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SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES


COURSE CODE: PCR873

COURSE TITLE: ARMS CONTROL AND DEMILITARISATION

**COURSE
GUIDE**

**PCR 873
ARMS CONTROL AND DEMILITARISATION**

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INTRODUCTION

Since the late 1980s, the United Nations (UN) has increasingly been called upon to support the implementation of several peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building mainstream programmes in countries emerging from conflict. In peace-making context this trend has been part of a move towards complex operations that seek to deal with a wide variety of issues ranging from security to human rights, rule of law and good governance both political and economic, rather than in traditional peace-keeping where two warring parties were separated by a ceasefire line patrolled by UN soldiers.

The changed nature of peace-keeping and post conflict recovery strategies requires deep understanding and a close coordination among scholars, students and UN agencies whose interest is or has the mandate in these areas.

In recent years, the issues of arms, arms control, demilitarisation, disarmament, understanding the theory and history of arms control, demystifying Cold War understanding games theory and bargaining, causes of armament, features of small arms and its proliferation, weaponry and weapons of mass destruction, global security and peace processes etc, are important post-conflict efforts that help create conditions necessary for sustainable peace and longer-term development understanding. The relationship between these activities and exploring the positions aspect can help to ensure that short and medium-term recovery strategies and security framework activities are linked to longer term efforts to develop an effective, well-managed, and accountable security sector.

WHAT YOU WILL LEARN FROM THIS COURSE

In this course you will learn more about human security and how to engage in arms control negotiation process.

COURSE AIMS

The aims of this course are to:

1. Examine the threats posed by arms, weaponry and their proliferation.
2. Explain the working of the post conflict recovery strategies in areas emerging from conflicts.
3. Analyse the implicit of arms and weapons of mass destruction on the international community.

4. Discuss the position of the international community on arms control and demilitarisation.
5. Determine the role of the united nation in arms control and demilitarisation and the effort to promise peace.

COURSE OBJECTIVES

At the end of this course, having examined the theory and history of arms control and demilitarisation, the causes of armament and disarmament, you should be able to:

- explain the need for arms control and demilitarisation
- produce support for the development of synergies in the design, implementation and sequencing of different elements of arms control and demilitarisation
- outline the opportunities and challenges relating to the nexus between arms control and demilitarisation
- apply the knowledge of arms control and demilitarisation process to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments, with the aim of total recovery and development.

WORKING THROUGH THIS COURSE

To complete this course, you are advised to read and study the units, read recommended books, online sources and other materials provided by the authority. You are required to submit assignments for assessment purposes. At the end of the course, there is a final examination.

COURSE MATERIALS

The major components of the course are:

Course guide
 Study units
 Textbooks and references
 Assignment file

STUDY UNITS

There are 22 study units in this course. These are as follows:

Module 1 Definition of Concepts

Unit 1 Arms and Arms Control
 Unit 2 Demilitarisation
 Unit 3 Disarmament and Demobilisation

Module 2 Theory and History of Arms Control

- Unit 1 Theory of Arms Control
- Unit 2 History of Arms Control
- Unit 3 Barriers of Arms Control
- Unit 4 Disarmament since the Second World War
- Unit 5 Game Theory and Bargaining

Module 3 Causes of Armament and Disarmament

- Unit 1 Sources of Armament
- Unit 2 Characteristics of Small Arms
- Unit 3 Proliferation of Small Arms
- Unit 4 Effects of Small Arms
- Unit 5 Civil Wars and Small Arms

Module 4 Weaponry and Weapons of Mass Destruction

- Unit 1 Light Weapons and Landmines
- Unit 2 Deadly Conventional Weaponry and Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Unit 3 Nuclear Weapons
- Unit 4 Spread of Nuclear Weapons
- Unit 5 Nuclear Strategy

Module 5 Global Security and Peace

- Unit 1 Security and Peace
- Unit 2 Nuclear Strategy and Balance of Power
- Unit 3 Multilateral Process
- Unit 4 Arms Control Agreement and Non- Proliferation endeavours

The first module explains the prominent concepts in this course. It considers the application of the concepts in contemporary world. The second module analyses the theory and history of arms control. Attention is given to disarmament, game theory and bargaining as mechanism facilitating the culture of peace. The third module gives you an insight into the causes of armament and the need for disarmament. The fourth module extensively discusses weaponry and weapons of mass destruction. It considers these weapons deadly and not aimed at helping humanity. The fifth module emphasizes the need for global security and peace. It draws attention to strategies targeted at improving global peace. Each unit was designed to help you achieve specific objectives that will obviously help you in achieving the aims of study, in

addition to the use of recommended texts for further reading. At the end of each unit there are self-assessment exercises you are to attempt all.

TEXT BOOKS

Some books have been recommended in the course. You may consult them for further reading.

ASSESSMENT

There two types of assessment in this course: the tutor-marked assignment and a written examination. In carrying out these assignments, you are expected to apply the knowledge acquired during the course. The assignment must be submitted to your tutor for formal assessment in accordance with the deadlines stated in the presentation schedule and the assignment file. The work that you submit to your tutor for assessment will make up to 30% of your total score.

TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT (TMA)

There is a tutor-marked assignment at the end of every unit. You are required to attempt all the assignments. You will be assessed on all of them.

When you have completed each assignment, send it together with a tutor-marked assignment form to your tutor. Make sure that each assignment reaches your tutor on or before the deadline. If for any reason you cannot complete your work on time, contact your tutor before the assignment is due to discuss the possibility of an extension. Extension will not be granted after the due date unless under exceptional circumstances.

FINAL EXANMINATION AND GRADING

The final examination for PCR 873 will last for the duration of three hours. It will carry 70% of the total course grade. The examination will consist of questions which reflect the kind of self-assessment exercises and the tutor-marked problems you have previously encountered. All aspect of the course will be assessed. You may find it useful to review your self-assessment exercises and tutor- marked assignments before the examination.

COURSE MARKING SCHEME

The following table shows the broken down of the course marking scheme.

Assessment	Marks
Assignment 1-5	Five assignment, best three marks of five counts as 30 % of course marks
Final Examination	70% of overall course score
Total	100%

COURSE MARKING SCHEDULE

Unit	Title of Work	Weeks Activities	Assessment (end of Module)
Module 1	Definition of Concepts		
Unit 1	Arms and Arms Control	1	Assignment 3
Unit 2	Demilitarisation	1	Assignment 2
Unit 3	Disarmament and Demobilisation	1	Assignment 5

Module 2 Theory and History of Arms Control

Unit 1	Theory of Arms Control	1	Assignment 2
Unit 2	History of Arms Control	1	Assignment 1
Unit 3	Barriers of Arms Control	1	Assignment 2
Unit 4	Disarmament since the Second World War	1	Assignment 1
Unit 5	Game theory and Bargaining	1	Assignment 1

Modules 3 Causes of Armament and Disarmament

Unit 1	Sources of Armament	1	Assignment 2
Unit 2	Characteristics of Small Arms	1	Assignment 1
Unit 3	Proliferation of Small Arms	1	Assignment 2
Unit 4	Effects of Small Arms	1	Assignment 1
Unit 5	Civil Wars and Small Arms	1	Assignment 1

Module 4 Weaponry and Weapons of Mass Destruction

Unit 1	Light Weapons and Landmines	1	Assignment 1
Unit 2	Deadly Conventional Weaponry and Weapons of mass Destruction	1	Assignment 1
Unit 3	Nuclear Weapons	1	Assignment 2
Unit 4	Spread of Nuclear Weapons	1	Assignment 1
Unit 5	Nuclear Strategy	1	Assignment 1

Module 5 Global Security and Peace

Unit 1	Security and peace	1	Assignment 1
Unit 2	Nuclear Strategy and Balance of Power	1	Assignment 1
Unit 3	Multilateral processes	1	Assignment 1
Unit 4	Arms Control Agreement and Non-Proliferation Endeavour	1	Assignment 2

HOW TO GET THE MOST FROM THIS COURSE

The study units replace the lecturer. The advantage is that you can read and work through the study materials at your pace, and at a time and place that suits you best. Think of it as reading the lecture instead of listening to a lecturer. Just as a lecturer might give you class exercise

your study units provide exercises for you to do at appropriate times. Each of the study modules follows the same format. The first item is introduction to the subject matter of the unit and how a particular unit is integrated with other units and the course as a whole. Next is a set of learning objectives. These objectives, let you know what you should be able to do, by the time you have completed that unit. You should use these objectives to guide your study. When you have finished the unit, you should go back and check whether you have achieved the objectives. If you make a habit of doing this, you will significantly improve your chances of passing the course. Self-assessment exercises are interspersed throughout the units and answers are given at the end of objectives of the units and prepare you for the assignments and the examination. You should do each self-assessment exercise as you come to it in the study units. Work through these when you have come to them.

TUTORS AND TUTORALS

There are 15 hours of tutorials provided in support of this course. You will be notified of the dates, times and location of these tutorials, together with the name and phone number of your tutor, as soon as you are allocated a tutorial group. Your tutor will mark and comment on your assignment, keep a close watch on your progress, and on difficulties you might encounter and provide assistance to you during the course. You must send your tutor-marked assignment well before the due date. They will be marked by your tutor and returned to you as soon as possible. Do not hesitate to contact your tutor by telephone or e-mail if you need help. Contact your tutor if:

- (a) You do not understand any part of the assigned readings
- (b) You have difficulty with the self-assessment exercise
- (c) You have a question, a problem with an assignment, with your tutor's comment or with the grading of an assignment.

You should do your best to attend the tutorials. This is the only way to have face to face contact with your tutor and ask questions which will be answered instantly. You can raise any problem encountered in the course of your study. To gain the maximum benefit from course tutorials, prepare a question list before attending them. You will gain a lot from participating actively.

SUMMARY

As a student of “Arms Control and Demilitarisation,” you can apply the benefits gained from this course in understanding your immediate context. As a Nigerian, you can appreciate this course because we are

discussing human security. In one way or the other, issues relating to war and peace will emerge. It will give you a thorough, understanding of matters arising in the development and cooperation of the whole world. So also, you will have an added knowledge of how to determine if arms control and demilitarisation could be of help to salvage West Africa from the war culture and developmental crisis and indeed among other Third World countries. Indeed, the UN policy of peace without weapons is totally encompassing, while it is meant to ascertain development in the Third World to compete with in the globalised world, it is also exclusive to ensure that countries emerging from conflict especially Third World countries that are war prone become free.

We wish you success in the course.

**MAIN
COURSE**

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MODULE 1 DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS

- Unit 1 Arms and Arms Control
- Unit 2 Demilitarisation
- Unit 3 Disarmament and Demobilisation

UNIT 1 ARMS AND ARMS CONTROL

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- 2.0 Objectives
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 - 3.3 Definition of Arms Control
 - 3.4 Process of Arms Control
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The 20th century witnessed two world wars and an “ignominious series of civil wars, genocide and ethnocide on an unprecedented scale” (Rupesinghe 1998) and the 21st century has not been any different. These acts are perpetuated through the means of arms. Arms are destructive and during the times of war, people often direct their ingenuity to the local production of weapons, especially guns. Reports reveal that bans on the sale of arms are not adhered to in full by all governments. In most societies where internal conflicts took place, the ownership of a weapon is seen to be essential for survival, both as protection and as an economic asset. Arms have led to more humanitarian emergencies than anything else. Arms create enemies, violence and insecurity. This is because its presence gives rise to war. On the other hand, arms control in a conflict region, in the post conflict era and in global stance commences at the point of importation. The end of the bipolar world changed the nature of arms control and disarmament the world over. Before now, the security of the international system that was based on bipolarity and deterrence posed a great threat to human existence. This reflected in the period of the cold war when arms control and disarmament appeared to be the highest priority of the bipolar powers in maintaining a balance. According to Adams D. Rotfeld (2001) arms control was considered to be a pillar that

supported strategic stability and maintained the balance of power between the superpowers and their respective allies. The predominant goals of traditional arms control theory, as developed in the late 1950s and early 1960s was to enhance security, and major powers shared in interest in avoiding global nuclear annihilation.

The achievement of the goals above was made possible, with ability of the then two powers to move beyond their deep ideological and political differences and engaged in a dialogue with the end of the cold war. However arms control experienced a fundamental change.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- describe the concept of arms
- explain the destructive nature of arms
- Define arms control
- analyse the nature of arms control
- explain the norms of arms control.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 What are Arms?

These are weapons responsible for inflicting injuries and used for war or any purpose intended to cause harm. Throughout history, warfare has been fought by the use of arms. People around the world are been killed by day others inflicted with enormous injury. From small arms to nuclear weapons to missiles and all sorts of arms; arms acquisition, production and usage have left half of the world's population in poverty and led many into prostitution and hunger. The world's resources are sunk into arms that have destroyed several communities and nation-states. The world leaders at the UN millennium summit in 2000 pledged to cut poverty by half by 2015. The UN requested \$50 billion per year to achieve the set goals. Most governments cried of not having the resources and pledged less than a quarter of this amount. It is astonishing, however, to note that despite the above stated inability to pay for development, governments have spent more than \$10 trillion on armaments since 1990 (Roche,2003). To this fact, the cost of arms acquisitions and production since the 20th century if calculated in figure will be far incomprehensible. Thus, arms are resources draining - both human and material.

Arms have become assets to the point that in “a number of cities in Africa and Asia automatic weapons can be hired on an hourly basis”

(Rupesinghe 1998). The business of arms may be conducted in hotel rooms in London, Moscow and other major cities of the world but the victims of arms are scattered around the world. Some countries of the world have become inhabitable due to arms. In fact the control of arms has become a contentious issue. This is because those at the helm of affairs like Britain, America, France, Italy, Russia and China are listed among the world's top arms producing nations.

In these nations, defence is a lucrative business and to that effect, it is a difficult task to change government policies regarding the manufacture and sale of arms. Our world has become awash with arms as the tools of violence continue to be used against civilians.

3.2 Effects of Arms

From the World War I to World War II, from Hiroshima to Nagasaki, from Angola to Afghanistan, El Salvador, Bosnia, Somalia, Cambodia, Congo DR, Liberia, Cote d' Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Rwanda and several other nations of the world, arms have left an indelible mark on their soils. Arms used during the World War II had claimed the "lives of 15 million combatants and 35 million civilians" (Roche 2003). It was tagged the most destructive conflict in history. Arms have eroded the resources of several nations, as millions of dollars are plunged into the act of war and several people go hungry. As quoted in Rupesinghe (1998) "The real experience of war is not the shelling and so on, those are just moments, though they are the ones you see on TV." In the real sense of the word, the years of suffering hopelessly with a disabled husband (in the case of a woman) and no money or struggling to rebuild when all your property has been destroyed is what Rupesinghe described as the real war. These damages are done with lethal small arms, Kalashnikovs, AK 47s, landmines, chemical weapons, biological weapons and nuclear weapons. The disasters caused by these ammunitions are too numerous to mention. They have no doubt hindered sustainable development in several nations.

Militarism as an act is facilitated by use of arms and attempts through global diplomacy to move out of this war mentality have proved difficult. Countries around the world especially the developed ones sink billions of dollars annually to the production and usage of arms while the developing countries as evidence have shown, are becoming worse off than what they were. Roche (2003) noted that "In the past half century, world population has more than doubled". He added "that is a sizable growth in demand for the basics of life but world economic growth could easily have taken care of basic human needs." World leaders of rich western countries have been criticised for destroying the economies of half of the world in their quest to ensure security for themselves. This

is clear from the damning criticism of these nations by Prime Minister Dato Seri Mahathir Mohamed of Malaysia. In an opening address to the 2003 summit of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM), Mohamed noted:

Now the rich give no more aid. They do not lend either. And all the time, the international agencies they control try to strangle the debt-laden poor countries which had been attacked by their greedy market manipulation...The rich want to squeeze out literally the last drop of blood from the poor (Roche, 2003).

Mohamed in the address brought forth a warning that the growing disparity between the developed and the developing nations, the rich and the poor are making the world practically ungovernable. He pointed out:

Since September 11, 2001, the rich and the powerful have become engaged with the poor half of the world. And their extreme measures to ensure security for themselves have only amplified the anger of the oppressed poor. Both sides are now in a state of blind anger and are bent on killing each other on war.

Mohamed acknowledged that to stop the ravaging effects of arms is a daunting task. This he added that:

Unless we take the moral high ground now, we shall wait in vain for the powerful north to voluntarily give up slaughtering people in the name of national interest (Roche, 2003).

The devastating effects of arms cannot be over emphasised. The indictment of the West above is a truth that must be told, unless the gap between the two worlds is bridged, and then more violent storms lie ahead. Analysts have interpreted the Middle East revolution as not devoid of Western influence. It needs to be added that “governments and financial institutions exclude many of those they seek to govern.... They are heavily influenced by the demands of the rich; usually the corporate rich who have a mentality that seeks to preserve and expand their wealth

– wealth built on power. And power is built on militarism-arms” (Roche, 2003).

The effect of arms or militarism plays out in many ways both directly and indirectly. It is clear that the diversion of resources to arms or militarism results in a lost opportunity for sustainable development. Roche (2003) and Rupesinghe (1998) captured several ways through which excessive spending on arms and its usage affects physical environment. Roche shows this playing out on the planet’s ecosystems. To start with, the usage of military equipment/arms pollutes the air, land and water. Roche noted that “the world’s military forces are responsible for the release of more than two-thirds of CFC-113, an Ozone- depleting chemical.” In addition to this, Roche (2003) noted:

As a result of naval accidents, at least 50 nuclear warheads and 11 nuclear reactors litter the ocean floor. The pentagon generates five times more toxins than the five major US chemical companies combined and is the longest single source of US environmental pollution.

The generated toxins as shown in the above pollutes both air, land and water and the cost of cleaning up the damage gulps billions of dollars resulting to lopsided development and lack of sustainable development. To this end, Rupesinghe (1998) recommended conflict prevention, termination and settlement. He argued that nuclear radiations are hazardous.

The radiations caused by nuclear explosions have stressed and still stresses the environment and human safety. Examples of these are the later year’s manifests of the territory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and their inhabitants. The immediate and long term impacts of arms used during conflicts are enormous. This is because there are agricultural havocs by landmines. Examples of this are fields of Angola, other fields of African territory and Asia. An experience from the Gulf war shows the burning of oil wells. At this moment in history, oil wells “were ignited and four to eight hundred million barrels of oil were spilled into the sea, severely damaging 460 miles of coastline” (Roche, 2003). Residents of several communities around the world have been displaced, their farmlands damaged and noise and pollution from low flying military aircrafts are several other effects of arms and its usage or militarism.

Good food and safe water are basic elements needed for the enhancement of human life. These two elements are inseparable from environmental concerns. Adequate food and safe water are what the world population that was six billion in 2000 needs and not the excessive acquisition of arms that destroys human existence. The world population is expected to reach 9 billion in year 2050 and this population will have to feed and house. Statistics show that all future population growth will occur in the developing countries. Thus the increase in population and the need for higher standard of living in the developing world particularly will pose a grand challenge on land, water, energy and other natural resources. Above all, the most needed elements for human existence are food and water. But millions of the world populations die annually for lack of reliable access to either safe water or adequate food. Roche (2003) argued that “hunger and unsafe water are among the top health risks in the world.” This corroborates Rupesinghe’s argument that world population is at risk of unsafe water. Global development of people are stunted by famine, this no doubt “saps their strengths and cripples their immune system.” The most major causes of food insecurity are armed conflicts. To this fact, Roche (2003) noted

War and civil strife were the major causes of food emergencies in 15 countries in 2001 and 2002. The overall impact of armed conflicts on food security disrupts food production and economic activity by displacing rural populations within a country and across borders.

The victims of war, especially those who are displaced are usually unable to provide for themselves thus they become dependent on humanitarian agencies. Rupesinghe argues that “at such times, national resources are channeled towards the civil strife to acquire arms or enlarge the armies.” A good example of this is the civil strife that is ongoing in Libya. Such situation will definitely handicap the country that she may be unable to meet basic requirements of its people – such as importing food and giving safe water. Sometimes opposing group may intentionally disrupt the supply of food and clean water as a means of inflicting starvation on civilians. This was the case during the Nigerian civil war between 1967 and 1970. Again such disruptions in “1999 left close to 24 million people hungry and in need of humanitarian assistance” (Roche, 2003).

Clean and fresh water is the basic requirements for life but this element is becoming scarce and serves as the source of conflicts. It will equally serve as source of increasing conflict in the future. The presence of arms

facilitates some of these conflicts, it is unfortunate that resources that should be channeled towards development are used for arms acquisition and their usages have helped in crippling the world.

3.3 Definition of Arms Control

Arms control suggests the presence of norms and the need to reduce and control the use of arms. Schmid (1998) notes that arms control are efforts, through international agreements, to limit or reduce war making capabilities by restricting the quantity and / or quality of weapons and making forces or the zone of their deployment in an attempt to avoid arms races or conflict escalation.” The concept of peace (Boutros-Ghali 1992) notes is easy to grasp. But a lot of contradictions have arisen within the international community as the desire to reduce arm increases. Boutros-Ghali adds that major powers have begun to negotiate arms reduction agreements. There has been rising tensions finding expression in violence and as Boutros-Ghali puts it, “There are technological advances that are altering the nature and expectation of life all over the globe, thus the need to check this ugly situation.”

This new dimensions of insecurity must not be allowed. At this moment of renewed opportunity, the efforts of the international community to build peace, stability and security must encompass matters beyond military threats in order to break the fetters of strife and warfare that have characterised the past. “Armed conflicts today, as they have throughout history continue to bring fear and horror to humanity, requiring our urgent involvement to try to prevent, contain and bring them to an end” (Boutros-Ghali 1992).

3.4 Process of Arms Control

The process of arms reduction the world over began in 1991 when the USA and USSR signed the START treaty. START in its full meaning is the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. This process began in 1982 with the strategic arms negotiations between the above mentioned super powers. This process that has been on hold since the beginning of the decade reopened with the new name (START) as stated above. This talk unlike the previous ones sought significant reductions - particularly in the Soviet Arsenal (Baglione, 1997). The super powers made very little progress on arms control, including START and the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) talks throughout the first half of the 1980s. In January 1985, the superpowers agreed to resume the dialogue in three separate but linked forums, discussing strategies as well as space and intermediate-range systems.

In October 1986 at Reykjavik, the USA and USSR established the basic outline for the START treaty, agreeing to limit the number of strategic warheads to 6000, restrict the number of nuclear launch vehicles to 1600, and abolish all ballistic missiles in ten years (Baglione, 1997). The START process languished when the USA insisted on pursuing strategic defense and the Soviets would not agree to reductions in offence systems. The two issues, offence and defence made the negotiation static until September 1989 when the Soviets agreed to drop the over linkage. The foreign ministers of the two states reinvigorated the START process with the instructions to reach an agreement. Within all these, the climax of it all came as Baglione (1997) quotes:

In 1991, the USA and USSR reached an accord to make significant cutbacks in their strategic arsenals. A few months after the agreement was signed, the superpowers also unilaterally decided to undertake steps to decrease their readiness for war, eliminate tactical nuclear weapons, and accelerate the START reductions. While the outcomes may appear to follow from the collapse of Soviet power or domestic political developments, closer examination suggests that a singular focus on neither power considerations nor internal politics can explain adequately these instances of arms control. Instead, leaders appear to have played a principal role, simultaneously balancing domestic political considerations against international challenges and opportunities.

From the above, it was nine years after the negotiations began that the two superpowers reached an agreement to make significant reductions in their strategic arsenals. Yet the action of the superpowers towards the process is not devoid of their domestic political interests. In the words of Baglione (1997) arms control is seen as a battle between liberal and conservative forces in the USA context and a struggle between reformists and orthodox members of the elite in the USSR; whichever group is stronger wins. If neither is dominant, the domestic actors involved in setting policy cut deals to arrive at a negotiating position that serves their organisational interests instead of national security.

Considering the danger of the proliferation of illicit small arms to human security, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) under the stewardship of Mali adopted a moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of small arms and light weapons in West Africa. The moratorium adopted at its 22nd Summit in Lome, Togo states that, “The most significant measure is a code of conduct to backstop the implementation of the moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of light weapons, adopted in Abuja, Nigeria on October 31, 1998. The moratorium came into force on November 1, 1998 for a renewable period of three years.” The ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their ammunition and other related materials was adopted on June 14, 2005. The objectives of this convention are:

- to prevent and combat the excessive and destabilising accumulation of small arms and light weapons within ECOWAS
- to continue efforts for the control of small arms and light weapons within ECOWAS
- to consolidate the gains of the declaration of the moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of small arms and its code of conduct
- to promote trust between members states through concerted and transparent action on the control of small arms and light weapons within ECOWAS
- to build the capacities of the ECOWAS executive secretariat and member states in their efforts to curb the proliferation of small arms and light weapons
- to promote the exchange of information and cooperation among member states.

To achieve these objectives, ECOWAS member states agree to the following:

- i. Member states shall ban the transfer of small arms and light weapons into, from or through their territory. They shall ban, without exception, transfers to non-state actors that are not explicitly authorised by the importing member state.
- ii. Member states can request exemption from the ban on transfers in order to meet legitimate security needs or participate in peace support operations. Exemptions will be refused if the transfer violates international legal and humanitarian obligations.
- iii. Member states shall undertake to control the manufacture of small arms and light weapons within their territories. They shall regulate the activities of local manufactures and adopt policies to reduce the manufacture of small arms and light weapons.
- iv. Member states shall establish national computerised registers and databases of small arms and light weapons. They shall undertake

- to establish a sub-regional database and register and shall provide all the information necessary for its operation.
- v. Member states shall prohibit the possession, use and sale of light weapons to civilians and regulate civilian possession, use and sale of small arms. They undertake to implement a strict control regime for civilian possession of small arms.
 - vi. Member states shall take the necessary measures to ensure the safe and effective management, storage and security of their stockpiles of small arms and light weapons. They shall collect and/or destroy surplus, seized, unmarked or illicitly held weapons.

The code of conduct laid down stringent waiver procedure for any ECOWAS member state wishing to import, export or manufacture light weapons during the duration of the moratorium. The ECOWAS Summit approved the implementation of the prototype of a regional arms register and database on light weapons in the West African sub-region. Following this initiative, the African Union in July 2002 adopted a common African position on the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, commonly referred to as the Bamako Declaration.

ECOWAS welcomed the adoption of the UN programme of action, as an effective mechanism to support regional arms control efforts. The UNDP supported the implementation of the moratorium through the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development in Africa (PCASED), which was set up to address security questions in the region. At the end of PCASED's mandate in 2004, ECOSAP, a five year SALW programme again involving the collaboration of UNDP with ECOWAS was launched on June 6, 2006. The project aims to build capacity of the national commissions in the region, and to provide technical support to the small arms unit in the ECOWAS secretariat. ECOSAP has collaborated with civil society, especially the West African Action Network on Small Arms (WANSAs).

However, understanding the international system, any model of arms control must take into consideration both international and domestic variables and the role the leader plays in reconciling external and internal pressures when making security policy (Baglione, 1997). Thus, arms control as a concept is complex and has posed a great challenge in its reduction strategy. But the international community has achieved many remarkable arms control programmes, though not devoid of pitfalls. This, therefore, is bringing the dream of Boutros-Ghali to curtail the existence and use of massively destructive weapons pointed out in his great work "An Agenda for Peace" (1992) into reality. This, therefore, defines arms control as the curtailing usage of all forms of weapons against human security.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

- In your definition and estimation what are arms?
- With abundant factual examples, define arms control and discuss its process and how they have ravaged the world.

4.0 CONCLUSION

It is rather unfortunate that the world of man has been conditioned to violence. There is violence in the home, in the media, in the street and everywhere. Arms have generated child soldiers both girls and boys, some between nine and ten years old. Arms are weapons of destruction; they inflict injuries, cause harm, destroy nations and leave many in poverty. The damages caused by arms if put into figure will be far incomprehensible. Acquiring arms may be easy but controlling them is not in any way an easy task thus arms control is an attempt to reduce and regulate arms. Its primary objectives was to monitor, manage and regulate the competition that existed between the two blocks of the cold war. It served as a check on the two antagonistic powers. The process had been for decades but took a new shape in 1991 when the START treaty was signed. At that period, arms suffered several setbacks considering the fact that, the process had several domestic hurdles to cross on both sides of the bloc before arriving at an agreement. However, arms control has come to mean more than just restricting a number of weapons.

5.0 SUMMARY

Ammunitions have in the last and present century, caused several humanitarian disasters. It does not take an experienced diplomat or politician, considering the experience thus far to realise that prevention of violence generated by arms is better than waiting for the death toll to rises and number of refugees swells. It is known to the world that millions of people have been killed. Arms have destroyed property and agriculture, houses, schools, hospitals, industries, and trade. Arms through the scourge of war have destroyed the infrastructure that keeps societies together. These destructions could be limited by arms control, which is seen as the curtailing usage of all forms of weapons against human security. Though the term has come to mean more than restrictions, it is interrelated with disarmament and has had many pitfalls many of which were generated to cause a blow. The concept has had a landmark achievement at least it has not allowed a third world war.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. With conspicuous examples define the concept of arms and show clearly their effects on global existence.
- ii. What is arms control?
- iii. To what extent has arms control helped shape international security?

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UNIT 2 DEMILITARISATION

CONTENTS

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Efforts by the Security Council of the UN to resolve international dispute amount to attempts to deconstruct the ideological and institutional structures of militarisms. Militarisms, an act of seeking violent solutions to conflicts, regard the preparation for war as a normal human activity that should be desired. Militarism drives huge military spending in the name of national security. It is clear that the insatiable demands of the military industrial complex propel military spending. These activities are profitable to some. The traditional belief that war just made the world take to violence to solve their problems. Violence, however, has never solved a problem, the entire world have seen the need to deconstruct this ideology. The war structures which facilitated the study of war, needed to be de-emphasised and emphasis laid on demilitarisation; hence the need to implement a security mechanism which guaranteed a return to normalcy and sustainable development to areas emerging from conflict.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- define militarisation
- explain militarism
- analyse and discuss demilitarisation.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Militarisation

Examining the process of demilitarisation around the globe, there is a misconception of what really is demilitarisation. To understand this concept, it is important to understand militarisation and militarism. As quoted by Willet (1998) "Militarisation can best be described as an interactive process of increasing influence of the military on all levels of society." This is giving importance to military values. This can be devastating because the military can be authoritarian and everyone takes to aggressive posturing.

3.2 Militarism

Militarism on the one hand in its purest form can be described as a set of attitudes and social practices, which regard war, and the preparation for war, as a normal and desirable activity. It also implies a tendency of favour or to seek violent solutions to problems and conflicts (Willet, 1998).

3.3 Demilitarisation

Demilitarisation is the search for a new framework for implementing security at areas emerging from conflict. Willet points out that demilitarisation includes disarmament in cost saving and arms control sense, but it is more all encompassing concept, which attempts to deconstruct the ideological and institutional structures of militarism and reassert civil control over the organs of the state and over the economy (Willet, 1998). In every demilitarised zone, military forces or installations are prohibited (Dupuy, 1986). The process of demilitarisation is only possible in areas where concerted attempts have been made to exert civilian authority over the military. There should exist increased openness and transparency in all areas of defense and security decision making, and a redefinition of the areas of security doctrine from one based exclusively on military to a broad-based definition which places human security and development at the centre of the areas security discourse.

However, instead of complying with the United Nations views of a demilitarised zone serving as a symbol of the international community's concern that conflict can be prevented the world is getting militarised. That is to say, what is obtainable in conflict regions is a high degree of militarisation. While the UN proposes demilitarisation, the military expenditures of many nations that resort to conflict grow higher. It is true that in supporting the process of disarmament, multilateral and

bilateral donor agencies have encouraged a reduction of military expenditures by adding it to their lists of conditionality for aid. The primary concern in donor's community has been to encourage the reallocation of resources to sustainable development goals. But so far there have been few development gains to be had from defense saving as most of the resources have been absorbed by deficit funding (Willet, 1998).

Demilitarisation is not non-armament; it is a process that prohibits the installation of facilities which service crawling or free swimming military systems. Any negotiation targeting demilitarisation must be done in good faith. The processes of demilitarisation may be a difficult operation considering the disparity between military potential of states and varying perceptions of security. This scenario excludes a mechanical adoption of arithmetically equal limits at least at the initial stages of the process that could further militarise conflict regions (Goldblat, 1987). Goldblat adds that a step towards the creation of conditions which facilitating a regional or sub- regional reductions of armament with a view to demilitarisation would be the acceptance of principles to guide mutual relations among parties concerned. Absence of this principle is one basic problem encountered in demilitarisation process. To this effect Golblat (1987) asserts:

To deal with this problem, recourse could be had to the ingenious method devised by the drafters of the Contadora Act on peace and cooperation in Central America. This act has defined the criteria that must be taken into account in fixing limits for military development in the region in question. Many of these criteria, if properly developed, would be applicable to other regions as well...

He believes that for the purpose of sub regional arms limitation, which should eventually lead to demilitarisation, factors like the area to be defended , the population- its structure and density, including the mobilisation potential and several others should be taken into account.

The best way of achieving the needed guarantee in the view of Goldblat would probably be through the neutralisation of the concerned area. He concludes that there are groups of countries which could refrain from a competition in arms and engage in arms reduction without exposing themselves to risks. This confidence building becomes an indispensable factor in the process; and total demilitarisation is not achievable without international security guarantee. Hence, as earlier noted, it must be done in good faith.

According to a report of Congressional Research Service (CRS) the effort to dispose of, and demilitarise, surplus military equipment dates back to the end of World War II, when the United State government decided to reduce a massive inventory of surplus military equipment by making such equipment available to civilians. CRS added that “to demilitarise military equipment is to destroy its inherent military offensive or defense capability.” In addition, CRS argued that the demilitarisation process itself may include scraping, melting, burning, or alteration of the material to prevent further use of its originally intended military or lethal purpose. Demilitarisation applies equally to equipment that may be in a serviceable, or unserviceable condition, and to equipment that has been screened and rendered to be excess equipment. In another sense, “demilitarisation implies the disengagement and withdrawal of the military from the political arena” (Adejumobi, 1999). Adejumobi’s argument draws from demilitarisation antonyms of militarism and militarisation. According to Adejumobi “militarisation is viewed as the armed build-up and engagement of society, through military camps, authoritarian regimes, war, armed conflicts, internal military intervention and the dominance of patriarchal powerful military and repressive state apparatuses.”

In furtherance to the above, it is important to further distinguish militarism and militarisation. According to Ohlson (1991) in Willet (1998):

Militarisation can best be described as an interactive process of increasing influence of the military at all levels of society. One can distinguish a military level proper, at which the increase in the terms to perform military action (such as fighting wars) can be measured: an economic level in which the increased costs of military sector can be measured: an ideological/cultural level, at which an increased importance is attributed to military values connected to the military (such as nation, security, honour, law and order) throughout society; and, finally, at political level, at which increased political influence of the military is felt.

The above contradicts Adejumobi’s definition of the concept of demilitarisation – to disengage the military from political authorities. In democratic societies, a clear distinction would appear to exist between

civil and military activities but this is not always the case in an authoritarian society where there is an encroachment of military into normal civilian spheres of influence. Enloe (1983) in Willet (1998) vividly described the intrusion of the military into civilian lives as a process involving both material and ideological dimensions. Willet further argues that:

In the material sense it encompasses the gradual encroachment of the military institution into civil society and the economy. The ideological dimension implies the extent to which such encroachments are acceptable to the population and become seen as 'common sense' solutions to civil problems.

The particular manifestations of militarisation are contingent upon the historical and cultural legacies of the country in question. In the Nigeria context Adejumobi (1999) emphasises military incursion to politics and the denial of political space to civil society groups and other political actors as the provocative factors to severe conflicts in Nigerian society. Adejumobi argues that the political misrule and economic mismanagement of the military at that time exacerbated the contradictions in the Nigerian political economy. With this, inter-communal clashes, violent agitations by minority groups, demonstrations, student unrest and violence became the norm of social and political life.

In South African context, militarisation is as a social process involving the mobilisation of resources for war. The process emerged in response to the intensification of resistance to the apartheid state in the 1980s from both domestic and external sources (Willet 1998). Willet adds that:

It was conceived and executed by the South African Defence Force (SADF) who subsequently expanded and extended the power of the military into civil society via their monopoly or key organs of the state and into the economy via the creation of a sizeable domestic defence industry.

The above societal perversions in both Nigeria and South Africa is not short of militarism. To this end, Ohlson (1988) in Willet (1998) represents the concept as:

A static phenomenon, consisting of three components: a) a set of values, and attitudes (an ideology); b) a social structure; c) behaviour. Thus, militarism in its purest form can be described as a set of attitudes and social practices, which regard war, and the preparation for war, as a normal and desirable activity. Furthermore, militarism implies a tendency to favour or to seek violent solutions to problems and conflicts.

The above representation, explains why “the politics of the gun has taken precedence over the politics of dialogue, negotiation and consensus” in most parts of Africa (Adejumobi, 1999). By the end of 1994 in sub-Saharan Africa, no less than 12 countries were at war, two in the early post-war phase and 14 had a record or experience of significantly high levels of political violence. In all, more than half the countries in Africa experienced violent conflicts, the number were 28 and that was not a good record for Africa. By 1996, about 16 countries were at war. Political crisis in Africa have had grave effect on the continent, bequeathing her with increasing poverty, hunger, disease, escalating refugee problems, human right abuses and an inhospitable political environment (Adejumobi, 1999).

