampment sites shall be provided by the ECOMOG, monitored and verified by UNOMIL and LNTG.

It was also agreed that, in the process of the disarmament, all violations of the ceasefire agreement shall be reported to UNOMIL who shall, on immediate receipt of the information on violation, commence an investigation and make findings thereof.   UNOMIL shall submit its findings to the ceasefire violation committee.   The violation committee shall invite the violating party (ies) for the purpose of having such parties take corrective measures to redress the violations within such time frame as may be stipulated by the committee. Should the violating party (ies) not take the required corrective measures, the use of peace enforcement powers are recommended against the violator, the LNTG in collaboration with ECOMOG shall thereupon take the necessary action,

(Onyike, 2003:243-249). However, the ceasefire was continually violated by all sides and there was a display of unwillingness by the factions to provide vital information on the number and location of their combatants, weapons and mines. The growing hostilities and fighting added to the lack of success in the disarmament and demobilization process. By June 1994, a total of only 3,192 combatants had been demobilized.

5.0   SUMMARY

In this unit, we have examined the role and performance of the United Nations in its peace initiative efforts. This is against the backdrop of the proliferation of violent conflicts in the continent. The strategies employed in particular cases were also identified.

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENTS (TMAS)

i)   Outline the strategies of intervention used by the UN?

ii)   Make a critique of the UN intervention in Liberia.

7.0   REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

Nabudere, D. N. (2000) *Globalisation and Post-Colonial African State*, Zimbabwe: Print Source Limited.

Nathan, L. (1999). 'International Mediation in African Civil Wars', *Global Dialogue*.

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UNIT 4   UN INTERVENTION STRATEGIES

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1.0   INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Charter obligates Member States to settle their disputes by peaceful means, in such a way that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.   But experience has demonstrated that the nature and forms of some wars have defied peaceful settlement to the effect that United Nations have invoked the coercive means of its Charter as the last option.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to;

i)   Explain UN's peaceful and coercive intervention strategies.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   United Nations Peaceful Intervention Strategies

Article 33 of the Charter expressly states the minds of the member states with regard to peaceful settlement of disputes thus:

(1)   The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security,

shall first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

(2)   The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Other Articles of the UN Charter dealing with maintenance of peace include Articles 11, 12 and chapters VI and VII. Peaceful intervention in conflicts at the level of the United Nations has taken the following forms:

Peacemaking
Peacekeeping
Preventive Deployment
Cooperation with regional organizations
Peace-building

3.2   Peacemaking

Peacemaking is the use of diplomatic means to persuade parties in conflict to cease hostilities and to negotiate a peaceful settlement of their dispute. The Secretary-General plays a coordinal role in peacemaking both by sending special envoys or missions for specific tasks, such as negotiation or fact-finding. The Secretary-General may take initiatives to encourage and maintain the momentum of negotiations between conflict parties. He may also use his "good offices" for mediating, or to exercise "preventive diplomacy". The impartiality of the Security-General is one of the United Nations' great assets. This role was exemplified in February 1998 when, sequel to consultation with the Security Council members, Secretary-General Kofi Annan visited Baghdad and succeeded in resolving a dispute with Iraq over weapons inspections, which threatened a renewal of hostilities with that country. A decade earlier, 1988, the then Secretary-General played similar role this led to the end of the war between Iran and Iraq that had persisted since 1980.

3.3   Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping as the name implies, involves deployment of troops to a conflict state with the aim of keeping the peace. Peacekeeping operation may involve military observer missions, peacekeeping forces, or a combination of both. Military observer missions are made up of unarmed officers, typically to monitor an agreement or a ceasefire. The

soldiers of the peacekeeping forces have weapons, but in most situations can use them only in self-defence.

While not specifically envisaged in the Charter, Peacekeeping was first deployed by the United Nations in 1948 with the establishment of the United Nations Truce Supervision organization in the Middle East (UNTSO). It has to be mentioned, however, that peacekeeping though has become more or less a traditional means of intervention used by the UN, is not a sustainable mans of conflict transformation. Justification to this assertion is apparent in the fragility of negative peace", if any, that peacekeeping operation always bring. This has also brought about perpetual stationing of peacekeeping force in conflict zones for fear of "return wars". An example is the UNTSO in the Middle East (Jerusalem), which had been deployed since 1948 and was still on as of July 1998 – a period of 40 years.