The process of demilitarisation

In the United States of America, the disposal of defense surplus property (demilitarisation) is delegated to the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) from the General Services Administration (GSA). This was authorised by the federal property and administrative services act of 1949 to GSA to dispose government real and personal property and DOD is delegated responsibility for the supervision, direction, sale, and final disposition of DOD property. DOD further delegates this responsibility to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and; DLA authorises a component group, the Defense Reutilisation and Marketing Service (DRMS), to carry out the disposal activity. Prior to 1972, each branch of military service had its own independent surplus equipment programme; after 1972, the army was assigned exclusive control. The formation of DRMS in 1972 was largely to fix the problem with the defense surplus equipment programme. With its headquarters in Battle Creek, Michigan, DRMS has a total work force of 1,328 civilians and 11 active duty military personnel. It has offices in 37 states of the United States, 14 countries (including Iraq and Afghanistan), and providing support at major U.S. military installations around the world. In the 2005 fiscal year, DRMS

processed 3.4 million line items, with an original acquisition value of over \$20 billion. Surplus and excess items can be large and small, and can range from baby bottles and desks to automobiles and full weapon systems (Source: CRS report for congress, updated October 30, 2006).

CRS reported that DOD identifies and disposes of approximately \$20 billion (acquisition value) of excess and surplus property annually (excluding ammunition, small arms, chemical weapons, nuclear weapons, or classified materials). Excess defense property goes to DRMS for redistribution within DOD or transfer to other federal agencies; property not transferred or redistributed is deemed surplus and donated to eligible state and local governments within the U.S., as well as among other qualified organisations; finally, property that remains is sold to the general public, some as scrap metal.

Writing on DRMS policy, CRS argued that “when surplus and excess items requiring demilitarisation are transferred within DOD to the military services or other DOD agencies, the responsibility for accomplishment of demilitarisation is also transferred.” It is different when “surplus and excess items requiring demilitarisation are transferred or donated to qualified individuals and groups (such as state agencies, museum owners, and foundations), a provisional title transfer is granted meaning that those qualified agencies, individuals or groups must return the items when they are no longer in possession of them. The concerned persons, groups or agencies are prohibited from leasing or selling the items to a third party not specifically authorised to possess them. Under DRMS policy, any property released through public sale is not considered sold until the demilitarisation process is completed. CRS added that “since demilitarisation is a condition of sale, DOD maintains that if there is no demilitarisation, there is no sale”. In that sense, “DOD maintains that private owners (or those in possession of DOD equipment cannot pass on ownership to subsequent owners” (CRS).

Demilitarisation codes are assigned to each item of property. This is done when items are manufactured for, or purchased by, DOD. CRS noted that “each of the military services sets the demilitarisation code for each item it owns in the DOD inventory”. It added that the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has the ability to challenge the demilitarisation code on an item if it appears an error was made, but each military service retains ultimate decision-making authority over demilitarisation codes for its items. It is the military services that assign codes to spare parts for new aircrafts, ships weapons, supplies, and other equipments. It is the code assigned that determines whether the item contains military technology or capability, and establishes what must be done to an item before it is sold to the public; they are reviewed and revalidated every five years.

CRS report stated that there are nine categories of code, depending on whether the item is part of the United States munitions list items (USMLI) or a commerce control list item (CCLI)". The report puts it that "codes range in severity; items coded with letter "A" require no demilitarisation, while items coded with the letter "D" require total destruction of item and components so as to produce restoration to a usable condition by melting, cutting, tearing, scratching, breaking, punching, or neutralising". The rules of demilitarisation vary according to the type of organisation that is gaining possession of property.

As argued earlier, demilitarisation is all encompassing. It is simply conversion, "which is basically perceived as the civilian (re) use of resources that were formerly used by military activities" (Kees Kingma, 2000). Demilitarisation channels resources to productive activities, leading to increased employment, social justice and decreasing social tension. Kingma (2000) listed six aspects of conversion this way:

1. Reduction of military expenditure
2. Reorientation of military research and development
3. Conversion of the arms industry
4. Demobilisation and reintegration
5. Base closure and redevelopment
6. Safe disposal or management of surplus weapons.

Indeed, conversion is demilitarisation. This is because it puts together the above aspects as previous discussion has shown.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Define the concepts of militarism and militarisation and differentiate them from demilitarisation.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The devastating state of human society in the world makes demilitarisation as an indispensable factor. The concept of demilitarisation believes that conflicts can be prevented and that the resources channeled towards humanitarian intervention and even military spending can be used for a sustainable development. Demilitarisation is not non-armament; rather it says no to the installation of facilities that service military systems. It must be done in good faith.

5.0 SUMMARY

Demilitarisation encompasses disarmament and arms control. It may be a difficult task but not impossible. The concept de-emphasises the culture

of war but emphasis peace. It guaranties human security. The hallmark of demilitarisation is to ensure that countries refrain from competition in arms and engage in arms reduction.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. What is demilitarisation and what are the principles that facilitate it?
- ii. What are the problems of demilitarisation and how do they affect human society?

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

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UNIT 3 DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILISATION

CONTENTS

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 - 3.2 Forms and Challenges of Disarmament
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 - 3.4 Problems of Demobilisation
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 - 3.6 Cases of Demobilisation
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Disarmament is seen as a multilateral negotiation. Its goal is “the consolidation of existing short term security to form the basis for lasting peace” (Kai-Kai 2006). Disarmament opts for peaceful settlement through dialogue. It is interesting to note that the initiative for disarmament most times is undertaken by combatants after a “seen it all, done it all, attitude”. Is it possible to disarm people (combatants) who prior to the conflict period had nothing to write about their socio – economic experience but during the conflict period became lords and wielded so much power and wealth knowing full well that the rifle in their hands was responsible for the change. Disarmament opposes the orthodox notions of national security and political will and questions their effectiveness in promoting human security. While traditional forms of inter-state military conflict appear to be on the wane, a host of other scenarios involving insecurity and violent conflict are burgeoning in the 21st century (John Borrie, 2005). The local effects and consequences of these conflicts, considering the inter-connectedness of the international system is a threat to human society. An alternative to this is to understand the broad view of human security which regards the security of the individual rather than the traditional options. Disarmament carries various connotations. It is the “elimination as well as the limitation or reduction (through negotiation of an international agreement by which nations wage war)” (Matthews and McCormack, 1999). The demobilisation stage of peace building process is usually accosted with several problems. Considering the fact that demobilisation is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups, its most critical problem is the refusal of

disarmed combatants “to demobilise for fear of losing their chances of rejoining the national army” (Kai-Kai 2006). Demobilisation is not achieved with aggression; it is a civilian programme with an objective to return the former combatants to a civilian life.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- define disarmament
- enumerate the forms of disarmament
- explain the challenges of disarmament
- describe demobilisation
- analyse the problems of demobilisation.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Definition of Disarmament

Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes (unddr.org). The objective of disarmament process is a complex task given to peace missions. It is to contribute to security and stability in post conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin. The Disarmament of ex-combatants is complex considering its political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimension. It aims to deal with post conflict security problem that arises when ex-combatants are left without livelihoods or support networks, other than their former comrades, during, the vital transition period from conflict to peace and development. Through the process of removing weapons from the hands of the ex-combatants, disarmament seeks to support those (ex-combatants) who become active in the peace process. This suggests that disarmament alone cannot guarantee quality peace building but as the weapons are taken away from them, they should equally be taken out of military structures and helped to integrate socially and economically into the society. This gives credence to the need for them to demobilise and reintegrate.

3.2 Forms and Challenges of Disarmament

There are many forms of disarmament, such as a reduction in military spending, reduction or destruction of the stocks of certain weapons system, a ban or limitation of the production of some types of military equipment, reduction in the numbers of military personnel, limitations

on arms transfers, control of defence and the monitoring and verification of weapon disposals and troop reductions (Willet, 1998). Willet adds that disarmament could be micro or macro. Demobilisation could be seen as micro disarmament while destruction, reduction in military spending and limitation is macro. It is beyond the elimination of arms, whether voluntary or compulsory it implies a modification of nation's military strategies. This is because the abandonment of certain types of weapons or defense capabilities such as nuclear weapons may constitute a conscious effort to reduce nation's offensive capabilities, thereby reducing the tensions created by an arms race (Willet, 1998).

The United Nations have also adopted arms embargo so as to disarm combatants especially with the case in Liberia. This was because their (combatants) continued resistance to compliance with the disarmament components of agreements and peace accords and the simultaneous proliferation of factions increased the level of fighting (Aning, 1999). The point to underscore is that often, the concerted efforts made to disarm the combatants prove abortive. Considering the fact that some combatants in post conflict areas, even when embargoes are placed to disarm them compulsorily and control arms, they still obtain weapons using unconventional suppliers. In states rich in natural resources they turn to non-state commercial suppliers, and obtain weapons in exchange for exploiting natural resources. Post-conflict restructuring could be truncated when neighboring states are still involved in violent conflicts. This results to cheap acquisition of weapons and the scenario is best known as neighbourhood effect. These activities impair the effective use of the disarmament strategy and also endanger the security of the public and especially the United Nations officers on peace mission.

As stated earlier, disarmament may be voluntary or compulsory. Voluntary when combatants willingly drop their weapons. It becomes compulsory because certain measures may be in place to make the ex-combatants comply with disarmament strategies when refusal to disarm is becoming a threat to the returning peace. Post-combat life is really challenging and this sometimes poses a threat to the disarmament programmes. The programme may not always work without economic incentives. To this effect, weapons buyback programme was introduced in Liberia when it became apparent that, without an economic incentive, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia's (NPFL) participation in the disarmament programmes could not be assured. Thus to respond to that, the Interim Government for National Unity (IGNU) introduced a cash-for-arms programme, whereby rebel soldiers who disarmed were given cash rewards, small scale business loans and job training schemes to help in providing better alternative possibilities of post-combat life (Aning, 1999). The controlling points of these strategies were the reintroduction of combatants who had been living a life of violence and

crime to productive ventures and alternative mode of useful contribution to societal development.

Another threat to the disarmament programme is the involvement of child soldiers. The child soldiers need to be reintegrated as quickly as possible into productive ventures. Some of them however become stranded in cities without family or community support. This can be dangerous because they are not included, this happened in the case of Liberia in the cash-for-arms programme. Subsequent agreements did not have specific stipulations concerning child soldiers. Thus there was no incentive to demobilise (Aning, 1999). The case of Sierra Leone however is different as some of the child soldiers were demobilised. The scenario in Liberia was likely used as a measure not to give economic incentives to the child soldiers and encourage the act. This could be dangerous to human security.

3.3 Demobilisation

Demobilisation is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilisation may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilisation encompasses the support package provided to the demobilised, which is called reinsertion.

3.4 Problems of Demobilisation

It has been observed that the refusal of disarmed combatants to demobilise for fear of losing their chances of rejoining the national army is the most critical problem of demobilisation. This was the case in Sierra Leone when ex SLA/AFRC members refused to demobilise. As noted by Kai-Kai (2006) the absence of a military reintegration plan which should have immediately screened and selected a restructured SLA, led to a long period of occupation of the demobilisation camp by this group of ex-combatants, taking up essential space that prevented other eligible combatants who wished to go through the civilian programme.

The presence of families of the ex-combatants is another thorny problem to demobilisation. This is so because the demobilisation camp was not planned to accommodate dependants. Surely, this was a mistake. According to Kai-Kai (2006) “management are left with the question of what to do for a group that is critical to the lives of the ex-combatants”. This was a big challenge to the demobilisation programme in Sierra

Leone and Liberia. In Kai-Kai's position, most family members of the ex-combatants are obliged to stay at the camp for prolonged periods with implications for resource use, especially food and space.

Again, demobilisation is faced with the challenge of refusal and/or reluctance of the demobilised ex-combatants to leave centres after discharge. Such attitudes are attributable to an "innate fear of returning to society and lack of access to their human areas. Some ex-combatant homes lie in areas still occupied by armed combatants" (Kai-Kai 2006). It's obvious that in such condition, if the demobilised ex-combatants return to such areas, then violent conflict may resume or they lose their lives.

3.5 The Impact of Demobilisation

As argued earlier, demobilisation is a process that significantly reduces the number of military personnel. The process includes reduction of the size of regular military and paramilitary forces, as well as the number of civilian personnel employed by the armed forces. According to Kees Kingma (2000a), "In several cases, demobilisation also incorporates the process of disbanding opposition forces sometimes after their integration into the (new) regular forces." Demobilisation does not always imply demilitarisation. This is because sometimes the reduction of the number of military personnel could be a modernisation effort to make the force easily controllable and more effective. Also, the reduction of security expenditure does not necessarily imply demobilisation, because there is the possibility that demobilised soldiers would still be available as part-time forces or reserves. Kingma pointed out that 'reserves are not counted in the statistics, when not under arms, but they might be very quickly mobilised. However, for a soldier to be considered demobilised, as soon as they have been disarmed and received their discharge papers; they have officially and de facto left the military command structure.

Recent cases of military downsizing in sub-Saharan Africa mostly centred on demobilisation exercise. The armies of most African states rely heavily on the number of soldiers as the mark of strength. The payroll of such number takes a bulk of the military expenditure; therefore making it difficult for post conflict countries to shoulder such challenge. Kees Kingma (2000b) noted that "when a war is over, pressure is felt to reduce the number of soldiers, especially after conflicts that were close-linked to the Cold War, since in those cases, arms and other equipments were often provided for free or with soft loans."

Demobilisation as a process is beyond linking demand and supply in the labour market. It is beyond the conversion of human resources.

Basically, it is considered a complex process where an ex-combatant has to find a new civilian life, and re-establish some root in society. Kingma (2000b) argued that:

...For the larger process of postwar rehabilitation and development, the demobilisation and reintegration process forms a continuum. Different components are sequenced or overlapping, according to the specific circumstances. The actual phasing of the demobilisation depends particularly on the time available – or taken – to prepare for demobilisation, resettlement and reintegration support.

As experience have shown, risks exist that the above processes may fail or even produce negative effects. Hence, to provide support to demobilisation and reintegration, though constitutes long-term costs to the society could be larger if the ex-combatants were unable to find new livelihoods. Kingma (2000b) added that such scenario could:

...lead to increasing unemployment and social deprivation, which could again lead to rising crime rates and political instability. Frustrated ex-combatants may also jeopardise the broader peace and development process. In such cases they might pick up their guns again.

Following the above, it is clear as it appears that the relationship that exists between development, demobilisation and security is indeed complex. In a positive sense, the skills of the ex-soldiers might be useful to the development of the community/society they are in or the region in general. The process of demobilisation hence had grave impact on security and development. Though this area has remained unstudied by scholars it is however not the focus of this section. The section only attempts to clarify concepts and show few cases of application.

3.6 Cases of Demobilisation

Ethiopia

After decades of armed conflict in Ethiopia, during the first part of the 1990s about half a million ex-soldiers were demobilised (Ayalew and

Dercon, 2000). The transition from combatant to civilian in Ethiopia was classified into three stages; demobilisation, resettlement and reintegration. As noted by Ayalew and Dercon (2000) about 509, 200 ex-combatants were demobilised and reintegrated. This high number is a challenge to the process anywhere. This is because management, accommodation and transportation of such number are not easy to shoulder and constitutes a security threat if the process fails. "Beyond the direct impact on ex-soldiers and their families, demobilisation may have externalities." Ayalew and Dercon argue that:

One hypothesis is that demobilisation might increase crime rates. In the case of Ethiopia one could expect a serious problem in this regard as a lot of ex-soldiers went with their weapons in disarray.

Following the above, there were reports by the police and press of theft and armed robberies mainly rural banditry and organised crime by ex-combatants. The government then set up mechanisms to collect weapons, namely; "through a call in the media to return weapons and through searches by district-level security committees" (Ayalew and Dercon 2000). Evidence available however indicates that there was no significant increase in crime rates in Ethiopia after the demobilisation process.

According to Ayalew and Dercon (2000) there was a flow of arms to neighbouring countries such as Kenya, Djibouti and Sudan. The literature on this issue is however scanty. This scenario should be expected as those who fled to the above areas had gone with their weapons. Ayalew and Dercon argue that "around 51,000 Ethiopian ex-soldiers in Sudan and 28,000 in Djibouti surrendered their weapons to authorities at refugee camps."

Mozambique

The war in Mozambique has been described to be enormous in terms of the loss of lives and destruction of infrastructure. Following the 1975 independence achieved as a result of 11 years of armed struggle led by the Mozambican Liberation Front (FRELIMO), the country experienced a new armed conflict within a few years. The conflict lasted more than a decade and ended October 4, 1992, with the signing of the General Peace Agreement (GPA) in Rome. The parties to the conflict were the government and the Mozambican National Resistance. Irae Baptist Lundin et al (2000) argue that "one of the most difficult recovery processes in Mozambique is dealing with the 'human instruments of

war, - the combatants.’’ In addition, they note that ‘‘contrary to weapon systems, which can be collected and stored in armouries before being destroyed, soldiers have to be demobilised and most importantly reintegrated into the normal socio-economic environment of their community.’’ To have demobilised combatants reintegrated into productive civilian life is a difficult process considering high material cost and the complex psychological and social transformations involved. Sometimes, the motivating factor for demobilisation and reintegration is assumed to be the need to cut cost in military expenditure, ‘‘in order to be able to reallocate funds to productive and social sectors’’. However the scenario in Mozambique is considered a paradox by Lundin et al. (2000). This is because Mozambique tried to reduce cost through a very expensive undertaking. In the first place, the General Peace Agreement (GPA) came to be as a result of the realisation that the war could no longer be sustained by either the conflicting parties or the larger society. The solution was to stop fighting and deal with the situation in a peaceful manner. The multiparty elections of 1994 set the stage for a new political set up and no significant record of political violence since then in Mozambique.

Demobilisation is not new to Mozambique as it was carried out twice between 1975 and 1978. The third was in 1994. The exact numbers of the demobilised combatants in 1994 slightly differs depending on the reporting agencies. According to Lundin et al (2000) ‘‘the figures provided by UNDP are believed to be the most accurate, since they are based on the donor’s monitoring system, including the last payment made to the demobilised combatants in January-March 1997.’’ The total number given by the table indicated 92,890 combatants were demobilised, of which 70,910 were government soldiers and 21,980 were RENAMO fighters.

Demobilisation can fail when the political commitment of the conflicting parties is lacking. This was the case in 1991 in Angola. It was the first attempt at demobilisation following the Bicesse Accords of 1991. This attempt failed due to absence of political commitment from both the government and the opposition force UNITA. Both parties were unwilling to cooperate with each other but maintained secret armies in violation of the accords (Kingma and Gehyigon 2000). The 1992 elections gave vent to another war that was more violent and destructive than the previous. Following the Lusaka peace accord of November 1994, ‘‘about 76,000 combatants of the Angolan Armed Forces and UNITA were to be demobilised’’. There was an initial progress made in 1997 in terms of encampment and demobilisation, but by April 1998 almost 50,000 had formally been demobilised, according UN data (Kingma and Gehyigon 2000).

Reinsertion

Reinsertion paves the way for a successful reintegration. Reintegration of ex-combatants into community life is an essential part of any post-conflict peace building. This needs to be integrated into the overall strategy of the DDR programme. Before reintegration however and following the discharge “from demobilisation centres, provisions had not been made for an orderly return of ex-combatants to their home communities such as envisaged for the internally displaced and refugees” (Kai-Kai 2006), hence the necessity of the short term needs of the ex-combatants.

Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilisation but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is a short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year.

Reinsertion facilitated the post conflict peace building in Sierra Leone. This was prior to the hostilities that broke out between May to June 2000. To this fact, arrangements were made for cash payment of US \$ 300 to each ex-combatant in two installments with a three month interval (Kai-Kai 2006). The ex-combatants however later received a more comprehensive in-kind reinsertion package at district level. This strategy was to prevent misuse of cash and contribute to a better resettlement of the former combatants.

Reinsertion as a short term assistance programme houses several logistical implications. The most prominent is the procurement and distribution of various items for the ex-combatants. However, the place of reinsertion cannot be sacrificed because it helps in getting the ex-combatants relocate to their home district for social reintegration, thus it must be adequately planned.

The most challenging aspect of reinsertion is the reconciliation aspect. In post conflict areas, ex-combatants encounter difficulties in acceptance. This also concerns former child combatants to the point that parents refuse to accept their own children during family tracing and reunion interventions. These problems are however addressed with assistance to meet immediate needs and can last up to one year.

Reintegration

Reintegration is considered the single most important aspect of the DDR programme by ex-combatants. This is because it takes into consideration their social and economic life. Demobilised ex-combatants usually nurse the fear of what their role will be if they go back home to areas housing fighters without adequate security. Security in this sense encompasses their mental alertness, economic strength, social interaction etc. Hence reintegration phase of DDR, gets the demobilised ex-combatants prepared for the task. The reintegration phase is faced with challenges, one of which addressing it is key to the success of the DDR. The point is how shall enemies become reconciled and accept to live together? This question is fundamental and needs to be addressed for there to be sustainable and constructive DDR.

Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance (unddr.org).

As raised in the introduction, it has been observed that it is usually difficult for demobilised ex-combatants to go back to their homes in areas where they have their former enemies. This was one of the problems encountered in Sierra Leone where the demobilised ex-combatants, especially the former RUF fighters found it difficult to return to their houses located in CDF areas (Kai-Kai, 2006). Reconciling these into enemies was a big challenge to the reintegration in Sierra Leone, hence the appropriate agencies charged with the responsibility of the reintegration must solve the puzzle of how to reconcile the enemies and make them live together. Until this is done reintegration efforts will be fruitless.

Again, where a society's economy has been ravaged by war and reduced to nothing, it makes it difficult for reintegration. It is clear that reintegration cannot take place in such environment. When the "private sector is largely crippled and in need of serious investment and the public sector is starved of resources as the government's limited revenue is directed to the war" (Kai-Kai 2006) reintegration becomes slow and a significant rise in unemployment is experienced.

Before beginning any DDR programme there is every need to put in place a clear strategy for reintegrating interested and eligible ex-combatants. These plans must be military and civilian where necessary. It is clear that the reintegration programme is conceived within a given

political and security environment. It is essential to constantly review this progress. This process will help monitor and address the challenges faced by reintegration.

In sum, reintegration is widely acknowledged by most key stakeholders in the DDR process as the hub of the activity. It is the key to a successful DDR. Usually, a society torn by war needs the reintegration phase to alleviate the grinding poverty that affects all categories of the population. There is need for adequate human security for all namely, economic opportunities and employment for ex-combatants.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

- i. What is disarmament?
- ii. Discuss demobilisation, reinsertion and reintegration in details.

4.0 CONCLUSION

It is necessary to disarm all who are in possession of weapons in areas emerging from conflict. Why compliance with disarmament initiatives is sometimes not successful is partly because the weapons had come to attain both a security and an economic value. For most of the fighters, economic incentives call value and loots-had become the primary motives for fighting. Combatants are usually not fully committed to disarmament in case fighting breaks out. The causation to this is the fact that there are no specific post-disarmament and demobilisation programmes. The next stage of the peace-building is sometimes overlooked and this keeps the ex-combatants wondering what their fate is (Aning 1999).

Another challenge to this task is the fact that the weapons not collected, documented and/or destroyed during the disarmament stage of the post conflict peace building, will definitely have a neighbourhood effect on the region of the area emerging from conflict. This is because the weapons will be ploughed back into use in these regions. This unit shows that demobilisation is in stages. The hallmark of demobilisation is the provision of the packages to support the demobilised. It is an attempt to put the former ex-combatants to a civilian life. Obviously, it has never gone without challenges hence the problems of demobilisation comes to mind. If these problems are well managed, it is so because of the next stage of the peace building process.

5.0 SUMMARY

It is not difficult to see why the disarmament process is encountering mountain of problems. This is due to the increasing complexity of the

issues surrounding the conflict. This no doubt makes it difficult to negotiate for disarmament. The point made is that disarmament is grounded on national security paradigm. It is only relevant as a unit of analysis and less is said about human security. We understood that demobilisation is such a critical stage of the peace building process, that the conflicting areas return to normalcy or conflict depends on it. Thus it takes political will to guarantee its success and never to use it for manhunt.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT.

- i. Discuss three disarmament strategies that can guarantee human security.
- ii. What is disarmament?
- iii. With conspicuous examples discuss:
 - Demobilisation
 - Problems of demobilisation
 - Stages in demobilisation.

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MODULE 2 THEORY AND HISTORY OF ARMS CONTROL

Arms control is an umbrella term for restriction upon the development, production, stock piling, proliferation, and usage of weapons, especially weapons of mass destruction. Arms control is typically exercised through the use of diplomacy which seeks to impose such limitations upon consenting participants through international treaties and agreements, although it may also comprise efforts by a nation or group of nations to enforce limitations upon a non-consenting country.

Unit 1	Theory of Arms Control
Unit 2	History of Arms Control
Unit 3	Barriers of Arms Control
Unit 4	Disarmament since the World War II
Unit 5	Game Theory and Bargaining

UNIT 1 THEORY OF ARMS CONTROL

CONTENTS

1.0	Introduction
2.0	Objectives
3.0	Main Content
	3.1 Definition
	3.2 The Scope and Goals of Arms Control
	3.3 Methods of Achieving Arms Control
4.0	Conclusion
5.0	Summary
6.0	Tutor-Marked Assignment
7.0	References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The traditional path to human security emphasised national self defense by amassing arms to deter aggressions. This however has made security elusive because humans have sought it in a wrong way. The theory of arms control is to think anew “about security from armed aggression in the light of humankind’s failed effort to find it” (Rourke 2001). Arms control was seen as a major force that supported the balance of power between the superpowers and their allies. The arms control theory that was developed in the late 1950s and early 1960s aimed at enhancing security and avoiding a global nuclear annihilation that was the interest of bipolar powers. The theory in its traditional sense targeted at moving beyond the deep ideological and political differences of the bipolar

powers and involving them in a strategic dialogue. To this fact, arms control theory was concerned with reducing the risk of a nuclear war between the above mentioned antagonists. The Theory however has metamorphosed as it has become connected and interrelated with disarmament.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- explain the theory of arms control
- describe the scope of arms control
- identify the goals of arms control.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Definition

Scholars and practitioners such as John Steinbrenner, Jonathan Dean and Stuart Croft worked extensively on the theoretical backing of arms control. Arms control is meant to break the security dilemma. It aims at mutual security between partners and overall stability (be it in a crisis situation, a grand strategy, or stability to put an end to an arms race). Other than stability, arms control comes with cost reduction and damage limitation. It differs from disarmament since the maintenance of stability might allow for mutually controlled armament and does not take a peace-without-weapons stance. Nevertheless, arms control is a defensive strategy in principle, since transparency, equality, and stability do not fit into an offensive strategy (source: council on US foreign relations).

3.2 The Scope and Goals of Arms Control

In the cold war era, as noted by Adam Rotfeld (2001) the specific objectives of arms control were to monitor, manage and regulate the competition between antagonistic blocs. One primary objective of arms control therefore is to moderate the pace of international armament competition. To adumbrate this fact Rotfeld posits that “Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin observed that arms control involves strong elements of mutual interest in the avoidance of a war that neither side wants in minimising the costs and risks of arms competition and in curtailing the scope and violence of war in the event it occurs.” This could be achieved in several different ways “Whether by formal diplomatic agreements or by unilateral but tacitly reciprocated mover” (Dougherty and Pfalzgraff 1981).

Arms control in practice however did not tackle the roots of conflicts but assumed that the major actors in international relations and armed conflicts were and would continue to be states. Rotfeld (2001) posits that “In theory, arms control embraced all types of armaments and all states”, but “in practice it was dominated by discussion of nuclear armaments among a small number of states – and in many cases among only the two superpowers, which were concerned first and foremost with maintaining stability of the strategic nuclear balance.” The point made in the above is that other forms of weapons like small arms and light weapons had little or no attention given them in the bipolar times and this also restricted participation and the scope of arms control regime. Within that framework arms control had both military and political dimension, considering the fact that channels of communication were limited.

Arms control theory has come to mean more in its new sense of existence. At the end of the cold war, the changing political climate had its emphasis on enhancing “stability and security and a number of arms control negotiations were brought to a successful conclusion” (Koulik and Kokoski 1994). Conventional arms control and reductions had the objective to strengthen stability and security in Europe. As noted above, in the new sense, arms control has been interpreted to mean several things. According to Adams Rotfeld (2001), the term arms control in English is “interpreted to mean managing, administering or steering military capacities. In other European languages - French, German and Russian – the term is associated with increasing levels of knowledge about military capacities through verification, inspection and monitoring”. Rotfeld adds that at its broadest sense, the term covers different forms of cooperation among states in military matters, particularly in the field of limitations, elimination or reduction of weapons, their use and verification of arms related agreements.

One major goal of arms control is to have a better knowledge and understanding of the true state of military capabilities in the world. This connotes transparency in the discussion of international security. Another goal of arms control was to safeguard past achievements. To this fact, if a nuclear war broke out in that period, it would have amounted to vanity. This arms control treaties facilitated peaceful transformations in the world.

Arms control as noted above is meant to break security dilemma. States have sought relief from this dilemma in various ways. Arms control is one of such ways. Several efforts at arms control have been attempted throughout history and the underlying premise has been to have a re-think since ‘self help’ through technological breakthroughs or the deployment of more numerous forces are likely to be futile. Then why

not concede that futility and see security through cooperation (Richard Ullman 1991). The care of arms control is for adversaries to recognise that they have common interests. Arms control is not limited to any kind of weapon. Richard Ullman noted that:

Arms control therefore includes all the forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and economic costs of being prepared for it.

But what really do governments seek to control? The decision that government must make is to determine what they should control. “Should they, for instance, seek limits on numbers of weapons or military personnel, on qualitative improvements in weapons, or on geographic locations where forces might either operate or be stationed?” (Richard Ullman 1971).

Historical records indicate that governments have sought to use arms control to “limit those activities of another power that they find threatening, while at the same time minimising the impact of controls on those of their own activities that they regard as essential for preserving their security”; hence it is a difficult decision to make. Any control to be imposed on a potential adversary, a government must decide first, whether it can tolerate control in that area.

Richard Ullman (1991) argues that arms control agreements will always be partial. It is unlikely that arms control agreements can cover all weapons or military activities. He added that, “their effect, therefore, will be to shift competition between states away from controlled spheres to spheres that are less controlled”. To this end, “the first U.S.-Soviet agreement limiting offensive strategic weapons controlled numbers of ballistic missile launchers but not numbers of bombers” or areas which the U.S. considered control disadvantageous.

The effort by states to achieve absolute security is what is considered security dilemma. This is because such efforts will make other states to feel absolutely insecure. That is to say if a state deploys military forces that are sufficiently powerful to enable its government and citizens to feel secure against likely threats from other states, such a state will surely appear threatening to the government and citizens of those other states. No doubt, the threatened states will seek security by building up their own military capabilities. With this posture, aggression will definitely continue.

The effect of arms control has been to soften the impact of the security dilemma, not to enable states to escape it. Arms race, Ullman argues have been slowed and compartmentalised, not ended. But the slower the pace and the more that competition has been channeled, the less, governments need worry that an adversary might suddenly achieve a usable superiority that might in a moment of crisis seem to promise some theory close to absolute security.

Arms control has always been about change – change in number of weapons, setting or redefining ceilings, altering the structure of forces and the overall strategic balance, and so on. The verification provisions of arms control agreements have had to deal with these changes and have been structured to do so with a minimum of controversy and a maximum of assured compliances. These provisions have rarely performed perfectly, but neither could they be expected to do so (Koulik and Kokoski 1994).

In addition to the above, Koulik and Kokoski (1994) argue that:

The verification of arms control agreements presents new challenges, perhaps most prominently in attempting to provide a true perspective on the amount and type of monitoring that is really necessary for them to succeed.

To the above scholars, national security is a function of threat perception; hence to provide accurate threat assessment, adequate knowledge is essential. “Acquiring this knowledge in the most efficient and timely manner is fundamental.” It is important to add that “the same technology that makes it possible to deliver a weapon with pinpoint accuracy against a target half around the earth makes a state’s territory substantially transparent for the purpose of keeping track of military capabilities” (Richard Ullman 1991). It is difficult to evade the eyes and ears of the sensors. In Ullman’s words this is true if the state under observation chooses to cooperate, so as to facilitate monitoring, rather than to conceal.

3.3 Methods of Achieving Arms Control

There are several approaches to achieving arms control. Groups of analysts and practitioners have put up arguments on the need for improvement of approaches that targets to limit and reduce the number of arms and their spread. According to Rotfeld (2001) one group of analysts and practitioners has argued that fundamental changes in the existing arms control framework should be avoided. Reason for this has

been that radical changes could constitute a risk to existing processes that have not been completed. However, for the goals of arms control to be achieved, certain methods need to be put in place to accelerate the actualisation of the objectives. Changes to approaches need be effected when the situation demands so but practitioners must be sensitive to conditions where political relations are strained; for this may diminish security by amplifying disagreements. Hence every method employed need to be understood.

There are several methods of controlling arms in order to limit their number and reduce their spread. These methods as Rourke (2001) points out include numerical restrictions; categorical restrictions; and transfer restrictions. They are discussed below.

Numerical restrictions

Placing numerical limits on existing weapons, or weapons that might be developed is the most common approach to arms control. This approach specifies the number or capacity of weapons or troops that each side may possess. Sometimes the numerical limits may be at or higher than current levels. The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START I and II) are good examples. They relied more on numerical limits to show future expansion rather than reducing existing levels. This method may also be lower than existing arsenals. START I and II treaties significantly reduced the number of American and Russian nuclear weapons. This strategy relies heavily on strength (Rourke 2001).

Development, testing and deployment restrictions

This approach involves government of military birth control that ensures that weapons systems never begin their gestation period of development and testing or, if they do, they are never delivered to operational sites used by the military. The advantage of this method is that it stops a specific area of arms building before it starts. The anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty of 1972 put a clear cut limit on the US and Soviet efforts to building a Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system, which many analysts believe could destabilise nuclear deterrence by undermining its cornerstone, Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). The restriction on long-range BMD systems and the debate over US national defense systems are not subject to international controversy within the United States (Rourke 2001).

Some of these restrictions aim at stopping weapons proliferation. Rourke adds that one common element of the Biological Weapons Treaty (BWT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) treaty and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is that all the countries that

have ratified them and those that do not have the weapons covered in them do not agree to develop such weapons. A related initiative is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which is designed to end all forms of nuclear tests. The testing of nuclear weapon by India and Palestine in 1998 demonstrates that neither the NPT nor the CTBT is fully effective. Weapons may be developed yet is still possible to place workable restrictions on them.

Categorical restrictions

This strategy employs the principle of limitation and/or elimination of certain types of weapons. Rourke (2001) posits that the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty eliminated an entire class of weapon – intermediate-range nuclear weapons. Several other treaties aim at eliminating types of weapons. In this category is the anti-personnel mine. To this, men, women and children can step on the earth and walk around it freely especially in areas that ratified the treaty.

Transfer restrictions

This approval is one that prohibits or limits the flow of weapon and weapons technology across international borders. Rourke (2001) notes that under “the non proliferation treaty, countries that have nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon technology pledge not to supply weapons or the technology to build them to nonnuclear states.” He adds that limiting the transfer of missile technology and missiles capable of attacking distant points is another arms control area that focuses on transfer restrictions. The primary effort to stem missile proliferation centres on informal 1987 multilateral agreement styled the “Missile Technology Control Regime” (MTCR) targeted at ensuring nuclear safety.

Assessing these strategies, a bordering question comes to mind: Have arms control measures been successful? If not, why?

Finally, analysts believe that the methods are not enough to address the challenges and problems posed by arm proliferation. Hence there is every need to expand the arms control agenda to include more weapons, more issues. These include also humanitarian, economic, governance and more actors. Unless the issues are well understood by all actors involved, arms control agenda may be difficult to achieve.

To achieve the arms control agenda, there is every need to improve on the methods of arms control.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss with conspicuous examples the scope of arms control and the method of achieving them.

4.0 CONCLUSION

Arms control is to break the global security dilemma. The theory comes with cost reduction and damage limitation. The traditional arms control tried to check external influence or threat coming from outside in the name of territorial expansion that was the order 70 years ago. In recent times, territorial conquest is minimal yet the agenda of arms control remains an unfinished business. It is clear that the use of force to address territorial and border conflicts still exists in Europe, Africa, Latin, America and Asia.

Finally, the question that needs to be addressed is, to what extent does the arms control theory help shape the international order? We need to understand arms control as a theory that aims at mutual security between partners and overall stability. It is a defensive strategy in principle, since transparency, equality, and stability do not fit into an offensive strategy.

5.0 SUMMARY

In summary, security extends further than being safe from armed attacks. The abounding weapons however have added to the building of tensions round the world. Arms control unlike disarmament, does not say no to weapons or total abolition of weapons. The theory suggests a limited self defense. It must be added that security is partly a state of mind. But is our society secure enough to move without arms? Again the presence of arms suggests the presence of tension. Why do we have so much insecurity? No doubt, human avarice and power-seeking is responsible.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. What is arms control?
- ii. Does arms control guarantee total security? What are your reasons?

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UNIT 2 HISTORY OF ARMS CONTROL

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- 2.0 Objectives
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The objective of arms control agenda has been to strengthen stability and security all over the world, this began several centuries ago. The period that marked the end of the cold war was seen as the peak of arms control. This period (1990 – 1992) was marked by series of achievements in conventional arms control (Koulik and Kokoski, 1994). Before then however, frantic efforts have been made to control warfare and the weapons used to execute it. Hence this unit x-rays these efforts.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- account for the development of the arms control agenda
- explain various efforts at arms control
- list some arms control treaties.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 The Early Stage

One of the first recorded attempts in arms control was a set of rules laid down in ancient Greece by the Amphictyonic Leagues. The rules specified how war could be waged, and breaches of these could be punished by fines or by war. The act of war was partly condemned in

ancient religious civilisations. As noted by Dougherty and Pfalzgraff (1981) philosophers and legalists condemned certain modes of warfare as immoral, illegal, or uncivilised.