3.4   Prevention Deployment

This is a pro-active way of responding to potential conflict and forestalls same. It is the fielding of peacekeepers to forestall probable conflict. This is a relatively new dimension of conflict prevention that the International Community needs maximally utilize. It is one of the nexus of steps encompassed in Early Warning and Early Response to Conflict. A good successful example of this pro-active measure is the *United Nations Preventive Deployment Force* deployed in former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 1992 consequent on the country's request and The Security Council's approval. The 1,100 – strong force has been monitoring developments in the border areas that could threaten the country's territory or undermine its stability in the course of the Yugoslav conflict.

3.5   Co-operation with Regional Organisations

The ubiquity of wars and intractability of most of them nowadays around the world has made the United Nations to be increasingly cooperating with regional organizations and other external actors as well as mechanisms provided for in Chapter VIII of its Charter.
Article 52 of the Un Charter provides thus:

1)   Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

2)   The members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

3)   The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.
        Article 55 of the Charter further provides thus:

        (1)   "The Security Council shall, where appropriate utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council…"

In accordance with the provisions of its Charter as highlighted above and in the search for international pace and security, the United Nations has worked closely with a host of regional organizations. For instance, it worked with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in Somalia and Western Sahara. In a civil war that broke out, following the downfall of President Said Barre, in 1991 in Somalia between the faction supporting Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and that loyal to General Mohamed Farah Aidid, the United Nations, in cooperation with the O.A.U. and other organizations sought to resolve the conflict. It was an intractable war and the UN troops UNOSOM withdraw in March 1995 when the warring factions refused to enact a ceasefire and form a Government of National Unity.

Moreover, in a spiral of political upheavals that attended the departure of "Life President" Jean-Claude Duvalier in 1986 in Haiti which culminated in the expulsion of a democratically elected president Jean-Bertrand Aristide from office by coupists led by Lieutenant-General Raoul Cedras, the United Nations worked extensively in collaboration with the Organisation of American States (OAS) to redress the situation and enthrone democracy. A joint United Nations/OAS mission – the *International Civilian Mission in Haiti* (MICIVIH) – was deployed in the country in 1993. Its task was to monitor the human rights situation and to investigate violations.

In the same manner, the United Nations supported the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in its efforts to end a civil war that had broken out in late 1989 in Liberia. These efforts

included establishing, in 1990, an observer force, the ECOWAS Ceassefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).

After ECOWAS brokered a peace agreement in Cotonou, Benin, in 1993, the Security Council established the *United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)*. Its task was to support ECOMOG in implementing the Cotonou Peace agreement.

3.6 Peace-Building

Peacekeeping and peacemaking functions of the UN are well documented but little or nothing has been head about its peace-building activities. Peace-building is essentially targeted at engendering sustainable peace. In his paper *An Agenda for Peace,* former UN Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali described peace-building as:

> *Action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict – rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife (and tackling the) deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression, (Boutros-Ghalki, 1992:11).*

Peace-building is concerned with establishing a stable environment in which negotiated settlements can flourish and it complements the peace-keeping and peace-making activities of the United Nations. The tasks involved in peace-building have the potential to serve as a preventive strategy. This assertion is expressed by the Secretary-General thus:

> *Demilitarization, the control of small arms, institutional reform, improved police and judicial systems, the monitoring of human rights, electoral reform and social and economic development can be as valuable in preventing conflict as in healing the wounds after conflict has occurred.*

As of February 2000, the UN has run peace-building missions in El-Salvador, Nicaragua, Haiti, Cambodia, Namibia, Mozambique, Angola, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau and the Central African Republic. The United Nations commitment to Peace-building becomes imperative based on its past unpleasant experience in peacekeeping and peacemaking, as well as on the great proliferation of internal conflicts, which have emerged since the end of the Cold War.