There were few recorded attempts to control arms during the period and even before the rise of the Roman Catholic Church. The church used its position as a trans-national organisation to limit the means of warfare. The 989 Peace of God (extended in 1033) ruling protected noncombatants, agrarian and economic facilities, and the property of the church from war. The 1027 truce of God also tried to prevent violence between Christians. The second Lateran Council in 1139 prohibited the use of crossbows against other Christians, although it did not prevent its use against non-Christians. The development of firearms led to an increase in the devastation of war. The brutality of wars during this period led to efforts to formalise the rules of war, with human treatment for prisoners of war or wounded, as well as rules to protect non-combatants and the pillaging of their property. However during the period and until the beginning of the 19th century, few formal arms control agreements were recorded, except theoretical proposals and those imposed on defeated armies.

One treaty which was concluded was the Strasbourg Agreement of 1675. This is the first international agreement limiting the use of chemical weapons, in this case, poison bullets. The treaty was signed between France and the Roman Empire. The 1817 Rush-Bagot Treaty between the United States and United Kingdom was the first arms control treaty of what can be considered the modern industrial era, leading to the demilitarisation of the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain region of North America. This was followed by the 1817 Treaty of Washington which led to total demilitarisation.

3.2 The Industrial Age

The industrial revolution led to increased mechanisation of warfare, as well as rapid advances in the development of firearms. The increased potential of devastation (which was seen in the battle fields of World War 1) led Tsar Nicholas II of Russia calling together the leaders of 26 nations for the first Hague Conference in 1899. At the conference the Hague Convention of 1899 was signed. The convention specifies the rules of declaring and conducting warfare as well as the use of modern weaponry and it also led to the setting up of the permanent court of arbitration. A second Hague conference was called in 1907 leading to additions and amendments to the original 1899 agreement. A third Hague conference was called for 1915, but this was abandoned due to World War I.

After World War I, the League of Nations was set up which attempted to limit and reduce arms. However the enforcement of this policy was not effective. Various naval conferences were held during the period between World Wars I and II to limit the number and size of major warships of the five great naval powers. The 1925 Geneva Conference led to the banning of chemical weapons (as toxic gases) during war as part of the Geneva protocol. The 1928 Kellogg-Briand pact, whilst ineffective, attempted for “providing for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy”. After World War II the United Nations was formed as a body to promote world Peace. In 1957 the International Atomic Energy Agency was set up to monitor the proliferation of nuclear technology including that of nuclear weapons. The 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty was signed to prevent further spread of nuclear weapon technology to countries outside the five that already possessed them. These are the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China.

3.3 The Cold War Stage and Beyond

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union in the late 1960s and early 1970s led to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and an interim strategic arms limitation agreement, both in 1972. The SALT II talks started in 1972 leading to agreement in 1979. Due to the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, the United States never ratified the treaty; however, the agreement was honoured by both sides. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was signed between the United States and Soviet Union in 1987 and ratified in 1988 which led to an agreement to destroy all missiles with ranges from 500 to 5,500 kilometres. The 1993 chemical weapons convention was signed banning the manufacture and use of chemical weapons. The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaties were signed as START I and START II, by the United States and the Soviet Union to further restrict weapons. This was further reinforced by the treaty on strategic offensive reductions. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was signed in 1996 banning all nuclear explosions in all environments, for military or civilian purposes (wikipedia.com).

3.4 Nuclear Arms Control in the 1990s

There were series of nuclear arms control in the 1990s, though most of the negotiations that brought the treaties began a decade earlier.. The end of the cold war was seen as the hallmark in the control of nuclear armament which indeed was the primary focus of that era. The war was between the US and USSR but later became multilateral at the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union.

3.4.1 Start I and II Treaties

In the words of Larsen and Rattray (1996), “The most significant arms control during the 1990s involved efforts to control nuclear arms.” Here we assess the START I and START II treaties and the NPT renewal and the CTBT. The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START I) was signed in 1991 after a decade of negotiation by President George Bush of the U.S. and Mikhail Gorbachev of the USSR. As Rourke (2001) notes, the treaty mandated significant cut backs in U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces, including a limit of 1,600 delivery vehicles and 6,000 strategic explosive nuclear devices each. The processes of reducing strategic range (over 5,500 kilometres) delivery system and warheads therefore began with START I. Rourke adds that “both the United States and Russia have used dynamite to destroy hundreds of ICBM silos, have cut up ICBMs, dismantled bombs and warheads, and have withdrawn nuclear weapons from numerous sites.” These successes have seen that silos at several US ICBM sites are now completely empty, and some of the bases sold.

There was a step further in 1993 when President Boris Yeltsin who replaced Gorbachev at the helm of affairs in the Soviet and his US counterpart George Bush signed the START II treaty, reducing the heap of nuclear weapons. The senate ratified the treaty in 1997 in the US, but anger over the expansion of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the air war against Yugoslavia and several other issues delayed Russian’s parliament from ratifying the treaty until May 2000. The Russian’s ratification was conditional, that in effect delays final agreement. They threatened that unless the United States abandons the possibility of building the national missile defence system that agreement will never be. They also threatened that if US goes ahead with the missile defence system, then they will withdraw from the START I treaty.

By 1997, Russia had not ratified START II treaty, but President Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin agreed on the broad principles for a third round of START. This was aimed at further cutting the quantity of nuclear devices mounted on strategic range delivery system by one third of the START II treaty limits (John Rourke 2001). The goal here is to bring down the number of such weapons to between 2000 and 2500. Negotiation on this however was not possible unless Russia ratifies in totality the STAR II treaty.




Fig. 1: Russian Nuclear Arsenals

Source: Rourke, 2001

The above table shows the Russian arsenal. It indicates impact of arms control efforts by comparing the data from the projection of what Russia’s nuclear forces might have become without any arms control treaties.

3.4.2 Other Efforts to Control Nuclear Arms

Again, nuclear non- proliferation treaty has gone through renewals. The proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of the high challenges facing the international community. The fact remains that nuclear weapon are proliferating. About 50 years ago, no record shows any country in possession of nuclear weapons, but as indicated earlier, there are eight countries that have declared their possession of nuclear weapons. These countries include USA, Russia, China, France, Britain, Pakistan, India and North Korea.

The hub of the effort to limit the spread of nuclear weapons is the NPT. In the words of Rourke (2001), the treaty was originally signed in 1969,

it was renewed and made permanent in 1995, and it has now been signed by more than 95% of the world's countries. The signatories to this treaty agree not to transfer nuclear weapons or in any way to "assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons". Non-nuclear signatories of the NPT also agreed not to build or accept nuclear weapons and to allow the IAEA to establish measures to ensure that nuclear facilities are used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

The efforts notwithstanding, proliferation continued with the India and Pakistan nuclear test in 1998. At this point, one may be forced to say that the NPT was a flop, but that will rather be hasty conclusion as there are many other technologically advanced countries that chose to remain non-nuclear. These countries adhere to the NPT, which indicates the expression of their integrity and how resolute they are toward proliferation. They therefore remain without nuclear weapons.

In the words of Rourke (2001), "Another outcome of the NPT renewal resulted from the allegation that the nuclear weapons powers were attempting to maintain a nuclear monopoly." such allegations and other arms negotiation finally led to a global conference in 2000 held at the UN. At this conference, the five long-standing nuclear weapons powers (China, France, Great Britain, Russia and the United States) agreed to "an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament."

In addition to nuclear arms controls in the 1990s and beyond, several efforts were made within this period to control arms. One of such important efforts involves the testing of nuclear warheads. "The UN conference on disarmament in Geneva attempted to agree on a complete test ban, in point as a response to the pledges made during the NPT negotiations. The negotiations were derailed, however, by the opposition of several countries, most notably India. New Delhi's main concerns were the treaty's lack of time table committing current nuclear weapons states to disarm and that it might be left vulnerable to nuclear threat or attack by China and Pakistan (Rourke 2001).

As a result of India's non compliance, the CTBT suffered a setback but could not stop the effort from going on. Australia led 116 other countries to the UN Geneva assembly to endorse the CTBT. These countries were determined to get the treaty signed with or without India's agreement .The treaty however will be ineffective without India's signature, the 116 countries believed that all countries that are signatories to the treaty will be obligated not to test their weapons. According to Rourke (2001) "the treaty has a clause stating that three years after it becomes effective,

countries that have signed it may consider sanctions against those that have not. Rourke adds that the general assembly endorsed the CTBT in 1996 by vote of 158 to 3 (India, Libya, and Nepal opposed, 24 other countries abstained or were absent). In Rourke's words "President Clinton called the CTBT "the longest sought, hardest fought prize in arms control history" and predicted that it would immediately create an international norm against nuclear testing even before the treaty formally enters into force. By mid 2000 however 155 countries had signed the CTBT and 51 countries had ratified it, since it had to be ratified for it to be effective.

3.4.3 Biological and Chemical Arms Control

Since 1945, much attention in arms control increases were given to nuclear weapon with less attention to other weapons of mass destruction that include the biological and chemical weapons. From 1990s however, there was a turn around, as attention was given to conventional weapons inventories and to the transfer of conventional weapons. In an attempt to limit the transfer of conventional weapon, 21 countries in 1995 agreed to the Wassenaar arrangement on export controls for conventional arms and dual – use goods and technologies. Several other efforts were made at the conference on illicit trade on small arms and light weapons in the UN declared war on all aspects of weapon in mid 2001.

Biological and chemical arms control started in 1925 in the Geneva protocol, but weapons in this class still threaten human security. The general concern here is that there are still countries with biological weapons development programme and some have the remains of the previous of such programmes. Also chemical weapons have challenged the international community as some countries have refused to sign the treaty, and the point that some chemicals also have weapon application is an issue of concern.

3.4.4 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that is widely known as ABM became effective from May 1972 after it was signed by the Soviet Union and the US, though it was not enforceable until October of the same year. This treaty was negotiated along the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). This formed the cornerstone of bilateral efforts during the cold war. The subject of ballistic missile defense receded in the early 1990s but returned with a force of renewal as a debate in the US in the later years.

According Kile S. N. (2001), "In May 1999 the US House of Representatives approved the National Missile Defense Act of 1999,

which committed the USA to deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective national missile defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorised, or deliberate).”

The National Missile Defense (NMD) Bill was later signed into law, this saw the emergent consensus in Washington in favour of developing and deploying a limited NMD system to protect the US territory from attack by smaller states. This therefore limited the number of long-range missiles in existence. Finally, Mahatma Gandhi once noted “you must be the change you wish to see in the world,” hence the nuclear powers must change the rationale behind developing sophisticated nuclear weapons in order to check nuclear weapons, and this will no doubt help in moving towards nuclear disarmament.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Analyse the history of arms control from the early stage.

4.0 CONCLUSION

All efforts of the arms control agenda have been to replace military confrontation with a new pattern of security relations that are sensitive to the increasingly violent world. Several attempts have been made with specified rules to control arms. However, the increasing development of fire arms stands as a poser to those efforts as it increases the devastation of war. As noted earlier, the brutality of war during the early period of human civilisation necessitated efforts to formalise the rules of war. These efforts continued for decades, but it was the periods of 1990-1992 that the world experienced a major breakthrough when START I treaty was signed between the then major superpowers, the US and USSR.

5.0 SUMMARY

In summary, this unit has attempted to capture the development of arms control agenda from its earliest stage. Attention was given to how the agenda came to be from Christian teachings and was developed to meet the challenges of the changing world. The unit affirms that there has been a tremendous achievement in the arms control agenda, though more need to be done.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Trace the likely origin to the 20th century of the arms control agenda.

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UNIT 3 BARRIERS TO ARMS CONTROL

CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Content
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Arms control activities is an idea that interests a teeming population of the world. This is highly favoured by most people. But it is surprising that only a little progress has been made or sometimes not at all. Several issues stand on the way to its success, yet none of these issues that will follow here have been pinned down to be the main factor impeding arms control efforts nor are the factors impossible to surmount. However it follows that these factors are responsible for the setbacks.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- summarise and evaluate the barriers to arms control
- explain security barriers to arms control
- differentiate between technical and domestic barriers to arms control.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Security Barriers

Man will be quick to suggest an alternative to arms, but then his security concern is a major barrier to arms control. As Rourke (2001) notes, “Those who hold to the realist school of thought have strong doubts about whether countries can maintain adequate security if they disarm totally under the current political scene and about the claimed contribution of arms control.” That suggests that the realists are doubtful of adequate security if arms are totally eliminated.

The future possibility of conflict is a barrier to arms control. This is because the realists believe that tension gives rise to the acquisition of arms and a possible war. Hence, so many fears that with the tensed world, there is a possibility to resort to conflict. Though with the end of the cold war interstate military threat is almost diminishing; but threats of terrorism, regional upheavals, aggressive confrontation of Asian countries and civil unrests in Latin America, and Africa etc. are existent. These pose a serious threat to the national security of several nations; hence they acquire arms for defense purposes. This is really challenging as it has earnestly impeded the effectiveness of arms control.

The need for arms control has been questioned by those who doubt its value. This is another barrier to arms control. These set of people are skeptical about the said benefits of arms control. They see no reason to believe that arms control agreement represents progress (Kydd 2000, Rourke 2001). The skeptics do not believe that acquiring arms sets off arms races. Their argument is that the world is a dangerous place and everyone must arm him/herself and fight the forces. The realists believe that the tension results from the tenet of real politick and that political settlement should be achieved before arms reductions and negotiations (Rourke 2001).

Possibility

If the 20th and 21st centuries should be assessed, we will discover that global population is threatened in many ways across a wide spectrum of issues. We have threats from terrorism, hunger, regional troubles etc. The point is that with all these put together, arms control seems elusive. It is a trite fact that security the world over changed significantly after the cold war, this change Anders Bjurner (2001) noted “is that there is no longer the threat of a global war”, but there are risks of the possible use of nuclear weapons. Several nuclear weapons remain on hair-trigger alert. The refusal of some states’ parliaments like the Russian Duma to ratify the START processes complicated issues as other states like Iran, India and Pakistan openly engaged in dangerous pursuit of nuclear weapons. No doubt, deploying such systems will have negative impact on disarmament and non-proliferation. Nuclear weapons are giving new roles on daily basis and thereby threatening global security and standing against arms control. To this fact Bjurner (2001) argues:

A most disquieting tendency has appeared in recent years whereby nuclear weapons are assigned new roles. In the wake of declining conventional capabilities, Russia has given more prominence to these

weapons in its defense planning. In other quarters the notion has surfaced of possible retaliation with nuclear weapons attack involving other weapons of mass destruction.

There are some states that openly pursue nuclear weapons and missile development. It is a set back to international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. This position Bjurner (2001) argues contrasts starkly with such positive previous developments as the conclusion of the CTBT and the adherence of Argentina, Brazil and South Africa to the NPT. Furthermore, in the fragmenting and multiplier world of today other states marked by unstable and/or obscure one man rule structures, may be tempted to follow suit.

The issues in North Korea are points at hand. Some new actors have as well joined. The issues of corruption or inadvertent dispersal of nuclear materials, technology and scientists constitutes a significant threat that nuclear weapons will end up in the hands of states not complying with their international non-proliferation obligations.

One of the biggest security barriers to arms control is that some militia groups, terrorists, drug barons and other criminal groups now have possession of workable devices. Those groups are not only well supplied with small arms and light weapons but now have access to well sophisticate equipment. Such groups as Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, Somali Pirates etc., with access to new technologies and more open borders have added to the dangers.

States view as essential objective her protection against external aggression and for this reason they acquire arms and heavy equipments that are eventually used against her own citizens. States in this category include Yemen, Libya, and Syria. The states that claim external aggression however have more impending challenges to security such as ethnic conflicts, extreme deprivation, hunger, access to and use of natural resources, depletion of resources, large scale flows of migrants or refugees and gross violation of human rights and democratic principles. These issues affect human security and that indeed is the challenge faced by most nations today and not external aggression.

It is hard to believe that over seven million people mainly civilians have died in armed conflict since the end of the Cold War. But can the international community ensure the security of the world without arms? If not, of what value then is arms control? It is clear that a more sophisticated security analysis is required to make headway. Though while such analysis is been done in some countries, others rely primarily

on military hardware for their security. The signal that such possession and reliance send to other actors is negative. To this fact, Anders Björner (2001) posits:

The impressions that states with nuclear weapons intend to continue to rely on possessing them has contributed to the assessment by others- states or non-states actors- that they are useful and to their ambition to acquire them.

A look at the daily human realities, the possession of heavy equipment in the name of security is a barrier to arms control. On the whole, security is a barrier to arms control and in the final analysis, one may be tempted to ask; what are the contributions of arms control? Aggravating or reducing the intensity of conflicts?

3.2 Technical Barriers

Comparing weapon systems is a problem in arms control. Rourke (2001) notes that, “Numbers alone mean little in arms negotiation because similar weapons have varying quality, capability, capacity and vulnerability characteristics.” Note that these are great challenges to arms control.

Another technical barrier is the difficulty encountered in verification. Though absolute verification is impossible but countries keep suspecting one another that they will cheat. Possible cheating can be divided into two, breakout cheating and creep out cheating. A violation significant enough by itself to endanger your security would constitute a breakout. This possibility worries skeptics of arms control; some are also hesitant about arms control because of what they believe would be the reluctance of democracies to respond to creep out cheating. In this scenario, no single violation would be serious enough by itself to create a crisis or warrant termination of the treaty (Rourke, 2001).

Verification

Arms control itself is a security measure. The arms control treaties have their limits and “a failure to appreciate the limits of treaties- in their political, economic, scientific and technical dimensions can result in less security rather than more” (Terence Taylor, 2001). There is need for the scrutiny of any treaty to know its limits. Enforcing the implementation or negotiation of a treaty without taking accounts of its limits is almost an ideological drive. On this issue, Taylor (2001) notes that:

The possibilities for effective verification of compliance with a treaty depend on the scientific and technical nature of the subject of the treaty. It is easier to verify the presence or absence of a missile with clearly defined characteristics than to monitor a wide range of activities in the chemical or biotechnology industry.

Though there have been great advances in the verification procedures and technologies, but “nuclear war heads have been miniaturised to the point where ten or more can fit on one missile and could literally be hidden in the back of a pickup truck or even in a good-sized closet” (Rourke, 2001).

Seeing treaties as global instruments for arms elimination without considering the limits of such treaties is an error in international security policy. In every treaty there is the possibility of cheating by one of the sides and the inability to have all actors as signatories to the treaty are limits to such treaty. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in its implementation has both political and historical difficulty to overcome, in “that the treaty recognises five nuclear weapon states, while all other parties under-take not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons” (Taylor, 2001). This is seen as an act of injustice by the non-nuclear states and therefore they seek redress through the NPT provisions.

Verification is a daunting task. Treaties cannot be completely verifiable because some rogue states are expected to be within. These states would not participate. That calls for the use of intelligence from national sources as verification measures. This is a sensitive issue as far as the security of a state is concerned; it is relevant to multilateral compliance monitoring activities. These issues should be dealt with. Terence Taylor (2001) has noted that:

It is hard to see, in the difficult cases where states are determined to avoid their obligations, particularly in areas such as biotechnology that are relatively easy to hide.

Taylor concluded that intelligence is necessary in multilateral inspection activities. However, arms control treaties are part of international law and parties understand the implication of violating the treaties. Those who violate the treaties however hardly admit such “except in cases

when violation occurs as a result of misperception and misjudgment” (Istvan Gyarmati, 2001). Violation of treaties leads to withdrawals as most treaties contain a provision for withdrawal if the treaty is grievously violated. On the other hand, withdrawal may be worse. This is because “discontinuing a treaty means that even its partial implementation becomes impossible, let alone the prospects for its full implementation” (Gyarmati, 2001). Some of the treaties contain ambiguities in their provisions. It raises questions like: is it the information provided that should be verified or the assumed number of equipments? Assessing this question through the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE treaty) Gyarmati (2001) noted that if it is the equipment, it would mean that even the information provided should be verified. If it is the information provided, then how can doubts about the reliability of the information provided be ruled out and/or clarified? The dilemma of verification is in the interpretation and what really is the correct information.

We had established that arms control treaty is a part of international law and international law is difficult. By implication, the enforcement of arms control treaty is a difficult terrain. These technical issues are barriers to arms control. For this reason, Gyarmati (2001) concludes that arms control treaties are all about consultations and if the consultation could not produce results then it is withdrawal. He points out that withdrawal is a difficult concept. If a party to the treaty feels threatened by partial implementation of a given treaty it will certainly feel even worse without the treaty.

3.3 Domestic Barriers

Arms control suffers another barrier at home front. Complex decision making process makes it difficult for countries in the issues of arms. This is common with democracies, as leaders; even if they favour arms control have some other powerful political actors to wrestle with at home. Most of the challenges leaders face in attempt to reduce arms comes from ideological differences. Some of the actors may have hidden reasons they want the arms flowing.

Some other domestic factors that constitute barrier to arms control include national pride, and the relationship between military spending, the economy and politics. Some countries get into arms race for self esteem. Again countries like Libya once there is economic boom, may want to acquire arms for certain political reasons (Rourke, 2001). Hence the home front constitutes a barrier to arms control.

Winner takes all perception

According to Keith Krause (2001) “The perceptions in the various actors in a conflict are often shaped by longstanding and directly violent confrontations in which the identity and contours of the political community are precisely at stake.” Krause added that arms control at its most basic, requires that conflicting parties accept the right of the other party to exist and to share in the division of political, economic and social ‘goods’. This is an issue in several contemporary conflicts, since one party has a (legitimate) fear that its survival or access to power or resources is at stake and dependent on the arm he/she is carrying, hence arms control or disarmament become difficult. Third party intervention has never allayed the fears of parties at such instance as it seldom guarantee protection.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss the central challenges of arms control.

4.0 CONCLUSION

President Dwight Eisenhower once told Americans that “every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies in the final sense, a threat to those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed”. High military spending no doubt constitutes a major barrier to arms control. It ruins the economy. Military expenditures are capital intensive, it requires large sums of money but employ only a few. Acquiring arms sets off arms races and technical issues worsen the issues as it results to suspicion among states.

5.0 SUMMARY

In summary, conflicts especially those that took place after the cold war have demonstrated that states and non-state armed groups can accumulate offensive weapons that are in the final sense against the tenets of the treaties they are party to. These military capabilities can be acquired covertly and their use can lead to loss of control in an area which a state exercises legal sovereignty. This unit has x-rayed some barriers to arms control and pins down certain covert activities both in the domestic and international front. Thus, there is every need for concerned actors to reconsider the strategies employed to service the arms control agenda.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. Discuss in details the relationship between national pride and military spending. How does it constitute a barrier to arms control?
- ii. Why and how in your opinion does the domestic front, technical issues and security matters constitute barriers to arms control?

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UNIT 4 DISARMAMENT SINCE WORLD WAR II

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The world today faces greater challenges, especially in the relentless march to war. We are experiencing a turning point as the injustices against sustaining the culture of war are heavily criticised. But merely criticising the injustice does not accomplish much. Action becomes necessary, hence the need for human-centered world and not a world that is war-centered. We therefore need to disarm our world. The culture of war was thought to be sustainable after World War II. But war is not in the genes of man, it is only in the culture that is borne out of our interaction with others. So, there arose the need to douse the highly tensed world after World War II, disarmament became the option.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- discuss the state of disarmament after World War II
- explain the nature of disarmament
- analyse the effect of the Cold War on disarmament process
- highlight the impact of globalisation on disarmament.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 World War II and its Aftermaths

After World War II, the United Nations came to be as a body to promote world peace. This achievement became a reality in 1945 considering the world's tensed militarisation when Adolf Hitler rose to power in 1930s

in Germany. He began to rearm his country that was yet to recover from the loss of World War I. Hitler had invaded Poland in 1939 and then invincible Britain responded with the declaration of war. When the war ended in 1945, it was said to have claimed the lives of 15 million combatants and 35 million civilians (Roche, 2003). That conflict is considered the most destructive in history, with nothing less than 56 countries involved. The number of Soviet casualties amounted to 20 million. In the same conflict more than six million Jews and five million others were murdered in German concentration camps. The list of that war's destruction may be unending as the world is still suffering from its shock. It must be noted that the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki ushered the world into frightening nuclear weapons era. Following the above atomic bombings, the concept of disarmament became imperative.

3.2 Disarmament and its Nature

Disarmament can be referred to as a form of demilitarisation and part of an economic, political, technical and military process to reduce and eliminate weapons or limit their use. This suggests that disarmament serve as a mechanism for conflict prevention. The nature of disarmament after World War II was threatened by a pattern of superpower posturing. It was after fewer weeks of the UN formation that the atomic bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki dealt a blow to the new organisation and set her on her heels. The UN resolution of 1946 passed at the first General Assembly "recognised by unanimous decision the close connection between problems of security and disarmament" (Hussain, 1980).

There was no recorded serious headway at this period to eliminate arms. The United Nations had asked its newly established Atomic Energy Commission to make urgent specific proposals targeted at eliminating from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction. This vision at that period could not be achieved considering the aggressive posturing of the superpowers. Both sides ensured their proposal for disarmament would contain conditions which the opposite side was unlikely to accept. With such attitudes, disarmament after World War II was more of a mirage than a success. 15 years after the war, popularly known as the years of the cold war, the world witnessed a more tensed world filled of armaments than its elimination - disarmament.

3.3 Disarmament and Cold War

The year of the cold war was a bigger threat to disarmament process. The efforts were frustrated that it had no major breakthrough. Each

proposal had conditions that will frustrate the plans. The cold war disarmament was defined with aggressive postures.

Disarmament during the Cold War

The act of disarmament is a complex and difficult task especially during the cold war era. Threats to security became imminent year after year at the end of World War II, thus security and disarmament became so vital an issue. The most terrifying threat is the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs which dealt a blow to the United Nations within weeks of signing its charter. The UN first General Assembly recognised by enormous decision the close connection between problems of security and disarmament, this being in 1946 was its first resolution. The assembly asked the newly established UN Atomic Energy Commission urgently to make specific proposals for the elimination from the national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction. After that and throughout the cold war era several UN special sessions on disarmament was held without any major breakthrough. This was so because of the antics of the cold war specialists.

Hardened positions

According to Husain (1980) the pattern of superpowers posturing was set from the very beginning. Both sides would present comprehensive proposals of disarmament but would be careful to see to it that these would contain conditions which the opposite side was unlikely to accept. Husain adds that at the first meeting of the UN Atomic Energy Commission, the US presented the Baruch Plan for the prohibition of the manufacture of atomic bombs and for placing all phases of the development and use of atomic energy under and international authority, but this seemingly magnanimous plan contained provisions which the Soviet Union could not accept. 17 days after Baruch had presented his plan to the commission, the US demonstrated its unwillingness to sacrifice its advantage by conducting its first post war atomic test. This action was before the commissions technical committee could meet. In response, the Soviet Union in 1949 exploded its first atomic bomb. The United Nations Atomic Energy Commission was dissolved after three years of inactivity in 1952. As Husain posits; with the explosion of a hydrogen bomb by the US in 1952 and by the Soviet Union in 1953, the idea of international custody of nuclear weapons disappeared from superpowers' proposals.

The years of the Cold War were dominated by debates of whether conventional or nuclear disarmament should come first; this activity

remained until an approximate nuclear balance was established between East and West.

In 1962, the US and the USSR submitted to the Geneva disarmament committee draft treaties for General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) which included establishment of UN peace-keeping machinery. The general and complete disarmament in its holistic approach was given within a year after a debate over the first few causes (Husain 1980). The attitudes of the superpowers during the years of the Cold War were really discouraging. They were always declining and never totally complying with disarmament processes. The major advances in nuclear weapons technology and their system of delivery introduced changes in strategies of nuclear warfare and in the inter relationship of the super powers. From the above, it is clear that the cold war years was a big threat to disarmament as it countered all efforts to implement it.

Despite the disarmament strategies put in place, the period of the cold war became more tensed than ever before. The position of the concerned parties and their interests made it so. It was a period of attack and counter attack; hence there was no room for disarmament to function effectively.

3.4 Disarmament and Post Cold War

The post Cold War period moved from that of seeking advantage to seeking cooperation. Disarmament is all about cooperation. Attitudes at this period therefore changed to accommodate disarmament policies, though it was short-lived. It made inroads into reducing the military capabilities that were in place.

3.4.1 The new thinking

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union ended the cold war between capitalism and socialism with the triumph of the former over the later. It had been noted earlier that disarmament is a complex and sometimes contradictory peace building process. Susan Willet (1998) argues that "There are many forms of disarmament, such as a reduction in military spending, reduction or destruction of the stocks of certain weapon systems, a ban or limitation on the production of some types of military equipment, reduction in the numbers of military personnel, limitations on arms transfer, control of defense research and development, and the monitoring and verification of weapon disposal and troop reductions." The concept of disarmament has relaxed significantly the tension that existed between superpower actors of the Cold War (USA and USSR). This development became possible not because of a change in the balance of forces but because the leaders of the USA and USSR recognised that the unintentional use of the

nuclear weapons represented a greater threat to security than the war plans of their longtime enemies (Baglione, 1997). It was at different occasions that the leaders of the superpowers arrived at the above understandings.

It was Gorbachev who first developed a new thinking though the absence of sufficient autonomy in the Russian system denied him opportunity of carrying out the required transformative security policies. The new thinking would guarantee the needed conversion of military technologies to civil use and reduction and limitation of the production of some type of weapons. However, Russian arsenal was cut drastically with the democratic opening of 1989 which opened more autonomy for Gorbachev.

3.4.2 Threat to the New Thinking

The attitude of Gorbachev (Russia) in the above compelled the USA to change its position from that of seeking advantages to seeking cooperation. Disarmament is all about cooperation. To this, the US believed that the only way to remove the structures of Cold War aggressive posturing is through joint action. With the domestic position of Gorbachev not secured, Bush, the then US president affirmed that a transactional approach to negotiations was still warranted. The attitudes of the parties changed however with time to accommodate more disarmament policies.

General and complete disarmament is however yet to be achieved in the post-Cold War era. The nuclear strategy remains a threat to global security. Bush administration in 2001 conducted a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) “which showed that its nuclear weapons stockpile remains a cornerstone of US national security policy” (Roche2003). The NPR gave four reasons for the possession of nuclear weapons. These are to:

1. Assure allies and friends
2. Dissuade competitors
3. Deter aggressors
4. Defeat enemies.

It is important to state here that disarmament differs from arms control. While arms control seeks to limit arms, disarmaments seeks to eliminate arms thereby bringing an end to incessant global conflicts. The US attitude to disarmament through NPR should be seen as aggressive. This is because the NPR lists specific scenarios for using nuclear weapons. A conflict with China over Taiwan, a North Korean attack on South Korea, and an attack by Iraq on Israel or another neighbour show this

aggression (Roche 2003). The implication of this policy is that the US will threaten the use of nuclear weapon against states that do not possess it. This policy no doubt goes contrary to the nuclear proliferation treaty which the US ratified. This fact, Roche (2003) asserts that “under the guise of participating in nuclear disarmament through the dismantling of excess nuclear weapons, the US is actually widening the role of nuclear weapons far beyond the deterrence measures against the former Soviet Union during the Cold War.

The point made in the above is that the sudden resurgence to weapon possession and use diminished to a certain degree the practice of disarmament. This was because President Vladimir Putin of Russia was quick to respond to the then Bush’s new nuclear strategy with a plan to develop low-yield nuclear weapons. Putin, in 2003, in an annual address to Duma, noted: “I can inform you that at present the work to create new types of Russian weapon, weapons of the new generations, including those regarded by specialists as strategic weapons, is in practical implementation stage”(Roche 2003). Putin’s statement precipitated the US congress to vote to end the ban on research and development of low-yield nuclear weapons, with these, the post Cold War era is increasingly forcing nuclear weapons out of laboratories unto active preparations.

The activities of the United States cannot be said to be in the spirit of good faith. This is because it does not comply with the unequivocal understanding which was promised in 2000. The US withdraws its support from some of the treaties entered into. To this end the “US went on to vote against a resolution at the UN disarmament committee which was intended to uphold the 13 practical steps” (Roche 2003). The 13 steps are several treaties to guarantee general and complete disarmament. With these discoveries it is clear that the post-Cold War disarmament has no doubt met with aggressive posturing in order to foster the capitalist tendencies of the superpower.

A careful examination of the disarmament in the post-Cold War period reveals that the later efforts towards disarmament were not genuine. In the final sense, the idea was to enthrone capitalism over socialism. The distinction made between arms control and disarmament reveals that the need was not to limit arms but to eradicate them. Hence disarmament at that period made no serious inroad.

3.5 Disarmament and Globalisation

Disarmament as a global phenomenon seeks to institute the culture of peace using every means available that guarantees justice. Globalisation as a concept desires to influence others to behave and act in a particular

way. The concept of globalisation has been used to expand capitalism through air travel and communication. Therefore minds are being programmed for both violence and peace. With economic success measured by the number of university degrees, especially in America and the West, education policy is considered a factor that should be at the forefront of globalisation. This unit explores the relationship between disarmament and globalisation.

3.5.1 Effects of Globalisation

It has been a difficult task among theorists to establish the starting point of the phenomenon of globalisation. However, the end of world war II brought a great expansion of capitalism “with the development of multinational companies interested in producing and selling in the domestic markets of nations around the world” (Ukpokolo 2004). With this, air travel and communication enhanced international business. No doubt, this had a negative effect on global security, as the Internet provided the opportunity to buy weapons and hire terrorists round the world. Thus, the culture of war was facilitated.

The much ado about globalisation suggests that most of the world’s population will be well off but we know that it is capitalist in nature. If the world seeks development then disarmament shows a critical relationship with it. It is neither shortage of capital nor shortage of resources that has kept the world from equitable development but that of much anchor on militarism. To this fact, disarmament is paramount. It benefits humanity if a portion of military spending by government of nations is diverted into economic and several developments. It is appalling to note however that some governments backed away from implementing the conclusions of the disarmament and development conference (Roche, 2003). Persistence of war culture hampers the practice of disarmament. It forces countries to be preoccupied with their own security and in the name of national security weight is thrown on the acquisition of arms.

3.5.2 Role of Globalisation on Disarmament

Just as globalisation has made possible for the violent world to acquire the arms they want, it has equally facilitated disarmament. Peace education serves as a strong tool of globalisation to achieve general and complete disarmament. The relationship between peace, comprehensive security and sustainable development in an increasingly independent world can only be understood through an attitude of openness. This helps us decipher and reason out ways to go beyond weapon reduction and achieve disarmament. “A UN study on disarmament and non-proliferation education published in 2002 by a group of experts after two

year review, laid out” (Roche 2003) among other things the objective to “convey relevant information and foster responsive attitude to current and future security challenges through the development and widespread availability of improved methodologies and research techniques. Education is at the forefront of globalization; hence policies in this area will enhance the principle of disarmament.

To this, Roche (2003) affirms that “consequently the present generation has been left ill- prepared to adapt peaceably to a globalised world demanding precisely the opposite qualities.” Roche, to drive home this point cited Pope John Paul II who in 2003 emphasised the need to educate future generation on “true peace”.

In addition, Roche (2003) pictures the place of globalisation in having a peaceful world through elimination of weapon. This way:

The reality of globalisation demand that the current generation, and those who came after, acquire more knowledge and understanding of the world than their elders ever possessed ... certainly many actions can be taken to make a more humane society in the aftermath of war: disarming combatants, collecting and destroying weapons, repatriating refugees, training security personnel monitoring elections, and reaffirming and strengthening government institutions. But to cement peace in place, a much deeper and sustained effort is needed to educate present and future generation...

With regards to the above the UN commits heavy to disarmament research and training using communications gadgets in the manner that was unimaginable few years ago. It is a trite fact that several obscene messages and junks go through e-mails it remains valid that it has facilitated disarmament. The Internet can be extensively utilised to counter the media war that exists between the America, the West and the Middle East. If globalisation is well utilised it serves as antidote to the culture of war. Thus globalisation, despite providing the opportunity for the free flow of trade and therefore enhance the acquisition of arms, it can be effectively utilised to eliminate the same arms through peace educations.

4.0 CONCLUSION

From our study of this unit, we can picture the events leading to World War II and the body that emerged afterwards – the United Nations.

Assessing the damage of that war, it is clear that the world is still suffering from its shock. The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki no doubt led the world into frightening nuclear weapons. The world responded to those challenges with disarmament but this effort suffered some setbacks at that period.

5.0 SUMMARY

In summary, this unit has considered the events leading to World War II and what followed thereafter. This unit situates the failure of the disarmament programme after the war in the actions of the superpowers. The unit therefore concludes that disarmament in that period was a mirage.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Discuss disarmament and its nature after World War II.

7.0 REFERENCES / FURTHER READING

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UNIT 5 GAME THEORY AND BARGAINING

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- 1.0 Introduction
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Game theory and bargaining introduces you to analytical tools. These instruments are used for examining strategic interactions among two or more participants. These tools are practically unavoidable in international relations and other related disciplines. The tools if properly explored, explains the risks involved in any cooperative behaviour among participants in a negotiation process.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- critically examine game theory and bargaining
- explain the roles of game theory and bargaining in international relations
- enumerate types of diplomacy.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Game Theory

This is a mathematical tool that is used to examine the strategic behaviour between economic, political, or social actors. Game-theory models are used to provide further insights into outcomes (e.g. conflict and cooperation) that are jointly produced by choices made by distinct actors (e.g. state, groups or individuals). Smith (2003) insists that game theory is a tool that can help explain and address social problems. Game

theory provides analytical tools for examining strategic interactions among two or more participants. By using simple, often numerical models to study complex social relations, game theory can illustrate the potential for, and risks associated with cooperative behaviour among distrustful participants. Though less familiar than typical board or video games; the lessons from these more abstract or hypothetical games are applicable to a wide array of social situations.

Just as people generally try to win games, people also try to “win” or achieve their interests or goals in competitive situations. However, both in games and in the real world, we generally follow a set of rules to do this. Some games, like some real situations are “winner take-all”. As Dougherty and Pfalzgraff (1981) posits “Some people are either shocked or offended or both at the suggestion that such serious phenomena as politics and human conflict should be treated as games.” Dougherty and Pfalzgraff adds that a distinguished Dutch philosopher-historian Johan Huizinga (1872-1945) argues that human culture cannot be fully comprehended unless we realise that man is a “player”; and that human beings play games from childhood through old age in all dimensions of life from making love to making war. It is assumed today that all human behaviours often acquire a game-like quality. This is true for labour management bargaining, price competition among large industrial firms, the strategy of guerrilla insurgency or the conduct of international arms control negotiations (Dougherty 1981).

It is a specialised decision-making theory. Martin Schubik (1964) defines game theory as a method of studying decision-making in conflict situation. This definition to some social scientists is a good point of departure considering the fact that it believes in the contention that game theory must be expressed in mathematical terms to be comprehensible. Thomas C. Schelling (1963) says game theory is concerned with situations whether in games or in strategy. This kind is in contrast to the game of skill or games of chance in which the best course of action for each participant to do is exalted. Game theory is based upon an abstract form of reasoning, arising from a combination and logic.

It must be clear to us that conflict in the parlance of social sciences presupposes a kind of contest among human parties who are consciously seeking objectives which are, at least for the time being, incompatible. When dealing with international strategic situations, game theory helps to clarify our thoughts about available choices, suggest novel possibilities which might not otherwise have occurred to us, and induces us to penetrate beyond a mere verbal description of a problem to a deeper, more generalised level of comprehension at which more powerful analytic methodologies might usefully be brought into play.

Some may still wonder how game theory is useful to international issues and especially to conflict. Dougherty and Pfalzgraff (1981) have noted that international relations or the operation of international systems cannot be fully comprehended merely within the analytical framework of a “game”. But the patterns and processes of international relations undeniably manifest certain game-like characteristics. The application of analytical techniques derived from game theory, therefore, can aid in improving our understanding of the subject, provided that this approach is employed with the balanced intellectual perspective of those who regard it as one among several useful tools.

It is generally believed among game theorists that international relations can best be conceptualised as an N-person (non zero sum) game, in which a gain by one party is not necessarily at the expense of the other party. Much of the zero-sum (one wins the other loses) quality that mark certain bilateral interstate relations is a function of ideological attitudes combined with the dialectics of communication systems and mass politics. Sometimes, leaders may feel compelled to pay lip service to the ideological objective of “the annihilation of the enemy” even if they have no serious intention of embarking upon an Armageddon during their tenure of rule. It will always be important to distinguish the way in which a bilateral conflict is viewed by government policymakers, by various politically conscious social groups, and by individuals (Dougherty and Pfalzgraff 1981).

So many theorists saw the Cold War as a non zero-sum game while others interpret it from a zero – sum perspective. It must be admitted that the more ideologically oriented on each side of the parties, are inclined to view the contest as a zero-sum game on which neither side can fully enjoy security. The two blocks of the Cold War knew quite well that considering their economies they have more to lose than to gain, so the games could be played at the expense of other state’s economy. Thus they may take aggressive posturing but never given to war.

In sum, deterrence theory has guided the US and the USSR defense strategy since the end of the World War II. It assumes that a credible and significant threat of retaliation can curb an aggressor’s behaviour; if an individual believes that aggressive behaviour may trigger an unacceptable and violent response from the others, he or she is less likely to behave aggressively. The threat of reprisal attack does not directly reduce the probability of violence, instead, the perceived benefit of aggressive behaviour decreases, in the face of probable retaliation. If two individuals recognise that their best interests lies in avoiding each other’s retaliation, neither is likely to initiate hostilities. This was the

guiding principle behind US-Soviet relation during much of the Cold War.

3.2 Bargaining Theory

Bargaining is a process of give and take during negotiations. Negotiations usually begin with an initial offer (entry point) from each side and end (if they are not aborted half way), with final offers (exit points). Agreements may be reached by compromising on each single issue or by trading concessions and exchanging points.

The values attached to the goods exchanged are not the same for all parties. Parties generally give away what they value less in order to obtain what they value more; this is known as “Homans Theorem”. Successful bargaining produces an agreement or settlement. A bargaining process is aborted if one or both sides have a better alternative than a negotiated agreement (Schmid 2000).

Schelling (1951) considers bargaining theory a strategic theory, which according to him, “takes conflict for granted, but also assumes common interest between the adversaries. It assumes a “rational” value maximising mode of behaviour, and it focuses on the fact that each participant’s “best” choice of action depends on what he expects the other to do; and that strategic behaviour is concerned with influencing another’s choice by working on his expectation of how one’s behaviour is related to his. Schelling’s writing, as Dougherty and Pfalzgraff (1981) claims, is “interested with such problems as the conduct of negotiations, the maintenance of credible deterrence, making of threats and promises, double-crossing, the waging of limited conflict, and formulation of formal or tacit arms control policies”. This indicates that despite the strategic opposition of parties, there is a mutual minimum interest. Thus, they have their concessions to trade and points to exchange. Dougherty and Pfalzgraff (1981) posit that bargaining parties are not motivated solely by a desire to agree. Divergent interests skew the quest for convergence. But if agreement is finally reached, it means that forces for agreement proved stronger than forces for severance of negotiations”.

The most important thing in bargaining is to make your points clear to the other party so that on no account will he/she believe you are bluffing. The points you make clear must be an outcome of your analysis; the issue, context, powers of the situation and the interest and position of the opposition to the conflict.

3.3 Types of Bargaining

Types of bargaining reveal to us the types of bargaining and how the art can be carried out through the use of diplomacy. It informs you on the role of diplomacy in international diplomacy. As the unit takes into consideration the types of diplomacy, it draws attention to the effective application of game theory and bargaining.

There are three types of bargaining, they are:

1. Bilateral bargaining
2. Trilateral bargaining
3. Multilateral bargaining

Bilateral bargaining involves two parties in negotiation. In bilateral bargaining the parties may aim at getting the best of each other or may decide to be cooperative in their negotiations.

Trilateral bargaining involves negotiation between three parties. It is complex because bringing the three together may be difficult. For instance in international waters, if party A needs a dam and Niger River passes through three states, party A will have to negotiate with party B and C. This becomes a problem because within this, national interest comes into play. The strategic interest of the three parties must be taking into consideration. Who are the allies of each party and what are their interests? The issue of collective security of a sub-regional interest is another factor. Take for instance, the investment of the Nigerian government on the Liberian crisis was a serious tool of bargaining to avert neighbourhood effect.

You will remember that at the time Samuel Doe was overthrown and assassinated, military government was in place in Nigeria and other West African countries. Thus, the Babangida administration did all possible to stop neighbourhood effect.

Multilateral bargaining involves many parties, this is more complex because sometimes a party to the negotiation may belong to an international organisation, and the organisation's interest may overshadow the party's interest and this make negotiation difficult.

Muammar Gaddafi's movement across West Africa on the campaign of changing O.A.U to A.U and the idea of making Africa a united states was a multilateral negotiation. Though multilateral bargaining is complex, a powerful leader can lead others to the negotiation table.

Each of the bargaining above can be distributive, integrative or interest-based.

- a. Distributive bargaining: is competitive, power-based, zero sum approach to negotiations which seeks to achieve a better outcome than the opponent's.
 - b. Integrative bargaining: this is a cooperative, non-zero sum approach to negotiations, whereby mutual gain and the promotion of common interests are sought by all sides.
 - c. Interest – based (positional) bargaining: this is an approach to negotiations whereby conflict parties focus on the basis of their underlying interests rather than on the basis of firm positions which are hard to leave without loss of face.
- Bargaining, therefore, is extremely important to conflict management strategies, from arms control to demilitarisation. We need bargaining for global security. Effective bargaining cannot be without good and quality analysis.

3.3.1 The Roles of Diplomacy in Bargaining

With a highly tensed world, when bargaining fails militarisation becomes the option. Bargaining is almost impossible without diplomacy. Diplomacy is a human activity. In the words of Starkey et al. (1999) diplomacy is “the desire to resolve problem amicably that pervades all arenas of social organisation. It is the function of negotiation to provide a channel for peaceful dispute resolution”. The Nature of diplomacy lowers down the flame of crisis. Most of the major crisis around the globe experiences diplomatic interplay between the conflicting parties. There is a believe at the level of international relation that when diplomacy fails to bring the conflicting parties to track, the position is between acquiescence and war.

Diplomacy functions differently on different occasions and at different settings. It could apply the use of force as it helps to facilitate negotiation. But force cannot easily be applied in international relations unless it is placed in the pedestal of diplomacy. As Rourke points out, the nature of diplomacy and how it is carried out are also affected by its setting. He added that the setting can be rightly divided into three parts; the international system, the diplomatic environment and the domestic connection.

As Rourke (2001) posits, the nature of the anarchical international system creates a setting in which self-interested actors pursue their diplomatic goals by, if necessary, using power to ensure that their goals prevail over the goal of others.

3.3.2 Types of Diplomacy

What determines the diplomatic environments as the second part of diplomatic setting is the relationship between the actors who are involved in the matter on ground. The part is subdivided into diplomatic environment, hostile, adversarial, coalition and mediation diplomacy.

Hostile diplomacy: This kind of diplomacy involves the engagement of one or more countries in armed clashes or in the words of Rourke (2001) “When there is a substantial possibility that fighting could result, diplomacy is conducted in a hostile environment.”

Adversarial diplomacy: This is a picture of a situation where two or more countries interests are at the less confrontational level. This is usually when there is little or no chance of armed conflict. Rourke (2001) notes that “a great deal of diplomacy involving economic issues occurs in adversarial circumstances as countries press other countries to accede to their wishes.’ This is true of Joe Garba’s diplomatic moves in the 1970s to persuade Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire to support or become an ally to Nigeria on the Angolan crisis. In Garba’s words,

I immediately went on the offensive and accused him as strongly as a foreign minister could dare to, of being responsible for the tension between our two countries ...
He would henceforth instruct his foreign minister that at no time would he personally or anyone in the foreign policy making machinery articulate any Zairean position without first ascertaining Nigeria’s position
(Garba, 1987).

The relation between the parties may seem tense, overt and with threats of sanctions yet it is more explained in terms of cold war.

Coalition diplomacy: This kind of diplomacy becomes significant when a number of countries have similar interests, often in opposition to the interest of one or more countries. National leaders spend a good deal of time and effort to build coalitions that will support the foreign policy initiative of their country or of other international actors that they support (Rourke, 2001). This is done to achieve multilateral support and in return the aim is to give legitimacy to certain actions exhibited by some countries. For instance the unilateral war waged by the US against Iraq in 1991 sought and made use of multilateral organisation support. The goal however was United States’.

Mediation diplomacy: this is third party diplomacy. It is unlike hostile, adversarial or coalition diplomacy. Mediation diplomacy occurs when a country that is not involved directly as one of the parties tries to help two or more sides in conflict resolve their differences. Rourke (2001) notes that in July 2000, President Clinton decided on a bold and risky strategy to advance peace in the Middle East by inviting Israel's Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian National Authority (PNA) head Yasser Arafat to meet with him at the presidential retreat at Camp David in Maryland. Rourke adds that "the meeting inevitably evolved images of a similar event in 1979, during which President Jimmy Carter successfully served as mediator, and Prime Minister Menachem Begin and President Anwar Sadat of Egypt negotiated a historic peace treaty between their two countries."

Domestic connection

Political action at the home front influences the outcome of diplomatic issues. These actions include interest groups, public opinion and legislators. Domestic politics therefore provide for the third part of diplomatic setting. Here, the concept of two levels game theory holds that for a country's diplomat to be successful, the diplomat must find a solution that is acceptable to both international actors and domestic actors. From this perspective, the diplomatic setting exist at the domestic as well as at the international level , and is influenced by interplay of the two levels when leaders try to pursue policies that satisfy the actors at both levels (Trumbore, 1998, Peterson, 1996, Rourke, 2001).

The conduct of diplomacy is a complex game of maneuver in which the goal is to get players to do what you want them to do. The number of the players in bilateral diplomacy is two while there are many in multilateral diplomacy (Rourke 2001). This number of players has been explained in bilateral, trilateral and multilateral bargaining. Diplomacy is highly portrayed by an image of simple negotiations. Rourke (2001) posits that diplomacy as a communication process has three elements; negotiation, signaling and public diplomacy. Negotiation, he adds occurs when two or more parties are talking with one another, either directly or through an intermediary. Signaling entails saying or doing something with the interest of sending a message to another government. When leaders make bellicose or conciliatory speeches, when military forces are deployed or even used, when trade privileges are granted or sanctions invoked or when diplomatic recognition is extended or relations broken, these actions are, or at least should be signals of attitude and intent to another country . Public diplomacy moves away from its traditional mode of government-to-government communication. Rather, it involves the modern practice of trying to influence a wider audience including public opinion, in another country or throughout the world.

Diplomacy as a great instrument of bargaining employs different options in its conducts. It could be direct or indirect negotiation, High-level or low-level diplomacy, using coercion or rewards to gain agreement, being precise or being intentionally vague, communicating by word or deed. No matter the form the conduct takes, diplomacy is as stated above, a complex game. Diplomacy is to bargaining what the ball is to the game of football. To that end, understanding how the game ought to be played does not always produce a win on the playing field of sports or success at the negotiating table of diplomacy (Rourke 2001). Certainly, you are advantaged if you know the fundamentals of diplomacy and utilising the principles of game theory; then quality bargaining can be conducted and good results achieved.

3.4 Game Theory and Bargaining

It has been noted above that game theory is an effective tool for analysis, and to achieve global security you need bargaining, and there will be no effective bargaining without a good analysis. The bargaining powers of the parties are very important because their power bases are not the same. As noted above, you must put into consideration certain factors that will help your analysis. They include the context, issue, power and interest. The parties go into analysis to know their tradable (what they can give up) and non-tradable (what they cannot give up). Analysis will help you to predict the possible content of the other parties' proposal, what they can give up and what they cannot give up. Analysis will equally enable the parties to know the strategically important places in the case of Nigeria's and Cameroon (Bakkassi Peninsula).

Using game theory enable the parties to know the response behaviour of the opponents, their strength and weakness. These are maximized to achieve a goal. Without a good analysis that is scientific and logical you can sell off your state or organisation in bargaining.

From the above, it is clear that game theory and bargaining are essential in conflict management. We discover here that mutual deterrence paved the way for arms control measures and further cooperation. By highlighting strategic choices and potential collective outcomes, game theory and bargaining helped illustrate how a potentially destructive relationship could be framed, managed and transformed to provide mutual benefits, including avoidance of uncontrolled arms race and nuclear war.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How relevant is the game theory and bargaining theory scenario to peace-making process?

4.0 CONCLUSION

Game theory and bargaining theory are inseparable in international relations. Just like in games, politics and international affairs on the world stage take the nature of analysis. The theories claim that man is a player. Hence the tools that can provide their much needed analytical power to execute most of the world affairs need be taken as games. Usually what you bargain for is what you receive. It is understood that the various types of bargaining are themselves complex. The unit showed clearly that it is almost impossible to conduct a bargaining without diplomacy and without the game theory tool one may sell off his state or organisation in a negotiation process. Thus the conduct of international arms control negotiation is dependent on game theory and bargaining.

5.0 SUMMARY

This unit explored the relevance of game theory and bargaining in the conduct of international affairs. The unit concludes that the tools of bargaining and diplomacy must be properly situated in the negotiation process less one experience a heavy blow at the negotiation table. That is, the negotiator can sell off his/her firm or state without knowing.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Discuss the steps taken to ensure effective negotiation.

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MODULE 3 CAUSES OF ARMAMENT AND DISARMAMENT

Unit 1	Sources of Armament
Unit 2	Characteristics of Small Arms
Unit 3	Proliferation of Small Arms
Unit 4	Effects of Small Arms
Unit 5	Civil Wars and Small Arms

UNIT 1 SOURCES OF ARMAMENT

CONTENTS

1.0	Introduction
2.0	Objectives
3.0	Main Content
3.1	Causes of Armament
3.2	Just War Theory and Just Cause of War
3.3	Approaches to Peace
3.4	Pacifism
4.0	Conclusion
5.0	Summary
6.0	Tutor-Marked Assignment
7.0	References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

With the collapse of the Cold War and the evolution of the international system, several conflicts that the Cold War sent to the coolers began to emerge. The era is culminated with the tension posed by armament, arms race and proliferation of small arms. This unit introduces you to the various reasons why the world is arming and re-arming itself. The unit discusses the prevalent contradiction in matters of human security round the globe and pins down several factors responsible for the rising tension.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- enumerate causes of armament
- explain just war theory and just cause of war
- highlight various approaches to peace.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Causes of Armament

The entirety of humanity has been confronted by a serious threat to security, especially since after the Cold War. To this fact, the concepts of conflict and peace situate themselves in the heart of the contemporary man. The tensions of conflict and the need for peace in several sectors of the security have dominated every headline. The causes of armament are pervasive and deep. The promoters of peace the world over need to constantly engage in debate, pursue political initiatives and promote discussions about the causes of armament, terrorism and all forms of conflict. The issues of armament and disarmament are often incomprehensible to the poor and wealthy nations alike, considering the fact that we live in an era of human history full of contradictions.

The source of armament is several. These ranges from technological advancement, offensive and defensive systems, economic boom, expansionist policy, expansion of the sphere of influence, growing disparity between the rich and the poor and several other sources to conflict and armament.

There are several other reasons why there is arm proliferation. Sometimes the causes of armament are also the causes of war. Philosophers, world leaders and social scientists have many theories why there is armament. As we noted above, the balance of power politics was a major causation to armament. In the words of Rourke (2001) "The distributions of power in the world is one possible cause of conflict." He adds that the international system is built around numbers of poles (big powers) their relative power and whether the poles are stable or influx. The implication is that when a power is rising and another is declining, there is power vacuum to fill this result to armament.

Considering the anarchical nature of the international system, parties take to arm for fear of the other actors. This results from the absence of a central authority to try to prevent conflict and protect countries. This is worsened by ineffective law creation, enforcement or adjudication. The end result of this is insecurity, hence countries acquire arms in part because other countries do; creating a tension-filled cycle of escalating arms tension arms tensions until a flash point is reached.

You should note that it has been noted above that economic factors cause armament. These range from the global gap between the wealthy and poor countries, the distribution of resources between countries and regions. This could lead to influence of arms. Again territorial dispute

can lead to acquisition of arms. Some others may be frustration, aggression and anxiety. These factors may well cause the acquisition of arms.

Cold war and colonial legacy

“The worst calamity that can befall a nation” Ahmed Kasravi says “is disunity”. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 did not only signal the end of 50 years ideological conflict that reached all part of the world, it was also the end of a bipolar world where the balance of power between the then Soviet Union and the United States created a semblance of normality and stability round the world. Rupesinghe (1998) notes that:

When the wall tumbled, the whole Europe rejoiced. In Czechoslovakia, the “Velvet Revolution’ captured the world’s imagination by bringing radical change through peaceful action.

The world truly needed peace. At that time it seemed that all the enemies and the threat to international security were gone. The governments of the West were quick to capitalise on the optimism. There were talks everywhere by politicians on the peace dividend and military budget were cut. There was great enthusiasm as the old Warsaw Pact countries experienced a boom through the invasion of business men who were interested in reaping the reward of the emerging markets. The enthusiasm however did not last. Because:

As eastern European struggles to rebuild the nations, the ethnic divisions and territorial conflicts that had been obscured by the Soviet Union began to surface. Yugoslavia descended into a bleak and vicious war. Within the former Soviet Union, conflict arose between the central government and regional states such as Azerbaijan and Tajikistan as well as the neighbouring states themselves (Rupesinghe, 1998).

It was not difficult to understand the causes of these conflicts as the collapse of any empire is bound to reveal some fault lines that was concealed. The conflict should not have come as a surprise. The spate

and spectre of oppression of the Russians could not be haboured by the Georgians, Latvians, Kazakhs, and the Tartars.

Before now, the US and the USSR had created and contained small wars and conflicts but with the collapse of Berlin Wall those wars and conflicts were now unchecked and the “result was the spread of violence and the emergence of disparate groups, ostensibly fighting in the name of ideology, religion or ethnicity but seeking to finance their operations through local taxations, plunders and pillage’ (Rupesinghe 1998). The belligerents to these conflicts sought all they needed through the instrument of arms; hence armament acquisition became the order.

The end of the Cold War cannot be blamed for several conflicts that result to armament acquisition. Most conflicts that were experienced in Africa were as a result of former colonial structures. The colonial power led to inter-ethnic rivalry. Within countries like Rwanda, and Burundi existed social distinction between Hutu and Tutsi. This scenario was largely determined by the Belgian colonialists and deliberately sustained after their departure. The Tutsi, considered as minority retained control of administrative structures while the majority Hutu was increasingly oppressed or marginalised. As years passed the ethnic distinction that was a mere indication for social standing became a determining factor for survival. The conflict in Rwanda led to 1994 genocide that claimed almost a million lives after three months. The conflict became complex with issue proliferation. In every conflict, there comes a time when actors and issues multiply. At such a time when several actors come into play and the issue moves from one to two and above is said to be actor or issue proliferation. Situations like these are complex. That was the case in Rwanda and as a result several weapons were brandished—machetes and different kinds of guns. Terror was everywhere as the spate of rape was unimaginable. The entrepreneurship of conflict orchestrated massacres for their selfish interests.

In Burundi it was still the same colonial creation of the Hutu and Tutsi. Though the immediate cause of the later conflict in Burundi was the fall out of the failed coup d'état of 21 October 1993, the protracted nature of the conflict indicated that its origin were neither recent nor superficial. Patrick D. Gaffney (2000) points out that:

Persistent patterns of institutionalised bias along ethnic and regional lines, resulting in wide spread discrimination, selective development and state-sponsored repression accompanied by periodic outbursts of genocidal slaughter, on a local or on a

national scale, have produced immense structural gap and spanned irreconcilable ideologies that have degenerated from ineradicable suspicion to mutual demonisation.

The colonialist's principles of stratification originally embedded in a division of labour between cultivators and pastoralist is a key dimension to the evolution of Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi. The ethnic divide in Burundi led to the death of many.

The Cold War superpowers also maintained overtly corrupt and ruthless leaders in Africa, Latin America and Asia. Such leaders are Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, Idi Amin of Uganda, Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos of the Philippines and several other military regimes and dictators where to be heavy burden and sources of conflict at the long run. These conflicts generated all forms of arms and this in turn benefited the economics of western countries while the developing nations were impoverished. Rupesinghe (1998) notes that "At the time, sustaining figures such as Mobutu and Marcos was justified in the name of defending western and supposedly democratic interest in the face of the communist threat." The short sightedness of that age and the self-serving policies plunged the world into arms race and subsequent annihilation of many. The world is yet to recover from that.

Resurgence of religion

The revival of Islam that was triggered by the Iranian revolution of 1979 and referred to as "Islamic fundamentalism" was another causation to arms race. Rupesinghe argued that it caused a "significant shift in the global status quo". In the last 25 years, the world has witnessed an extreme form of "Islamic fundamentalism". The fundamentalists claim to be protesting against western influence and domination. To this end, Rupesinghe (1998) asserts:

...this is a popular reaction to western cultural domination and the West's support of often corrupt regimes.

The fundamentalists are also reacting against the gulf between the rich and the poor. In the areas where these fundamentalists exists, "the clerics always maintain strong power bases amongst the poverty-stricken, have emerged as political figures, calling for a return to basic Koranic traditions and a rejection of any form of secularism" (Rupesinghe 1998).

The extremist Islamic groups have been responsible for the problems in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iran and even Iraq. The extremists became notorious for stringent Islamic laws. The religious resurgence of Islam is not alone. It was “accompanied by a rise in other manifestations of religious extremists”. In Israel for instance, Orthodox Judaism has gained strength in the political arena. Christianity is also not left out of the extremists. In the United States, the Christian extremists have gained strong voice in the political arena. Standing with the position, Rupesinghe (1998) points out that “at a time when ideologies and utopias are being swept away, religion is muscling its way back onto centre stage and, in doing so, has emerged as a potent source not only of spirituality, but also of identity”. The resurgence of religion has no doubt exacerbated arms race.

Over the years poverty has brought recourse to conflict. This has eaten deep into the world and reduced human dignity to nothing. People have in response to solve their poverty carried arms especially in states with mineral resources. The case in areas without resource like Somalia is no different. Arms in the hands of those who possess it have become a passport to economic well being.

Access to fresh water will be a source of increasing conflict. Throughout history, the world’s major shared water like the Nile, the Jordan, the Tigris- Euphrates and the Indus have been site of human conflicts (Roche 2003). One of the looming dangers of water conflicts is the Nile. Stretching from equatorial Africa to the Mediterranean Sea, the Nile stands as the longest river in the world, cutting across Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt. Each of these nations lay claim to the river but it is Egypt that has long used military force over the Nile headwaters. Roche (2003) argues that if the population of the three countries mentioned above rises as predicted from 150 million today to 340 million in 2050, competition for the limited water resource could be intense. Roche submits that another potential water war exists in Southern Africa; this he argues will involve Botswana, Namibia, and Angola. The implication is that if most national governments do not reduce their military spending to curb the problem of water scarcity, the world may soon witness another shots in that dimension.

3.2 Just War Theory and Just Cause of War

Taking up arms in the name of war has been adjudged to be just or wrong. Early writings on international law were concerned with the law of war, and this issue continues to be a primary focus of legal development. In addition to issues of traditional state versus state warfare, international law attempts also to regulate revolutionary and internal warfare and terrorism (Rourke, 2001).

There has been a rising issue of when and how war can morally be fought. There are two parts to the just war theory; the cause and the conduct of war. The *jus ad bellum* (just cause of war), is the primary belief of the western tradition. These could be war as the last resort, as declared by legitimate authority, as waged in self defence or to restore/establish justice and fought to bring about peace. This line of thought is maintained in *jus in bello* (just conduct of war) which includes the standard of proportionality and discrimination. Proportional here means that the amount of force used must be proportional to threat while discrimination means that the force must not make noncombatants intentional targets (Barry, 1998, Rourke, 2001).

Chesterman (2001), writing on the just war theory posits that justification for taking up arms against the wicked can be found in the writing and practice of most religions and those empires styling themselves as civilised. In Europe of the 16th and 17th centuries, wars and interventions over religious differences were frequent and many writers continued to accept such wars as just, either in themselves or insofar as they were undertaken on the orders of God. The point to underscore is that the standards of when to go to war and how to fight it are rooted in western Christian tradition. Rourke (2001) asserts that the parameters of *jus in bello* and *jus ad bellum* extend back to Aristotle's politics and are especially associated with the writings of Christian theological philosophers, Saint Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. The implication is that, this doctrine based on western culture and religion becomes a problem as not all the restrictions on war are the same as those derived from some of the other great religious traditions.

In attempt to keep to the standards of just war theory, its vagueness makes it difficult to abide. In the words of Rourke (2001) "What is proportional in the line of *jus in bello*? Almost everyone would agree, for instance, that France, Great Britain, and the United States would not have been justified in using their nuclear weapons against Yugoslavia in 1999 to force it to withdraw from Kosovo." What really constitutes a just war? The worrying issue is that the regulations provided in the UN charter are not adhered to; hence fundamental rights are violated, with the fact that sovereignty is no longer a legal absolute. This has been used to bring peace as well as war.

3.3 Approaches to Peace

The above notwithstanding, there has been several approaches internationally to bring peace and control arms. The most sweeping of these approaches is to disarm. Rourke (2001) points out that the principal argument in favour of disarmament is the idea that without weapons people will not fight. This rests in part on sheer inability.

General and complete disarmament (GCD) might be accomplished either through unilateral disarmament or through multilateral negotiation. In the situation of unilateral disarmament, the country involved would dismantle its arms. Its safety, in theory, would be secured by its nonthreatening posture, which would prevent aggression, and its example would lead other countries to disarm also. Unilateral disarmament draws heavily on the idea of pacifism, or a moral and resolute refusal to fight. The unilateral approach also relies on the belief that it is arms that cause tension and not vice versa.

On the other hand, there is a more limited approach to negotiated disarmament between two or more countries. There is an agreement between the advocates of this and the unilateralist about the danger of war. Those who toe this path are not in any way true pacifists as they believe that one-sided disarmament would expose the peace pioneer to unacceptable risk. Rourke (2001) concludes that the general and complete disarmament approach has few strong advocates among today political leaders. Even those who do subscribe to the idea also search for intermediate arms limitation steps.

3.4 Pacifism

Pacifism is seen as a bottom–top approach to global security. Pacifism says no to violence. At the individual level of war guidance, security and disarmament, the concept of pacifism becomes an issue. As a way to stop violence, it is simply refusing to fight physically. Pacifism is associated with Gandhian principles of “Ahimsa” but Gandhi affirms that the concept is not new. In his words “I have nothing new to teach the world. Truth and non-violence are as old as the hills” (Gandhi 1927). Unlike other approaches to security, pacifism is a bottom–up approach that focuses on what people do rather than a top–down approach that stresses government action. Pacifism originates with the belief that it is wrong to kill. The Russian novelist and pacifist Leo Tolstoy in 1909 at the Swedish peace conference noted that “The truth is so simple, so clear, and so evident ... that it is only necessary to speak it out completely for its full significance to be irresistible.” He adds that “truth lies in what were said thousands of years ago on four words; Thou shalt not kill” (Rourke, 2001). Some pacifists however differ from others. The universal pacifists oppose all forms of violence, there are the private pacifists, who oppose personal violence but would support as a last resort the use of police or military force to counter criminals or aggressors; and anti war pacifists, who oppose political violence but would use violence as a last resort for personal self-defense.

The idea of pacifism however, is to deter war or armament and promote peace. But there are obvious arguments that the practice of pacifism can

either get one killed or conquered; yet there are also arguments that it has been used in the past and was successful. Can pacifism work again? That is the question.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

With copious example discuss five causes of armament globally and analyse any approach to peace.

4.0 CONCLUSION

It is clear from our study of this unit that the worsening state of security through arm acquisition is pervasive and deep. We discovered that the distribution of power in the world is a strong source of armament. The unit considered the law of war and discovered the just war theory (*jus in bello*) as a cause of armament that is capable of bringing peace as well as cause war. The unit equally highlighted certain approaches that can bring peace.

5.0 SUMMARY

This unit on source of armament showed clearly the causes of armament, why wars are fought, and the possible ways to bring peace to the tensed world.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. What are the causes of armament?
- ii. Why are wars considered sometimes to be just and at other times to be wrong?

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

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UNIT 2 CHARACTERISTICS OF SMALL ARMS

CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Content
 - 3.1 Definition of Small Arms
 - 3.2 Features of Small Arms
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
- 7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This unit introduces you to what small arms are and the features of small arms. The unit discusses clearly the devastating effects of small arms.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- define small arms
- list the features of small arms
- explain the various forms of violence
- the effects of small arms.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Definition of Small Arms

Small arms are weapons of destruction killing hundreds of people around the world each year. This is far higher than the casualty count from conventional weapons of war like tanks, bomber jets or warships. The term small arms and light weapons refer to weapons that can be carried by a single person, either for military or civilian use. The term is often shortened to “small arms or “SALW”. It covers a wide range of weapons from pistol, machine guns, and other firearms to grenades, portable anti-tank systems and mortars.

3.2 Features of Small Arms

Worldwide, small arms are devastating communities through conflict and crime. This is so because of several features possessed by these lethal weapons.

Small arms are relatively cheap, they are available in abundance, highly portable, long lasting, and so easy to operate that a child as young as eight years old can carry and use them. These characteristics make small arms particularly susceptible to illicit trafficking. They are often sold illegally in exchange for hard currency or goods such as diamonds, drugs or other contraband. In Liberia for instance, Charles Taylor was exchanging mineral resources for arms. These same arms are sometimes recycled from one conflict area to another, thereby exacerbating the conflict and contributing to humanitarian crises.

The majority of people killed in wars and other armed conflicts are victims of small arms, tens of thousands of deaths each year. Most of these are civilians. Small arms truly have come to be weapons of mass destruction. Small arms kill an additional 200, 000 people in “peaceful” nations each year in homicides, suicides, unintentional shootings and shootings by police. In countries like Brazil, U.S.A and South Africa, guns are a leading cause of death among young men. An estimated 2 million children have been killed with small arms since 1990. In addition to those killed an estimated 1.5million people are wounded by small arms each year (www.iansa.org). It has been noted that over 90% of the victims of the use of small arms are civilians with women and children accounting for 80% of the casualties (Dhanapala, 1998). The acquisition or possession of these small arms has become business and a source of livelihood.

Small arms described above as the real weapons of mass destruction pose the greatest threat to human security. The inhabitants of Paris, Beijing, New York, and London may find it difficult to imagine that small arms, that is, great bulk of which are produced in their countries are causing great harm. It is unfortunate that the inhabitants of these great countries get only a glimpse of the reality of a daily life permeated by violence and fear through the use of the instruments of gun. People in places like Nigeria, Burundi, Rwanda, Cambodia, Bosnia, Tripoli, Liberia, and several other countries are living with this reality. People in these areas know it too well that due to the accessibility of small arms militia men appear to you at night wielding guns and machetes to raid your homes and families. Once violence is triggered somewhere, it seeps into society (Rupesinghe 1998).

Conflict may be functional or dysfunctional. It is often a source of creativity and change. Though the people in conflict may have differing goals or interests, they may still relate to one another. However, such conflicts are not usually violent, but when the conflict turns violent disintegration is the end product. This is because it is used to inflict injury and leads to a profound breakdown of relationships. Violence in conflicts manifests in so many ways. A famous scholar of peace research, the Norwegian Johan Galtung has drawn attention to three different forms of violence, both social and communal manifesting in society. They are direct, structural and cultural violence.

Direct violence: this refers to armed hostile actions. It is when an act of violence is being committed and the oppressor can be identified. In conflict times the brandishing of guns alone constitutes violence though it may be psychological but in situations of outright shootings, executions, massacre, or ethnic cleansing it is considered a direct violence. Direct violence often emerges from the depth of structural violence.

Structural violence: This is a kind of violence that is built in societal structure. It is in the inequalities of societal structures, that is, the gross power imbalance within the society. The mass production of guns from developed to the developing countries is an act of structural violence. The aggressor in a structural violence unlike direct violence is intangible and faceless. 'It is in effect, the system that bears down on every aspects of social and public life' (Rupesinghe 1998). Most times there may be countless incidence of direct violence but the main challenge is in the system. The system is usually at fault. For instance, the anarchical structure of the international system allows for a free flow of arms especially small arms.

Cultural violence: this can be identified in terms of religion, ideological or linguistic symbols. These symbols legitimise direct and structural violence. The symbol sometimes may be flags and anthems or inflammatory speeches or mythical stories. At any point, these cultural elements are used to provoke or encourage violence it is said to be cultural. It appears in the concept of a 'chosen people'. An example of this is the Jews and their Arab brothers in conflict situations. The adversaries use derogatory words to refer to themselves. A good example of this situation was the genocide in Rwanda where the Hutu militia used the term 'cockroaches' to refer to their Tutsi counterparts. The adversaries strip themselves of an identity to make the killings less wrong. No wonder the saying that 'if you want to kill your dog, you give her a bad name'. When the developed countries produce their small arms, are they really legitimising violence?

In most societies today, a man/woman without a gun is seen as a defenseless human being. In such societies guns have market value. They are ‘almost integrated into the local economy as ordinary cash’ (Rupesinghe, 1998). In places like Liberia the possession of a gun became pure business. You will recall that on the 12th April 1980, Master Sergeant Samuel Doe seized power in a violent coup. Doe afterwards executed 13 former cabinet members. Samuel Doe’s actions in governance charted avenues for the future conflict for Liberia’s warlords. The avenues built extensive informal commercial ties with regional trade networks (William Reno, 2000). Doe’s strategies failed and when Taylor eventually came on board, he used state resources to acquire arms. Exploitation of natural resources in Liberia by Taylor’s led NPFL to forced labour. People who were unarmed became an additional resource to be exploited to earn hard currency. Guns in the hands of even young people of 10, 11 and 12 years was a serious business. Charles Taylor had organised these children as young as 10 and 12 years in small boy units SBU’s (Reno 2000). Reno posits that:

Armed young men also discovered that control over business operations gave them access to additional benefits, such as the opportunity to extort food from farmers, set up road blocks to levy tolls on internal commerce, and organise protection and looting rackets.

Such lifestyle was described as the Kalashnikov lifestyle. The life style “suddenly elevated poor young men to the top of the local economic pyramid and gave them a material incentive in warfare” at the expense of others because they were unable to acquire a gun. All these were possible because of the easy accessibility of small arms. The abundance of small arms made this possible. The features of small arms made this possible. The feature of small arms themselves constituted violence to the people.