3.7   The United Nations Coercive Intervention Strategies

Despite the mechanisms for peaceful and pacific settlement of conflicts among nations of the world put in place by the United Nations, so that its ultimate aim of ensuring international peace and security can be achieved; there are also measures put in place by the same organization to curtail excesses and abuses of recalcitrant states.   The measures include:

Peace enforcement
Embargoes and Sanctions
Authorized Military Action

3.8   Peace Enforcement

Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council can take enforcement measures to maintain or restore international peace and security.   In the process of transforming a conflict, peacekeeping mandate of a peacekeeping force can be changed to peace enforcement if the warring factions refuse to respect ceasefire agreement or other agreement earlier signed.

This was the case in Liberia when, consequent upon the assassination of President Samuel Doe on September 9 1990, the ECOMOG Force Commander was changed and the mandate of the force too changed from peacekeeping to peace enforcement.

3.9   Embargoes and Sanctions

The Security Council has severally had to resort to economic sanctions and embargos as an enforcement tool when peace was threatened and diplomatic efforts had failed.

Article 41 of the UN Charter states that:

> *The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decision, and it may call upon the members of the United Nations to apply such measures.   These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.*

Sanctions were imposed, using the provisions of the UN Charter stated above, by the UN; against South Africa's Apartheid regime in 1977, and

subsequently lifted with the end of apartheid in 1994.   Recently, Sanctions have been imposed against Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Libya, Haiti, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, UNITA forces in Angola, Sudan and Sierra Leone.   These economic Sanctions have taken many forms, ranging from specific trade bans, pacific blockades to full embargoes, (UN, 1992: 76).

The use of mandatory sanctions brings pressure on the target state or entity to comply with the objectives set by the Security Council without resorting to force.

4.0   CONCLUSION

Authorized Military Action

When diplomatic peacemaking efforts fail, the UN may authorize stronger action by member states under Chapter VII of the Charter. Cases have been, when the Security Council authorized coalition of Member States to use "all necessary means", including military action, to deal with a conflict – as it did to restore the sovereignty of Kuwait after its invasion by Iraq (1991); to permit humanitarian relief operations in the midst of civil war in Somalia (1992) and Rwanda (1994); to restore the democratically elected government in Haiti (1994); and to protect humanitarian operations in Albania (1997).

These actions, though authorized by the Security Council, were entirely under the control of the participating states.   They were not United Nations peacekeeping operations, which are established by the Security Council and directed by the Secretary-General.

5.0   SUMMARY

In this unit, we have examined strategies employed by the United Nations. They are classified into peaceful versus coercive strategies.

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENTS (TMAS)

i)   Outline the strategies of intervention used by the UN?

ii)   Make a critique of the UN intervention in Liberia

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

Nabudere, D. N. (2000) *Globalisation and Post-Colonial African State*, Zimbabwe: Print Source Limited.

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UNIT 5   GLOBALISATION,   CIVIL   SOCIETY   AND
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

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1.0   INTRODUCTION

In this unit we will be examining globalisation and its impact on civil society and conflict management. To fully understand the dynamics of the concept of Global Civil Society, it would be necessary to explore further, the larger context of political globalisation and its relationship to societal activism.   The emergence of these transnational organisational groups to nearly every nook and cranny of the world in the past half-century and its relation to the growth and evolution of inter-governmental organization have involved complex processes that defy simply characterization.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

  i)   Explain the process of political globalisation;

 ii)   Highlight its implications for conflict, and conflict management; and

iii)   Describe the role of social activism within the process.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Political Globalisation and Non-State Actors

A theoretical fundamentality, germane to empirical analysis of the rise and influence of Global Civil Society in international relations and specifically in the area of conflict and peace studies, is the pluralist-interdependence model of international politics.   According to this model, political problems are embedded in the larger social-and particularly economic-setting in which they take place.   In contradistinctive to the realists outlook (that focus on the activities of states), the proponents of the pluralist-interdependence theory posit that in the modern global system, all policy actors are intertwined and affect each other.   This is because, states are not the only actors in the international system, though they (states) set the rules of economic, communications, technology and other games that occur simultaneously, they (states) do not set the international agenda, nor can they make decisions as if removed from the interests, values and aspirations of millions of business firms, banks, shipping companies, political parties, citizen's groups, and the like.   it is these non-state actors that initially raise items to international agenda.

Non-state actors, the pluralist-interdependence theorist argue, create all sorts of trans-national coalitions that circumvent the polices of any individual state.   They act as international pressure groups, they publicize problems and they propose solutions and way forward to the various world problems.   In the perspective of the pluralist-interdependence theorists, issues that are internationally recognized as "key" (transition, re-integration on of Ex-combatants, illegal, surplus Arms, etc) in post-conflict situations, could not be left in the hands of states alone, because in any enduring post conflict reconstructive efforts, the power of publicity and scientific, technical, economic knowledge largely replace the power of guns and armies.   Even in major international forum such as the UN they (proponents of this theory) reiterate:

> *Non-governmental groups have access to delegates; provide all sorts of information, and lobby of international problems, ranging from the saving of threatened animal species to the treatment of refugees in individual countries.*

Effort by international actors to integrate lives and livelihoods in societies emerging form civil war into relative peace has spawned a peace building industry akin to the aid industry that has attracted crusading zeal and accusations of hubris in about equal measure.

Consequently, in the spirit of humanitarianism and liberal internationalism, external organizations have assumed responsibility for building peace in war-torn societies with the aim of preventing receding into violent conflicts. This is why there is now the recognition of the legitimacy of transnational civil groups in the international system, in compatibility with the neo-liberal agenda to bring about enduring peace in war form countries and in the post-conflict reconstructive efforts. The main point of emphasis here is that the roles being played by transnational social movement in post-conflict reconstruction all over the world, (accelerating the transition to civil rules, increasing refugee returns, law and order, contributing to the development of institutions new electoral law, media reform, social welfare and human rights), are generally informed by the position of neo-liberalism that international peace and security in the world can only be achieved through the complementary efforts and understanding of states and non-state actors in international politics.

Although, interventionary actors appear to be caught in a dilemma between support for state sovereignty and support for civil society, and the ideology of neo-liberal economic modernization, with which lead organizations such as the world Bank and IMF have been imbued, often has the effect of undermining the mechanisms necessary for state building and dirigisme that could make authorities in war-torn societies take greater responsibility for the welfare and right of their people; the fact remains that in the peace process, international financial institutions and their main donors have often expected non-governmental organizations, private, voluntary sector and United Nations agencies to take on a safety-netting, role for such societies. Essential services are often subcontracted to the private or NGO sectors, in line with the neo-liberal agenda, that humanitarian organizations are impelled to attempt to provide a safety net beyond the phase of emergency, relief, where government structures, revenue and public expenditure allocations have foundered.

Furthermore, Global Civil Society has emerged as part of a political process of globalization. As argued by Reimann (2002), the emergence of global civil society is a build up on the social movement theory, the sociological institutional argument and works done by strong state theorist interested in civil society at the National level. In providing explanations for the rise of new citizen advocacy groups and social movement organisations, political scientists from the strong state perspective and social movement theorists have focused on the incentives provided by political opportunity structures in shaping various form of political participation. When extended to the

international level, the concept of political opportunity structure offers a useful theoretical framework for understanding how changing international political structures and contexts have directly shaped the growth of international Non-governmental organisations and other civil society groups operating trans-nationally.

Social movement theorists interested in trans-national social movements have argued convincingly that the emergence and expansion of inter-governmental organisations (IGO's) in the post war period (like the emergence of the nation-state in previous centres) has provided new incentives for societal actors to organize on a global scale and to turn to new international targets as location of action. Therefore, this political liberalization which involved a significant opening at the international level, of several dimensions of political opportunities, has been of particular relevance to organizers of global civil society.

Defining Globalisation

Globalisation has become one of the most frequently used buzz words in much of today's discourse not just within the social sciences, but across all academic disciplines, and even among non-specialists. It is the name that is given to the process whereby social transactions of all kinds increasingly take place without account for national or state boundaries, with the result that the world has become one relatively borderless social sphere. The trends that are usually pointed to as typifying globalization include:

> *The growing integration of national economies, a growing awareness of ecological interdependence; the proliferation of companies, social movements, and intergovernmental agencies operating on a global scale; and a communications revolution which has aided the development of a global consciousness.*

This phenomenon has brought about new qualitative development in the world economy and international relations in general. It is now being associated with the emergence of a global village.