Table 1: Showing Common Names and Models of Small Arms Technical Specifications

Category	Weapon	Undersised	Medium/Normal	Oversised	Oversised

I	Pistol Revolver Semi- automatic	$\leq .32$ cal ≤ 6 mm $\leq .32$ cal ≤ 6 mm	.38 to .40 cal 7 to 9 mm .381.357, 7 to 9 mm	$\geq .41$ ≥ 10 mm $\geq .41$ ≥ 10 mm	Hollow point, Teflon, liquid- filled Hollow point, Teflon, liquid- filled
II	Short gun Single/bolt/p ump Semi- automatic	≥ 20 gage ≥ 20 gage	16 to 12 gage 16 to 12 gage	≤ 10 gage ≤ 10 gage	Flachette Flachette
III	Sub-marine gun	$\leq .32$ cal ≤ 6 mm	.38 to 40 cal 7 to 9 mm	$\geq .41$ ≥ 10 mm	Hollow point Teflon, liquid- filled
IV	Rifle Single/bolt/p ump Semi- automatic Automatic special	≤ 5 mm ≤ 5 mm ≤ 5 mm	5.1 to 8 mm 5.1 to 8 mm 5.1 to 8 mm	≥ 9 mm ≥ 9 mm ≥ 9 mm	Dumdum, grenade Dumdum, grenade Dumdum, grenade Grenade
V	Machine-gun Light weight General purpose Heavy Auto cannons	≤ 5 mm ≤ 5 mm	5.54 to 8 mm 5.54 to 8 mm	≥ 9 mm ≥ 9 mm 10 to 16 mm ≥ 17 mm	Grenade Explosive s

VI	Antitank, mortars Howitzers Portable-1 man Portable-crew Automatic crew	≤ 30 mm ≤ 60 mm ≤ 30 mm	30 to 40 mm 61 to 84 mm 30 to 40 mm	≥ 41 mm ≥ 85 mm ≥ 41 mm	Flachette White phosphor ous Grenade
VII	Landmines	≤ 200 g	200g to 1.4 kg	≤ 1.5 kg	
VIII	Others		Flame throwers		

Table 2: Showing Some Common Names and Models of Small Arms

Technical Specifications

Category	Weapon	Undersized	Medium/Normal	Oversized
I	Pistol Revolver Semi automatic		Baretta/Glock/ Tokarev	Eagle
II	Short gun Single/bolt/pu mp Semi- automatic		RS200/MOD12 SPAS/MOD1100	MAG10
III	Sub-machine gun		UZI/stenMP5	

IV	Rifle Single/bolt/pump Semi-automatic Automatic Special		Sport/target/hunting M16/Ak47/FNFA L M16/ak47/FNFA L Sniper	Sport/ hunting Sniper
V	Machine-gun Light weight General purpose Heavy Auto cannons		RPK/Bren/SAW M60/MG34/SG43	M2/Dsh k-38 M242/ZSU
VI	Antitank, mortars Howitzers Portable-1 man Portable-crew Automatic crew	Mortars	M79/M203 Mortars Mk19/AG517	RPG, Rifle grenade, recoil Rifle, Mortar, Howitzers
VII	Landmines	VS50 PMD6 PPMi-D	POMZ/tyoe69/M18AI	MK7/M19/TM72
VIII	others		M202/LP050	

Source: Sverre Lodgaard and Ivor Richard Fung (1998)

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Can small arms be classified as weapons of mass destruction? Give conspicuous reasons for your answer.

4.0 CONCLUSION

This unit studied the characteristics of small arms and you can observe from the study that small arms constitute the biggest threat to humanity considering their portability and availability.

5.0 SUMMARY

This unit situates small arms among weapons of mass destruction because of their several features facilitate their being used to devastate communities.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

How does small arm exacerbate conflict and contribute to humanitarian crisis?

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UNIT 3 PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS

CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Content
 - 3.1 Proliferation of Small Arms
 - 3.2 Factors Aiding Proliferation
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- 5.0 Summary
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

This unit introduces you to the proliferation of small arms and explores the reasons behind the massive quantities of weapons round the world. The unit underscores the influences of illicit trade.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- explain the proliferation of small arms
- identify salient reasons for the proliferation of small arms.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Proliferation of Small Arms

The proliferation of small arms has been the trouble of most national, regional and international organisations even the United Nations. The proliferation of arms particularly the small arms have tripled since the end of the Cold War. They have become more accessible than ever. Virtually all conflicts in recent times that were dealt with by regional or international organisations have small arms as the primary or sole tool of violence. Dhanapala (1998) points out that most of the countries where these weapons were used in recent times to wreck havoc do not manufacture them. He adds that in most cases neither the manufacturer, nor the exporter nor even the buyer knows the purposes for which the weapons will ultimately be used because unlike the trade in any other category of weapons, nearly 40% of the trade in small arms is carried out through illicit means. Included in these accumulations of arms especially in Africa and its sub-regions are those supplied during the Cold War. These massive quantities of weapons are part of those that

still go around. Dhanapala (1998) asserts that about 2 million small arms and light weapons are still circulating in Central America, 7 million in West Africa and an estimated 10 million in Afghanistan. It must be added that several of these weapons have been used in places far removed from their original places of regular supply. The illicit means of transfer of arms at the international level are believed to involve multi-party deals involving false documentation, concealment, and smuggling and coded bank accounts.

War has proved to be profitable for some in recent times. The increasing spate of conflicts around the world has multiplied small arms as they are more readily available. There are several campaigns in theory to restrict the trade of small arms that is simply defined as light, portable weapon. Most governments claim to oppose the illicit trade of small arms which is responsible “for arming criminals and insurgent groups, and many governments also favour a code of conduct regulating which countries are deemed responsible enough to buy weapons on the open market on the other hand, the United Nation has already implemented a number of measures designed to restrict the flow of arms, but these have merely illustrated the difficulty of monitoring such flows (Rupesinghe, 1998).

The provision of monitor and control of arms in reality seem to be only a theory. For instance, a 1955 ordinance on the import and export of arms and ammunition except under import license....shall be guilty of arm offence. The same ordinance also provided that “any person who possesses any small arm unless he is a holder of a current license...shall be guilty of an offence” (Bayraytay, 2006). Bayraytay argues that these provisions were fairly applied during the 1960s and 1970s. He quickly added that in Sierra Leone gun contract largely disappeared. Thus the one party constitution of Sierra Leone was silent over the availability, possession and use of small arms. Under normal circumstances, this will lead to proliferation of arms, especially small arms as their usage would become overt among citizens especially with the privatisation of security. In Sierra Leone the regular military and paramilitary forces found themselves faced with parallel privately owned forces (Bayraytay, 2006). At this period in Sierra Leone, several arms trafficking took place, sometimes with the connivance of well-placed officers within the state security apparatus.

The need for cutting off the supply of small arms and light weapon (SALW) cannot be overestimated. The proliferation of small arms account for much of the killing around the world and “their availability ensures that society is plagued by violence” long after conflict have ended in conflict areas. Women and children have always been the victims of small arms especially in conflict times. The case in Sierra Leone was not different as women were the main victims of wanton

violence. However women also became aggressors. Binta Mansaray (2006) points out, “the hidden truth is that in many instances, women played a significant, “active” role in violence. Mansaray adds that the easy use of small arms and light weapons facilitated women’s role as aggressors. It has been noted that small arms require very little training. Mansaray also list three key reasons why women during the conflict in Sierra Leone became actors in the offensive. The reasons are:

1. Some women voluntarily joined the movement sometimes to escape from daily life as second class citizens and to demonstrate in violent way that they were capable of doing whatever men could do... they wanted to identify with a movement that they thought would liberate them and fulfill their fundamental human need for recognition...
2. Some of those who were abducted, according to testimonies of some aggressors, subsequently chose to stay in the movement they were trained as combatants. Hopefully that the RUF would take control of the country’s resources, these women believed they would enjoy their right to education, health and freedom as promised by the rebel leader Foday Sankoh.
3. Other women became perpetrators of violence because they were trapped in the movement and just could not get out. Women involved in the AFRC soldier’s movement were also disintegrated with life in the military, one of the casualties of state corruption.

Women were in connivance with the male rebels to rape fellow women. Mansaray discovered a situation where a woman was to be raped and she was not willing to give in but for a woman rebel with a gun in her hand she gave in. Mansaray reported that “the woman...was with the other rebels in the combat when they came to my house. The man tried to rape me and I didn’t want him to do that to me, then the rebel woman told me if I refused to be raped she will kill me so I just obeyed because I didn’t want to die.” The accessibility of small arms worsened issues as women became rapists themselves. Mansaray(2006) notes that:

Women aggressors also committed rape. According to data from victims of sexual abuse, 11.75% of a total of 2,110 rape cases reported were committed by female perpetrators.

A curb on illicit arms trade would restrict the accessibility of small arms and light weapons by rebel groups which facilitate their perpetuating violent and monstrous acts.

Table 3: Victims of sexual abuse by RUF/AFRC forces in Sierra Leone collected between March 1999 and January 2000

Age (years)	Male	Female	Total
0-5	31	68	99
6-12	142	157	299
13-18	63	628	691
19-25	7	852	859
Over 27	5	157	162
Total	248	1,862	2,110

Source : Binta Mansaray (2006)

The code of conduct on the legal trade of small arm has not yielded any positive effect. The proliferation of small arms may continue unless the concerned actors demonstrate the political will to curb the menace. Rupesinghe (1998) argues that “the difficulty lies not much in curbing the licit arms trade but in restricting the availability of weapons on the black market. Indeed, at the moment, it seems impossible to track the flow of arms trade and there is no organised system for determining the source of weapon. The sheer quality of small arms in the world today has exacerbated these difficulties.

3.2 Factors Aiding Proliferation

We have heavily explored various reasons why violent conflicts erupt among which small arm proliferation is a factor. Several factors contribute to the proliferation of small arms as pointed above. One of such factors is the privatisation of security. In countries such as Angola, Guatemala and Nicaragua, where official peace has come, poverty, insecurity and fear still plague different levels of society (Rupesinghe, 1998). In situation where a state cannot provide for her citizens, ownership of weapon becomes essential for survival, as noted inter alia both as protection and as an economic asset. It is believed that the possession of lethal weapon at personal level alleviates the insecurity but it in turn encourages the spread of violence.

The privatisation of state armies is another factor aiding proliferation. Rupesinghe(1998) notes that in “the absence of external patronage, conscript armies, or what is left of them are known to sell their arms, equipment or services to the highest bidder.” Rupesinghe argues that even in places like Ethiopia officers were found to be selling arms and ammunition during the closing years of the war. The case was worst in Zaire as some military commanders ran what was similar to personal fiefdoms. “The soldiers were not paid regular salaries, but were encouraged to loot and pillage local villages, demand contributions at

arbitrary road blocks and commit sexual violence against local women” (Rupesinghe 1998). Such privatisation of state army in Congo (Zaire) arose because of Mobutu’s repressive and kleptomaniac regime. Mobutu reduced the state army to an insignificant number, consolidating his power on fear and oppression through a network of security personnel that are best described as secret police and army. The command lines of his secret personnel are frequently changed to enable him control the security system, (Kisangani N.F. Emizet, 2000). Rupesinghe (1998) argues that Mobutu’s strategy was to suppress the national army, reduce it’s number to only 20,000 and provide little equipment or training. As noted above Mobutu concentrated on creating a series of covert special strike forces, formed and dissolved in quick succession. Oppressive regimes encourage the formation of militia groups which will no doubt lead to small arm proliferation.

Another factor that aids small arm proliferation is the use of children as soldiers. “Young recruits and children as young as eight has been evident in a number of long-term conflicts, especially where there is shortage of personnel. The child soldiers have fought in battle frontline and this is not removed from the fact that there is the availability of cheap, light and easy to use automatic weapons (Rupesinghe, 1998). Hence children are recruited and more arms required, as small arms require little or no training and coupled with the fact that children are obedient and disciplined, they are used. The end result therefore is arm proliferation and increase in the possibility of violence.

The presence of mercenaries is another factor aiding small arm proliferation. When the army of a state is disintegrated during conflict, it gives room for the resurgence of mercenaries and bounty hunters. The worst is that such groups have no interest or concern in the countries or regions which they fight. The groups have no motivation or incentive to end the conflict. Kumar Rupesinghe (1998) observes “From Sierra Leone to Angola, Sri Lanka, the Middle East and Papua New Guinea, the presence of mercenaries, heavily armed, highly trained, protecting and preserving ramshackle regimes or factions.” Such activities not only proliferates arms, it prolongs and intensifies conflicts. The avarice of such groups is always the interest. They may have their eye on oil, gold, diamond and other precious minerals within the region of those who contract them. The primary objective of such organisation is to make money and they require arms to accomplish their task, so illicit trade continues to grow and arms - small arms - keep proliferating.

Greed and grievances have also being explored by several scholars as a motivation for groups to rebel. Most groups attempt to have access to resources. Most times the motivation are the benefits “that may accrue

through activities such as pillage and looting during conflicts” (Collier and Hoeffler 2002).

The frustration-aggression mechanism as a response by regimes ignites violence. When regimes are oppressive, then violence is the last result. Again, in such state most times, the struggles for democratic governance often lead to violence perpetuated with the use of arms - small arms. Several other factors aid small arms proliferation.

Some of the weapons are locally made, while some are stolen from government armoury. There are transfers between sub national groups, others captured from government agents, some are taken from demobilised soldiers and so on. There are several ways of proliferating small arms. The production and export of small arms are increasing by day. Dhanapala (1998) adds that small arms and light weapons are being currently manufactured in over 70 countries which are almost twice as many as the manufactures of other categories of weapons. In Dhanapala’s words, “there are at least 20 known types of pistols available in close to 200 models, which mean that 400 varieties are being manufactured. Over 40 models of rifles are being manufactured to at least one dozen specifications, the better known AK-47 being just one of the 500 known varieties.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How does illicit trade on small arms promote proliferation?

4.0 CONCLUSION

You can understand from our study that most small arms constituting threat in the world today were supplied during the Cold War and they still go round today. Though some of the weapons are locally produced in the communities where they are used, it was understood that most of the weapons are manufactured far away from their point of use.

5.0 SUMMARY

This unit on proliferation of small arms extensively considered the proliferation of small arms and the factors leading to this proliferation. The unit concludes that the proliferation of small arms have tripled since the removal of the cold war restrictions.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. At what degree are small arms proliferating?
- ii. What are the factors responsible for these?

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UNIT 4 EFFECTS OF SMALL ARMS PROLIFERATION

CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objective
- 3.0 Main Content
 - 3.1 Effects of Small Arm Proliferation
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

This unit introduces you to the adverse effects of arm proliferation on the world. The proliferations serve as threats to the three categories of people in need namely, those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed and those without shelter.

2.0 OBJECTIVE

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- explain the diverse effects of small arm proliferations.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Effects of Small Arm Proliferation

The effects of these proliferations are diverse. It must be noted that guns do not have to be fired to cause damage; they are the primary tool used to force families and entire villages to flee their homes. There are 35 million refugees and displaced persons around the world, and the UN High Commission for Refugees has noted that armed conflict is now the force behind most refugee flows.

Secondly, the proliferation of small arms and its misuse generates a climate of fear and a culture of violence that can last for generations. Insecurity affects decision-making, access to food, water and shelter, as well as mobility and commerce. Those most in need are the most affected. Thirdly, small arm proliferation discourages foreign investment and damages the prospects of economic development, especially in developing nations.

The devastating effect of arms flows especially in developing nations is unimaginable. It has been noted earlier that one of the fall-outs of the cold war era was the legacy of reciprocal interference by states in each other's internal affairs. There were glaring cases of this interference especially in central African region. Of course arms flows made this possible. Olu Adeniji (1998) argues that "Zaire under Mobutu was known to be a close collaborator with successive American governments in the delivery of arms to Savimbi and his UNITA movement against the legitimate government of the MPLA of Angola." President Mobutu again during the post-cold war era collaborated with the French in support of one faction during the Rwanda crisis of 1994. Therefore Zairean territory was used by "Rwandese insurgents to launch attacks on Rwanda after the take-over of the Rwandese Patriotic Front." It is a known fact too that the Congo Republic (Congo Brazzaville) under Patrick Lissouba allowed UNITA to use its territory (the town of Pointe Noire) as a supply base. Cross-border interventions have had a grand effect on the proliferation of small arms. Though arms themselves cannot ultimately be sighted as a cause of conflicts but its availability contributes to conflict intensity and even conflict duration. Adeniji (1998) submits:

Such ready availability, especially in quantities that can be guaranteed to insurgents by the government of a neighbouring state, often escalates what should be peaceful negotiations into armed conflicts.

Most internal conflicts are hugely intensified by external interventions and small arms are the weapons of warfare.

Adeniji (1998) argues that the situation of antagonism in the Central African region created an ideal environment for the free flow of arms. Though the availability of arms gave the vent for the antagonism in the first place but the porous border system of neighbouring countries in the region facilitated further dimension of the flow. Adeniji adds that small arms and light weapons have already begun to show in the sub region, the corrosive effect on civil society by the creation of the vicious circle between acute sense of personal insecurity and higher demand for this category of arms. No doubt small arms proliferations pose potent danger to the daily lives of people.

Small arm proliferation increases the level of criminal acts in a society. Edward J. Laurence (1998) notes that in places like Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and increasingly Costa Rica, the increased availability of military style light weapons has made crimes the number

one social problem. In Nigeria for instance, as the other countries mentioned above, small arms proliferation have facilitated kidnapping, assaults, robberies, car hijacking and trafficking of contraband. Laurence adds that “the increase in lethality that comes with military style weapons has emboldened criminals, who often are better armed than police or military forces.”

Arms flows in small arms category promote violent solution to conflicts. Availability of small arms makes violence the first option for conflict resolution or management. At the absence of weapons, options may be avoidance or joint problem solving but arms gives rise to confrontation and this frustrates efforts to restore peace and stability in conflict regions. Disputes are settled by the use of force because the instruments to facilitate that are readily present. Laurence (1998) points out that in Guatemala the distribution of arms to the civilian patrols (20,000 weapons to 400,000 people) has resulted in a preference for solving problems by force. The United Nations has termed violent response to social problems as “mental militarisation”.

Again the constant condition of instability in countries affected by conflicts has been the major cause of such countries’ inability to “build national structures of government for the promotion of peace and security which are in turn necessary preconditions for sustainable development” (Adeniji 1998). In a World Bank’s publication Adeniji (1998) states “Armed conflict is responsible for the poverty of nearly half the population of Africa at least 250 million people.” Arms not only encourage children brutality by making them participants through their recruitment into the fighting forces, but also damage their future and the future of their countries. In his study of Central Africa Olu Adeniji submits that:

It is obvious that if countries in central Africa are to have any chance of realising sustainable development, they must first tackle the proliferation of arms, because so long as the weapons are in circulation, the potential for conflicts erupting or resuming will remain.

There is no doubt that increasing violence will see economic development projects either cancelled or postponed. With insecurity everywhere assets meant for peace building are confiscated by criminal activities. The point made is that crime and violence can disrupt the infrastructure needed for development. Thus small arm proliferation can stall or threaten economic or social development.

Some of the effects of small arm proliferation discussed above have led to a “circle of violence in which citizens protect themselves either with their own arms or hire one of an increasing number of private security organisation” (Laurence 1998). In Nigeria for instance several neighbourhood vigilante and militia groups have emerged, from the OPC to Bakkasi Boys, to MEND and now Boko Haram. These Nigerian groups are in one way or the other trying to provide security for themselves- social security, political security, economic security and military security. They no doubt constitute violence to the Nigerian populace. They hold several Nigerians hostage because of arm proliferation. Laurence (1998) points out that in Guatemala over 4500 groups in the class of the ones above have emerged as well as 33 authorised and 115 unauthorised private security organisations. Laurence adds that Guatemala loosened its gun possession law in 1992 so as to allow more citizens protect themselves. In any country emerging from conflict, a large number of small arms in the hands of individuals complicate any solution based on disarmament by voluntary weapons collection.

Small arm proliferation serves as a threat to democratic political development. When states try to nurture a new democratic political system or in attempt to prevent it from declining to an authoritarian state, the circle of violence in such states and the growing arms culture allows and in some cases fosters the increased use of state violence and repression. Such actions threaten to lead to the development of or turn to violence by opposition forces, just when such forces have been disbanded. Examples of these are in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala (Laurence 1998). The struggle as portrayed above is in essence a shift in power relations. Another apt example is in Burma, where elections were held and the democratic party of Aung San Suu Kyi won an overwhelming victory. But rather than stepping down, the military rulers hung on to power, persecuting, and killing protesters and dissidents (Rupsinghe 1998). When there are no alternatives in a state and those in power label themselves democratic in a repressive system the people take up arms.

In all the effects raised above, most of their impacts have been on civilians. You will agree with me that the number of people killed and injured from the use of small arms or armed violence has increased significantly in the past few years. In addition to this harm the lethality of the weapons ensures that the injuries are more severe, creating huge strains on the health care systems of the countries affected, (Laurence 1998). Of course the use of weapons with the intent to cause physical harm can be seen from the health perspective because, “ultimately, it affects people’s physical, psychological and social well- being” (Coupland, 2005).

A study by Robin M. Coupland (2005) discovered the effects of armed violence on health. The study enumerated four risk factors as a basis for modeling armed violence. These risk factors for a given effect are the:

1. Potential of the weapon to cause the effect (corresponding to design)
2. Number of potential users armed (corresponding to production and transfer)
3. Vulnerability of the victim (the potential to suffer the effect)
4. Potential for violence (intentional use for physical force).

Each of the effects of small arm proliferation discussed above is generated as long as the potential of each risk factor enumerated has a positive value. Each of the factors pointed out is necessary but not sufficient cause of the effects in question. The risk factors themselves interact but we may not say exactly how they do that. Coupland noted that the potential for violence using weapon must be influenced by the user's perceptions of the other three risk factors. By implication, the relationship between weapons and violence is played out in the psychology of the user or users. He further argued that "By extrapolation, the weapons themselves and their availability are major determinants of the nature, timing and extent of armed violence." Expressing the effects of small arm proliferation in terms of violence be it psychological, physical or structural, it is clear that reducing the availability of small arms is not the only measure that might prevent these effects, and again, the focus of "transfer (especially on illicit transfers only) is one step removed from removing the effects" (Coupland 2005).

There may be more appropriate measures to prevent the effects of small arm proliferation. Coupland (2005) presents these preventive measures this way:

Limiting the potential of the weapon to cause the effect by reducing the availability of ammunition... other means to reduce the immediate availability of military rifles, such as voluntary submission, forced disarmament, buy back programmes, exchanges and encouraging or enforcing safe storage. Means to reduce vulnerability of unarmed people include ensuring good governance, building an effective police force with hand guns only...

If these preventive measures are in place without any particular measure dominating, the measures may act in a kind of synergy.

There are arguments that when the guns are not there people carry out their intentions with machetes, this is true but the “potential of a single military rifle to cause multiple deaths is obviously much higher than a commonly available farm machete” (Coupland 2005).

Despite embargoes, demilitarisation and disarmament processes, this challenge pose a lot of threat hence the need to improve on strategies to control them and also implement agreements in this area.

According to Manuel Pastor and James K. Boyce (2000) the Central American civil wars of 1980s, occurring in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, can be described as complex humanitarian emergencies (CHE). Mats Lundahl (2000) quoting Raimo Vayrynen defines humanitarian emergency as a “profound social crisis in which a large number of people die and suffer from war, disease, hunger, and displacement owing to man made and natural disasters, while some other may benefit from it”. The civil wars in Central America are in line with this definition. For instance, El Salvador’s 12-year civil war claimed some 75,000 lives while the four decades of armed conflict in Guatemala killed approximately 100,000 people (Pastor and Boyce 2000). Many more people as argued by the above authors ‘were forced to flee their homes, with some estimates suggesting the displacement of one to two million Central Americans, nearly half of whom crossed international borders.

The roots of the El Salvador war can be traced to the latter half of the 19th century, when the country became a major producer and exporter of coffee. In response to the opportunities presented by coffee, “communal property was abolished by state decree in 1882. By the turn of the century the indigenous communities had been forcibly evicted, and the country’s best coffee lands converted into *latifundia*, large estates owned by the 14 families who formed the core of the ruling oligarchy (Pastor and Boyce 2000). Of course there were revolutions in responses to what was perceived as economic oppression and the military quickly crushed the revolt and about 10,000-30,000 people were killed by government forces.

While organised violence persisted in El Salvador, the option of possible armed revolution was considered as a viable vehicle for social change by the people. With this possibility for change, the peasant armed themselves with small arms that flooded Central America from neighbouring states. By 1979 some guerrilla activity had begun. Efforts were made to remedy the situation but the death of Archbishop of San

Salvador, Oscar Romero, whom Pastor and Boyce (2000) considered the most famous victim of the crisis worsened the situation. The Archbishop was said to be a national figure that was consistent in his calls for social justice, dialogue and peace. He was assassinated during a mass. The crisis situations in El Salvador that came to be known as a complex humanitarian emergency kicked off at the burial of Archbishop Oscar Romero, Pastor and Boyce (2000) captures it this way:

The limits were even more sharply etched when the thousands of people who gathered in Central San Salvador for his funeral were attacked with bombs and machine guns by military forces, leaving scores dead. By the end of 1980, the bulk of the leftist opposition concluded that avenues for peaceful opposition to the government had been closed. On 10 January 1981, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), a group named after the communist leader executed during la Matanzas, launched a military offensive... sporadic guerrilla warfare, roving death squads, and chaotic street demonstrations had 'matured' into full fledged civil war.

The civil war in El Salvador as earlier noted recorded high death rate and high degree of economic effects. No doubt, like any other civil war, the tool of perpetuating these murderous killings is small arms that proliferated. Though it is on record that heavy ammunitions were used during the civil conflict, it is certain that the most common instrument is small arm.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you assess the effects of small arm proliferation in Africa?

4.0 CONCLUSION

It is clear from our study above that small arms proliferation does not have one single effect. It impoverishes the people and keeps them in perpetual fear and no doubt insecurity affects decision making. This in turn affects all aspects of the society.

5.0 SUMMARY

This unit discussed the effects of small arms proliferation and discovered that they are diverse. The most outstanding effect being that the world lives in insecurity. The unit therefore stressed the need to improve on the strategies to control arms or eliminate them.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Discuss in details three effects of small arms proliferation.

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UNIT 5 CIVIL WARS AND SMALL ARMS

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- 3.0 Main Content
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

This unit introduces you to the roles of small arms in civil wars. The unit traces the causes of conflicts and affirms that the 20th century experienced the highest number of wars and the cruelest in history.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be to:

- give reasons why the world cultivate a culture of war
- explain the devastating roles of small arms in civil wars.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Civil Wars and Small Arms

The term civil war is used to describe a range of conflict situations. Martin Creveld characterises a state of modern civil war as one in which “armed forces is directed by social entities that are non-state...(and where) the legal monopoly of armed forces long claimed by the state, is wrestled out of its hands, (and) existing distinctions between war and crime... breakdown.” Peter Calvocoresi asserts that civil wars are wars which cut across the neat and tidy demarcations between states and non-states (and) have added to the repertory of war” (Rupesinghe, 1998). There are two basic variants of civil war:

- 1) When the control of the state is the source of contest.
- 2) When one part of the population wants to form a new state or join a neighboring state (Schmid, 2000).

Civil wars can also be triggered by external factors. At this instance, it is known as proxy wars. Most often, they are the result of intra-elite conflicts, with factions mobilising its groups. Within the academic community researches are ongoing to track and assess conflict situations, the scale and intensity of violence witnessed in recent times as stated earlier is immeasurable.

Civil wars of diverse intensity have painted the world with red, especially since the 20th century. As noted earlier, most of these wars are being fought with small arms. In Somalia, the civil war started at the end of 1990, this was about when it escalated in Mogadishu causing the remaining people in the country to flee. An alliance against President Siad Barre in October 1990 and fighting between the government and the opposition continued until the collapse of Barre's regime in January 1999, leaving thousands dead (Juha Auvinen and Timo Kivimaki, 2000). With the collapse of the regime, fighting continued among factional militaries resulting in tens of thousands of deaths. Bryden (1995) in Auvinen and Kivimaki (2000) put it at 30,000 and Salih and Wohlgemuth 1994 notes that it generated almost a million refugees inside and outside Somalia. The country attracted global attention, again some 18 months later when the United Nations intervened and as the international community made efforts to curb the violence and bring relief to the famine.

Siad Barre's dictatorial rule brought many casualties, this dates back to the overthrow of Somalia's elected parliament in October 1969. The 1970s experienced small conflicts between different groups and the government (Barre's army). The Somali war witnessed a high flow of refugees across the horn of Africa region. The war generated a lot of humanitarian emergencies. Auvinen and Kivimaki (2000) describe the war as acute. They point out that the availability of guns as both a precondition for successful mobilisation as well as an important cause of contention among political elites led to the death of many. The point is that small arms contributed to the escalation of war in Somalia.

The war in Afghanistan was another that generated a high degree of humanitarian emergency. The social stresses in Afghanistan became visible in the 1970s. The government had intermittently repressed members of various elites (tribal, religious or education). The repressed elites were thought to pose a political threat. Barnett R. Rubin (2000) points out that a severe drought in 1971 -72 created widespread hunger in parts of the country, and corrupt government officials profited from some of the international aid. The war in Afghanistan caused "not only physical destruction but social, economic and political destructions" (Rubin 2000). It is natural of any war to break the bonds that hold numerous forms of productive life. Rubin argues that war can attain and

sustain such intensity in a poor, pre-dominantly agricultural and pastoral society like Afghanistan only if it is funded and supported from outside the country. Afghanistan is said to be a victim of “struggles for power and wealth by global, regional, and domestic actors” Cold War actors played a predominant role in the Afghan war. The activities led to a major increase in weapons supplies as well as in humanitarian assistance to some parts of Afghanistan.

The state largely disintegrated, including the army. Rubin submits that it was not only the quality of weapons that led to the Afghanistan devastation but the way they were distributed. He adds that the effect of the supply of weapons to Afghanistan was eventually to maximise their accumulation while minimising their concentration. The supplies caused the mayhem in Afghanistan and it equally made the country not only the most armed state on earth on per capita basis, but many of these weapons were under no effective institutions control, and the number under such control decreased with the collapse of the state and army (Rubin 2000).

Mujahidin is one of the parts that received aids in form of weapons and dispersed them in an uncontrollable manner among various solidarity groups in the population and their activities to a great extent undermined human security. Rubin observes that the weapons were imported into Pakistan for Mujahidin and they remained under a centralised, hierarchical control as long as they were in the custody of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) which distributed the weapons to the Afghans. The war in Afghanistan destroyed farmlands- destruction of irrigation, livestock being shot, burning of crops, destruction of grain stores, bombing of the villages and livestock killed by landmine. The country became increasingly dependent on external supplies of food. Heavy weapons were used in Afghanistan, but small arms contributed immensely to the five million internally displaced persons.

Civil wars and other forms of social conflicts stand as the greatest challenge to human security. Once civil war breaks out in any society, the entire population becomes polarised along group lines, each claiming its own rights and individual identity. This menace causes the number of displaced persons to swell, homes destroyed and the economy devastated. At this instance violence becomes the status quo for years.

Small arms and light weapons thus is not only a threat to security but it undermines development, aggravates economic and social exclusion, leads to bad governance, places heavy burden on social services and diverts resources from development to fighting wars and crimes. Some

analysts have argued that the real war situation comes much after the shelling. To this end, it has been argued that:

The real experience of war is not the shelling and so on, those are just moments, though they are the ones you see on TV war is what happens afterwards, the years of suffering hopelessly with a disabled husband and no money, or struggling to rebuild all your property has been destroyed (Rupesinghe, 1998).

The proliferation of small arms has led to series of ignominious civil wars and these have posed obstacles to today's world. Can these obstacles be removed? Can they really be terminated? If yes, then how? The how is only by changing the strategies. This can be through peace education, investing in leadership development, making war an unprofitable venture, reducing power asymmetry and encouraging power symmetry and above all guaranteeing security. These can be achieved despite the challenges that come with it.

From Europe to Africa, America to Asia the Caribbean the world at large faces imminent and destructive situations of war. "Throughout history, conflict and war over land, strategic routes, water ways, oil, fresh water, precious minerals and a myriad of other resources have plagued humanity, often they come in different guises, sometimes as ethnic warfare, other time as ideological struggles, and often in circumstances of great poverty. Ironically, it is not the absolute lack of resources, which breeds violence; rather it is the struggle for the control of certain resources, which generates the worst conflicts" (Rupesinghe, 1998). Whatever be the source of war, it causes starvation, deepens poverty and ruin lives. War multiplies the gap between the rich and the poor as the entrepreneurs of conflict feed on people's lives. Millions of lives have been lost to the scourge of war especially since the 20th century. To this end Roche (2003) affirms that:

In the 20th century, at least 110million people were killed in 250 wars. This is six times the number of war-related deaths as in the previous century. More than six million people have died in war since the end of the Cold War, when global security should have improved. The 21st century does not offer many

prospects for improvement. In 2001 alone, 37 armed conflicts were fought in 30 countries. More than 600 million small arms are in circulation around the world, and they have been used to kill 500,000 people a year.

The point made is that the world has cultivated a culture of war that was facilitated by the proliferation and spread of illicit small arms.

The war in Vietnam that saw a US involvement in 1968 claimed one million Vietnamese and 58,000 US troops. War claims more lives per day than nature itself. Added to the above are the mass genocide in Cambodia in the 1970's the Bosnia war, 1992-95 and the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Others include civil conflicts in Somalia, Sierra Leone, DR Congo, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, Ivory Coast and several other parts of the world, Nigeria, not exempted. It is also a fact that wars are no longer about soldiers who are trained for the art of killing soldiers; civilians have also become front liners in war. The worst callousness of war in the contemporary age is the spectacles of child soldiers. To this effect Roche (2003) affirms:

Some 300,000 youths under age 18 have fought in recent years in conflict ranging from Sri Lanka to Cambodia, from Chechnya to Sudan. The widely used AK-47 assault rifle, for example, can be easily carried and used to deadly effect by children as young as ten. The New York Times recently reported that in Ivory Coast- a country rich with cocoa, timber, and diamonds - guns are as plentiful as mangoes in March, and longstanding tribal enmities are easily deployed. As are hungry, bored teenagers with a gun in hand and a chance to star in their own Schwarzenegger fantasies.

During the periods of World Wars I and II and leading to the Cold War, conflicts, especially wars were associated with big and powerful weapons. After the Cold War things changed as most of the killings were done with small arms just like Roche points out, small arms abound in different countries of the world. Most wars fought in recent years are perpetrated with small arms. Their proliferation contributed to the soaring of civil wars and violent crimes. With the help of globalisation, illicit small arms have penetrated expansive and porous

borders to the detriment of the receiving nation “the manufacture of these weapons have risen sharply and is widespread. A survey of the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva estimates that 1,000 companies in 98 countries produced the 639 million small arms that are in circulation today. The trade in illicit arms swells this number (Roche, 2003). The irony is that the biggest producers and traders on small arms in the world are those countries at the helm of affairs of security. They direct all proposals for disarmament yet they also counter them. These countries include the USA, Russia, China, the UK, France and Germany. Small arms have indeed become the real weapons of mass destruction, through the scourge of war and criminal activities.

The Somali crisis is rooted in relations between social identity groups. The identities were described not to be ethnic, linguistic or religious. To Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1996) “nearly all Somalis are ethnically and (except for one major distinct dialect) linguistically homogeneous, and nearly all are Muslim. They added that the basis of Somali society and the roots of the current conflict lie in the family, sub-clan and clan system.

Somalia gained independence in 1960 from Italy and has been described as to fit into Robert Jackson’s (1990) ‘quasi-states’. When Siad Barre initiated his long, disastrous dictatorship in 1969, he courted the Soviet Union and tried to construct a socialist state on that foundation. Ramsbotham and Woodhouse notes that Somalia were induced to call each other ‘challe’ –comrade – and a concerted assault was mounted on nepotistic clan politics. Following this action, the traditional institution of clan elders was therefore weakened and could not be replaced with an effective substitute. After the catastrophic war of 1977-88 with Ethiopia, Barre’s grip weakened that he came to depend on clan support.

The issues in Somalia are both of economic misery and political problems. The two are so intertwined that it is hard to explain one without the other (Samuel Maleinda 1993). At the end, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse add that:

The collapse of the official Somali economy signaled the collapse of the state. Black Markets flourished. Oases of localised self-help co-existed with organised crime... decreasing amounts of revenue reached the government outside and became one of the few sources of revenue, channeled by Siad Barre, together with money and weapons to his supporters.

Barre was consistent in distribution of arms to his supporters. He had opened his large arsenal and distributed it for the destruction of Mogadishu to the point that when he fled in 1991, he bequeathed to his successors a non-existent state.

Some external factors also fuelled the crisis in the Horn of Africa. Somalia has a warrior culture thus they had fought against Christian colonisation in the Horn of Africa region since the 16th century; it took British and European troops to put down a fierce jihad from the Somalis. As they fought in the 1920s, modern weapons littered the land. Soviet Union who had been a major supporter of Siad Barre and supplier of arms to the rogue state, later backed Ethiopia for a more advantageous alliance. In the words of Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1996), "Since Somalia has no indigenous arms industry; all the weapons flooding the country were supplied by outsiders, particularly the great powers." As the country became awash with weapons, supplied by Cold War patrons, fighting became endemic in many areas. Spears were automatically replaced with modern weaponry. To a great extent, the war in Somalia put guns in the hands of an average Somali.

The Nigerian civil war is also worthy of mention here. According to Abdullahi Shelleng (1984) the wherewithal with which the civil war was conducted is an important issue that should be examined. Shelleng noted that:

The Nigerian side started the war with mainly infantry, small arms, weapons and few artillery guns or armoured cars. However, within the first few weeks of the war, the Biafrans introduced the notorious B.26 bomber and helicopters which harassed the federal troops in the front lines and the civilian population in the rear.