It is important to however note that as we have arguments in favour of globalization, so, also we have thoughts and perspectives that discuss the seamy side or discontent of globalization. In the thinking of Claude Ake (1995), globalization is nothing but the march of capital over all the world in search of profits, a process reflected in the research and power of multinational corporations. Amuwo (2003) sees it as a complex process that has many sides and features attached to it; as he observed:

Globalisation is a complex process and phenomenon of antinomies and dialectics, integrating and fragmenting world; uniformity and localization; increased material prosperity and deepening misery; homogenization and hegemonization. Globalisation is nothing but a mixed grill.

Globalisation on the other hand has the potentiality of eroding national sovereignty of the weakest and poorest states, whilst widening the technological divide amongst states. On the other hand, Amuwo further argues that globalisation tends to provide an enabling environment for greater respects for human rights and gender equality. He (Amuwo) however concluded that globalisation:

Is an economic orthodoxy that is failing the peoples but enriching investors and big corporation?

The main argument, in respect to the theoretical underpinning of this study is that the emergence, roles, impact and influence of global civil society should be seen as a factor of the political liberalization, the interconnectedness and intertwined of the world.

Globalisation and Civil Society

Consequently, globalisation best explains the relevance of Global Civil Society in conflict management in line with the argument of Ali Farazmand (1999) that through globalisation, worldwide integration and transcendence take place, evoking at least two different intellectual responses. On one hand are those who argue that the growth in trans-national corporations, in particular because of their "state-indifferent" nature, and the spread of global capitalism have made states irrelevant or even obsolescent (Ball 1967; Naisbitt 1994; Ohame 1995). Others still believe that global agencies that are supplementing, if not supplanting, the territorial nation-states (Picciotto, 1989; Coz 1993; Korten 1995).
But more importantly, the relevant of Global Civil Society in conflict management is part of a system of collective world security where states and people can live in peace with each other, ideologies aside, and observed each other's borders and maintain collective security interests.

3.2   Global Civil Society and Conflict Management

Our mission is to increase the awareness of our interdependence and create a new vision of what it means to be a global citizen in this interdependent world. We hope to lay the foundations of global civic cooperation and to do so we need not only civic leaders and dignitaries, but also parents, students and children.

David Claudler of the Centre for the study of Democracy explains in his new book, titled, constructing *Global Civil Society* (2003), that with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold war in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a whole new era of ethical foreign policy and humanitarian intervention has come to preoccupy statement in Europe and America; this new politicization has had strong impact on the discipline of international relation.   In contemporary international relations, it appears that the old theories of relations between states, states pursing self-interest, governed by the principles of national sovereignty – are hopelessly outdated; there are new realities in international relations, such that the literature on conflict resolution, state building, international civil society, theories of the construction of national identifies and normative interpretations of the international sphere, now abound.

Defining Global Civil Society

What then is Global Civil Society? Theories of civil society based on domestic politics envision frequently and dense exchange among individuals, groups, and organizations in the public sphere, separate from state-dominated action.

A well-developed Global Civil Society has the potentials to influence national government in two basic ways: it enhances political responsiveness by aggregating and expressing the wished of the public through a wealth of non governmental forms of association, and it safeguards public/people's freedom by limiting the government's ability to impose arbitrary rule by force. In the same vein, the increase in the numbers of non-governmental organizations with shared trans-national goal could be equated with the emergence of global civil society. But the explosion in the number of actors is even a minimal condition for the rise of Global Civil Society; deeper changes should be evident in the quality of non-governmental access and proximity to global forms of governance.

Evidence of the globalism of civil society is empirical in the quality of social interaction in current global politics when we examine the substantive content of non-governmental organization participation and interactions (particularly at the UN conferences as earlier discussed in the preceding chapter) with the clear indication that common understandings are now developing both among non-governmental organizations themselves and between non-governmental organizations and states.   Global Civil Society therefore connotes a vast, interconnected, multilayered, social space that comprises many

hundreds of self-directing, or non-governmental institutions and ways of life. In the observation of Anheier and Themudo, (2002:24):

Through its cross border networks, global civil society is constituted of chairs of interactions linking the local, regional and planetary orders. This new social world is constituted of networks, coalitions, partnerships and social movements.

Other scholars or social movement theorists conceptualize Global Civil Society as made up of "some combination of networks of legal protection, voluntary associations, and forums of independent public expression". These conceptualizations, not withstanding, there is still a divergence of opinions scholarly can this emerging trend of global civil society. Some even argue that is too soon to declare that a global civil society has definitively emerged because of what they see as uneven geographical spread and achievement of global civil society as compared with the expectations generated from the theorization of the concept.   (Chandhoke, 2002; Keane, 2001, Clark, Friedman and Hochsteler, 1998).

However, from the foregoing, what is so fundamental to the concept of a global civil society and very relevant to the present study is that the emergence of trans-national social and political communities constituted through trans border migration is increasingly being conceptualized as the basis for new forms of citizenship identity to the extent that members maintain identification and solidarities with one another across state territorial divides. These identification and solidarities arise out of networks, activities and ideologies that span the home and the host society.

Therefore, recent researches in international non-governmental organizations, trans-nationalism, social movements, global citizenship and global governance indicate and declare that there is now a global civil society operating trans-nationally and cross – borderline all over the globe. (Anheiver and Themudo, 2002; Taylor, 2004; Chandler, 2004).

As reported by Professor Peter J. Taylor 92004), in the first yearbook of global civil society (Anheier et al. 2001a) the geography of its subject is given prominence… one of the most striking findings of the yearbook is that global civil society is heavily concentrated in north – Western Europe. The authors of the first yearbook of global civil society has illustrated their findings with a table that identifies the top countries that are the "focal points" of globalization, international rule of law and Global Civil Society. But by using an interlocking network model and data on 74, global non-governmental organizations with offices across

178 cities, Ngo connectivity values for cities show that there is a "global south", especially Sub-Saharan Africa, geographical bias, Nairobi is the most connected world city with respect to non-governmental organizations activities. Thus, Taylor 92004) concludes that:

> *Global Civil Society does not replicate the geography of economic globalisation; it is creating its own new geography. Thus is a revision of received wisdom on the geography of global civil society, based upon a new methodology that focuses upon the networks of NGOs activities across cities.*

It is imperative to proffer a reminder here, that Global Civil Society is actually more than the activities of just NGOs. But as Chandhoke 92002, 38) puts it "NGOs play a larger than – life sole in global civil society.

Consequently, non-governmental organizations remain, in line with this study and in the words of professors P. J. Taylor (2004) "the obvious foundation for describing the geography of Global Civil Society. In the argument of Sassen (2002), strategic cross border geography that by passes national states, is part of the infrastructure of Global Civil Society and this is because cities provide a "thick enabling environment through which trans-national and sub-national activities can be brought together. She subsequently concludes thus:

> *The density of political and civic cultures in large cities localizes global civil society in people's lives. We can think of these as multiple localizations of civil society that are global in that they are part of global circuits and trans-boundary networks.*

In her assessment of the anticipatory potential of Global Civil Society, Kaldor 92003) accepts the criticisms of Chandhoke (2001) and others that many NGOs have become too close to both governments and corporations thus compromising their radical potential. She understands this growing dissatisfaction and refers to NGOs as "tamed" successors to earlier, more radical, social movements. However, she (Kaldor) does not thereby conclude that Global Civil Society is irrelevant to creating a more humane globalisation. Thus, she observed that:

> *Global Civil Society is a process through which social contracts can be negotiated with agreements made at local, national and global scales.*

In the interlocking network model of conceptualizing global civil society used by Taylor 92004), as illustrated in Table 4, the results indicate that cities house NGOs, with very large office networks; these are the places to be for global NGOs. For their global strategies, most NGOs consider Nairobi, Bangkok, New Odhi and Manila to be as important as Brussels, London and Washington.

The key point in these empirical results is that the global south is not "represented" in any sense through NGOs but their global activities are providing a legitimizing platform for dissident and diverse voices from regions where economic and political power is lacking. As a result, it is bringing about "a renewed hope for developing an emancipatory global agenda, and therefore, inform the basis for situating global civil society within the context of conflict management and reconstruction in the continent of Africa.