Shalleng's testimony recorded that different kinds of weapons flooded Nigeria from Britain, France, Russia and private individuals within the neighbouring West African States. No doubt, the weapons especially small arms that circulated within Nigeria during the civil war (1967-70) were responsible for the terror unleashed on Nigerians over the years. Small arms have served as instruments of warfare in several ethnic and religious crises in Nigeria.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

With abundant examples discuss the humanitarian emergencies caused by civil wars.

4.0 CONCLUSION

You can see from our study that the proliferations of small arms have contributed to the soaring of civil wars and violent crimes. It is clear that through illicit trade, small arms have penetrated expansive and porous borders to the detriment of the receiving nations.

5.0 SUMMARY

This unit concludes that small arms have become the real weapons of mass destruction. The unit identified several conflicts around the world and why the wars are fought. Most of the wars are fought with small arms.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Wars are no longer about soldiers who are trained for the art of killing soldiers, civilians have also become active participants in wars. How does this assertion illustrate the role of small arms in civil wars?

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MODULE 4 WEAPONRY AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Unit 1	Light Weapons and Landmines
Unit 2	Deadly Conventional Weaponry and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Unit 3	Nuclear Weapons
Unit 4	Spread of Nuclear Weapons
Unit 5	Nuclear Strategy

UNIT 1 LIGHT WEAPONS AND LANDMINES

CONTENTS

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Weaponry and weapons of mass destruction has been a threat to humanity, during and after the Cold War. The term weapons of mass destruction are characterised by complexities of definition and usage. A weapon of mass destruction is a weapon that kills and brings significant harm to a large number of humans; it can as well cause damages to man-made structures like buildings, natural structures like mountains or to the biosphere in general. The scope and application of the term has evolved over the years and it is been disputed. The term was coined in reference to aerial bombing with chemical explosives; it has come to distinguish large scale weaponry of other technologies, such as chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear. The term was formerly differentiated from small arms, but in recent times small arms are said to have killed more people than the above mentioned weapons.

The term was first used in 1937 by the Archbishop of Canterbury Cosmo Gordon Long in reference to the aerial bombardment of

Guernica, Spain. The Archbishop posits “...who can think without horror of what another widespread war would mean, waged as it would be with all the new weapons of mass destruction?” As at that time there were no nuclear weapons, biological weapons were still being researched by Japan and chemical weapons were in use during World War I. Following atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and progressing through the Cold War, the term came to refer to non-conventional weapons.

The term evolved and during the Cold War it was used to refer to nuclear weapons. The term continued to see periodic usage, but with the end of the cold war, the US ceased to use nuclear strategy as a deterrent and shifted to disarmament. Though there has been an increased fear of non-conventional weapons and asymmetric warfare.

This unit introduces you to the concept of light weapons and considered them to be negative development. The unit describes specifically what light weapons are.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- explain what are light weapons and landmines
- write on the nature of landmines
- list weapons under the category of light weapons.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Light Weapons and Landmines

In the words of Lodgaard and Fung (1998), “Light weapons are weapons that are man-portable or transportable by light vehicles and that do not require much in terms of service, logistical backup training.” Light weapons in its wider category comprise small-caliber canons, light support weapons, combat grenades, anti-personnel mines, mortars, anti-tank weapons, anti-tank mines etc.

The proliferation of these weapons has posed a threat to the international community, thus the need to curb the menace. The essence of curbing this is to foster conflict prevention. Conflict prevention guarantees human security. But an environment that ensures human security cannot be flowing with arms especially those coming in from conflict regions, thus the need for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. Also to cut the flow and effects of light weapons there is also need for

repatriation and reintegration of refugees. Several other measures must be put in place to check this negative development.

The war in Sierra Leone and Liberia was further encouraged by arms proliferation. In a survey assessing the distribution of arms in Sierra Leone, the common types of weapons at the time of collection as they were used in the war were short guns, locally made rifles, automatic assault rifles. Before the war, illicit trafficking routes were rich, structured and highly regular affairs. The Sierra Leonean cities like Bo had well-known markets and traders, many of whom were from Lebanon and Syria, (Derek Miller, et al. 2006). In this survey Derek Miller, et al. state that border trafficking between Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia started long before the war. The demand of weapons in the category under analysis increased due to fighting in the said areas.

The African Union (AU) has continued to make progress in the fight against illicit trafficking and circulations of small arms and light weapons on the continent. AU's common position on the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons was adopted in December 2000 by the Council of Ministers of the OAU, as Africa's input to the negotiations on the United Nation's programme of action to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects (UNPOA). Member states under the declaration agreed to identify, seize and destroy illicit weapons.. It was also provided in the declaration for the establishment of measures to control the circulation, transfer and use of small arms and light weapons. The executive council decision of the eight ordinary session of the Executive Council of the AU of January 2006 called on the AU commission to take the necessary steps towards the establishment of a legally binding instrument to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in weapons in Africa. Consequently, the AU commission has established a mechanism for coordination, policy guidance, research, and monitoring circulation of small arms and light weapons through the ad hoc AU – regions steering committee on small arms and light weapons. It comprises the regional economic communities namely:

- The East African Community (EAC)
- The Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)
- The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
- The Economic Community of Central States (ECCAS)
- The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
- The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
- The Southern African Development Community (SADG)
- The Arab Maghreb Union (UMA).

Also, the AU organised three conference related to the issue of landmines. The first “continental conference of African experts on land mines” held May 19-21, 1997 in Kempton Park, South Africa. The conference was a major step towards a continental approach to addressing the problem of landmines. The second conference of continental experts on landmines was held 15-17 September 2004. The third conference was held September 9-11, 2009; the third reviewed the progress made by member states in making Africa anti-personnel mines free.

3.2 Landmines

Landmine is a victim-triggered explosive device which is intended to damage its target via blast and fragments. The name originated from the practice of mining, where tunnels were dug under enemy fortifications or forces. Landmines were designed for the main purposes which are to create defensive tactical barriers such as protecting a unit’s flanks against infiltration tactics, channeling attacking forces into predetermined fire zones or slowing an invasion force’s progress to allow reinforcement to arrive, and to act as passive area-denial weapons in order to deny the enemy use of valuable terrain, resources or facilities when active defence of the area is not desirable or possible. The current use of landmines is largely and primarily on the first purpose and the reason for their widespread use in the demilitarised zones of likely flash points such as Cyprus, Afghanistan and Korea.

3.2.1 The Nature of Landmines

A landmine can be triggered by a number of things including pressure, movement, sound, magnetism and vibration. Anti-personnel mines commonly use the pressure of a person’s foot as a trigger, but tripwires are also frequently employed. Most modern anti-vehicle mines use a magnetic trigger to enable it to detonate even if the tires or tracks did not touch it. Advanced mines are able to sense the difference between friendly and enemy types of vehicles by way of a built-in signature catalog. This will theoretically enable friendly forces to use the mine area while denying the enemy access. Mines may be dropped from helicopters or airplanes.

It should be noted that the process of placing landmines is less expensive than its detection and removal. This process is equally slow and dangerous. It is difficult to find unmarked mines and anti-personnel mines are the most difficult to find, this is due to the fact that they are of small size and many of them are made almost entirely of non-metallic materials specifically to escape detection. Manual clearing remains the

most effective technique for clearing minefields, though hybrid technique involving the use of animals and robots are being developed. Indeed, landmines have become plague to humanity. Rourke (2001) posits that they wait with menacing silence and near invisibility in the fields of Cambodia, on the paths of Angola, in the hills of Bosnia and elsewhere around the globe. They have been said to be patiently killing and maiming today, yet they will wait until tomorrow or many years to claim a victim. They are non-discriminating in selecting a victim, they care not whether it is the boot of a military officer or a child's foot that causes them to sprout and do the damage.

In the words of Rourke (2001) "The civil war in Angola is now over; landmines there still randomly will kill an average of 120 people a month." According to UNICEF, he adds, 75% of mine victims in El Salvador are children. Mines have taken a limb or an eye from one out of every 236 Cambodians; 80,000 have been killed. Sam Soa was trying to find his cow in a field near his village when he stepped on a mine. In Sam Soa's words "It knocks you down, I didn't realise what had happened and I tried to run away." This was unfortunate as Sam Soa could not run away, his left leg was gone. Rourke adds that it is impossible to know exactly how many landmines lie around the world, but a US state department report, "Hidden killers 1998; The Global Land mine Crisis" puts the figure at 60 to 70 million in 60 countries. Egypt, with 23 million mines dug into its soil, many dating back to World War II, has the most landmine on its territory. You will recall that the Nigerian civil war ended in 1970 but not until May 2010, some landmines were still discovered around Ngor Okpalla of Imo State.

3.2.2 Anti-Personnel Mines (APM)

According to Zdzislaw Lachowski (2001), "It is estimated that more than 250 million anti-personnel mines (APMs) are stored in the arsenals of 105 countries, according to landmine Report 2000." He adds that while the military utility of these weapons in interstate conflicts has been increasingly called into question they are still used extensively along international borders and in intra-states conflicts.

The elimination of APMs occurred in the 1990s when the international community experienced a significant shift in attitudes towards that. The problems of anti-personnel mines was not substantially discussed in any disarmament forum before 1992, but progress came after the change of attitudes which led to the 1995/1996 review conference of the 1981 convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effect. These weapons are also referred to as inhumane weapons. CCW convention was for a long time

the only convention that prohibited the use of mines, booby traps and other devices. The 1995/1996 conference as pointed out by Lachowski (2001) underscored the extent of the problem, gained widespread support for a ban and, at its concluding session in May 1996, adopted an amended protocol II, further restrictions on the use, production and transfer of arms.

Lithuania became one of the 20 countries to ratify the amended protocol II on June 3, 1998, and entered into force on December 3 1998. Presidents Jiang Zemin and Bill Clinton issued the Sino-US presidential joint statement on anti-personnel landmines, in which they agreed to work towards early ratification of the amended protocol II and to urge others to ratify it. The US Senate approved the amended protocol II on May 20, 1999 and President Clinton signed the instrument of ratification on May 24 1999, making the USA a party to the protocol II (Lachowski, 2001). The parties to the protocol II had their first annual conference in which the USA proposed:

- (a) strengthening protocol restrictions on the use of landmines, particularly anti-vehicle mines (delectability and providing self-destructing and self-deactivation mechanisms remotely delivered anti-vehicle mines)
- (b) increasing the reliability of remotely delivered mines
- (c) adopting a three-step procedure similar to that of the 1997 APM convention for handling cases and allegations of non-compliance (Lachowski 2011).

The conference did not give much support to the US proposal, but the US has since built support for the initiative, attracting more states to support the proposal. As at December 2000, 58 countries had ratified the protocol including China, India, Pakistan, the UK and the USA.

Table 4: The Status of the APM convention, as of 1 December 2000

Region	Signed but not ratified	Acceded and Ratified	Unable to accede/opposed	Unknown undecided	Total
Africa	13	30	2	8	53
Asia-pacific	6	20	6	24	56
Americas	6	27	2	0	35
Europe	5	32	2	8	47
Total	30	109	12	40	191

Source: Zdzislaw Lachowski 2011

The APM conventions were a hybrid agreement combining arms control and humanitarian law. The agreement comprises 22 articles and envisages no reservation or exceptions for specific types of weapon or their conditional use. Lachowski points out that well-spelt out in the agreement are the moral and humanitarian considerations that are at the fore and that the APMs are clearly defined as mines designed to be exploded by the direct “presence”, proximity or contact of a person, not just as those primarily designed to do so. The word primarily was tagged controversial and eventually dropped from the amended CCW protocol II. The APM convention in a way of definition explicitly excluded anti-tank and anti-vehicle mines equipped with anti-handling devices to prevent tampering. An anti-handling device is one “intended to protect a mine and which is part of linked to, attached to or placed under the mine” (Lachowski, 2001).

As stated under the terms of the convention, “small numbers of APMs – the minimum number absolutely necessary can be retained or transpired for the development of and training in mine detection, clearance or destruction techniques, and the transfer of the APMs for the purpose of destruction is permitted.” The APM convention did not take so much before coming into force. It entered into force as soon as the requirement of 40 signatories was achieved. This development happened within nine months. Thus Burkina-Faso, the 40th country to ratify the convention on September 18, 1998 gave vent to the convention that came into force on March 1, 1999. 139 countries had signed or ratified the convention as at 1 December, 2000 and 109 others had become parties. On the other hand 52 states had not acceded to the convention among these are China, Russia and the USA; these three are members of the UN Security Council permanent members. Others are major landmine producers India and Pakistan, most of the former Soviet republics and many countries in Asia. The figure of all signatories and parties to the convention is shown in table 4. They included “all the states of the western hemisphere except Cuba and the USA, all NATO nation’s except Turkey and the USA, all European Union members states except Finland, 43 African countries and 26 states in the Asia – pacific” (Lachowski, 2001).

The convention is weakened however by the absence of a strong monitoring and enforcement provisions. The Landmine Monitor, a civil society based monitoring network was among other things established to compensate for the absence of a traditional verification mechanism. This is to assess the implementation and progress of and compliance with the APM convention and to generally monitor other aspects of the “global landmine crisis in all countries of the world” (Lachowski 2001). Despite these efforts, landmines still cover fields and transport routes. Rupesinghe (1998), states that “50 countries produce 350 types of

landmines. There are an estimated 120 million landmines planted in 64 countries.” He added that it would cost US\$33-85billion to clear these mines.”

3.3 Safe Removal of Landmines

There are several organisations involved in the safe removal of landmines, especially the Norwegian NGO of Norwegian peoples aid. There has also been a treaty prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines. The treaty known as the “Ottawa Treaty” came into force on March 1, 1999.

This was the result of the leadership of the government of Canada working with the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) launched in 1992. The treaty was considered to be great achievement, but it does not include anti-tank mines, cluster bombs, or clay more-type mines. This is because anti-personnel mines poses the greatest long term (post-conflict) risk to humans and animals alike since they are typically designed to be triggered by any movement or pressure of only a few kilogrammes, whereas anti-tank mines requires much more weight.

Signatories of the Ottawa treaty agreed that they will not use, develop, manufacture, stockpile or trade in anti-personnel mines.

In 1997, there were 122 signatories to the treaty, while as at 2009 there were 158 signatories but ratified in only 153 countries. The big threat to this is the fact that 38 other states are not party to the convention, Russia, China, U.S.A inclusive. Landmine is a persistent danger to humanity (ICBL, Needham 1986 and Wikipedia).

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss in details what you understand to be light weapons and landmines.

4.0 CONCLUSION

From what we have studied in this unit, it is clear that light weapons cover a wide variety of weapons. The study pointed out the need to curb the menace caused by these weapons so as to prevent conflict. As you can also observe, landmines are so complicated. We discovered that the process of developing and placing a landmine is less expensive than its detection and removal. The device is therefore highly destructive.

5.0 SUMMARY

The unit X-rayed what light weapons and landmines are and the dangers or threats they portray to humanity.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Discuss light weapons in the wider category.

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UNIT 2 DEADLY CONVENTIONAL WEAPONRY AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

CONTENTS

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

This unit introduces you to conventional weapons classified as weapons of mass destruction. The unit explores the usage of these weapons as deterrence yet stands as a threat of war.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- explain what constitutes a weapon of mass destruction
- highlight efforts made to reduce the spread.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Deadly Conventional Weaponry and Weapons of Mass Destruction

Deadly conventional weaponry and weapons of mass destruction as its name implies are destructive weapons bearing a symmetrical non pictorial design. They are conventional because, they came by treaty, that is why it is stated above that the power that agree to it are symmetrical, at least to a certain dimension. Deadly conventional weaponry is known to be threats of war. Bernard Brodie (1959) points out that the threat of war, whether explicit or implicit, has always been an instrument of policy whereby one government dissuaded another

from pursuing certain courses of action. To this fact, advanced weapons technology and the fact that the technology constantly changes is intimately connected to the calculus of deterrence. However, the question aroused the vulnerability of these strategic weapons to surprise attacks. The weapons in the category were considered so highly destructive, that the superpowers, especially during the Cold War years and precisely the US and the USSR deployed them as a deterrence to check the use and proliferation of weapons in this category.

The two powers therefore deployed numbers of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) so as to make it impossible for either power to consider itself capable of launching a surprise first-strike against the other's missile forces without incurring a heavy damage in retaliation (Dougherty and Pfalzgraff, 1981). Weapons in this category include nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

3.1.1 Massive Retaliation Begins

World War II ended with over 150,000 Soviet troops stationed in Eastern Europe. This was to maintain the balance of power in Europe but two options however were available to NATO leadership. One was to master masses of conventional forces from NATO's war weary member states and the other was to have the number of conventional forces decreased. NATO was to mobilise for this while relying on the growing nuclear arsenal of the United States. Troubled by the casualties from the Korean war, and the rebuilding of western European nations, the United States were hesitant to counter the Soviet force by purely conventional means, thus the leadership of NATO at a meeting in Lisbon in 1952 choose to balance the Soviet conventional forces with the nuclear arsenal of the United States. The United States had led the world in the early 1950s in the design and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons delivery system. The leadership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) felt secure in relying on American nuclear might to counter Soviet conventional power in eastern Europe following the large and growing fleet of intercontinental bombers and a large stockpile of variety of nuclear weapons of the US. The United States began deploying tactical nuclear weapon to NATO military bases across western Europe in 1953. The reliance of NATO on the United States kept the balance of power for a short while, until technological advances in both the US and the Soviet Union once again upset the international balance of power.

Within the same period, the two states possessed some sort of fusion bomb. The technological advances increased Soviet's nuclear capabilities, leveling the nuclear playing field slightly between the USSR and the US while the United States dominated the realm of long-

range bombers, Soviet Union's mid-range bombers could easily strike targets in western Europe and a few newly developed Soviet jet bombers could strike the continental United States. The reign of NATO and the US in nuclear technology was shown to be supreme, while the Soviet Union was catching up. To prepare against a Soviet attack, NATO officially adopted a strategy of massive retaliation in 1956. Under massive retaliation, NATO resolved to respond to any attack on itself with an extensive nuclear retaliation.

3.1.2 Offensive-Defensive System

By the late 1960s as noted *inter alia*, “new military-technological advances in the fields of ballistic missile defense and multiple warheads once again prompted writers to worry about the possibility that the international strategic situation, viewed in objective mathematical terms, was becoming less stable (Dougherty and Pfalzgraff, 1981). There was great fear that the land based missile complexes were to many, becoming vulnerable. Also, the advent of “anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) and multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV) might bring about a situation in which one side would be tempted to initiate a nuclear strike on the expectation of a lop-sided exchange” (Dougherty and Pfalzgraff, 1981). Some writers believed that political leaders had great desire for the balance of terror that it is the most overwhelming persuasive way to make in the foreseeable future, the increasing armament competition unattractive.

NATO defined the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as a weapon that is capable of a high order of destruction and of being used in such a manner as to destroy people, infrastructure or other resources on a large scale. Thus “attempts made by state or non-state actors to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer, or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or devices and their means of delivery or related material, including precursors, without prejudices to the rights and obligations of the states parties to the following agreement:

- a. The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT)
- b. The convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction (CWC)
- c. The convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction (BTWC) such attempts are seen to be proliferation of WMD.

3.2 A Transformed World: The Change in Thinking

The revolutions in eastern Europe of 1989 marked the end of the Soviet empire and charted a new course for European and by extension global security. The transformation was also in politics and economy. The politics of the once monolithic Soviet empire at its transformation changed the problem of securing Europe. Richard H. Ullman (1991) asserts that:

For four decades was divided by an ideological watershed that also separated the two alliances – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) – wielding the most powerful aggregations of military force the world has thus far known. Moreover, each of the contending alliances deployed and trained its armies according to doctrines emphasizing offensive tactics and aiming to make it more likely that a European War, if it ever come would be fought as much as possible on the other alliances territory...

The outcome of the actions of the above alliances was a “dangerous synergism”. Ullman adds that “So long as international tensions remained relatively low, each of these military organisations exercised a powerful deterrent effect on the other.”

The two organisations were caught in a whirlwind of confrontation over Germany. The German states were divided between the alliances, of course having two ideological blocs. Each of the states considering its economy served as the anchor of the ideological blocs, “possessing the most powerful armed forces other than those of the bloc’s superpower.” Ullman argues that the symbol of this division – not simply of Germany but of Europe itself - was the formidable barrier of masonry, barbed wire, sensors, and minefields constructed by the East Germans and their Soviet patrons on the frontier between the two German states, and a similar barricade surrounding the city of West Berlin.

In November 1989, the closed borders between the two German states suddenly became wide open and that marked the collapse of East German communist regime. The ideological bloc between the two states became in the words of Richard Ullman “a historical anachronism”. This action altered the hair-trigger confrontation of blocs and gave a different set of security arrangement.

3.3 Efforts to Reduce the Spread of WMD

Rolf Ekeus (2001) argues that the “1999 NATO Kosovo operation demonstrated the possibility of high-technology war-fighting at long distance without casualties for the technically superior side.” The advances in technology significantly improved communications, command, control and intelligence, which made it possible to hit target with exactness in both air and ground wars. In today’s wars, civilians and their habitants are the real targets. Most times in recent wars, civilian casualties are many times larger than the military. Ekeus adds that “increasingly, destructive means and methods of warfare are deployed. At any moment a war aims at maximum destruction, WMD tend to become attractive. With growing customer demand, the more important becomes supplier control.”

The end of Cold War witnessed a looming threat of considerable significance and pressure for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction following the regional tensions and conflicts in Africa, Asia, and Europe. The efforts to reduce the proliferation were threatened by some challenges. Rolf Ekeus (2001) sees these challenges to be “the increase of ethnically and racially based conflicts aiming at inflicting maximum casualties on the opponent, and the widening gap between the high-technology military capacity of the technically advanced countries and the standard and sometimes even rag-tag quality of the weapons and equipment of most developing countries. The gap as Ekeus submits constitutes a temptation for major developing countries to compensate for that difference by striving to acquire massively destructive weapons. With these challenges in mind, there are obvious reasons why the international treaties should be reviewed, that is, the treatise and norms which have been agreed upon with the aim of eliminating existing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and preventing their proliferation.

The spread of scientific knowledge in areas of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons has been for a significant number of years yet the “fine points in engineering, chemistry and biology are difficult to master”. Globalisation is seen as a threat to our collective security, thus it contribute greatly to the proliferation of WMD. Ekeus argues that the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction like terrorism, epidemics and disease do not know any boundaries.

There is a treaty framework of weapons of mass destruction but most times the treatise and norms are not usually comprehensive. Scholars though have argued that this is not a major problem rather that implementation and compliance are the problems that put regimes under pressure.

Chemical weapons

Rolf Ekeus (2001) points out that there is a disturbing trend or erosion of the implementation of the verification provisions of the chemical weapon convention (CWC). The non implementation of the verification provisions diminished the effectiveness of the activities of the convention's Organisation for the Prohibitions of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The decision making body of OPCW however had several modifications to the rules of verification. These modifications as noted by Ekeus, makes it possible for states parties to evade detection by restricting evidence that could document their own non-compliance.

A special case of non-compliance to the CWC was the Iraq's use of chemical weapon against its own population (Halabja) in 1980 and massively against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war. This case was a total violation of the 1925 Geneva protocol prohibiting the use of biological and chemical weapons which Iraq was party to and also ratified the treaty. State parties to the convention reacted out rightly against the violation. Ekeus notes that political expedience and almost unanimous backing of Iraq in its war with Iran explain this regrettable lack of defence of the Geneva protocol. Iraq's action should be registered as non-compliance with its obligations as regards chemical weapons.

Biological weapons

Biological weapons were considered for a long time not to pose any severe problems. The issues of security in the years of the Cold War were seen from the perspective of military adaptability and practicability. Biological weapons were not the battle field weapon of choice because it had a delayed effect on the enemy; hence the biological and toxin weapon convention (BTWC) was negotiated. This was quickly done that no one bothered to load the convention with verification, control and compliance provisions. Few years later, precisely in 1975, the BTWC came into force with concerns whether the Soviet Union really took seriously its obligation under the convention. Ekeus' study reveals that "after the collapse of the Soviet Union it was revealed that a massive biological weapons (BW) programme had been conducted by the country, starting simultaneously from the moment when the Soviet signature was put to the convention".

Weapons of mass destruction terrorised the world population on a large scale as mass murder was the outcome of biological warfare most times with states that signed and ratified the BTWC. Ekeus shows Iraq's possession of biological weapons this way:

Iraq's secret large-scale BW programme, disclosed by UN inspectors, surprised the international community and added to a concern which led to an agreement between the states parties to the BTWC to start serious negotiations on drafting a protocol on verification and monitoring of compliance with the convention. With the advent of the post-cold war era came a new type of armed conflicts-civil wars in which more civilians were targeted than uniformed combatants.

Efforts were therefore made to strengthen the BTWC after the disclosure of the large-scale of biological weapons development, testing, and production programmes in Iraq and Russia.

Nuclear weapons

The nuclear weapon non-proliferation treaty (NPT) came with two undertakings; the first was the undertaking not to acquire nuclear weapons, and the second was the undertaking to negotiate for the disarmament of the nuclear weapon states in good faith. Iraq is an NPT party in good standing but it came as a blow to the non-proliferation system when the state was exposed as a major violator of the fundamental undertaking of not to acquire nuclear weapons. The second undertaking of the NPT was seen as the safeguard system of the NPT. Though the safeguard regime has gone through reform and strengthened it still does not constitute a comprehensive verification arrangement.

In January 1992 the United Nations Security Council adopted a statement to the effect that weapons of mass destruction proliferation constitute a threat to international peace and security. To this end, Ekeus observes that, "in 1997 the UN Secretary-General proposed a strengthening of the disarmament capabilities of the secretariat with inter alia a small number of weapon experts in order to serve the Security Council better in its declared ambition to prevent the proliferation of WMD."

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss the kinds of weapons under the category of weapons of mass destruction.

4.0 CONCLUSION

You can see from what we have studied, that weapons of mass destruction are weapons bearing a symmetrical design. This is so because they are conventional through a treaty signed by relatively equal powers.

5.0 SUMMARY

This unit on weapons of mass destruction discussed why certain weapons are classified as weapons of mass destruction. Though those who possess these weapons claim it is for deterrence, the unit considers them to be highly destructive.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Enumerate and discuss the weapons under the category of weapons of mass destruction.

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

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UNIT 3 NUCLEAR WEAPONS

CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
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- 3.0 Main Content
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

This unit introduces you to nuclear weapons and identifies states that possess weapons in this category.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- define nuclear weapons
- identify states that possess them.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Nuclear weapons

Nuclear weapons are true weapons of mass destruction. They are completely indiscriminate by their explosive power, heat radiation and radioactivity. The only country to have used nuclear weapon in war is the United States. The US dropped two atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II. Only eight countries have declared they possess nuclear weapons and are known to have tested a nuclear weapon. These countries include the US, China, USSR, UK, France, India, Pakistan and North Korea.

Analysts consider Israel to have Nuclear weapons of low number but maintain an official policy of nuclear ambiguity, neither denying nor confirming their nuclear status. Iran is one Arab nation suspected by western powers seeking nuclear weapons, Iran however denies this claim. In some quarters Iran's possession of nuclear weapons remains valid, it was stated in November 2007 that Iran halted its nuclear weapon program in 2003.

South Africa is another country to have developed a small nuclear arsenal in the 1980s but disassemble them in the early 1990s, making her the only country to have fully given up an independently developed nuclear arsenal. Countries like Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine inherited stockpiles of nuclear weapon following the break-up of the Soviet Union, but relinquished them to the Russian federation.

Nuclear weapons are indiscriminate weapons and their indiscriminate impact has shaped political policies and campaigns, has been as well fostered social movements. There has been non-proliferation treaty on nuclear weapons.

There has always been the need to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. This has been evident to many people from the early days of nuclear technology. The first UN General Assembly resolution in January 1946 envisaged the elimination of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of states. The United States as noted *inter alia* applied nuclear energy to the production of weapons in the same year (1946) of UN first resolution. The US however proposed in the UN the establishment of an international authority to control all atomic energy activities. The position of the US was that atomic energy activities were “potentially dangerous to world security”. The proposal known as the Baruch plan was without success. Afterwards, as indicated above, some other states also became nuclear weapon powers; the USSR in 1949, UK in 1952, France in 1960 and China in 1964 (Goldblat, 1985). Several states that have acquired nuclear power claim they do so for peaceful purposes. Today, several states have more of a “nuclear industrial base to produce atom bombs than the US had in the early days of Manhattan project which produced the atom bombs of World War II.”

The development of non-proliferation regime was in response to the international community cry to reduce the alarming threat of nuclear weapons on world security. The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) was concluded in 1968 with a view to preventing the addition of new nuclear weapon powers to the five then in existence. The treaty came into force in 1970 and “attracted a record number of adherents for arms control agreement. These included three nuclear weapon powers the UK, the USA and the USSR – as well as almost all highly developed, industrialised and military significant non-nuclear weapon states” (Goldblat, 1985). Goldblat points out that the treaty is unique in the sense that it prohibits the acquisition by an overwhelming majority of states of the most destructive weapons yet invented, while tolerating the retention of the same weapons by a few. However, Goldblat adds that the position of the non-nuclear weapon parties has always been to consider the NPT not as an end in itself, but as a transitional measure aimed at facilitating nuclear disarmament.

Within the first few years of nuclear technology “several political and military figures launched the idea of nuclear weapons for all”. The argument of the protagonists for nuclear weapon for all was that “the unprecedentedly devastating nature of the new weapon would dissuade any state from committing aggression, and that this would strengthen international security and contribute to the maintenance of peace” (Goldblat, 1985). This theory at the time lacked sincerity of purpose as those who advocated its existence as a universal nuclear deterrence spoke only on behalf of the narrow interest of their own countries which had great power aspirations. The Chinese for instance who propounded the virtues of a ‘nuclearised’ world abandoned the theory as they acquired nuclear weapons. Before now, there existed pretence by the nuclear powers that ‘nuclear plenty’ (the abundance of nuclear weapons) could serve the interest of all. The fact that it was dropped does not suggest that only the established nuclear weapons powers openly pursue a nuclear weapon programme. Countries like India, Pakistan and North Korea have since joined the nuclear weapon power. Some of these countries had refused to sign the NPT and kept their nuclear explosive option open. In places like India, some influential personalities had claimed that “without nuclear weapons the country is not able to defend itself against a nuclear weapon power”. India also “contended that the economic costs of a nuclear weapon programme would not be prohibitive for a country already possessing fissile – material production facilities and that, in any event, the costs should be subordinated to the considerations of national security” (Goldblat, 1985). Security sought under the nuclear umbrella has not been the best, this may prove counter productive.

Some other states especially those that oppose the NPT claim the treaty impinges on their political sovereignty or the sovereign rights of their states to acquire any kind of weapon of self defense. Maintaining the position of using nuclear weapons for self defense however poses the question whether the right of states to possess arms is absolute and unlimited? Can states use nuclear weapons in self defense without violating several fundamental rules of international armed conflict knowing their mass destructive effects? International law however has it that the right to injure an enemy is not unlimited; it does not in any way justify nuclear acquisition. The questions raised above may have various answers, however it must be noted that the sovereignty argument is weak in the sense that several states have acceded to the non-nuclear status. The states that acceded out-numbered the sovereignty protagonists. It is important to add that those who have acceded to non-nuclear states did so to exercise their sovereign rights and in pursuit of their national interest. National interest or sovereignty should not lead the world to a nuclear war.

There is also an argument that the nuclear states discriminate against non-nuclear states. This led the Indian state pushing for and acquiring nuclear weapons. Such states like India and Argentina believe that the NPT is meant to serve the vested interest of nuclear states therefore should be considered an “unjust international status quo”, and that the nuclear states engage in nuclear “monopoly and blackmail over other states”. Most states against nuclear weapons argue that the existing stockpile of nuclear weapons is a real threat to global peace. The NPT as a measure to control the spread of nuclear weapons has been faulted. Goldblat (1985) points out that “it is true that the NPT is unbalanced as regards the rights and obligations of the parties”, this however does not suggest that the NPT itself is discriminating; rather the nuclear states are. Discrimination of states predates the NPT treaty. The NPT did not come to correct that discrimination but to prevent the situation from getting worse.

The NPT distinction between the haves and the have-nots was to fail nuclear proliferation both horizontally and vertically. To this fact Jozef Goldblat (1985) contends that:

A non-proliferation treaty not containing a distinction between nuclear haves and the have-nots would have had either to make allowance for a nuclear building in non-nuclear weapon states, or to provide for the elimination of all existing nuclear weapons within a specified period of time.

The positions on the above sum have given no meaning to arms control and a solution that is beyond reach. Goldblat asserts that the first solution would contradict the very idea of arms control and the second solution he considered ‘infeasible’. The decision then was to stop further horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons among states, in view that this would make way for measure, limiting the vertical proliferation of the weapons possessed by nuclear weapon states. The prohibition of horizontal proliferation is as important as that prohibiting the vertical proliferation. This is because without that there would have been rule or law that will restrict states from becoming members of the nuclear club. By implication, nuclear weapons would have been, if you can, you produce yet it would not have removed discrimination between the nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states.

Nevertheless, the fact that only nuclear weapon states are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council is a puzzle to ponder.

Some states see it “as justifying the claim that nuclear weapons confer special privileges on their possessors by giving them access to the top table of international policy making” (Goldblat, 1985). Goldblat further argues that several years after World War II, countries like France and the UK are accorded preferential treatment in the United Nations for no just reason. They are placed over countries like India and Brazil with enormous demographic and economic potential, or highly industrialised countries like: Japan or the Federal Republic of Germany. Several moves to increase the number of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council have been politicised.

Israel is one country that portrays the attitude of nuclear ambiguity. Nuclear ambiguity is neither consenting to the possession of nuclear weapons nor denying it. Some states claim that there is an advantage in such attitude. Thus this deliberate cultivated uncertainty as to the nuclear intentions or capabilities of states that falls into such categories needs to be questioned. Goldblat argues that “the policy of calculated ambiguity is being practiced in states which evicted a nuclear infrastructure using modern technology and which oppose the NPT as well as comprehensive nuclear safeguards.” When India exploded a nuclear device, the country “demonstrated that it possessed the ability to manufacture a nuclear bomb and acclaimed by a number of countries for its technological prowess. The prestige gained by India as a result of that nuclear advancement has not been translated into international political value in terms of influence in world organisations. If such explosions were needed, it has not enhanced Indian security rather it gave Pakistani regimes a nuclear capability. India was however dismayed when Pakistanis prestige was enhanced following their influence in the Arab Middle East.

At a time, the status of Argentina was also that of ambiguity. Their policy of acquiring the elements of a nuclear weapon programme could not bear fruit. It rather produced confusion considering the fact that their target of possible Argentine nuclear weapon was totally obscure. The pursuance of a nuclear policy could not enhance Argentine security neither did it improve the Argentine standing internationally nor did it improve the cohesion of the Argentine state. Such policies could also not improve the material conditions of the Argentine people. Israel is another state that has remained ambiguous in its status towards nuclear programme claiming that it is to deter enemies or to obtain concessions from others. The implication of this position is not just nuclear capability but that of actual possession of nuclear weapons. Writing on the position of Israel, Goldblat (1985) quotes the country’s spokesman that “Israel would not be the first country in the Middle East to introduce them into the region.”

He argues that this assertion may imply that Israel have built nuclear weapons already, but will not be the first to reveal the existence of such weapon unless another country in the region uses it in her territory.

The claim that nuclear energy was used for peaceful purposes is projected by either nuclear weapon states or those seeking nuclear capability. They claim that the non-proliferation consideration hinders such purposes. It is important to add that the principal sponsors of non-proliferation of nuclear technology are at the same time the main and highest suppliers of nuclear material, equipment, and technology. With this position, nuclear weapon states stand the risk of being charged with the attempt to preserve nuclear monopoly. If there are such charges, then those who hold to the position may not be wrong as a clause in the NPT provided the 'inalienable' right to the parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The treaty denies non-nuclear weapon states the right to "nuclear weapons, the manufacture or acquisition by other means of nuclear devices to conduct the so-called peaceful explosions" (Goldblat, 1985). Countries like India, Brazil and Argentina put forward criticisms against the NPT on such denial. India in the early 1960s believed that all forms of nuclear test are basically explosions and weapon explosions. India however changed this position when she decided "to develop a nuclear weapon capability and test a nuclear device".

The claim by some states that nuclear weapon acquisition improves economic status is untrue. They believe that acquisition will "reduce the technological gap between the developing and industrialised states" (Goldblat, 1985). The world must know that the high aspirations for great power status cannot be achieved by acquiring nuclear weapons.

3.2 Chemical and Biological Weapons

Chemical and biological weapons are instruments of warfare with unconfined effects on both combatants and civilians over space and time (Husain, 1980). The weapons upset ecological balance of nature threatening civilised existence. Chemical weapons included lethal and non-lethal harassing nerve gas, tear gas, and herbicides. Some consider chemical and biological weapons not weapons of mass destruction but weapons of terror, though over the years they have come to mean weapons of mass destruction.

Many historians trace the use of biological warfare to 1763 when, during an Indian uprising, the British commander in North America, Sir Jeffrey Amherst, wrote to subordinates at Fort Pitt, "Could it not be contrived to send the small pox among those disaffected tribes of Indians?" As it turns out, Sir, Jeffrey's prompting was unnecessary. Soldiers at the fort

had already given disease-infected blankets to members of the Shawnee and Delaware tribes (Rourke, 2001).

Germ-based biological weapons have continued to pose threat to humanity despite the 1972 biological weapons convention which placed ban on their production, possession and use. To this fact, Rourke (2001) affirms that “The UN led inspections of Iraq since the Persian Gulf War indicate that the country also had a germ warfare programme that had at maximum, produced 132,000 gallons of anthrax and botulism toxins.” He adds that according to one expert, “it’s far more likely than not” that in addition to Russia, such countries as Iran, Iraq and North Korea also have biological weapons.