3.3   Top 25 NGO Cities by Network Connective

City	NGO Connectivity Level	Network Connectivity Rank	Global Connectivity Rank	Network Difference
Nairobi	3729	1	99	98
Brussels	3408	2		13
Bangkok	3378	3		25
London	3211	4		-3
New Delhi	3209	5		47
Manila	3198	6		40
Washington	3181	7		30
Harare	2999	8		124
Geneva	2796	9		58
Moscow	2779	10		24
New York	2758	11		-9
Mexico City	2626	12		6
Jakarta	2624	13		9
Tokyo	2616	14	5	-9
Accra	2599	15	150	135
Cairo	2569	16	59	43
Dhaka	2562	17	152	135
Rome	2560	18	53	35
Dakar	2433	19	207	187
Santiago	2408	20	57	37
Abidjan	2326	21	131	110
Buenos Aires	2320	22	23	1
	2282	23	196	173
Dar es Salam	2256	24	44	20

Copenhagen Beijing
Source: Globalization, Vol. 1, No. 2.

4.0   CONCLUSION

The nature of conflict has changed since the end of the Cold War. There are fewer conflicts between states and more conflicts over power and dominance within states. These internal conflicts often form along religious or ethnic lines. Ethnic and religious conflicts "are often perceived as being rooted in past atrocities and reoccur from generation to generation, each new conflict building on the last." Internal conflicts often result in the breakdown of governance and civil society. The changing nature of conflict poses new challenges for NGO intervention.

NGOs have the potential to play key roles in restoring civil society and building peace. First, however, NGOs must recognize that their interventions do affect the course of conflicts, and "that their work in relief and development, affects not only the social and economic well-being of their target groups, but also the larger political situation." "Aall" (1996:436) "Aall" suggests four roles that NGOs might play in the peacemaking process. First, NGOs should pursue their traditional relief and rehabilitation activities. Secondly, they should continue to monitor human rights abuses. NGOs should also take on the newer tasks of providing early warning of potential violent conflicts and should pursue conflict resolution activities. "Aall" warns that these roles must be kept separate both for the safety of the NGO workers, and in order to be effective.

While NGOs should continue their traditional relief and rehabilitation activities, NGOs must adopt a more long-term perspective on their activities. "Aall" suggests that "the initial emergency relief response should be linked to a set of activities that leads to the transformation of those conflicts in a way that promotes sustained and comprehensive reconciliation among the warring parties."(p. 439) Many NGOs act at the middle and grass-roots levels of society, and so are well-placed to develop such links and transformative activities. In providing relief and rehabilitation, NGOs should seek to draw on local resources.

Developing local resources empowers people. Excessive use of external resources can foster dependence and passivity. External resources can also become a new object of contention, inadvertently fueling the conflict. NGOs should also seek to draw new participants into their activities. For example women, who have often been overlooked in peace processes, have recently played key roles in re-establishing communication and economic ties between fighting groups in Somalia.

One way to make peacemaking more effective is to shift more towards a preventative approach to conflict. Local and grass-roots oriented NGOs are uniquely placed to recognize the early signs of conflict and

deteriorating social conditions. In many cases, the international community has had early warning of a potential conflict, but has lacked the political will to act. Here, NGOs might also act as advocates for early intervention.

NGOs should consider engaging more directly in conflict resolution activities when four conditions are met. First, the NGO must be very familiar with the country, issues, and participants in the conflict. The NGO should have indigenous partners. The NGO staff must be well grounded in conflict resolution skills and knowledge. And finally, NGO workers must understand and accept the personal risk they run in attempting to intervene directly in the conflict.

Generally, NGOs and other international organizations need to better coordinate their efforts. In particular, NGOs must learn to cooperate with military peacekeeping forces. All suggests that NGO and military cooperation would be improved by a clearer understanding of the overall mission objectives on both sides. Given the changing nature of conflict in the post-Cold War era, "humanitarian operations should form a key part of training for the armed forces."[p. 441] International and NGO coordination would be improved by developing a single unified chain of command for conflict interventions. Procedures for holding NGOs accountable for their actions should also be developed.

5.0   SUMMARY

In this unit, we have examined globalisation and its impact on civil society and conflict management processes. The concepts of globalisation, global civil society, and participants were discussed.

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENTS (TMAS)

i)   What is globalisation?

ii)   What is global Civil Society?

iii)   What roles can NGOs play in conflict management?

iv)   How effective are African NGOs in the global civil society?

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

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