Chemical weapons on the other hand, being relatively easy and inexpensive to produce become the most prevalent among the three components of the nuclear, biological and chemical weapon (NBC) warfare. Chemical weapons were in use between 1980 and 1988 in the grueling war between Iran and Iraq. Again, Iraq equally used them to attack Kurds in Iraq’s northern provinces. Rourke (2001) adds that “the UN inspection in Iraq after the Persian Gulf War also discovered huge store of chemical weapons, including over 105,000 gallons of mustard gas; 21,936 gallons of tubun, sarin, and other nerve gases; and over 453,000 gallons of other chemicals associated with weapons”. In addition, he noted that of this supply was contained in ammunition, such as 12,786 artillery shells filled with mustard gas and 18 warheads or bombs filled with nerve agents. Though there was no evidence that every chemical weapon were used during the Gulf war, there were traces of mustard gas and sarin detected in the battle field.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

What are nuclear weapons?

4.0 CONCLUSION

From our study in this unit, we can point out clearly what nuclear weapons are. The unit discussed further the nations in possession of nuclear weapons and stated clearly their effects on the World.

5.0 SUMMARY

In sum, this unit analysed what constitute a nuclear weapon and traced the United States as the only country to have used it. The study revealed several countries that claim to be in possession of nuclear weapon and concluded that the impact of nuclear weapons have shaped political policies.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. What are nuclear weapons?
- ii. How negatively have nuclear weapons impacted the world?

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

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UNIT 4 SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

CONTENTS

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- 2.0 Objective
- 3.0 Main Content
 - 3.1 Spread of Nuclear Weapons
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

This unit introduces you to the dangers in the spread of nuclear weapons. The unit suggests that the test and counter test of nuclear weapons during the bipolar era multiplied the nuclear powers in the new international system.

2.0 OBJECTIVE

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- state the reasons behind the spread of nuclear weapons.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Spread of Nuclear Weapons

There was a serious concern of dangers of the spread of nuclear weapons to countries not already possessing them, with special reference to the Cold War years. The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was an eye opener to the international community, with the United Nation's charter just signed few weeks before the incident. This action from the US deepened the superpowers posturing pattern that has been for a long time. The results of the posturing were the spread of the nuclear weapons.

In 1949 the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb; this was in response to the US' conduct of her first post war atomic test. In 1952 the US again exploded a hydrogen bomb and the Soviet did same in 1953. There existed the doctrine of massive retaliation and roll back by the superpowers in the years of the Cold War. With every major advance in nuclear weapons technology and their system of delivery there were

changes in strategies of nuclear warfare in the inter-relationship of the superpowers (Husain, 1980).

Nuclear weapon was only possessed by the US and the USSR, but later the countries that possessed it increased. Officially, People's Republic of China, France, India, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and North Korea possess nuclear weapons. On the other hand countries like Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey are said to have access to nuclear weapon through nuclear sharing agreements (Wikipedia).

The horizontal spread of nuclear armament is detrimental to security and it will remain so as long as the nuclear weapon states act as if nuclear weapons were politically and militarily useful. China shares a view that there are two aspects to the issue of nuclear weapon spread; "on the one hand, those countries which already possess nuclear weapons continue to enlarge and improve their nuclear stockpiles, on the other hand, there exist possibilities that other states will acquire nuclear weapons" (Wu Xiu Quan, 1985). The major nuclear powers intensifies their nuclear arms race by day, incessantly proliferating nuclear weapons both horizontally and vertically, that is, the increase in quantity and enhance the quality of their nuclear weapon.

To this fact Quan (1985) noted that "consequently, mankind is facing an ever more serious threat of nuclear war". That notwithstanding, some of the nuclear powers are "unwilling to commit themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. They have, under various pretexts refused to give guarantee of the latter's security."

The position of the peoples Republic of China, one of the nuclear weapon states in the development of nuclear weapons cannot be removed from her conception of the defence of a sovereign and autonomous state in a world that was then controlled by two superpowers. The Chinese early alliance with one of the superpowers (Soviet Union) made their concept of autonomous defense stronger; by implication this alliance is the possession of a nuclear weapon. When the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) came into being in 1949 it had the hostile West to confront. In 1950 Chinese troops intervened in the Korean war, with the leadership of China nursing the fear of being invaded by the USA. The then US head of the UN forces, General MacArthur spoke of using nuclear weapon against China. The Chinese who had the sole support of the Soviet Union in political, economic and military terms placed these issues in perspectives and desired to be independent both of the Soviet Union and of the threat of the United States. The leadership of China therefore became convinced of the absolute necessity to acquire nuclear weapons. "In April 1957 Mao

Zedong told a delegation of the Japanese socialist party that China, Japan and India would eventually have nuclear weapon". Zedong argued that "since the best situation was no longer nuclear weapons for any nation, and the worst situation would be sole possession of nuclear weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union; China must inevitably develop them as well" (Reinhardt Drifte, 1985).

In August 1958, China launched a heavy bombardment on Quemoy, an island very close to the Chinese mainland. Drifte reported that the Guomindang still occupied the island at the time of this launch. This triggered the United States reaction with a military buildup which included nuclear weapons. No doubt, the Soviet Union helped the Chinese to develop her nuclear weapons and dozens of Chinese engineers went to the Soviet Union for training. Afterwards, in 1958 precisely, the Chinese claimed to have mastered the enrichment of uranium.

The Chinese later accused the Soviet leaders of having dropped their demand for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. The leadership of China within this context saw a difference between nuclear weapons in socialist and capitalist hands (Drifte, 1985). With the above position, China prepared for the justification of the coming Chinese bomb this way:

With regard to preventing nuclear proliferation, the Chinese government has always maintained that the arguments of the US imperialists must not be echoed, but that a class analysis must be made. Whether or not nuclear weapons help peace depends on who possesses them. It is detrimental to peace if they are in the hands of imperialist countries; it helps peace if they are in the hands of socialist countries. It must not be said indiscriminately that the danger of nuclear war increases along with the increase in the number of nuclear powers. Nuclear weapons were first the monopoly of the United States. Later, the Soviet Union also came to possess them. Did the danger of nuclear war become greater or less when the number of nuclear powers increased from one to two? We say it

became less, not greater. Nuclear weapons in the possession of a socialist country are always a means of defense against nuclear blackmail and nuclear war. So long as the imperialist refuse to ban nuclear weapons, the greater the number of socialist countries possessing them, the better the guarantee of world peace. A fierce class struggle is now going on in the world. In this struggle the greater the strength on our side the better (Reinhardt Drifte, 1985).

Consequently, China had several nuclear tests which resulted from the above thinking, the fission bomb test of 1964, the hydrogen bomb test of 1967 and several others.

Today, the role of nuclear weapon in Chinese defence seems not to have diminished. China however condemned the global arms race especially within the United States and Russia, blaming them for the lack of progress in disarmament. After China, several other countries sought nuclear capability and eventually developed nuclear weapons.

After World War II, two democratic states, Great Britain and France embarked on military nuclear programmes. They were able to do this “in the absence of any parliamentary decision, public consultation or organised opposition” (Bertrand Goldschmidt, 1985). The US-British nuclear relations broke down in 1943 during World War II and its partial repair of 1944 clearly indicated the USA unwillingness to share nuclear even with Britain, her closest ally. The British government reacted to that with a decision to embark on nuclear weapon project. The project began in 1947 and was not disclosed until 1948. Bertrand Goldschmidt argues that the decision to embark on such project for the UK was a natural outcome of World War II. While a country like France considered the manufacture of nuclear weapons years after the war when the supplies of uranium and the scale of her nuclear enterprise made it possible. The French independent nuclear development was fulfilled with the discovery of uranium deposit at the central region of France.

This discovery was in 1949 but France carried out a long term plan for the manufacture of nuclear weapons that came to be in 1958. As at 1953, the French military circles were still against a weapon project with the fear that it was beyond the reach of the French defense budget. “In 1954, at a time when defeat was looming for the French army in Indo-China, a right wing deputy insisted during a discussion of the defense budget that

a positive decision should be taken on the production of nuclear weapons” (Goldschmidt, 1985). The French had discussed this situation at the highest level of government headed by Pierre Mendes – France. This French premier, had his country’s defeat at the Indo-China to deal with at this point, also was confronted with the problem of French nuclear independence. The French leader addressed the UN General Assembly in November 1954 in what became a fruitless effort to persuade the USA and USSR to desist from testing nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. This appeal had earlier been made by the Indian Prime Minister Nehru after the H-bomb tests in the Pacific and “the traumatic accidental irradiation of Japanese Fishermen” (Goldschmidt, 1985). The French government later became conscious of the disparity at the international scene between the nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states in negotiations of disarmament.

France however manufactured a nuclear weapon in 1958 and tested it in 1960 after what Bertrand Goldschmidt describes as “the greatest post-war dramas”. Goldschmidt points out that France was obliged to stop its military advance into Egypt at a crucial point. He added that France was abandoned by Great Britain, her partner in the operation, held back by NATO, thwarted by the USA and threatened by Soviet Union. The French suddenly found themselves alone at the very moment the war in Algeria was entering its most difficult stage. With that development, the military circle hostility towards French nuclear armament disappeared and the hostility was transformed overnight into determined support for national nuclear armament.

Pakistan is among the states that have contributed to the spread of nuclear weapons. The country has a significant nuclear programme and several nuclear research centres. Zdmay M. Khalilzad (1985) in his study of Pakistani nuclear technology argues that the country “has got as far as it has, not only through nuclear cooperation with several western countries and with China, but has also through espionage aimed at acquiring nuclear technology.” Pakistan’s nuclear capacity has continued to expand over the years. They have done this through purchasing critical nuclear components in the West through middlemen and front organisations. Khalilzad points out that “Pakistani nuclear policy, like Pakistan security policy in general has been overwhelmingly influenced by competition with India”. The Pakistan attitude towards the NPT reveals this position. Pakistan believed that India’s refusal to join the NPT is an indication that she (India) wanted to keep her nuclear option open as a result, Islamabad also refused to be a party to the NPT. The press in Pakistan attributed their country’s actions to Indian’s behaviour on 5 July 1968. Dawn (Karachi) observes, “Pakistan has already made it clear that its decision about the non-proliferation treaty will be guided by the attitude of India on this issue” (Khalilzad, 1985). In

the sphere of nuclear technology, India's policies determines Pakistan action. Following the fact that Security Council Resolution 255 did not provide credible guarantees for non-nuclear weapon states, Pakistan claimed that they feared India non-membership to the NPT and would have no protection against a potential Indian threat. It was reported in *Pakistan News Digest*, that:

While India retains the freedom to manipulate these weapons of death and destruction... the intended victims of aggression can only count on the conventional assurance of the nuclear powers to come to their rescue; besides the fact that help may come too late, there is a fear that it may not come at all. After all, when Indians violated international borders to invade Pakistan, not a mouse stirred. All the defence pacts and the much-publicised security system went by the board (Khalilzad, 1985).

Pakistan refused to join the NPT rather the country increased her efforts to improve its nuclear potential. Pakistan has channeled her energy towards nuclear weapon since 1960s. They believed that any hindrance to the development of nuclear weapon is a hindrance to Pakistan's science and technology. Bhutto wrote in 1969 that:

All wars of our age have become total wars and it will have to be assumed that a war waged against Pakistan is capable of becoming total war. It would be dangerous to plan for less and our plan should include the nuclear deterrent. India is unlikely to concede nuclear monopoly to others... it appears that she is determined to proceed with her plans to detonate a nuclear bomb. If Pakistan restricts or suspends her nuclear programme, it would not only enable India to blackmail Pakistan with her nuclear advantage, but would impose a crippling limitation on the development of Pakistan's science and technology...our problem, in its

essence, is how to obtain such a weapon in time before the crisis begins (Khalilzad, 1985).

Pakistan increased her efforts in 1972 towards proceeding a nuclear bomb after the country was defeated by India in Bangladesh. Though Pakistan had declared its support for the NPT but refused to join unless India did so. Both countries have since tested their nuclear explosions. The spread of nuclear weapon both vertically and horizontally have not helped the security of the states possessing them, several other states refused to join the NPT, this does not enhance their security either rather it threatens the civilian non-nuclear states.

Dougherty and Pfalzgraff (1981) argue that the possibility of nuclear war would increase in geometric proportion to the number of independent nuclear powers in the world. They were quick to add that arms control analysts were inclined to think that a world of 12 or 15 nuclear states would be less stable than a world of four or five because the former would contain a greater static probability of technical accident, unauthorised use, strategic miscalculation or uncontrolled escalation from a limited to a general war.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How does the spread of nuclear weapons constitute a danger?

4.0 CONCLUSION

We can affirm from our study above those countries not possessing nuclear weapons are constantly threatened by the existence of the weapons; hence they feel insecure and attempt to possess them for defence – thus leading to the spread of nuclear weapons.

5.0 SUMMARY

This unit discussed the reasons behind the spread of nuclear weapons. The unit also paid attention to the strategic miscalculation and escalation of the countries that possess it and concluded that they lead to a general war.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Why are nuclear weapons proliferating?

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UNIT 5 NUCLEAR STRATEGY

CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Content
 - 3.1 Definition of Nuclear Strategy
 - 3.2 Factors Responsible for Nuclear Strategy
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

This unit introduces you to nuclear strategy as a medium of deterrence that replaced the classical ‘balance of power’. The unit detailed the post Cold War nuclear strategic planning and the factors that necessitate it.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- define nuclear strategy
- enumerate factors responsible for nuclear strategy
- explain how the purpose of nuclear strategy can be achieved.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Definition of Nuclear Strategy

Nuclear strategy served the purpose of deterrence especially to the two principal military powers and to all in possession of nuclear weapons. Nuclear strategy is seen as mutual deterrence in a sense of the classical notion of “balance of power” in modern guise. As Dougherty and Pfalzgraff (1981) posits, mutual deterrence, stable deterrence, balanced deterrence and stable arms balance have been treated by theorists of international relations in terms curiously reminiscent of earlier treatise on the balance of power. Due to some conventional force, imbalance existing between the Soviets and western Europeans, nuclear strategy became necessary. Dougherty and Pfalzgraff add that the magnitude of the imbalance was called to question notably after the Hungarian uprising highlighted the political unreliability of eastern European national military force. Thus the US nuclear strategy became a source of confidence to the western Europeans to the fact that they became

disturbed with the Kennedy's administration desire to de-emphasise massive nuclear retaliation and to move towards a strategy of flexible response.

Nuclear weaponry forced both military and political leaders worldwide to reassess the role of warfare. In the words of John W. Jensen (1979) "More than ever before, the mandate of national strategists focused on preventing war rather than on successfully prosecuting it." Jensen adds that "Theorists went so far as to suggest that the destructiveness and ferocity of modern weaponry had made obsolete other means of resolving international conflicts." The issues raised the debate of the suitable doctrine and strategy for warfare among scholars in the nuclear age. Nuclear weaponry posed a great challenge to military doctrine and strategy. Writing on the terms "doctrine and strategy", Jensen (1979) posits "Throughout the history of military thought, both have taken on a variety of meanings in different contexts."

Anyone studying works on military theories and strategies will observe that there are array of definitions depending on the period of history during which the writer wrote and his perspective as well influences the definition. Drawing emphasis on nuclear strategy, John Jensen (1979) states that military doctrine can best be defined as a set of prescriptive principles set forth as a guide for action and designed to have uniformity of thought and action through the armed forces of a nation in prosecuting its policies during peace and war. In his view, it is the doctrine of the military that defines the manner in which the military is to contribute to the political activities of the state and establishes the guidelines on which military action may properly be employed in the pursuit of the goals of the state. On the other hand, Jensen sees strategy to be subordinate to doctrine. He argues that it is the broad set of military actions consistent with the accepted doctrine, which are to be employed when the military is used to implement the policies of the state.

John Jensen furthers his argument on what influences the choices of a nation military doctrine and strategy. He asserts that:

A nation's choice of military doctrine and strategy has historically reflected the intellectual and cultural climate of the times and peculiar economic, political, geographic, and social characteristics of the country. A state's political system and ideology, its national goals and aspirations, its historical experiences, and its

perception of itself and the world political environment – all contribute to its choice of appropriate doctrine and strategy, while its geography and resources determine the practicality of the strategic options open to it.

The term nuclear strategy therefore “refers to a military strategy employed by nuclear weapon states (NWS), i.e. states that possess nuclear weapons”. The term details how many nuclear weapons to deploy, what delivery system to put on them, and what kind of policies to adopt regarding the circumstance in which they would be used. (Vicente A.H.E, 2011). He added that in a more general sense, nuclear strategy involves the development of doctrine and strategies for the production and use or non-use of nuclear weapons.

3.2 Factors Responsible for Nuclear Strategy

Nuclear strategy was seen by policy makers as insane or reckless. They believe that any non violent strategy of conflict resolution was rational but any violent form is irrational. It was believed in these quarters that this strategy will lead to the necessity of initiating nuclear war. In some quarters the policy was seen as the only avenue to deter the tendency of nuclear war that exists among the states that possess nuclear weapons.

The post-Cold War changes to strategic nuclear weapons and strategy have brought on new challenges in strategic planning. Within this context a debate has arisen that houses two important issues; (1) how to minimise the chance of nuclear war and (2) how to maximise the chance of survival if a nuclear exchange does occur. The attention here however is on deterrence. This concept, as noted earlier has been and still remains at the centre of the strategy of all the nuclear powers. The concept is based on two factors; capability and credibility.

Capability: As noted by Rourke (2001), effective deterrence requires that you be able to respond to an attack or impending attacks on your forces. This capability, he adds, is what India claimed it was seeking when it openly tested nuclear weapons in 1998. “Our problem is China”, said an Indian official, “we are not seeking (nuclear) parity with China ...what we are seeking is a minimum deterrent”. Possessing weapons however is not enough. This is because, once a missile attack is launched, there is no way to defend such. Deterrence therefore requires that you have enough weapons that are relatively invulnerable to enemy destruction so that you can be assured that some will survive for a counter attack.

Brigadier Vijai K. Nair has argued that the 21st century is headed for strategic turmoil among the primary centres of power. He noted that the emerging global order is likely to fall under the shadow of the growing strategic rivalry between China and the United States. He added that the fall-out from this rivalry will permeate the entire global strategic order, generating problems not the least of which would be the strategic concerns of the other Asian powers, India and Japan. In Nair's view, the striking focus on nuclear weapon capabilities based on emerging threat perceptions is a significant factor that drives the Sino-American strategic competition. Nuclear strategy (capabilities) draws its strength from the vertical proliferation among nuclear powers and the horizontal spread to other states seen as "emergent newcomers".

Beijing, Nair posits, while insisting that its nuclear weapons are exclusively "defensive" in nature and focused only on deterring the possibility of nuclear coercion by other NWS has an added proviso that nuclear weapons have a role in preserving its sovereign territorial integrity, thereby extending their use in any military operation it may launch to wrest the territory it claims from India. India sees China as a threat that consistently augments their nuclear capability. With a view of high level competition among the Chinese and other NWS, the Indian Ministry of Defence (MOD) took note of the Chinese government's report to the 16th National Party Congress in November 2002. The report's content is captured this way by Nair:

The strengthening of national defence is a strategic task in China's modernization drive in view of a serious imbalance of military power, especially between the developed and developing countries. It also reiterated that China's continued occupation of approximately 38,000 sq km of Indian territory in the Aksai Chin Area, its claims on yet another 90,000 sq km in the Eastern sector, and the ceding of additional 5,180 sq km of territory in Northern Kashmir to it by Pakistan must be factored into any evaluation of China's 'strategic task'.

Nuclear race and capability connotes a sense of concern for global security.

Credibility: Perception is a key factor in credibility. It is necessary here for other countries to believe that you (who possess nuclear power) will actually use your weapons. This makes meaning because the operational reality will be determined by what the other party believes rather than by what you intend.

The two factors of deterrence sound simple, but the question remains how can they be achieved? Answering this question has generated two schools of nuclear strategy; which include Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and Nuclear Utilisation Theory (NUT). The MAD believe that deterrence as Rourke (2001) posit is best achieved if each nuclear power's capabilities include (1) a sufficient number of weapons (2) capable of surviving a nuclear attack by an opponent and then (3) delivering a second retaliatory attack that will destroy that opponent. In Rourke's words "MAD believes, in other words, is deterrence through punishment". The conclusion here is that possessing these three capabilities, guarantees a mutual checkmate. To this end MAD theory holds that no power will start a nuclear war because doing so will lead to its own destruction, destroying its enemy notwithstanding.

The NUT see MAD theory to be madness as it relies on rationality and clear-sightedness negating other scenarios like an accident caused by a technical malfunction or a human technical error, when an irrational leader comes to the picture, an unprovoked attack, escalation and several other scenarios. The NUT favour deterrence partly through damage, denial and/or limitation, in contrast to MAD's punishment strategy. The implication of the NUT's believes is that the enemy's weapons should be destroyed before they explode on one's own territory or forces. Hence, destroy the weapons before they are launched.

As noted earlier nuclear strategy is associated with the bipolar world. In the words of Sergey Rogov (2001) "Arms control was never meant to end the Soviet – US global rivalry; it had a much more limited purpose, namely, to regulate the competition between the Soviet Union and the US by technical arrangements, establishing equal ceilings for certain weapon systems". The ceilings are to limit certain types of weapons. Such ceilings could be "non-deployment of nuclear weapon in space and non-deployment of territorial anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems" etc. Nuclear weapons had during the Cold War acquired the status of deterrence as noted above. Nuclear deterrence was then recognised as the only political instrument for a meaningful nuclear position. Deterrence served the purpose of limiting a possible war. Rogov distinguished between mutual nuclear deterrence and a pure deterrence. A 'pure' nuclear deterrence may not be directed against a particular country, even if the country possesses a nuclear weapon. For the fact that there where threat from all angles of the bipolar system introduced a

brinkmanship that required a well calculated strategic measure to maintain the balance. This nuclear strategy is an imposition of USA and Russian regimes at the end of the Cold War. Rogov (2001) argues that the discipline of the bipolar world rigidly maintained the inequality of the participants in the international relations – the great majority of them were forbidden to do what was allowed for nuclear powers.

The USA-USSR nuclear relation at the level of the Cold War was that of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). The MAD posture gave them special privileges over other nuclear weapon states. They owned 98% of the nuclear weapons of the world. Russia and the USA maintain the top level of nuclear strategy but the nuclear might is not exclusive to them. At the middle of that are China, UK and France, though a different set of rules apply to them, they are not meant to challenge the two other powers. Other small and medium countries like Pakistan, India etc. have acquired nuclear weapons but their status has not been upgraded following the role of the NPT regime.

In furtherance of the above, it is clear that the need for nuclear strategy arose following the Ideological and political rivalry that existed between the USA and Russia. With the end of such rivalry, there may be no need for nuclear confrontation. In fact the global nuclear that was apparent has been reduced to almost nothing. The world is no longer controlled by US-Russia relation. It has been replaced by a new international system, where the new terms of interaction are economic-centered. Rogov (2011) argues that in world history, with rare exceptions (Carthage and Rome, the USSR and USA), international relations have always had a “polycentric character”. He adds that “the constant change in the balance of power among the largest states and coalitions regularly resulted in infringements of the geopolitical balance and in military conflicts, causing a rearrangement of the world in accordance with the new distribution of power.” The new system has ushered in new centres of power (economically, politically and militarily) and these powers are not willing to give themselves to others by reconciling to a minor status. Nuclear strategy has become a much more difficult task. The end of the bipolar system undermined the nuclear discipline that was so rigid on other countries. It would have been a bit easier to control two nuclear superpowers than the madness of a dozen power centres. Though countries like China and India argued that the power diffusion reduces the threat of a nuclear war claiming that nuclear monopoly could easily lead to a war but if several nations possess the weapon it serves as deterrence to other nuclear weapon states. Sergey Rogov (2001) assesses this new international system and itemised three key security challenges to the system. These challenges are: (a) the disorderly diffusion of power, especially the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological and sophisticated conventional weapons; (b) abrupt changes in the global

balance of power and (c) efforts to use military force for political purposes. The nuclear powers today are under pressure considering these three dimensional security challenges. Of course, the violation of the old nuclear regime by India and Pakistan who tested their nuclear weapons has propelled China to reengage in an effort to modernise her nuclear forces. Nuclear strategy at that instance may be failing the world as majority of the nuclear weapon states are reluctant towards nuclear arms reduction. The post-Cold War nuclear strategy exists at a time when the world order seems disorganised.

There may be need to ask this question “Of what relevance is nuclear strategy in an age where nuclear weapon states, especially the US is aggressively pursuing technological superiority in the areas of militarism?” The United States recently produced the fastest airplane which covers a distance of 2.7km per second. This airplane is for military use. The focus in American technology in the 21st century is technically referred to as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Rogov (2001) argues that the “RMA concept has been actively promoted by the US military as the foundation for US military strategy at the beginning of the 21st century.” By the RMA, the United States aims at achieving total battlefield dominance. Attempting a definition of the RMA, Sergey Rogov (2001) posits:

The RMA can be defined as a fundamental change in doctrine, weapons, equipment, force structure organization and training of the military, which produces a decisive advantage on warfare methods to achieve strategic objectives in a minimum time with minimum losses.

Such military buildup as the RMA is definitely not aimed at reducing the possibility of a nuclear war but rather to aggravate its possibility. For Rogov, the aim of the RMA is a:

Complete transformation of military notions of time and space – the traditional concepts of maneuver, firepower, protection and sustainment.

The concept of the RMA makes nuclear strategy calculation irrelevant.

The aim of nuclear strategy was to time the spread and usage of nuclear weapons. But the use of the RMA may necessitate the use of nuclear

forces. Rogov noted that the “RMA systems can threaten many strategic targets, including early warning systems, which are crucial for the maintenance of credible nuclear deterrence.”

In a situation where early – warning signs are threatened through the RMA other nations may have other plans that may lead to a temptation to use nuclear forces if they lack the means to resist the RMA. At the moment, no nation is able to match the US military technologies and the United States is not enthusiastic about giving up the advantages that come from that. The maintenance of this military advantage or superiority is to the United States “the goal of absolute invulnerability”. Cohen calls this “freedom from attack and freedom to attack”. The position of the United States in the RMA is totally not compatible to the arms control that necessitated nuclear strategy. Sergey Rogov (2001) concludes that the RMA can undermine the issues of nuclear strategy regime this way:

The RMA may encourage greater reliance on nuclear weapons by other countries. This is reflected by Russia’s growing emphasis on early use of nuclear Weapons. China and India give priority to their build-up of nuclear forces. Some other countries may also do so in the future or may create incentives for other countries to acquire them. Thus the RMA can completely undermine the Cold War – period arms control regimes, which were based on selective choice of weapons and the notion of parity.

The RMA situation is a deadly one. If the world really intends to check the spread and usage of nuclear weapons, then the biggest powers must control their quest for military technologies. The USA is a country that is willing to allocate a large chunk of her national resources for both development and procurement of RMA systems. Also, Russia to some extent commits a little resource to the research and development of RMA related issues. On the other hand china and India also spend money procuring fourth generation weapons.

The world should move from the USA–Russia mutual nuclear deterrence to a generalised nuclear deterrence. Nuclear policy today has a life of its own. The United States and Russia till date still maintain the readiness to eliminate each other within minutes. New approaches need to be developed to address the issues of nuclear warheads and applying a

strategic arms control regime that takes into consideration the state of global security.

In sum nuclear strategy demonstrates the ultimate resoluteness from nuclear armament or face retaliation. This retaliation may cause more harm than good to the economy of the first country to exhibit aggressive posturing. The strategy also explained the international competition for nuclear armament among the powers that already possessed it.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

What constitutes effective deterrence and why is nuclear strategy dangerous?

4.0 CONCLUSION

You can see from our discussion that nuclear strategy is a complex issue. While some believe that it is insane and reckless others believe that it is necessary. Two important questions were raised in the study which attempts to situate how to minimise the chance of a nuclear war and how to maximise the chance of survival if a nuclear war does occur.

5.0 SUMMARY

This unit explicitly defined nuclear strategy and discussed the factor responsible for nuclear strategy. Attention was drawn to two schools of thought – Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and Nuclear Utilisation Theory (NUT). The study showed what inform the argument of the two schools of thought.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Does nuclear strategy justify nuclear proliferation?

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MODULE 5 GLOBAL SECURITY AND PEACE

Global security is an enduring yet elusive quest. The international system as practiced has employed several approaches to securing peace. The international system itself is anarchical in nature, lacking in laws and adherence to law. Can there then be a global peace? This module however shows efforts made to achieve global peace and how effective they have been.

Unit 1	Security and Peace
Unit2	Nuclear Strategy and Balance of Power
Unit 3	Multilateral Process
Unit 4	Arms Control Agreement and Non- Proliferation Endeavours

UNIT 1 SECURITY AND PEACE

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7.0	References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This unit introduces you to the increasing demands for security and peace. It draws attention to the poor state of security in the world.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- define security and peace
- explain the issues involved in security and peace
- highlight how to reduce complex security challenges.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Security and Peace

Global security became an imminent issue at the end of World War II; but more importantly at the end of the Cold War where most states that saw armament as a means of deterrence, began to drop the idea and embrace disarmament. Security and peace therefore became paramount in global issues. The term security is used in variety of contexts. Under the umbrella of human rights, 'human security or 'the rights to security of person' refers to the individual's rights and sense of safety. There is also internal security and national security – the relative immunity of a nation from possible military attack. Within alliances there can be collective security and in an even broader sense, "common security: involving several alliances systems. States face a "security dilemma" in situation where the fear of external attack increases their own bellicosity and triggers an arms race (Schmid 2000). Peace in this context has been redefined by the United Nations to mean a condition within states rather than one between them.

The condition of starvation in Somalia was seen as a threat to peace by the Security Council Resolution 794 of December 3, 1992. The resolution justifies the use of a necessary intervention including a massive United Nations-sponsored military intervention to provide security for the delivery of humanitarian assistance (Schmid 2000). Global security and peace therefore entails using every necessary means to curb violence and the possibility of violence in whatever form whether physical, structural and psychological.

Global security is an alliance of international systems to address the menace of several unwanted conditions.

3.2 Reducing the Complex Challenges of Security

National security has always been a reference point; it remains relevant and important in the new International system. National security draws attention to the concept of sovereignty. It is clear that in the present system in international affairs, the authority of a state is being undermined more and more by ever increasing array of factors. These include globalisation, mobility of capital, ceding of sovereignty to supranational bodies and the emergence of non-state actors. Sovereignty has been redefined. It is no longer seen as an absolute power derived from God but from the people. The definition of Thomas Hobbes makes this clear and asserts that the sovereignty of a state is not absolute but kept alive in the ability of the state to provide for the general well-being of her citizens. Hobbes argument intended to make the king more

accountable to his subjects while not dismissing the need for a king. Patrick McCarthy (2005) believes that today “the argument seeks to make the state more accountable to the international community for the way in which it treats its citizen (while not discounting the need for the state)”. This issue of sovereignty has led to several humanitarian emergencies. Human security has been identified to be of importance than territorial security even though neglected over the years.

It is from the above stand point that the United Nations Security Council has played an active role since 1990 in areas of humanitarian intervention. Situations leading to these actions are considered threat to the international peace and security. Before now however, a form of collective security existed in Europe. The practice seen as diplomatic dealings among nations have developed through time. All through the Middle Ages, the Renaissance and to the 18th century, the sense of insecurity and fear of Europe’s Christians arose from the presence of a strong Muslim Ottoman empire rampaging across its eastern borders. The Europeans resorted to a collective security in form of princely European league. The league was made of representatives with right to vote on assembly policies. This dates back to 1462 and not totally differently to today’s NATO. The idea was to quell any conflict arising within the boarders of a member state. In today’s world, the new international system has emerged with the aim to free the world from terror (terror against humans).

The United Nations system was first conceived after World War I when President Woodrow Wilson of the United States presented a 14-point peace settlement. The world was no doubt horrified and disillusioned with the outbreak of the war. The main features of the 14-point peace settlement included “a call for the principle of self determination, a reduction in armaments, the abolition of secret diplomacy and the formation of League of Nations” (Rupesinghe 1998). The league did not succeed as there were several powers to battle. A new institution, the United Nations emerged in 1944 when the key elements of: a security council, a general assembly, a permanent secretariat, and a secretary-general, were accepted by the representatives of 50 states. The aim was:

To save succeeding generation from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and; to establish conditions

under which Justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom (Repesinghe 1998).

The Security Council served as the executive and was given the authority to enforce the body's will and all member states were obliged to accept the council's decisions. In attempt to guarantee international peace and security, the Security Council has played a vital role to reduce the complex challenges of international security. It was because of these complexities that George W. Bush in 1990 noted that:

Out of these troubled times...a new world order can emerge: a new era, free from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of Justice, and more secure in the quest for peace... a world where the rule of law supplants the rule of Jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and Justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak (Simon Chesterman 2001).

The instrument for this change has been the Security Council through the peace support operations – peace-keeping, peace-making, peace-enforcement and peace-building processes. Humanitarian intervention used to be a matter of self-help by states. The Security Council has demonstrated an extra ordinary broad interpretation of its responsibility under chapter VII of the United Nations charter to maintain international peace and security. Chesterman points out that the council has set up international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda under chapter VII and authorised the use of force to apprehend alleged criminals, imposed a war reparations procedure on Iraq and demarcated and guaranteed the Iraq–Kuwait boundary etc. Chesterman adds that peace-keeping operations have expanded in number and scope. By the end of 1999, a further 35 operations had been established; these operations received their mandate from the Security Council, which increasingly draws its power from chapter VII of the charter.

The peacekeepers are now charged with a more complex task in more dangerous areas. Chesterman (2001) submits that the nature of these


mandates has changed somewhat from original model of an impartial, consent-based operation where force is used only in self-defence. He adds that “as a result of attacks on peacekeepers in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda, it has become common for council to authorise peacekeepers to ‘use all necessary means’ to achieve specific objectives. Situations like that are referred to as “mission creep”. Such situations have made it difficult to draw a line between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The council has considered several issues as threat to international peace and security.

The United Nations charter provided that the organisation should not intervene in the domestic matters of member states. It has become difficult however for member states to determine what conflict is internal as a state is now accountable to the international community. Threat to international peace and security has been re-conceptualised to include internal armed conflict, humanitarian crisis and disruption to democracy. The resolutions of the Security Council on the internal strife in Iraq, Yugoslavia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda and Angola were regarded by many as the abrogation of sovereignty. The council acted with the view that leadership of these countries should be with a degree of responsibility and where that is lacking, leading to humanitarian emergencies then the council will have to intervene.

Every conflict however is unique and there should never be any rigid set of rules or strategies to follow in terms of intervention. Certain criteria can be taken into consideration according to the intensity of violence or the stage of the conflict. Writing on this issue Rupesinghe (1998) suggests that when there is general awareness that tensions and discrimination exist between particular groups within a stable society, medium to long-term strategies could be designed to break down the barriers and improve communication and understanding between them. Originally, that was the mandate of peacekeepers, but the international community was accused in Yugoslavia and Iraq to have ulterior motives which determined the strategies of intervention. During the time of such crisis, the medium to long-term strategies should provide “employment policies, educational opportunities, community networks and joint economic programmes to establish links and create a mutually reliant and beneficial relationship”. Rupesinghe captures the situation in Malaysia in the 1960s when the Chinese population rioted. At that he observes that “A new political policy was implemented to give the Chinese better access to education and economic and political opportunities.” Repesinghe adds that despite the Chinese have less access and control of the political arena they are more dominant in the world of trade and business than their Malay counterparts in Malaysia. It can be said that with the above position, there is a degree of mutually acceptable parity.

The authorities must know when the tensions increases, this means that when the political situation is unstable or government's legitimacy is questioned and violence is brooding, conflict prevention mechanisms should be applied to reduce such security challenges. At this point the conflict must be acknowledged and parties engaged in dialogue; afterwards external diplomatic assistance could come in. Such assistance could come in form of good offices, informal consultation and conciliation efforts. All these must meet with international standard. Dealing with the issue of conflict intervention must be in stages. The immediate deployments of troops by the Security Council have rather complicated security challenges more than reducing it. To reduce security challenges, the international community must take into consideration human security. Once this is addressed, then the world can talk about security and peace.

Figure showing stages for intervention along peace and war



Source: Rupesing 1998

Fig. 2: Stages for Intervention along Peace and War Continuum

Figure 2 gives you a better understanding of the peace-war continuum discussed prior to the graph. The graph indicates stages of intervention in times of conflict by the international community. For example, if there is a general awareness that tensions and discriminations exist between particular ethnic groups within a stable society, medium to long-term strategies could be designed to break down the barriers and improve communication and understanding between them. The figure indicates from the time of durable peace to the time of crisis (war).

3.3 Peace Support Operation and Problems

The term Peace Support Operation (PSO) has gained currency in the dictionary of conflict management, and so has the study of its many facets. The term takes its origin from what the international community originally referred to as peacekeeping operations. Henry Anyidoho (2000) argues that “over time however, it became clear that there are many stages of managing conflict; hence the introduction of the term peace support operations.

From inception in 1945, the United Nations has aimed at international peace and security. Boutrous Ghali (1992) observes that the sources of conflict and war are pervasive and deep. To reach them, he adds will require our utmost effort to enhance respect for human right and fundamental freedoms, to promote sustainable economic and social development for wider prosperity, to alleviate distress and to control the existence and use of massively destructive weapons. It has been noted that the end of the Cold War witnessed the outbreak of numerous intra-state conflicts that called for intervention by the international community. Several military conflicts that were also humanitarian catastrophes had to be dealt with by the international community. The immediate need for humanitarian aid is often linked to the long-term reconstruction and/or development as well as political/military efforts to suppress the level of conflicts.

Over the years, peace support operations experienced a number of problems. One great challenge of PSO as noted by Par Erickson (1999) is that the military and political situation is volatile and hostilities arise at the same rate that agreements are broken and new alliances are formed. One major problem of PSO is that local leaders in conflict areas may want to prolong the conflict for various reasons. Erickson argues that leaders or groups may have a wide variety of reasons for wanting to prolong armed struggle. Such persons known as entrepreneurs of conflict may view it as a way to maintain their position of power (whether political, economic or social); of ensuring their personal

income from smuggling, the black market and arms sales, of avoiding being tried and convicted for various misdemeanors including war crimes, of recapturing land previously lost or of protecting their people from a real or perceived threat. Charles Taylor's role in the war in his native country Liberia and neighbour Sierra Leone demonstrates this position. Alie (2008) notes that:

Charles Taylor (leader of the rebel National Patriotic Front in Liberia NPFL) had threatened to punish Sierra Leoneans for allowing their territory to be used as a base for... (ECOMOG) Peace-keeping Operations against his movement. In Charles Taylor's Words, "Sierra Leoneans would task (sic) the bitterness of War because of their support for ECOMOG"...

Alie's testimony shows that ECOMOG's presence in both Sierra Leone and Liberia prevented Taylor at least for the time being from shooting himself into power in Liberia.

Several other problems impinge PSO and to this end, the international community has advocated earnestly for preventive diplomacy.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How does a contemporary issue of global security affect the individual?

4.0 CONCLUSION

You can see from our study above that security not focused on the individual is not all embracing. The study suggested collective security but in a broader sense common security.

5.0 SUMMARY

The unit on security and peace discussed the necessity of global security especially after the Cold War. The unit therefore emphasised the need to prevent situations that can trigger arms race and to encourage necessary intervention delivery of humanitarian assistance in conflict areas.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

In the context of international relations and human affairs what do you think constitutes security?

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UNIT 2 NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND BALANCE OF POWER

CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Content
 - 3.1 Nuclear Strategy and Balance of Power
 - 3.2 Balance of Power: Definition and its Problems
 - 3.3 Purpose and Functions
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

This unit introduces you to a strategy to check the excesses of armament acquisition called nuclear strategy and balance of power.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
define nuclear strategy and balance of power
highlight the problems of balance of power
enumerate the purpose and functions of balance of power.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Nuclear Strategy and Balance of Power

At the mention of nuclear strategy and balance of power what comes to mind is politics in general. It is seen as stability and peace in a concert of power and also instability and war. Still, it is seen as a guide to policy makers. To Inis L. Claude (1962), "Balance of power has several meanings." Nuclear strategy is seen as a means to check the excesses of armament acquisition by states. It is deterrence to the use of nuclear armament on the global system. The strategy is aimed at striking a balance. Balance of power on the other hand implies an objective arrangement in which there is relatively widespread satisfaction with distribution of power (Dougherty and Pfalzgraff, 1981). Nuclear strategy and balance of power therefore aim at maintaining eternal vigilance and being prepared to organise a countervailing coalition against the disrupter of the balance. To this fact in modern methods of maintaining or restoring balance, the United Nations has played a major

role to keep the security of the global society. Though the system refers to a multi-national society in which all essential actors preserve their identity, integrity and independence through the balancing processes. There are still pitfalls.

Traditional theory of balance of power

According to Dougherty and Pfalzgraff (1981), balance of power was recognised at least implicitly in ancient India and Greece, though not formally articulated. They added that the term balance of power may be modern, “The maxim of preserving the balance of power is founded so much on common sense and obvious reasoning, that it is impossible it could altogether have escaped antiquity.” This practice is believed to have been from the ancient times up to the 18th century. Balance of power could be called “a formal theory of international politics but its modern concept was associated with the Newtonian conception of a universe in equilibrium”.

The equilibrium notion is basic to the sciences whether in the social or pure sciences. In chemistry, a solution is spoken of in equilibrium. The biologists warn against human activities that disturb the balance of nature between organisms and environment. In economics there is a perceived balance in countervailing forces, such as demand and supply while, the political scientist often analyse the interaction of interest groups in terms of checks and balances (Dougherty and Pfalzgraff 1981). Balance is central to the power relations of any state. This is because they seek their security through a form of balancing – power balancing.

3.2 Balance of Power: Definition and its Problems

Balance of power was accused of causing semantic confusion. Some say it has too many meanings, others say it is a difficult concept to define. Richard Cobden said this of the concept:

It is not a fallacy, a mistake, an imposture – it is an indescribable, incomprehensible nothing; mere words, conveying to the mind not ideas, but sounds like those equally barren syllables which our ancestors put together for the purpose of puzzling themselves about words...(Dougherty and Pfalzgraff, 1981).

Rather than equilibrium, some have taken it to be superiority. The concept is full of ambiguities. Dougherty and Pfalzgraff noted that it is “theoretically possible to conceive balance of power as a situation or condition, as a universal tendency or law of state behaviour, as a guide for statesmanship, and as a model of system– maintenance characteristics of certain types of international system.”

The concept as a situation or condition suggests a satisfactory distribution of power. Dougherty and Pfalzgraff conclude that the term balance of power “refers to a multi-national society in which all essential actors preserve their identity, integrity and independence through the balancing process”. The phrase “multi-national society” implies the international system. We noted above that nuclear strategy is seen as a means to check the excesses of armament acquisition by states, by implication nuclear strategy is equally talking about a balance.

3.3 Purpose and Functions

Balance of power is used for various purpose and functions. In its classical term as expounded by Bolingbroke, Gentz, Metternich and Castlereagh, the balance of power system is meant to: (a) prevent the establishment of a universal hegemony; (b) preserve the constituent elements of the system and the system itself; (c) insure stability and mutual security in the international system; and (d) strengthen and prolong the peace by deterring war – i.e. by confronting an aggressor with the likelihood that a policy of expansion would meet with the formation of a counter-coalition” (Dougherty and Pfalzgraff, 1981). The techniques and methods in the traditional ways for maintaining a balance were:

(a) the policy of divide and rule (working to diminish the weight of the heavier side), (b) territorial compensation after war; (c) creation of buffer states; (d) the formation of alliances; (e) spheres of influence; (f) intervention; (g) diplomatic Bargaining, (h) legal and peaceful settlement of dispute; (i) reduction of armaments; (j) armaments competition or races; and (k) war itself (Dougherty and Pfalzgraff, 1981). The above list of objectives were said to be marred with internal inconsistencies both in practice and theory, but they were equally said to be unavoidable.

On the other hand, nuclear strategy served the purpose of the bipolar world- US-Russia relations but repositioned to serve the international purpose of deterrence. With the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the United Nations as a body play or act as a check on nuclear weapon states to deter war. Nuclear strategy and balance of power is therefore an organised principle for arms control. The international system knows the

reality of nuclear weapon existence and proliferation and attempts were made to have strategic plan to reduce the threat of a nuclear war and maximise the chance of survival if a nuclear exchange does occur. It is believed that the concept of deterrence, which means to persuade an enemy, implies that the attack of a fellow will be of no potential gain. We have discussed the factors of capability and credibility at the nuclear strategy section but we must add that with the changes in the political world and nuclear weapons inventories soft-pedaled the mutual assured destruction (MAD) and nuclear utilisation theory (NUT) debate, with echoes in current weapons and weapon issues.

The purposes and functions of traditional methods of balance of power are numerous. They perform the same thing in nuclear strategy. Most of these purposes and functions are utilised today by the UN to guarantee global security and peace. The purposes were to prevent the establishment of a universal hegemony, preserve the constituent elements of the system and the system itself, and ensure stability and mutual security in the international system; and strengthen and prolong peace by deterring war. In modern stance, the last purpose informs the US involvement in Iraq (Gulf war) in 1991 to rescue Kuwait.

The aggressor, Iraq in its expansionism was met with counter coalition led by US. To achieve this strategy, the techniques employed to maintain peace and restore order include the policy of divide and rule (this works to diminish the weight of the heavier side), territorial compensation after war (this appears in peace building policy of the United Nations), creation of buffer states, formation of alliances, spheres of influence, intervention, diplomatic bargaining, legal and peaceful settlement of disputes, reduction of armaments, armaments competition or races (Dougherty and Pfalzgraff, 1981).

In addition, balance of power theory is applicable to any of the polar systems or configurations, but it is most often associated with multi-polar systems. Advocates of balance of power politics also believe that leaders will be well advised to continue to practice its principles in the evolving multi-polar system. The realists reject the idealists' contention that power politics is outmoded because of such factors as the growth of international organisation and independence and that power politics is a failed and increasingly dangerous way of trying to achieve stability and peace (Rourke, 2001). There are also debates on whether the number of poles will not increase the possibility of war. The question however remains; will nuclear strategy and balance of power ensure stability? Are the purposes as stated above consistent? What really is the state of things as the evolving international system is finding it difficult to curb the menace of conflict?

A review of these purposes and methods indicates that there were some inconsistencies in the practice, though they were unavoidable. Hence, there is need for multilateral processes that also employ the use of some of the older methods.

From the above it is clear that possession of nuclear weapons by some states to deter external aggression is what is regarded as nuclear strategy. Richard Ullman (1991) argues that:

It is arguable – and countless analysts have made the argument – that nuclear weapons are responsible for the long peace that Europe has enjoyed since 1945. Because we cannot turn the clock back and test the counterfactual, the argument is impossible to refute. It is equally arguable, and equally irrefutable, that, more than any attribute of national power, the enormous nuclear arsenal wielded by the United States and the Soviet Union have been the primary badges of states that have demarcated them as superpowers. Similarly for Britain and France, their own smaller but nonetheless potent nuclear forces have set them apart from the other nonnuclear states of Europe.

We must pause to think of it, is “extended deterrence” plausible? “Because the world has never known a nuclear war nor, indeed, even a crises in which there was a substantial probability that nuclear weapons would be used” (Ullman 1991), it makes the concept of extended deterrence questionable. This is because it remains untested by experience. Extended deterrence is a concept that suggests that if state A eliminates her nuclear warheads and suddenly was attacked by state B, state C and D can come together to use their nuclear weapons on state B. with this possibility, state B would be reluctant to use nuclear weapon on state A for fear of counter attack from C and D. However, behind extended deterrence lies the question: How can the leaders of one state persuade the leaders of a second that they value the population of a third as much as they do that of their own population, and, accordingly, that they are prepared to risk their own lives, and those of their own people, to safeguard the people of the third! Some world leaders like former French President Charles de Gaulle thought an impossible task. On the contrary, Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of State continually spoke about its plausibility. The former French leader observed that it is

not plausible that the “United States could persuade his Soviet opposite number that, despite declarations of resolve, he would really risk Chicago to save Hamburg” (Ullman, 1991).

As noted by Brookings Institution, western Europe figured heavily in American nuclear strategy and nuclear deployments during the Cold War, primarily because American leaders were convinced that western European security was a vital national interest; for them what happened in Europe was laden with implication for the world balance of power and the future of American political and economic institutions. From the period of the World War II, American leaders worried earnestly over the possibility of dominance of western Europe by a hostile power which they thought could present a dangerous challenge. Such fears lingered because American leaders needed to keep the alignment with western Europe and they believed that US institutions could not flourish in a hostile environment. Thus “If hostile powers, whether fascist or communist, dominated industrial Europe and world trade, the United States would start regimenting its foreign trade to compete effectively and to acquire necessary imported raw materials. But an unfriendly European hegemony would present a formidable military challenge to the United States” (William Burr, Brookings Institution).

Nuclear strategy is a persistent theme in most state’s foreign policy and national security. Most States, especially the United States are perturbed over the importance that nuclear weapon still retain. Vicente (2011) argues that “there is no greater imperative than that of securing the nuclear peace of the world.” There is every need to reassess the appropriate role of nuclear weapons, arms control initiatives, and non-proliferation programmes as a vital tool to understanding today’s international security problems and their future challenges. Vicente argues that:

The huge nuclear arsenals developed during the Cold War are being reconsidered in the absence of superpower confrontation and in light of the difficulties of deterring outlier states and amorphous terrorist groups. At the same time, maintaining and safeguarding existing nuclear weapons and materials continue to require substantial resources.

Following the above, reconsidering nuclear arsenal may be dangerous in the face of re-emergence of previously subdued ethnic conflicts transforming into wars and demanding international intervention, the persistence of the Israel–Palestinian crisis, the global economic and

financial crisis still present, an unstable and transitional international order arising and in the words of Vicente, “climate change and global environmental issues are rising priorities in the agenda, the Arab democratisation wave going on with unpredictable consequences for the region (Middle East), a global war on terrorism is underway, and the long-range outcome of the war in Afghanistan that may be problematic. Vicente (2011) contends that:

In this unbalanced security environment, the United States is reducing its nuclear arsenal, fielding an embryonic system of national ballistic missile defenses, restructuring its military and foreign policy, and reorganizing its government in order to promote a vision of a world without nuclear weapons. The implications of the trends for the nuclear deterrence, security investments, and military and strategic postures (e.g. 2010 nuclear posture review, national security strategy and NATO’s strategic concept) are continuously evolving, and they raise critical questions about associated policy processes and outcomes.

Anyone analysing the nuclear strategy of a state especially the United States is faced with a dilemma. This is because on the one hand, nuclear weapon possession is the greatest potential threat to the livelihood of her citizens; on the other, they are also the greatest guarantee to their safety. There has been a profound improvement on nuclear disarmament since after the Cold War. Though nuclear weapons and its strategy have had great influence on the choices of NWS regarding the nature of their alliances, regional policies and how the domestic front is organised. Vicente (2011) points out that the years of dependence and reliance on nuclear weapons created a vast industry of theories, doctrines and practical procedures to demonstrate how nuclear capabilities protect US security.

The collapse of the Berlin Wall ended the dangerous bloc-to-bloc confrontation of opposing military forces. Vicente posits that the leaders of the former Soviet Union and subsequently the Russian federation and other NWS appeared to have decided upon a more cooperative course of relations with the West-essentially agreeing for the first time to serious arms reductions, and promoting multilateral processes on non-proliferation and nuclear disarmaments.

The United States nuclear strategy is gradually shifting from the Cold War mentality to that of peace and other NWS should follow suit. To this end Vicente (2011) argues that:

During his presidential campaign, George W. Bush began a scathing attack on the Clinton administration's nuclear strategy. He understood that although a decade had passed since the end of the Cold War, US nuclear policy still resided in that already distant past and remained locked in a Cold War mentality.

On assumption of office, the Bush led administration directed the United State's Department of Defence to review US nuclear strategy from bottom up. These adjustments in the United States nuclear strategy did not deter the efforts of other states from developing stronger nuclear forces or acquiring WMD. Vicente argues that this would cause a chain reaction, demolishing regional and global stability and peace.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How consistent is nuclear strategy and balance of power in the growing international system to manage conflicts?

4.0 CONCLUSION

This unit as you can see raised striking issues on the use of nuclear strategy and balance of power as a deterrence strategy on the global system. This unit pointed out the strength and weakness of the system on global security and wondered if it will not increase the possibility of war.

5.0 SUMMARY

This unit on nuclear strategy and balance of power stresses on the multi-national systems in which all essential actors attempt to keep their identity, integrity and independence through the balancing processes. The unit considered the subjects discussed from their traditional to modern stance.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

How can nuclear strategy and balance of power guarantee stability and mutual security in the international system?

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UNIT 3 MULTILATERAL PROCESSES

CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Content
 - 3.1 Definition
 - 3.2 The Techniques and Instruments of Disarmament
 - 3.3 Humanitarian Intervention and Assistance
 - 3.4 Cases of Intervention (The War in Bosnia)
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

This unit introduces you to multilateral processes to negotiating peace.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- define multilateral processes
- analyse the roles of multilateral organisations in negotiating peace
- explain the techniques and instruments of disarmament.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Definition

Multilateral processes are strategies to douse tension, pacify and talk the conflict parties to a negotiation. This is a strategic plan that involves the use of game theory to address issues. These processes are achieved by keeping all channels of communication open. Multilateral processes become the important tool to disarm parties for global security and peace.

3.2 The Techniques and Instruments of Disarmament

During the Cold-War years, techniques for disarmament were rather non-armament measures. The techniques were not targeted toward arms reduction, limitation or disarmament. The techniques were marginal, partial and non-armament ones. In the words of Husain (1980), ‘Prior to

the establishment of the negotiating Geneva Disarmament Committee in 1962, the only agreement concluded was the Antarctica, a non-armament measure relevant only to the four nuclear powers and eight other countries having interests in that inhospitable environment.” Several other treaties emerged but they were for non-armament and not disarmament.

In recent times, most accords have explicit disarmament techniques. These accords house disarmament components like arms embargoes; weapons buyback programmes; disarming the combatants; and irregular forces. Disarmament techniques entail peace building mainstream while the instruments through which they are achieved include sub-regional bodies like the ECOWAS, regional bodies like the AU, NATO and the international bodies, the United Nations peacekeeping force. The Liberian civil war was a good example where the ECOWAS peace keeping force known as ECOMOG was instrumental to disarmament. Chesterman (2001) posits that the conflict began in late 1989, when former Minister Charles Taylor organised a rebel force in Cote de Ivoire and invaded Liberia in an attempt to oust the unpopular President Samuel Doe, who had come to power after a coup ten years earlier. The civil war became intense and in the absence of the UN and OAU action as Chesterman adds, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) called on warring parties to observe an immediate ceasefire and established the ECOWAS ceasefire monitoring group (ECOMOG), with the purpose of keeping peace, restoring law and order and ensuring that the ceasefire is respected. The aggressive interpretation of the rule of ECOMOG was instrumental in bringing the warring factions to negotiating table. A ceasefire was agreed and after series of meetings, the Yamoussoukro IV accord was adopted in October 1991. This accord provided for the disarmament of warring factions and the organisation of elections.

Though the above was not properly managed but it is worthy of mention here that interventionist technique brought them to negotiating table. The election as a peace building technique was to ensure complete disarmament of warring factions. Weapon buyback programme was in place in Liberia as a technique of disarmament, others include public information sensitisation campaign, restructuring the army and the police, supporting the restoration of state authority and revival of government institutions; facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons. The instruments on the other hand include; the UN agencies, the ECOMOG and non-governmental organisations in the case of Liberia.

3.3 Humanitarian Intervention and Assistance

The terms of the debate about humanitarian intervention have consequently changed. Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse (1996) argue that “instead of being a matter of self help by states, as during the Cold War, it is now mainly about collective responses through the United Nations.” They added that “instead of a primary emphasis on forcible intervention, it is now more a case of trying to understand how what we call non-forcible military options (peacekeeping) and non-military options (broadly, humanitarian assistance) should be brought into play in response to these crises.” One possible outcome of non-forcible military intervention is enforcement, yet the preoccupation of the military forces in this situation is “the establishment of a secure environment for non-military operations such as electoral monitoring, refugee repatriation and the distribution of humanitarian relief supplies by civilian agencies” (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse,1996).

The concept of humanitarian intervention in the words of Chesterman (2001) “concerns the threat or use of force.” He added that in the 1990s the term was sometimes used to refer to less intrusive actions, such as the provision of food, medicine and shelter. For such non-forcible actions Chesterman like Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1996) uses the term “humanitarian assistance”. Ramsbotham and Woodhouse further define the term this way:

International humanitarian relief or assistance is concerned with the immediate needs of victims of natural or political disasters, not necessarily in war zones and not necessarily connected with explicit violations of human rights.

The three “legal pillars of international protection” as Ramsbotham and Woodhouse further note “include international humanitarian law, and human rights as well as refugee law”. The above authors add that:

International humanitarian assistance is thus linked to the international law of armed conflict through Article 25 of the Universal Declaration Of Human Right, which recognizes a right to food, clothing, housing and medical care in crisis situations, although it is at the same time distinct from both...

The point raised is that humanitarian assistance is in its classic form confined to organised refugee, hunger and relief efforts designed to bring succour to those who are suffering during humanitarian emergencies, “as against longer-term, more structural concern for development.”

Humanitarian intervention has gone through transformations but the core has been to respect fundamental human rights. These transformations as argue by Chesterman (2011) have affected the United Nations in general and the Security Council in particular since the thawing of Cold War tensions in the late 1980s. The United Nations tested the embryonic collective mechanisms for forcible and non-forcible humanitarian intervention within the few years that followed Security Council Resolution 688 and General Assembly Resolution 46/182. During the Cold War, the context within which the question of humanitarian intervention arise entailed the abuse of human right by over-strong governments but with the end of the Cold War the switch has been human suffering in violent, confused conflicts in which government has been contested on non-existent (Remsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996).

The United Nation’s Security Council has been the author of multilateral actions since the 1990s. Between 1946 and 1989, Boutros-Ghali had estimated in his famous “Agenda for Peace” that over 100 conflicts had left 20 million dead in the brief overview of UN operations. Chesterman (2001) argues that:

...Cold War tensions and the exercise of veto were major factors in United Nation’s apparent paralysis: the veto was exercised on 279 occasions, with the result that when the Council did pronounce on matters that might have attracted its coercive powers, hortatory resolutions were prepared.

The Security Council vetoed whatever operation by mostly the provision of chapter vii of the UN charter but the Cold War period saw more muscular peacekeeping operations thus some, especially the Korean operation was seen as an aberration. With the collapse of the Cold War the old order in the areas of international peace and security came to an end and the new order began. This new order is made clear in President Bush’s speech in 1990. He pointed out that:

Out of these troubled times... a new world order can emerge: a new era, freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace... A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the Jungle. A world in which nations recognizes the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak (Chesterman, 2001).

In the new era, the Security Council that came to demonstrate an extraordinarily broad interpretation of her responsibility to maintain international peace and security, met 1,183 times between 1990 and 1999 and adopted 638 resolutions, an average of about 64 per year. This was against the 2,903 times she met between 1946 and 1986 of which 646 resolutions were adopted, averaging less than 15 a year. Indeed, the council did more. In Chesterman's words:

Acting under chapter vii, it has set up international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and authorized the use of force to apprehend alleged criminals; it has imposed a war reparations procedure for Iraq and demarcated and guaranteed the Iraq-Kuwait boundary, and it has attempted to force Libya and the Sudan to extradite alleged terrorists.

The United Nation's peacekeeping under chapter vii has expanded in number and scope. In 1992, the Security Council convened at the level of heads of states and governments and emerged with a new definition to "threat to peace and security". They noted that:

The absence of war and military conflicts amongst states does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security (Chesterman, 2001).

The council has recognised internal strife or armed conflicts, humanitarian crisis and disruption to democracy as part of what constitutes threat to peace and security. Multilateral actions have been taken along this line that has come to be known as peace support operations.

3.4 Cases of Intervention (The War in Bosnia)

With the death of Tito in 1980, the state structure of the former Yugoslavia weakened. This brought about the re-emergence of powerful, historically rooted communal fears, ambitions and antagonisms offering a fertile ground for unscrupulous leaders to launch a challenge for the only guarantee for security and power-sovereignty. As Ramsbotham and Woodhouse argue “the old state had been born at the end of World War I, in an earlier era of upheaval, out of the multinational Habsburgs and Ottoman empires”. At this period, the Wilsonian idea of self determination was on-going around Europe; thus the ‘South Slavs’ were given their own kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes’ in 1918. The Serbs identified with Yugoslavia at the turn of the 20th century after 500 years of subjugation. Yugoslavia was of greater Serbia while the Croats became restive for autonomy. Croatia was reconstituted under Germany during World War II and “the fascist Ustashe emulated their masters by killing, on estimates, hundreds of thousand of Serbs and others, including perhaps tens of thousands in the notorious death camp at Jasenovac. The Chetniks retaliated” (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996).

The issues led to frontline wars and later to the humanitarian tragedy in Bosnia, which posed a terrible challenge to the international community. As an international social conflict, it called for a collective action through multilateral process. Prior to the Bosnian war, members of the UN Security Council had looked at the conflict with a statist spectacle around 1990 and 1991. Their aim however was to maintain the integrity of Yugoslavia. According to Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1996), “both the Soviet Union and the United States feared repercussions if Yugoslavia were to break up, not least for the integrity of the Soviet Union itself. At this point, the United Nations did not consider that it should intervene in the internal affairs of a member state. As pointed out by Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, the conference on security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE) were hamstrung by unanimity rules and the fact that Yugoslavia was a member. The European Community (EC) wished it could keep Yugoslavia from disintegrating though it has its interest fixed on reasserting itself after the Gulf war confusion and an attempt towards closer cooperation in security, foreign policy and defence. To this end, the international community and its agencies explored the concept of non-intervention in the sense of doing nothing at

that point. However, whether or not outsiders realised it, those that pressed for the preservation of the Yugoslavian state were, in effect, supporting the Serb position.

On 15 December, 1991, the Security Council approved in principle a peacekeeping force by Security Council resolution (SCR) 724. Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1996) note that:

The Secretary-General was asked to pursue his humanitarian efforts in Yugoslavia, in liaison with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) the UN International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and other appropriate humanitarian organizations to take urgent practical steps to tackle the critical needs of the people of Yugoslavia.

The above notwithstanding, it was SCR 743 of 21 February 1992 that "formally launched the United Nation's protection force (UNPROFOR) in former Yugoslavia. The Bosnia war had not yet begun when UNPROFOR went into action on March 8, 1992. UNPROFOR encountered several problems in the attempt to assist, protect and punish offenders. The process was multilateral orientation for peace but the attitude is simply best described as in action.

In furtherance to the above, while inter-state military conflict is on the wane, intra-state is on the increase and that explains the increasing attentions focused on multilateral negotiation in recent years. John Borrie (2005) argues that "security thinking in the context of multilateral arms control and disarmament has, at least until lately been threats to states and, in particular, threats posed by other states". With the changing issues, multilateral processes go beyond peace support operations (peace-keeping, peace-making, peace-building, and interventions), arms control and disarmament. Multilateral negotiations are also in the field of migration, climate change and public health. This section however concerned itself with multilateral processes in the areas of peace support operation, arms control and disarmament.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss the nature of disarmament after the Cold War.

4.0 CONCLUSION

As observed in the unit, multilateral process as strategies of negotiations involves the use of game theory to address issues. As a technique to douse tension, it redefines traditional disarmament.

5.0 SUMMARY

This unit on multilateral process explored the mode through which international organisations negotiate for peace. It became a yardstick to disarm warring parties for global security and peace.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Multilateral processes are important tools to disarm parties for global security and peace discuss.

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

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UNIT4 ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION ENDEAVOURS

CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Content
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 - 3.2 Ways of Mitigating Threats from Small Arms and Other Weaponry
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
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- 7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This unit introduces you to several arms control treaties. The unit views these processes as measures, to avoid arms races.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- list various arms control agreements
- analyse the reasons for arms control agreement
- identify other ways of mitigating threat from arms.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Arms Control Agreements and Non-Proliferation Endeavour

Arms control treaties and agreements are seen as non-proliferation endeavours, considering the fact that they are measures used to avoid costly arms races. Arms race could be dangerous to humanity, and usually proves counter-productive to national aims and future race. Some of the treaties are measures to curtail some of the military technologies, the missiles and nuclear arms. This effort guarantees producers that they cannot be victims of their own technologies. The damages caused by warfare are essential reasons why arms control agreements are carried out.

One non-proliferation endeavour worthy of mention is that of the former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, who introduced the “perestroika and glasnost” policy. This policy states the conversion of military technologies to civilian needs. Gidadhubi (1990) points out that conversion has generally been meant to increase the output of civilian goods in defense factories, transferring of military technology to civilian sector, providing services in defense establishments for civilian needs and so on. Though academics in the Soviet saw this activity not truly of conversion as it has been tried in some western countries known as “Spin Off”, they believe that conversion policy should be both economic and military.

Another non-proliferation endeavour is the decline over the years in military personnel and expenditure. According to Kingma and Gehyigon (2000) “Levels of military personnel in sub-Saharan Africa fluctuated since the early 1980s.” The decline over the early 1990s, they add, was more or less in line with a global trend in armed forces personnel. The total number of armed forces world-wide reached its high of 28.8 million people in 1987. Subsequently it decreased to an estimated 22.7 million in 1996. Also Kingma and Gehyigon (2000) add that military spending in sub-Saharan Africa indicate that between 1983 and 1990 there was an increase in military expenditure from US \$8,704 million to US \$10,675 million. Subsequently, expenditures on the military declined to US \$7,717 million in 1996 – below the level in the early 1980s. The implication is non-proliferation of arms.

From the first international agreement limiting the use of chemical weapons in Strasbourg in 1675 to the contemporary time, arms control agreement entails non-proliferation endeavours, though some have been kept and others violated. From all indication peace is highly valuable to the contemporary world despite the uprisings in the Middle East and Africa.

The United Nations have played the role of controlling armament and securing the world since 1945. The goal has been to contain the spread and enlargement of weapons and arms stockpiles which have rested on three pillars, which include norms, treatise and coercion. These three, have been under attack in the past few years. Patricia Lewis and Ramesh Thakur (2004) argues that:

Norms are efficient mechanisms for regulating social behaviour from the fairly and village to the global setting. They enable us to pursue goals, challenge assertions and justify actions.

Following the above, a norm is an efficient mechanism. It is not deterrence; hence, one of the most powerful norms since 1945 has been the taboo on the use of nuclear weapons. Lewis and Thakur noted that norms have anathematised the use of nuclear weapons as unacceptable, immoral and possibly, illegal under any circumstance – even for states that have assimilated them into military arsenals and integrated them into military commands and doctrines.

There are several treaties and conventions regulating the use, spread and possession of armament. Among the earliest arms control treaties were those that prohibited nuclear test explosions in the atmosphere, under water, or in space and signed in 1963 by the United States, Britain, and the USSR under the name Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). Others are the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. This has been described as a superpower treaty that banned biological weapons and provided for the destruction of existing stockpiles. This convention is regarded as the first and only example, since 1945, of true disarmament of an entire weapons category. However, the negotiation for a comprehensive test ban to prohibit the testing of nuclear weapons has remained elusive. Again in 1974, the superpowers signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) limiting nuclear tests to explosive yields of less than 150 kilotons. The TTBT however did not prevent the powers from developing nuclear warheads, exceeding 150 kilotons; The Soviet warhead SS 17- missile possesses as much as a 3.6-megaton capacity. Peaceful nuclear testing was banned in 1976 through the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) signed by the superpowers.

Various arms control treaties were designed to bridge communication gaps. That is to say that they were to improve communication between the superpowers. It has been noted that the first in this category came after the Cuban missile crisis. The Hot Line Agreement was then signed in 1963, setting up a special telegraph line between Moscow and Washington. It was updated in 1978 by a satellite between the two superpowers. The effort by the United States and the USSR to create protocols designed to prevent an accidental nuclear war paid off in 1971 with an agreement on measures to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war. This agreement as noted by some scholars required advance warning for any missile tests and immediate notification of any accidents or missile warning alerts.

The nuclear non-proliferation treaty of 1968 is one of the most celebrated arms control agreements in history. The treaty was designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the countries that already possessed it. There were over a hundred states that were signatories to the agreement. Under the NPT, countries not possessing nuclear weapons gave up their right to acquire it while those already possessing

waive their rights to export nuclear weapons technology to countries lacking that technology.

There is yet another variety of arms control treaty that sought to ban weapons from a non-militarised area. In this category is the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, which prohibits military bases, maneuvers, and tests on the Antarctic continent. Also, the 1967 outer space treaty, that placed a ban on the testing or deployment of “weapons of mass destruction” in earth’s orbit or on other bodies in the solar system. The above arms control agreements are classified as modern.

According to Koulik and Kokoski (1994), “the period 1990-92 was marked by a series of achievements in conventional arms control.” This was a period when the emphasis in Europe precisely was on enhancing stability and security. It was the dawn of a new political climate with the fall of Berlin Wall, indicating an end to the Cold War. This period brought several arms control negotiations to a successful conclusion. Some of these agreements in Koulik and Kokoski’s words are:

Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks (1973-89) and the important signing of the Stockholm document in 1986, the signing of the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe (The CFE treaty) in November 1990, together with that of the 1992 concluding act of the negotiation on personnel strength of conventional armed forces in Europe (the CFE – 1A agreement), soon thereafter ushered in a new era in European arms control.

The mandate for the negotiation as the CFE was recorded by Koulik and Kokoski (1994) this way:

The objectives of the negotiations shall be to strengthen stability and security in Europe through the establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional armed forces, which include conventional armaments and equipment, at lower levels; the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and security, and the elimination, as a matter of priority, of the capability for launching surprise

attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action... these objectives shall be achieved by the application of military significant measures such as reductions, limitations, redeployment provisions, equal ceilings, and related measures, among others.

The above objectives were reaffirmed by the CFE treaty. The attempts made were to replace “military confrontation with a new pattern of security relations among all the states parties based on peaceful cooperation and thereby to contribute to overcoming the division of hope”. The signatories to the CFE treaty expressed confidence that “the signature of the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe represents a major contribution to the common objective of increased security and stability in Europe and convinced that these developments must form part of a continuing process of cooperation in building the structures of a more united continent” (Koulik and Kokoski, 1994).

Zdzislaw Lachowski (2001) lists the main elements of the CFE treaty this way:

1. Battle tanks, 20,000
2. Armoured combat vehicles (ACV), 30,000.
ACVS include armoured personnel carriers (APCs), the more capable armoured infantry fighting vehicle (AIFVs) and heavy armoured combat vehicles (HACVS), sub-ceilings of 18,000 for each side were also agreed for AIFVs and HACVS, of these no more than 1500 can be HACVs.
3. Artillery pieces, 20,000. These include guns, howitzers, mortars, and multiple rocket launchers of 100mm caliber and above.
4. Combat aircraft, 6800. In a separate declaration the two blocs agreed to limit land-based combat naval aircraft to 430 on each side, with no single state allowed more than 400.
5. Attack helicopters 2000.

The above categories of treaty limited equipment (TLE) contained more than 240 different types of equipment. The selection of TLE categories was based on assessment of probable threats and on concerns about the main elements of military doctrines of the various parties to the negotiation and agreement (Koulik and Kokoski, 1994).

3.2 Ways of Mitigating Threats from Small Arms and Other Weaponry

One sure way of mitigating the threat from small arms and other weaponry is as Dhanapala (1998) suggests, through a voluntarily

commitments by affected governments to ban their import, export, and manufacture. I believe here that the affected governments should be the entire world community because we all are affected by the menace of weaponry.

A moratorium on weaponry will go a long way to halt this dangerous trend, if all regional and sub-regional governments accept it. This activity was carried out on light weapons in April 1998 in Mali for West Africa. It is on record that Mali on 27 March 1996 made a bonfire of nearly 3,000 small weapons to light a flame of peace (Dhanapala 1998). This action by the Malians is commendable. For the international community to mitigate this threat, they can adopt effective regulations to control weapon production, export, import and transfer. Secondly they should identify and prosecute those engaged in illegal manufacture and trade in small arms and other weapons. Appropriate measures should be taken against violations of any UN Security Council arms embargo and all confiscated, seized, and collected arms should be properly destroyed.

Table 5: Selected Arms Control Treaties

Treaty	Provisions	Date Signed	Number of Signatories
Geneva Protocol	Bans using of gas or bacteriological weapons	1925	125
Antarctic Treaty	Internationalizes and demilitarizes the continent	1959	42
Limited Test Ban	Bans nuclear test in the atmosphere, outer space or under water	1963	123
Outer Space Treaty	Internationalizes and demilitarizes space, the moon and other celestial bodies	1967	94
Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT)	Prohibits selling, giving, or receiving nuclear weapons, materials, or technology of weapon	1968	187
Seabed Arms Control	Bans placing nuclear weapons in or under seabed	1971	92
Biological Weapons	Bans the production and possession of biological weapons	1972	131
Strategic Arms Limitation	Limits the number and types of U.S and USSR	1972	2

Talks Treaty (SALT 1)	strategic weapon (expired 1977)		
ABM Treaty	U.S – USSR pact limits antiballistic missile testing and deployment	1972	2
Threshold Test Ban	Limits U.S and USSR underground tests to 150 kt	1974	2
Environmental Modification	Bans environmental modification as a form of Warfare	1977	48
SALT II	Limits the number and types of USSR & US strategic weapons	1979	2
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)	Eliminates all US and Soviet missiles with ranges between 500km and 5,500 km	1987	2
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)	Limits transfer of missiles or missile technology	1987	25
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE)	Reduces conventional forces in Europe Non binding protocol in 1992 covered troops	1990/1992	20/30
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty (START I)	Reduces strategic nuclear forces between the US and the USSR/Russia	1991	2
START II	Reduces US and Russian Strategic nuclear forces	1993	2
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)	Bans the possession of chemical weapons after 2005	1993	165
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)	Bans all nuclear weapons Tests	1996	155

Sources: Rourke (2001)

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss Gorbachev's conversion policy as non-proliferation endeavour.

4.0 CONCLUSION

This unit as you can see considered arms control treaties as a non-proliferation endeavour. This unit assessed the dangers of arms race and concluded that Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost policy was a laudable achievement in arms control. The unit points out the challenges encountered by the conversion policy and acknowledged that it was not error free.

5.0 SUMMARY

This unit on arms control agreement and non-proliferation endeavours, extensively considered it as a means to curtail the spread of military technologies. The unit discussed the conversion policy, reduction in military spending and engagement in a moratorium. The unit equally showed the table of selected arms control treaties and concludes that arms control and non-proliferation is achievable.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. Discuss two ways to mitigate the threats from small arms and other weaponry.
- ii. List any four arms control treaties since the 1990s.

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